SECRETARY OF LABOR.
HACKNEY BRIGHTON CORPORATION.
OSHRC Docket No. 88-610
Before: FOULKE, Chairman: WISEMAN and, MONTOYA, Commissioners.
BY THE COMMISSION:
Hackney/Brighton Corporation ("Hackney") fabricates
steel for pressure vessels at a facility in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. On February 12, 1988,
Compliance Officer John Wormer inspected the facility in response to an employee safety
complaint. Following the inspection, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
("OSHA"), of the United States Department of Labor, issued Hackney one citation
alleging serious violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1971, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 651-678 ("the Act"). The Secretary of Labor proposed penalties totaling
$500.[] Review Commission Administrative Law Judge David J. Knight vacated all items in
the citation. Issues arising from items 1(b) and 2 of the citation were specified in the
direction for review. [] For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the judge
regarding these items, find that Hackney's violations of the standards were
other-than-serious and assess a total penalty of $150.
1. Whether the Administrative Law Judge erred in vacating the alleged serious violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.37(j).
The Secretary alleged that Hackney failed to comply with section 1910.37(j)[] by failing to provide a substantially level means of egress through an exit door. She proposed a total penalty of $150 for the alleged violations of 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.37(h)(1) and 1910.37(j).
The door was located near a corner of the east wall of the
building and was elevated approximately 4 feet above floor level. The door was made of
steel, with no glass windows or other openings, and there was no lock, panic bar, or any
other means of gaining access from the outside. The side of the exit door inside the
building was equipped with a panic bar opening mechanism, which was located approximately
three feet above the doorsill. Because there were no stairs or ramps leading to or from
the elevated exit door, an employee who wished to exit through this door would have to
reach 6 1/2 to 7 feet above ground level to engage the panic bar, climb up 4 feet to the
door sill while holding the door open, and jump down 4 feet on the exit side. The surface
outside the exit door consisted of "recently excavated or graded soil." The exit
door was located approximately 40 feet from another exit on the same wall and about 60
feet from another fire door. The building had two other exits.[] All five of the exits
were accessible to all of Hackney's employees. There was at least one employee working in
this area who might require use of this exit in the event of an emergency or if one of the
other doors was blocked.
Plant Manager Rudolph Chiappetta told Compliance Officer Wormer
that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Department of Labor and Industry had instructed
Hackney to install an exit door at this location in order to receive an occupancy permit.
The door not be installed at ground level because there was a "heavy" stone wall
below the door, visible on the outside of the building. Chiappetta testified that Hackney
did not put a permanent stairway outside the fire door because of a high incidence of
vandalism, robberies, drug activity and street people in that area, and "if we had
stairs there they would try to force their way into [the] building" Chiappetta did
not testify why there is no stairway or ramp inside the building. The compliance officer
testified that Chiapetta told him that Hackney "had not gotten around to putting
steps or a ramp up on either side of this exit door as of the date of the
Chiapetta testified that there were two wooden ladders
approximately 20 feet from the exit. The ladders were to be used so that "in case of
an emergency...we would take the ladder, open the door and put the ladder down" to
facilitate exiting the building. The compliance officer testified that he did not remember
seeing a ladder during his inspection.
When asked about the type of injuries that could occur as a
result of the door being elevated 4 feet above the ground, the compliance officer
testified that "normally, if it were a healthy person in a normal situation, they
could probably go four feet without a problem. But, if it were a panic situation or if a
person had some type of handicap, it may create some physical problems for that person to
drop four feet. [] He believed that it was possible for "broken bones, severe
bruises with hematomas, or anything of that nature" to occur from employees jumping
down 4 feet from the exit door's sill to the outside. The CO based this on his past
experience reviewing accident reports that described "falls with less than four foot,
to even soft ground, that have resulted in broken bones, overturned ankles with
complications, and bruises, and things of that nature that required medical
attention." However, the compliance officer testified that there was a "low
probability" of a serious injury occurring. []
The judge vacated the section 1910.37(j) violation on the
grounds that four other available means of access existed at the facility, only eleven
employees worked in the building and there were ladders nearby which would provide safe
access to the exit door.
The judge concluded that the door "being four feet off the
floor and easily operable does not constitute a hazard or impeded agrees which this
standard is written to prevent.
On review the Secretary argues that the judge ignored the
standard's "clear intent to require only stairs or ramps where a egress is not
substantially level." The Secretary asserts that the lack of egress could be
potentially fatal where a tire has blocked the plant's other exits or where confusion
compels an employee to precipitantly attempt to negotiate the elevated exit".
In response, Hackney argues that under Spot-Bilt, Inc.,II BNA
OSHC 1998, 1984, CCH OSHD ¶ 26,944 (No. 79-5328, 1984), not every exit of a facility must
comply with the cited egress standard when there are adequate exits. In Spot-Bilt, the
employer was cited under the emergency egress standards at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.36(b)(4).
1910.37(k)(2). and 1910.37(q)(1) for failing to maintain a tree and unobstructed means of
egress and to mark it with an exit sign. The cited door. which was locked, had its handle
and exit sign removed and was also blocked by a number of objects, including sheets of
plywood. Spot-Bilt locked the door because it was being used for unauthorized egress
during work hours and because of "break-ins" The Commission vacated the
citation, finding that the five other exits in the room met the cited standard's purpose
of ensuring that employees had free and unobstructed egress from the room.
Hackney also argues that if a violation is found, it should be
classified as de minimis because the Secretary failed to prove direct and immediate
relationship to the safety or health of its workers, based on the unlikelihood of a fire,
the compliance officer's testimony of a "low probability" of an injury and that
other exits were available to the employees. For support, Hackney cited National Rolling
Mills, 4 BNA OSHC 1719, 1720- 21, 1976-77 CCH OSHD ¶ 21,114, p.25,415 No. 7987,
1976)(fall distance of 3 feet into a pit is de minimis when exposures are brief and brief
and precautions are present). []
The Secretary responds to Hackney's citation of Spot-Bilt by
arguing that Spot-Bilt does not apply to the case since in the instant case, Hackney made
no effort to discourage or otherwise prevent employee use of the elevated door." The
Secretary argues in the alternative that "Spot-Bilt is simply bad law
Section 1910.37(j) requires that a "means of egress"
be equipped with stairs or ramps when it is not "substantially level." Hackney
argues that under Spot-Bilt, the door here would not be considered a means of egress. In
Spot-Bilt, however, in addition to the presence of numerous other exits, the cited door
was not intended for use as a door, it had no handle or exit sign, and access to it was
limited by a number of objects placed in front of it. Here, despite the lack of of a
substantially level access to, the door. the door could be opened from the inside, and it
was intended to be a means of egress. Because the door was intended to provide a means to
exit the building in an emergency, we find that the door is a "means of egress."
Since it is clear that an exit 4 feet above the ground cannot be considered substantially
level,".we therefore find that Hackney violated the standard.
For a violation to he deemed serious under section 17(k) of the
Act. 29 U.S.C. § 666(k), there must be "a substantial probability that death or
serious physical harm could result if an accident occurred. In determining whether a
violation is serious, the issue is not whether an accident Is likely to occur, but whether
the result of an accident would likely be death or serious injury. Spancrete Northeast,
Inc., 15 BNA OSHC 1020, 1024, 1991 CCH OSHD ¶ 29,313, p.39,358 (No. 86-521, 1991).
The compliance officer testified that "broken bones"
or "severe bruises" were possible if a person exited the door in a panic
situation, but he also testified that the probability of a serious injury occurring was
low. Based on this testimony, we find that the evidence does not establish a substantial
probability that death or serious physical harm, could result from Hackney's failure to
provide a substantially level means of egress. We therefore find that the Secretary failed
to meet her burden of proving a serious violation of this standard.
However, we find no basis for finding the violation de minimis, as argued by Hackney. A violation properly characterized as de minimis when it has no direct or immediate relationship to employee safety, and is normally limited to situations in which the hazard is so trifling that an abatement order would not significantly promote the objectives of the Act Dover Elevator Co., 15 BNA OSHC 1378, 1382, 1991 CCH OSHD ¶ 29,524. p. 39,850 (No. 88-2642, 1991. See also Super Excavations, Inc.,15 BNA OSHC 1313, 1991 CCH OSHD ¶ 29,498 No. 89-2253, 1991 Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, 9 BNA OSHC 1653, 1981 CCH OSHD ¶ 25,359 (No. 13401, 1981). Here, Hackney has provided no basis for a finding that the violation lacks a direct or immediate relationship to employee safety. It is clear that if an accident had occurred, it would be neither "trifling" nor likely to result in death or serious injury. We therefore conclude that the violation was other-than-serious.
Based on the penalty factors enumerated in 17(j) of the Act, 29
U.S.C. § 666(j), we assess a penalty of $75 for the other-than-serious violation of 29
C.F.R. § 1910.37(j).
II. Whether the Administrative Law Judge erred in vacating the
alleged serious violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.252(a) (2) (iv) (c).
The Secretary alleged that Hackney failed to comply with
section 1910.252 (g) (2) (iv) (c)[] by storing an acetylene cylinder in a compressed
gas storage area with ten oxygen cylinders. She proposed a penalty of $150.
The compliance officer testified that he observed a storage area located in the middle of Hackney's facility which contained one acetylene fuel-gas cylinder among several oxygen tanks without the requisite distance or noncombustible barrier between them. The area containing the gas cylinders was demarcated by yellow painted partitions and erected steel bars. It was the compliance officer's understanding that this was the primary storage area for these tanks, and he did not recall any other areas being shown to him. The cited gas cylinders were capped and not in use. Approximately 15 feet from the storage area, an employee operated a radiograph burner machine that emitted two sources of ignition: open flames and electrical sparking.
Chiappetta testified that he told the compliance officer that
the cylinders in question were delivered up to a half-hour before closing time the
Thursday before the inspection on Friday[] Chiappetta testified that the cylinders
referred to in the citation were "temporarily place(d) there pending their
movement." He testified that the acetylene cylinders are normally stored 40 feet away
from the oxygen cylinders. When the cylinders are delivered, they are brought in through
the main entrance at the building and left at the "storage area." Those
cylinders containing a "gas," such as acetylene, are then moved to a separate
gas storage area. If the acetylene had been delivered "early enough," it would
have been moved immediately, but the acetylene cylinder in question was not moved because
it was "the end of the shift." Chiappetta testified that if the compliance
officer "hadn't come in that morning, it would have been moved at that time, early in
the morning." At around 9:30 a.m. Friday, the cylinders were placed in their storage
areas. There was only one employee exposed to the alleged hazard, and the compliance
officer opined that the condition was of a low gravity.
The judge vacated the section 1910.25(a)(2)(iv)(c) violation on
the grounds that the 2 1/2 hour delay between the plant opening at 7:00 a.m. and the 9:30
a.m. inspection was not tantamount to storage.
The Secretary argues that the judge erred in vacating this
alleged violation because the cylinders were, in fact, in storage overnight. The Secretary
claims that the issue is not whether the cylinders were stored but whether short-term
storage falls within the standard's coverage. The Secretary claims that the term storage
"encompasses even a short-term placement of oxygen cylinders with acetylene
tanks," and claims that her interpretation is entitled to deference.
Hackney argues that the cylinder was not in storage within the
meaning of the standard. Hackney notes that the standard refers to cylinders in storage,
and stresses that the word "in" before "storage" "denotes the
placement of cylinders in a particular area with some degree of permanency." Hackney
claims that the acetylene cylinder was temporarily kept with the oxygen cylinders until it
could later be moved to its own designated storage facility. Hackney also argues that
"but for interruption in [Hackney's] normal procedure, which was caused by [the
compliance officer's] early morning inspection, the subject cylinder would have been put
in its respective storage area shortly after the facility opened, rather than at
approximately 9:30 a.m., as happened on the morning of the inspection."
In response, the Secretary argues that Hackney's argument would
permit an employer to avoid complying with the standard "simply by formally
designating an area as a storage area [so that] a cylinder not in this special are will
not be 'in storage' even if it has been negligently left unused in a production area for
days at a time."
It is undisputed that the acetylene cylinder was left with the
oxygen cylinders in the oxygen cylinder storage area between 3:00 p.m. and 3:30 p.m. on
the day before the inspection, and was not moved to its own storage area until 9:30 a.m.
the next day. The acetylene cylinder was not to be used. but rather was to be relocated to
its proper storage area "early in the morning." We have held that under section
1910.252(a)(2)(iv)(c) cylinders are in storage if they are either not in use or soon to be
in use. See MCC of Florida, Inc. 9 BNA OSHC 1895, 1897, 1981 CCH OSHD ¶ 25,420, p. 31,681
(No. 15757, 1981) (cylinders are not "in storage" where they are "available
for immediate use in the area where they were located"): Pratt & Whitney
Aircraft, 9 BNA OSHC at 1672, 1981 CCH OSHD at p. 31,519 (cylinders tied together in a
corner covered with dust and not used for "quite awhile" were not available for
immediate use and were in storage); Grossman Steel & Aluminum Corp. 6 BNA OSHC 2020,
2023-24, 1978,CCH OSHD ¶ 23.097.(No. 76- 2834.1978)(oxygen tank and acetylene tank were
not in storage but were available for use in an area where welding was to be performed on
a intermittent basis). See also Armour Food Co. 14 BNA OSHC 1817,1827,1987-1990 CCH OSHD
¶ 29,088. p. 38,889 (No. 86-247, 1990) (cited under section 1910.252(a)(2)(ii)(b),
cylinders on a cart at the location where they will be used within fifteen minutes are in
used and not in storage). Given the fact that the acetylene cylinder was stored overnight
with the oxygen cylinders, we find that the cylinders were in storage within the meaning
of the standard and that Hackney violated that standard.
Testimony as to the seriousness of the violation was given by
the compliance officer. He testified that the presence of the acetylene near the oxygen
would tend to enhance any ongoing fire that occurred near the cylinders. Nevertheless, he
also opined that violation was one of "low gravity," and that "the severity
factor is also considered in that low gravity."
If we were to substitute our judgement for that of the
compliance officer, we might find the violation to be serious. However, we are constrained
by the evidence presented in this case to find that the Secretary failed to establish that
a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result if an accident
occurred. We therefore find the violation to be other-than-serious.
Although we find that the Secretary failed to establish that
the violation was serious, Hackney has provided no support for it claim that the violation
should be characterized as de minimus. It is clear that if an accident did occur, the
result would not be trifling. Nor is there any suggestion that oxygen and acetylene
cylinders should not be separated as the standard requires. Hackney represented that the
cylinder would have been moved had it not arrived so late in the day.
Based on the penalty factors enumerated in 17(j) of the Act, 29
U.S.C. § 666(j), we assess a penalty of $75 for the other-than-serious violation of 29
C.F.R. § 1910.252 (a) (2) (iv) (c).
Accordingly, we find that the violation of 29 C.F.R. §
1910.37(j) was other-than-serious and assess a penalty of $75. We also find that the
violation of § 1910.252(a)(2)(iv)(c) was other-than-serious, and assess a penalty of $75,
for a total penalty of $150.
Edwin G. Foulke, Jr. Chairman
Donald G. Wiseman Commissioner
Velma Montoya Commissioner
Dated August 28, 1992
SECRETARY OF LABOR.
HACKNEY BRIGHTON CORPORATION.
OSHRC Docket No. 88-610
Decision and Order
Appearances: For the complainant::
Marshall H. Harris, Regional Solicitor
U.S. Department of Labor
By: Joseph T., Crawford, Esq.
For the respondent::
Frederick W Addison. III, Esq.
Rader, Addison & Stony, P.C.
By a citation[] issued February 23, 1988, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor (complainant) alleges
that Hackney/Brighton Corporation, a fabricator of steel for pressure vessels in
Lancaster, Pennsylvania, (respondent), seriously violated (that is, a substantial
probability of serious physical harm or death existed, 29 U.S.C. § 666(j); three safety
The first concerning the adequacy of an emergency exit, in two
parts, is as follows as this is governed by the safety standard at 29 § 1910.27:
(h) Discharge from exits. (1) All exits shall discharge
directly to the street, or to a yard, court, or other open space that gives safe access to
a public way. The streets to adequate to accommodate all persons leaving the building.
Yards courts or other open spaces to which exits discharge shall also be of adequate width
and size to provide all persons leaving the building with ready access to the street.
(j) Changes in elevation. Where a means of egress is not
substantially level, such differences in elevation shall be negotiated by stairs or ramps.
A total of 11 non-handicapped employees are engaged at this
facility (Tr. 58, 86). The plant floor (a trapezoid) measures approximately 140 by 540 by
80 by 140 feet (Ex. R-3) with five doors. The door in question, shown as the "fire
door" on a sketch, exhibit R-3, is located near a corner of the building about 40
feet from another exit (Tr. 53), on one side , and about 60 feet from another door (Tr.
But its bottom sill is four feet up from the floor (Tr. 17-18
and photo C-2); and the panic bar three more feet or seven feet from the floor (Tr. 21).
Respondent's plant manager testified, however, that two ladders were located 20 feet from
this door; all employees can reach the panic bar from floor level and handily open it; and
all doors are easily accessible to all employees (Tr. 92-103, 135-196). He pointed out the
ladder to the inspecting officer (Tr. 107) but the officer did not remember either that
statement being made or seeing a ladder (Tr. 114, 121).
The area of the plant's location has a high vandalism rate and
is populated by "kids" and drug users. Street people find accommodations along
the wall, settling there with mattresses and even a refrigerator. Respondent fears that
they might force their way into the building if they could reach this door. Therefore, it
was installed in 1986 above floor level without a ramp or any ready access (Tr. 90-92,
This door accesses to an open and graded area (not paved) with no obstructions whatsoever impeding a safe exit to the street by any number of people as required by 29 C.F.R. § 1910.87 (h), cited above. Complainant's brief does not mention this alleged violation at all and I find that no fact supports it. This item is vacated in the order below.
However, a jump of four feet to ground could cause bodily harm as testified to by the officer, but with a low probability of injury (Tr. 57-59, 74) if a panic situation existed. But given 1) four other readily available means of access; 2) only 11 employees in the building; and 3) ladders nearby (and I accept the plant manager's testimony over the officer's here since the latter did not remember) which would provide safe access to and from the door, I find that this door being four feet from the prior and easily openable (Tr. 93-94),does not constitute a harzard of impeded egress which this standard is written to prevent and I conclude that no violation of 29 C.F.R §1910.37(j) exists under these circumstances. This item is violation in the order below.
The second alleged violation concerns the placement of
compressed gas cylinders specifically encompassed by 29 C.F.R. § 1910.212(a)(2)(iv)(c):
oxygen cylinders in storage shall be separated from fuel-gas
cylinders or combustible materials (especially oil or grease) ,a minimum distance of 20
feet or by a noncombustible barrier at lease 5 feet high having a fire-resistance rating
of at least one-half hour.
The officer testified that an open area enclosed by yellow
steel bars (photo exhibit C-2) was a storage area for compressed gases and within it was
one acetylene cylinder among several oxygen tanks. A source of ignition was within 15 feet
of this area (Tr. 26-30, 75). Any leak could result in a fire or explosion (Tr. 31).
The officer did not recall being shown any other storage area
for cylinders, or being told when these particular bottles were delivered to the plant
Respondent disputes this allegation on the basis that these mixed cylinders were not in "storage" as the standard requires before a violation may be affirmed. Its plant manager testified that the cylinders on the right of photo exhibit C-3 were delivered between 3:00 and 3:30 p.m. the night before when the plantwas closing. At around 9:30 the next morning, they are separated and placed in their storage areas, the oxygen and acetylene being 40 feet apart from each other (Tr. 94-98 and exhibit sketch R-3). This is normal procedure when gases are delivered late in the day (Tr. 114).
While the plant opens at 7:00 a.m, I do not find that this two-and-half hour delay tantamount to storage. [] In fact, the acetylene bottle was moved to its storage place while the officer was at the plant according to the plant manager (Tr.114). The normal safety operation of the plant requires storage of these tanks apart, and the standard does not forbid placing these tanks together but rather their storage. Cf., Secretary v. MCC of Flordia, Inc., 9 OSCH 1895. I conclude this standard has not been violated as alleged in that the time between delivery and the final storage is not unreasonable; and this item is vacated in the order below.
Finally, respondent is alleged to have violated 29 C.F.R. §1910.304(f)(5)(v) requiring
Equipment connected by cord and plug. Under any of the conditions described in paragraphs (f)(5)(v)(a) through (f)(5)(v)(c) of this section, exposed non-current-carrying metal parts of cord and plug-connected equipment which may become energized shall be grouped.
in that a radiograph machine (which cuts circular patterns in steel plates, see photo exhibit C-3) in operation was missing the ground prong form its plug (Tr. 33) Thus, according to the officer, if the machine's operator (the only employee exposed) came into any metal contact when the machine experienced any type of short circuit , he could suffer an electrical shock (Tr. 34-38). The plant manager could not explain how the ground prong came to be missing (Tr. 37). The officer testified that these three-prong plugs may be at any hardware store and installed in minutes (Tr. 68).
This alleged violation may not be sustained. The machine's cord was plugged into an extension cord which in turn ran to the source of power (Tr. 76). The plant manager testified that the extension cord had a ground plug and was properly grounded in accordance with the company's safety manual and practices (Tr. 112). The officer's testify, during the case-in-chief or when called for rebuttal, concerning the fact that the machine was grounded as required by cited standard and concluded through the extension cord. As a matter of fact, I find that the machine was grounded as required by cited standard and conclude that no violation of that has been shown. Additionally, this three-pronged plug is not of a common variety but is difficult to obtain and was on order before the inspection, being finally installed by an electrical contractor on March 31, 1988 (Tr. 99, 100-101 and exhibit R-4). This item is vacated in the order below.
Based on the finding of fact and conclusion of the law reached
after considering the evidence and the parties' arguments and proposals, which to extent
shown are adopted or rejected as having insufficient support in the preponderance of the
evidence or precedent, it is ORDERED that the citation issued February 23, 1988, alleging
serious violations of items
1) 29 C.F.R. § 1910.37 (h (I) and .37(j);
2) 29 C.F.R. § 1910.252(a) (2) (iv) (c); and
3) 29 C.F.R. § 1910.304 (f) (5) (v) be, and they are hereby, vacated together with the civil penalties (totaling $500) assessed therefor.
DAVID J. KNIGHT
[] The alleged violations are as follows: 1(a):29 C.F.R. §
1910.37(h)(1) - one of the exits at its facility allegedly timed to discharge directly
into a street or other open space. 1(b) 29 C.F.R. § 1910.37(j) - one of the exit doors at
the facility was four feet above the level of the interior floor: 2: 29 C.F.R. §
1910.252(a)(2)(iv)(c) - an acetylene cylinder was allegedly stored in a compressed gas
storage area with 10 oxygen cylinders; and 3: 29 C.F.R. § 1910.304(f)(5)(v) - the ground
prong was missing on a radiograph machine power cord.
[] The Secretary did not petition for review of the judge's
vacation of serious citation no. 1 Item 1(a), which alleged a serious violation of 29
C.F.R. § 1910.37(h)(1). On December 21, 1990, the Secretary filed a notice of withdrawal
of serious citation no. 1, Item 3, which alleged a serious violation of 29 C.F.R. §
1910.304 (f)(5)(v). On January 25, 1991, the Commission struck this item from the
direction for review.
[] Section 1910.37(j) provides as follows:
Changes in elevation. Where a means of egress is not substantially level, such differences in elevation shall be negotiated by stairs or ramps.
[] The compliance officer testified that Hackney's facility
had a total of three exits. However, it appears that the compliance officer was referring
to the total number of fire exits. Plant Manager Rudolph Chiappetta testified that there
were a total of five doors in this facility.
[]Chiapetta testified that none of Hackney's employees are
incapable of climbing up the 4-foot ledge in order to reach the door.
[] There was no testimony regarding injuries which could
occur while reaching the elevated fire door.
[] To support this and other arguments in his briefs.
Hackney cities several unreviewed judges' decisions However, an unreviewed judge's
decisions does not have procedural value Leone Constru. 3 BNA OSHC 1979, 1975-76 CCH OSHD
¶20,387 (No. 4090, 1976).
[] Section 1910.252 provides as follows:
Oxygen cylinders in storage shall be separated from fuel-gas cylinders or combustible materials except oil or grease, a minimum distance of 20 feet or by a noncombustible at least 6 feet high having a fire resistance of at least one-half hour.
In 1990, 29 CFR § 1910.252(a)(2)(iv)(c) was recodified without any substantive changes as 29 C.F.R. §1910.253(b)(4)(iii)
[] The facility closes at 3:30 pm and the bottles were dropped off between 3:00 pm and 3:30 pm.
[] Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29
U.S.C. § 651, et seq., citations were issued after inspection (here on February 12, 1988)
and may be contested within a 15- working day period (here March 1, 1988) Both parties
were represented by counsel at the hearing (August 10, 1988). Briefs were filed by both
parties by October 19, 1988. Jurisdiction is admitted (Tr. 6) and respondent does not
assert (apparently withdraws) it's motion concerning the number of employees necessary to
justify the issuance of a citation (Tr. 7 and respondent's letter dated October 12, 1988).
[] In Secretary v. Ormet Corp., 9 OSHC 1055, cited by
complainant the Commission found the cylinders in question were in "storage" See
foot note 12 at page 1060.