UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
SECRETARY
OF LABOR, |
|
Complainant, |
|
v. |
OSHRC
DOCKET NO. 2314 |
JUHR
& SONS |
|
Respondent. |
|
January 13, 1976
DECISION
BEFORE BARNAKO, Chairman;
MORAN and CLEARY, Commissioners.
BY THE COMMISSION:
This
case presents the question of whether Commission Judge Garl Watkins erred in
ruling that both a citation and penalty were properly before the Commission for
disposition when the notice of contest was clearly limited to the penalty. For
the reasons stated herein, we find that Judge Watkins’ ruling was in error.
Following
an inspection by one of the Secretary’s representatives, Respondent was cited
for one serious and five non-serious violations of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651 et seq., hereinafter ‘the Act’). Thereafter,
Respondent filed a timely notice of contest which stated in relevant part:[1]
We
acknowledge receipt of the above citation for Serious Violation for a condition
that existed at our building project on the University of Oregon campus. We do
not deny the violation.
We
do request however, that the proposed penalty in the amount of $550.00 be set
aside for reasons as follows:
1.
The conversion Lit parts to make the saw in question comply with OSHA standards
was ordered by our firm from Chown Hardware & Machinery on July 13, 1972,
as per the attached acknowledgement (sic).
2.
The manufacturer has so far failed to supply Chown Hardware with parts for
delivery to us.
On
March 19, 1973, the Secretary filed his complaint. In response, Respondent
filed an answer in which it stated:
In response to the
above complaint, we wish to advise you that we do not deny any portion of it.
However, as first requested in our letter of February 23, 1973, and requested
here again, we do ask that we be given relief from the proposed penalty of $550
for the serious violation. (emphasis added).
On
May 30, 1973, a hearing was conducted in this matter before Judge Watkins.
During the course of the hearing, the following exchange took place between
Judge Watkins and Mr. Juhr, who represented Respondent at the hearing:
MR. JUHR: The 5
items, we were going to accept that, rather than contest it. The Citation No.
1, the Serious Violation, we were asking for relief of the penalty.
JUDGE WATKINS: And
the penalty only?
MR. JUHR: Yes sir.
MR. JUHR: The
intent of the letter (answer to complaint) was to restate our position that we
did not deny that the violation occurred.
JUDGE WATKINS: And
that’s the Serious Violation as well as the others?
MR. JUHR: The
Serious Violation.
JUDGE WATKINS:
Okay, But you are asking or you are contesting or protesting,
whatever—(interrupted)
MR. JUHR:
Protesting, yes.
JUDGE WATKINS:—the
penalty in that?
MR. JUHR: Yes,
sir.
Thereafter, Judge Watkins
stated on the record:
JUDGE WATKINS: I
will not accept an admission of the validity of 29 C.F.R. 1910.213, standard or
standards embodied in it . . .
I am not sure I do
yet, but I know I must go as far as I am going here, at least, in this case,
and the reason I am not accepting—and I want the record to show that the
Respondent denies the validity of the standard, which I just cited, which would
be in Paragraph III of the Complaint, a denial that the Secretary of Labor duly
issued, as an Occupational Safety and Health Standard, 29 C.F.R. 1910.213.
In
(a) case where there is not counsel in a case, I am sure my duty goes that far,
and further, and to what extent, I don’t know. I am sure at this point, at
least, it is my duty to say and to rule that I will not accept an admission of
the validity of the Standard from you at this point.
In his decision, Judge
Watkins found that both the citation and penalty were in issue. He then vacated
the citation on the basis that 29 C.F.R. 1910.213 was not a valid enactment by
the Secretary of a national consensus standard, under Section 6(a) of the Act.
We
find that Judge Watkins erred in considering the merits of the citation. Where
a notice of contest is limited solely to the penalties and Respondent’s
subsequent pleadings do not indicate an intent to contest anything other than
the penalties, the citation becomes a final order of the Commission under
section 10(a) of the Act after 15 working days. Florida East Coast
Properties, 6 OSAHRC 404, BNA 1 OSHC 1532, CCH S. & H. Guide para.
17,272 (1974); Turnbull Millwork Company, OSAHRC Docket No. 7413
(_____). By Turnbull the Commission modified its precedent established by
Florida East Coast Properties. It will now permit amendment of a notice of
contest which on its face is limited to penalties only to include a contest of
the citation if an employer demonstrates by a subsequent pleading that it was
his intent to contest the citation when he filed the notice.
In
the instant case, however, Respondent has not asked that its contest be
enlarged to include the citation. Indeed, the record clearly demonstrates that
this Respondent has only intended a penalty contest.
Not
only is the notice of contest without ambiguity, but Respondent’s answer and
statements at the hearing express a clear intent to contest only the penalty.
Accordingly, we will reverse the Judge’s decision vacating the citation.
We
note that at the time Judge Watkins issued his decision, Florida East Coast
Properties, supra, was the binding Commission precedent. That decision held
that where the notice of contest was limited to the penalty, the citation
became a final order under Section 10(a) of the Act, within 15 days. Despite
the fact that Judge Watkins was bound to follow that precedent, Gindy
Manufacturing Company, 10 OSAHRC 367, BNA 1 OSHC 1717, CCH S. & H.
Guide, para. 17,308 (1974), and that Respondent expressed a clear intent to
contest only the citation, Judge Watkins literally forced Respondent into
contesting the citation on the basis of the possible invalidity of the
standard. As Judge Watkins himself states:
. . . I have taken
it upon myself, rightly or wrongly, to interject this question of the validity
of 213.
We
believe it was improper for Judge Watkins to enlarge the issues beyond those
raised in the notice of contest, where Respondent repeatedly stated that the
notice of contest expressed his intent. Judge Watkins’ action has not only
delayed the entering of an abatement order, but has caused Respondent to incur
additional and unnecessary expense in briefing the issue of the validity of the
standard before the Commission.
We
have reviewed the penalty factors specified in section 17(j) of the Act and
find that the $550 penalty proposed by the Secretary is excessive. The gravity
of the violation is moderate. However, Respondent is a relatively small
employer, employing approximately 30 employees. Respondent’s good faith is
indicated by the fact that he had already ordered the equipment to abate the
violative conditions at the time the citation was issued. In addition,
Respondent has no history of prior citations under the Act. In view of the
foregoing, we find a $100 penalty to be appropriate.
Accordingly,
the Judge’s decision vacating the citation is reversed and a $100 penalty is
assessed. IT IS SO ORDERED.
FOR THE COMMISSION:
William S. McLaughlin
Executive Secretary
DATE: JAN 13, 1976
MORAN, Commissioner,
Dissenting:
For
the reasons expressed in my opinion in Secretary v. Noblecraft Industries,
Inc., OSAHRC Docket No. 3367, November 21, 1975, I would affirm Judge
Watkins’ vacation of the citation because the occupational safety standard
codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.213(h)(1) was improperly promulgated. Furthermore,
I believe it is wrong for my colleagues to shirk their duty and at the same time
criticize Judge Watkins for his conscientious efforts in correctly carrying out
his judicial responsibilities.
Judge
Watkins disregarded the respondent’s admission of liability to consider whether
the Secretary exceeded the limits of his delegated authority in promulgating
the aforementioned standard. Therefore, the question in issue pertained to
subject matter jurisdiction. See Secretary v. Stevens Equipment Co., 2
OSAHRC 1501 (1973). Jurisdictional issues may be raised by the members of the
Commission or the Commission’s trial judges at any time and on their own
motion. See Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 588 (1939); Hackner
v. Guaranty Trust Company of New York, 117 F.2d 95 (2nd Cir. 1941). In
fact, it is their duty to do so for Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure contains the following mandate:
‘Whenever it
appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.’
(Emphasis added.)
See
also United States v. McGee, 464 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1972).
Finally,
the lead opinion’s assertion that Judge Watkins was bound to follow the
precedent established in Secretary v. Florida East Coast Properties, Inc.,
6 OSAHRC 404 (1974), is erroneous. That case is not applicable to the instant
situation as it did not involve a jurisdictional issue.
Accordingly, I conclude
that the Judge’s disposition was correct and that he properly entertained the
jurisdictional issue, particularly since the respondent was represented pro se.
Because this decision does not fully state the matters covered in Judge
Watkins’ decision, his decision is attached hereto as Appendix A.
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION
The following
opinion has been transcribed from microfiche to
improve the quality of duplication. Any errors or omissions resulting from
the transcription are unintentional. If you would like to request a copy
of this decision in the original microfiche form, please use this link to get instructions about filing a FOIA
request.
SECRETARY
OF LABOR, |
|
Complainant, |
|
v. |
OSHRC
DOCKET NO. 2314 |
JUHR
& SONS |
|
Respondent. |
|
FINAL ORDER DATE: May 16,
1974
DECISION
AND ORDER
Appearances:
Jane Ann McKenzie
Attorney United States Department of Labor Seattle, Washington For the
Secretary
Robert E. Babcock
Attorney at Law Kenneth James Juhr, partner Lay representative Portland, Oregon
For Respondent
At Consolidated
Supplemental Hearing:
Robert A. Friel
Associate Regional Solicitor Jane Ann McKenzie United States Department of
Labor Seattle, Washington For the Secretary
Douglas B. M.
Ehlke Tacoma, Washington For Respondent Weyerhaeuser Company in Dockets 1231
and 1758
George J. Tichy
Spokane, Washington For Respondent Konkolville, Lumber Company in Docket 2437
GARL WATKINS, Judge:
In
this enforcement action under Section 10(c) of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.A. 651, et seq., the only question for decision is
whether on January 19, 1973, Respondent was in violation of Section 5(a)(2) of
the Act because its employees used a radial arm saw without a guard for the
lower portion of the blade as required by 29 CFR 1910.213(h)(1); and if so,
whether the violation was serious, and the amount of the penalty. Resolution of
the question will depend upon the decision on the underlying question as to the
validity of 29 CFR 1910.213(h)(1) and the legality of the acts of the Secretary
of Labor in adopting them.
Respondent
is a general partnership in Portland, Oregon engaged in business as a general
contractor. The worksite is the campus of the University of Oregon at Eugene
where Respondent had one of several prime contracts in the construction of an
Administration Services Building. On the day of inspection, the Respondent had
about 25 employees on the job. It has a total of about 30 employees.
On
January 19, 1973, a Compliance Officer of the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, United States Department of Labor, visited and inspected the
worksite. Two citations were issued February 16, 1973. One containing five
items alleging violations not deemed to be serious was not contested. The other
alleged a serious violation in operating the radial arm saw without a guard for
the lower blade in violation of 29 CFR 1910.213(h)(1) and a $550.00 penalty was
proposed for it. It was contested by letter of February 23, 1973.
After
the Secretary’s Complaint was filed, Respondent, not represented by counsel,
responded by letter of March 26, 1973. The letter was accepted by the trial
judge as an answer to the Complaint. In the letter, Respondent stated, ‘In
response to the above Complaint, we wish to advise you that we do not deny any
portion of it.’ The Secretary moved for summary judgment. The motion was denied
because of the balance of the letter and Respondent’s further statement,
‘However, as first requested in our letter of February 23, 1973, and requested
here again, we do ask that we be given relief from the proposed penalty of
$550.00 for the serious violation.’ The letter continued at length, including
information on steps taken to abate the violation. It also contained statements
which could reasonably be construed as a denial of the violation. They were so
construed.
The
first hearing was in Eugene, Oregon on May 30, 1973. The record indicates
compliance with the statute and rules of procedure regarding service and
posting of notices, and no one appeared and asked to assert a party status in
the action.
Respondent
was represented by Kenneth James Juhr, one of its partners. After that hearing,
Mr. Babcock appeared for Respondent.
The
trial judge held that the issues were the fact of violation of the alleged
serious violation citation as well as the penalty. The answer was deemed to be
a denial, but Respondent admitted the facts alleged constituting the violation.
This admission necessarily included admitting alleged facts showing
jurisdiction in the Review Commission. Without considering the standard, there
remained for proof the questions as to whether the violation was serious, and
the amount of the penalty.
As
the trial judge, I pointed out the questions which had arisen regarding the
validity of 29 CFR 1910.213, and stated I would not accept an admission by an
unrepresented Respondent that the standard was valid. I invited a specific
denial of the standard’s validity, or a more specific statement about it. This
was forthcoming from counsel in Mr. Babcock’s letter of August 15, 1973.
Although
my ruling granting Respondent’s motion to amend the answer to deny the validity
of the standard was announced, and known to counsel in all related cases; no
formal order previous to this was entered.
The pertinent language of
the citation, the Complaint, and the standard are as follows:
‘CITATION FOR
SERIOUS VIOLATION
Citation Number 1
of 1
Date Issued
February 16, 1973
EMPLOYER Juhr
& Sons
ADDRESS
(Street 1339 SE
Sideon
(City Portland
State Oregon
Zip 97242
An inspection of a
workplace under your ownership, operation, or control located at 1555 East 13th
at Eugene, Oregon 97402 and described as follows Construction of administration
bldg. has been conducted. On the basis of the inspection it is alleged that you
have violated the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. 651, in
the following respects:
Standard or
regulation allegedly violated 29 CFR 1910 |
Description of alleged violation January
19, 1973 |
Date on which
alleged violation must be corrected |
29 CFR
1910.213(h)(1) |
DeWalt’
Radial arm saw in the saw shack, North of the construction site, had no guard
covering the lower half of the saw blade.’ |
March
8, 1973 |
COMPLAINT
‘III
The
Secretary of Labor, pursuant to the authority vested in him by section 6 of the
Act duly issued and promulgated the Occupational Safety and Health Standards
(29 C.F.R. Part 1910), hereinafter referred to as the safety and health regulations.
V.
On
January 19, 1973, at the aforesaid worksite and place of employment described
in paragraph II, the respondent violated the safety and health regulations and
the construction work regulations, in the six respects enumerated in Exhibits A
and B attached hereto and incorporated herein as if fully rewritten. Exhibit A
is a Citation for Serious Violation duly issued to the respondent on February
16, 1973 containing one serious violation of 29 C.F.R. 1910.213(h)(1) involving
a radial saw, which is hereinafter referred to as Citation for Serious
Violation, or Exhibit A. Exhibit B is a Citation for Violations duly issued on
February 16, 1973 containing five overall violations of 29 C.F.R. Part 1910 and
29 C.F.R. Part 1926, all as enumerated therein, and all of a non serious
nature, which collectively is hereinafter referred to as Citation, or Exhibit
B.’
STANDARD
29 C.F.R.
1910.213(h) Radial saws.
‘(1) The upper
hood shall completely enclose the upper portion of the blade down to a point
that will include the end of the saw arbor. The upper hood shall be constructed
in such a manner and of such material that it will protect the operator from
flying splinters, broken saw teeth, etc., and will deflect sawdust away from
the operator. The sides of the lower exposed portion of the blade shall be
guarded to the full diameter of the blade by a device that will automatically
adjust itself to the thickness of the stock and remain in contact with stock
being cut to give maximum protection possible for the operation being
performed.’
The
facts of the case are rather simple. The saw is shown by Secretary’s Exhibit 1.
The amount of use is not clear nor does the record show the exact number of
Respondent’s employees who used it. There were apparently several and all were
experienced in operation of saws of that type.
If
Respondent was charged under a valid standard, there was a violation. It was
non-serious in character and in view of the continued sincere efforts of
Respondent to comply with the Act, the penalty would be nominal.
Our
inquiry will now be into the woodworking machinery guarding standards and the
charge laid under it, specifically into the question of the validity of the
standards themselves.
This
question was the subject of a supplemental hearing in Seattle on August 29, 30
and 31, 1973, and completed at a continued hearing on September 17. Ten cases
were consolidated in that part of the hearings for the purpose of receiving
evidence on the validity of the standards set out in 29 CFR 1910.213 and the
legality of the actions of the Secretary in adopting them. This is one of the
ten cases. At the conclusion of the session on September 17, an order of
severance of the cases was entered. Three more cases containing the identical
question have since been assigned to me. One has been heard.[2]
Perhaps
a few words about the background of the inquiry and the reasons for the
scrutiny of the standards having to do with machine guarding requirements for
woodworking machinery would be in order.
After
hearing the two consolidated Weyerhaeuser cases (Dockets 1231 and 1758) in
Klamath Falls, Oregon on January 16 through 19, 1973, I was in the process of
preparing decisions in two other cases involving lineal pine moulding plants in
Prineville, Oregon for woodworking machinery would and Prineville Mouldings,
#1045). The only violation charged in one of those cases and the only serious
violation alleged in the other was a deficiency in the guard of hand fed
crosscut table saws under 29 CFR 1910.213(d)(1). The facts of both cases were
almost identical.
The
guards went completely around the circular saws except for about six inches at
the top of each where the moulding was lowered onto the saws to be trimmed.
They are called ‘trim saws’ in the industry.
The
superintendents of the two Respondents and of one other similar plant with 30,
30 and 20 years respective experience, and broad knowledge of practices in the
industry, testified the use of such saws was uniform in the kind of plants they
managed. They had never heard of such saws being guarded as required by the
cited standard.
I
became curious about how the guarding requirements could be ‘national consensus
standards.’ This line of inquiry led me to the Seattle Public Library where I
found only the 1971 standard 01.1—Revised, of the American National Standards
Institute (hereinafter ‘ANSI’, whether reference is to the organization with
its present name, or previous names of American Standards Association or United
States Standards Association). A telephone call to the New York office of ANSI
brought me the source standard—ANSI 01.1 1954, reaffirmed 1961. (29 CFR
1910.221 lists the source as ‘AMCI.’ All parties stipulated this was a
misprint. ‘ANSI’ 01.1 1954 R (‘reaffirmed’) 1961 is correct.)
My
curiosity was further aroused by the headnote on Section 4.1 of that standard.
This Section includes all substantive material adopted in the OSHA standards in
the cases before me. The headnote is:
‘NOTE: It is
recognized that the standards for saw guards in 4.1 are not perfectly applicable
to all operations for which saws are used. The standards given are those which
woodworkers have agreed are most generally useful. Since there are a
considerable number of cases not satisfactorily met by these standards, the
enforcing authority should exercise rather wide latitude in allowing the use of
other devices which give promise of affording adequate protection. It may be
expected that by so doing further progress in saw guarding will be encouraged.’
Further
inquiries within the ANSI organization, with a few members of the ANSI ‘01’
committee which adopted the standard in 1954 and reaffirmed it in 1961, as well
as with Mr. Patrick F. Cestrone, who was Director of the Office of Safety and
Health Standards, United States Department of Labor, when 29 CFR 1910.213 was
adopted as a national consensus standard; convinced me it would be advisable to
obtain additional evidence in some areas having to do with the question of the
validity of the woodworking machine guarding sections of the Occupational Safety
and Health standards.
Three
rather obvious questions having to do with the validity of the standards seemed
not to be answered adequately by the record. They were:
(1)
The effect of the headnote; which was not adopted by the Secretary and which,
in itself, constituted an integral part of the standard,
(2)
Whether the ANSI 01 standard is in fact a national consensus standard as
defined in the Act. Stated more precisely and in the reverse, the real question
here is whether Congress adopted a definition of a national consensus standard
which could be met by the ANSI promulgation as one adopted ‘under procedures
whereby it can be determined by the Secretary that persons interested and
affected by the scope or provisions of the standard have reached substantial
agreement on its adoption,........’, (Sec. (Sec. 3(9)(1) of the Act)
(3)
Whether the standards were ‘formulated in a manner which afforded an
opportunity for diverse views to be considered........’ (Sec. 3(9)(2) of the
Act)
Respondent
Weyerhaeuser, and later Konkolville (Docket 2347), squarely raised the question
of legality and validity of the standard from every point of approach necessary
to test it.
In
the meantime, eight more cases (including Konkolville) were assigned to me, all
alleging violations of subsections of 29 CFR 1910.213. In some the question of
the validity of the standard was raised. In some it was not. Two of the
Respondents were not represented by counsel.
Under
the circumstances it seemed unconscionable to me to make an extensive inquiry
tending to show whether or not the woodworking machine guarding standards were
valid in a few cases, and reach whatever decision might be forthcoming; without
going into the same question in all the cases. The two Respondents not
represented by counsel had no way of knowing how to raise the defense of
invalidity of the standard. Counsel in the others had at best a difficult task
in finding out that their clients might be charged under unenforceable
regulations.
Consequently,
the question was raised at the hearings on the merits in all cases thus far
heard. In the case of pro se Respondents, I interpreted their answers to
include a defense of illegality and invalidity of the standards. Other counsel
were given an opportunity to amend their pleadings. The posture of all cases on
which hearings have been held in now such that the question is properly raised
in all.
Before
proceeding to the three main questions raised, disposition must first be made
of certain preliminary matters.
While
not arguing the point at length in his briefs, the Secretary has consistently
taken the position that neither the Review Commission as an independent or
administrative adjudicatory agency, nor I as a judge conducting its hearings,
had the right to reopen the cases, call witnesses and consider evidence not
produced by counsel for the parties. (Konkolville was not reopened. The record
was left open for the supplemental hearing.) I have been told repeatedly that I
am not (and of course the Review Commission is not) a ‘court.’ Apparently the
feeling is that a ‘judicial’ adjudicatory body can do what an independent or
‘administrative’ adjudicatory body cannot do.
The
question is interesting, and it must be resolved contrary to the Secretary’s
position. While most authorities refer to the ‘inherent power’ of courts
to call witnesses in order to develop the truth in a judicial inquiry; the fact
is, it is an ‘inherent duty.’ However far able and competent advocacy
may cause us to digress from some fundamental principles involved in
adjudicatory proceedings under our system, the fact remains that the primary
responsibility for developing the record lies with the presiding officer of the
tribunal.
Briefly
expressed, ‘courts have inherent power to do all things that are reasonably necessary
for the administration of justice within the scope of their jurisdiction.’ (20
Am Jur 2d, Courts § 79)
Federal Rule of Evidence
614(a) provides
‘CALLING AND
INTERROGATION OF WITNESSES BY JUDGE
(a) Calling by
judge. The judge may, on his own motion or at the suggestion of a party, call
witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus called.
(b) Interrogation
by judge. The judge may interrogate witnesses, whether called by himself or by
a party.
(c) Objections.
Objections to the calling of witnesses by the the judge or to interrogation by
him may be made at the time or at the next available opportunity when the jury
is not present.’
McCormick has been rather
widely quoted. § 8, pages 12–13 provides:
‘8. THE JUDGE MAY
EXAMINE AND CALL WITNESSES........... Not only may the judge examine witnesses
called by the parties, but in his discretion he may also, for the purpose of
bringing out needed facts, call witnesses whom the parties might not have
chosen to call.’
While
the Administrative Procedures Act does not specifically provide for the calling
of witnesses by a hearing examiner or administrative law judge, numerous cases
have upheld this right even over the objections of the parties; usually basing
it on 5 USCA 556(c)(9).
Professor
Davis in his Administrative Law Treatise takes the position that such power and
authority are present under the quoted section of the Administrative Procedures
Act; and cites authorities encouraging such action in agencies having rules similar
to our Rule of Procedure 66, as well as those not having such rules. A clear
inference from Davis is that there is a greater need for independent action of
this kind on the part of an administrative law judge or hearing examiner than
in the case of a judge in the judicial branch of the government. He cites
Congressional history in the adoption of the APA:
(§ 10.02)
‘........ that presiding officers have ‘the authority and duty—as a court
does—to make sure that all necessary evidence is adduced and to keep the
hearing orderly and efficient..... The trial examiner shall have authority.....
(j) To call, examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce into the
record documentary or other evidence.’ The courts have often upheld the active
role of examiners: ‘It is the function of an examiner, just as it is the
recognized function of a trial judge, to see that facts are clearly and fully
developed. He is not required to sit idly by and permit a confused or
meaningless record to be made.’’
Rule of Procedure 66 of
the Review Commission provides:
‘Rule 66 DUTIES
AND POWERS OF JUDGES.
It shall be the
duty of the Judge to conduct a fair and impartial hearing, to assure that the
facts are fully elicited, to adjudicate all issues and avoid delay. The Judge shall
have authority........, to:
(h)..... order
hearings reopened.....
(j) Call and
examine witnesses and to introduce into the record documentary or other
evidence;’
The
only United States Court of Appeals case under our Rule 66 which has come to our
attention is: Brennan, Secretary of Labor v. OSAHRC and John J. Gordon
Company 2nd Circuit, Feb. 25, 1974—Docket 73–1729.
The
second preliminary question requiring decision is whether Section 6(f) of the
Act provides an exclusive method—the only method which may be used at any
time—to challenge the validity of any standard issued by Secretary.
The section provides:
SEC. 6. (f) ‘Any
person who may be adversely affected by a standard issued under this
section may at any time prior to the sixtieth day after such
standard is promulgated file a petition challenging the validity of such
standard with the United States court of appeals for the circuit wherein such
person resides or has his principal place of business, for a judicial review of
such standard. A copy of the petition shall be forthwith transmitted by the
clerk of the court to the Secretary. The filing of such petition shall not,
unless otherwise ordered by the court, operate as a stay of the standard. The
determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive if supported by substantial
evidence in the record considered as a whole.’ (Emphasis supplied)
The
Solicitor contends that since a specific section of the Act provides a
procedure to challenge the validity of a standard if the action is started
within sixty days after its effective date, this method is exclusive; even
though the Act doesn’t say so.
Respondents,
on the other hand, take the position that this is a pre-enforcement remedy
only, and that the validity of any standard may be challenged in an enforcement
proceeding.
Respondents’
position seems fundamentally correct. The words underlined above indicate the
action is optional, not mandatory. There is no express language indicating this
is an exclusive method for attacking a standard. Additionally it would seem
that investing ‘any person who may be adversely affected’ with a right to test
the validity of a standard, but limiting that right to 60 days from the
effective date indicates an intent on the part of Congress to provide this
as a preliminary pre-enforcement procedure, rather than as the sole procedure
by which a standard can be challenged.
Respondent
Weyerhaeuser quotes from Divesco Roofing & Insulation Company, Docket 345,
1 OSHC 1079:
‘........ the
legal validity of the standards under the Constitution and Statutes of the
United States is necessarily involved in the adjudication of enforcement
proceedings, and this function has been reserved for the Commission subject to
judicial review.’
Admittedly
the language of the entire statute could provide a clearer guide to the answer
we seek here. Perhaps it is ambiguous or unclear and subject to construction.
If so, then it is proper to examine the Legislative History for assistance.
Two
such references would seem sufficient. In the final Senate report, No. 91–1282,
page 8, as reprinted in the Legislative History, page 148, we find the
following:
‘Judicial Review
of Standards.—Section 6(f) provides that any person who may be adversely
affected by a standard may, within 60 days of its issuance, seek judicial
review in an appropriate United States court of appeals. While this would be
the exclusive method for obtaining pre-enforcement judicial review of a
standard, the provision does not foreclose an employer from challenging the
validity of a standard during an enforcement proceeding. Unless otherwise
ordered by the court, the filing of the petition would not operate as a stay or
the standard.’ (Emphasis supplied)
In
explaining the real need for a twofold system of standards review, Senator
Williams stated in a speech on the Senate floor—and in support of the provision
as it was enacted—
‘The bill as
reported by the committed provides an opportunity for a person affected by the
promulgation of a standard to seek judicial review within 60 days of the
promulgation of such standard or the standard may also be challenged during
an enforcement proceeding. This is a
very broad-scaled judicial review protection that completely meets any industry
concerns regarding the ability to contest the standards in court.’ (Underlining
added)
Legislative
History, p. 431.
Other
references in the Legislative History of the Act are to the same effect, but
their inclusion would only lengthen this decision unnecessarily.
Neither
the Review Commission nor its judges have hesitated to invalidate a standard
for a variety of reasons—but all on the basic ground that the action of the
Secretary in adopting the particular standard was in excess of the power
granted him by the Act. A few cases discussing the principle—most holding the
standard invalid—follow:
Joseph Bucheit and
Sons Company,
Docket 295, 1 OSHC 3106. (‘validity’ distinguished from ‘wisdom’)
Oberhelman-Ritter
Foundry, Inc.,
Docket 572, 1 OSHC 3087, (‘should’ changed to ‘shall’. Standard invalidated.)
Divesco Roofing
& Insulation Company, supra.
Tilo Company, Inc., Docket 211, 1
OSHC 1206 (Standard invalid—unenforceably vague)
Santa Fe Trail
Transport Company,
Docket 331, 1 OSHC 1457 (whether hospital, infirmary, or clinic; in ‘near
proximity to work place.’ Invalid as unenforeably vague.)
More
standards have been held invalid by the Commission—and judges—on this ground
than on any other.
The
third preliminary question for decision before we may reach the heart of the
case, is whether the Review Commission has the right to pass on the legality or
validity of a standard at all. Whether this be called a ‘right’, ‘power’,
‘authority’ or ‘jurisdiction’ makes no difference. The specific question is
whether the validity and legality of those portions of 29 CFR 1910.213 under
review, as derived from ANSI 01.1 1954, reaffirmed 1961, may be adjudicated by
the Review Commission, an independent of ‘administrative’ adjudicatory
tribunal; or whether they must be left untouched until they come before a
‘judicial’ adjudicatory tribunal.
It
is worthy of note in passing that insofar as the precise issues involved in
this case are concerned, the trial judge’s duty, authority and power at the
hearing stage of the proceeding, are no different from the Review Commission’s
duty, authority and power at its review stage of the proceeding. No contention
has been made on the part of any party that there in a difference, and no
authority in support of any such position has been cited.
It
should likewise be noted that the questions involved here are sufficiently
closely related to those last discussed, that some authorities cited are
persuasive to the issues in both. There are more differences than similarities,
however, and thus the subjects lend themselves more readily to separate discussion.
We
may start on the assumption that unless the Secretary acts in some manner
authorized by statute to withdraw his regulation (we call it a ‘standard’) or
otherwise invalidate it, and if litigation then develops questioning its
legality or validity, the answers can only be determined by ‘adjudication.’ The
question is—in what forum; considering the precise questions raised and all
parts of the particular statute?
The
Secretary would have us believe the tribunal must be so marked as to indicate
it is a ‘court’ or part of the judicial branch of the government.
I
have read and considered the briefs filed, and the cases cited therein; and
have conducted some independent research. On the basis of this Act, I find no
authority, even persuasive, in support of the Secretary’s position.
For
example, the Secretary’s greatest emphasis as authority for his position—as
determined by its prominent position and repeated citation in the Solicitor’s
briefs—is on the case of Stark v. Wickard (1944), 321 U.S. 559,
88 L.Ed. 733, 64 S.Ct. 559, 571. In that case, the court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Reed said:
‘The
responsibility of determining the limits of statutory grants of authority in
such instances is a judicial function entrusted to the courts by Congress by
the statutes establishing courts and marking their jurisdiction.’
As
quoted out of context, this is persuasive language in favor of the position of
the Secretary here.
The
court neither says nor implies, however, that Congress cannot adopt a law wherein
the initial adjudication ‘to protect justiciable individual rights
against administrative action’ is by an independent or ‘administrative court’,
subject to judicial review by the United States Court of Appeals. The real
question involved in our case is whether Congress did adopt such a law.
Not
could the court have so stated or implied, because the holding of the case was
simply that the plaintiffs had standing to sue in Federal District Court to
question the validity of a milk marketing regulation of the Secretary of
Agriculture.
The
authority cited by Mr. Justice Reed in support of the quoted statement above is
U.S. v. Morgan (1939) 307 U.S. 183, 83 L.Ed. 1211, 59 S.Ct. 795–799,
800. In the opinion by Mr. Justice Stone may be found language even more favorable
in this instance to the position of the Respondent in our case; if we consider
it out of context also, and assume the ‘agency’ to be the Review Commission,
and its ‘action’ adjudicatory.
‘........ In
construing a statute setting up an administrative agency and providing for
judicial review of its action, court and agency are not to be regarded as
wholly independent and unrelated instrumentalities of justice, each acting in
the performance of its prescribed statutory duty without regard to the appropriate
function of the other in securing the plainly indicated objects of the statute.
Court and agency are the means adopted to attain the prescribed end, and so far
as their duties are defined by the words of the statute, those words should be
construed so as to attain that end through coordinated action. Neither body
should repeat in this day the mistake made by the courts of law when equity was
struggling for recognition as an ameliorating system of justice; neither
can rightly be regarded by the other as an alien intruder, to be tolerated if
must be, but never to be encouraged or aided by the other in the attainment of
the common aim........’ (Emphasis added)
If
this language could be used literally, it would be decisive of the issue of
this case. It cannot, however, because the administrative action to which
reference was made was not adjudication. It was the adoption of an order by the
Secretary of Agriculture fixing maximum rates to be charged at the Kansas City
stock yards; and the question in the case was the validity of the order.
Neither
case can be considered as precedent in the one before us.
Judge
Burchmore’s statement in Divesco, supra, warrants repeating:
‘........ the
legal validity of the standards under the Constitution and Statutes of the
United States is necessarily involved in the adjudication of enforcement
proceedings, and this function has been reserved for the Commission subject to
judicial review.’
The
problem is to find the intent of Congress—either from the plain language of the
Act or from inferences to be drawn from it. If a point is reached where it may
be concluded that the language is not clear and unambiguous, that it may be
subject to construction, then—and only then—may we consult the Legislative
History for aid in finding an answer to our inquiry.
There
is no specific provision in the Act spelling out in exact words the power of
the Review Commission to adjudicate the validity of the standards adopted by
the Secretary and the legality of his actions in so adopting them. Our
considered conclusion is that this power and authority are so clearly granted
by inferences to be drawn from the Act, there is no reasonable ground for
disagreement about it. Our further conclusion is that the Review Commission is
not only a proper forum for such adjudication, but it is the only
one where the question may be raised past the pre-enforcement status of the
standard.
Suppose
we enumerate and explain briefly the reasons for these statements.
(1)
The Review Commission’s function is adjudicatory; nothing more, nothing less.
The basic grant of this power is in Section 2(b) of the Act:
‘CONGRESSIONAL
FINDINGS AND PURPOSE
SEC. (2)..........
(b) The congress
declares it to be its purpose and policy, through the exercise of its powers to
regulate commerce among the several States and with foreign nations and to
provide for the general welfare, to assure so far as possible every working man
and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve
our human resources—
(3)........ by
creating an Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission for carrying out
adjudicatory functions under the Act;’
(2) All findings
of violations and imposition of penalties by default—for failure to contest an
action of the Secretary—are those of the Review Commission. The statute
provides: ‘They shall be deemed a final order of the Commission.....’ (Sec.
10(a)(3))
(3) With the
exception of certain equitable powers to restrain conditions or practices in
the event of imminent danger, vested in the United States District Courts (Sec.
13), all civil actions and adjudications under the Act are in the Review
Commission. All findings of violations of the Act are functions of the Review
Commission.
Under
Section 10(c), if a proposal of the Secretary is contested, ‘the Commission
shall afford an opportunity for a hearing’ under the provisions of the
Administrative Procedures Act. Thereafter the Commission must enter an order
‘based on findings of fact, affirming, modifying, or vacating the Secretary’s
citation or proposed penalty, or directing other appropriate relief,...’
We
have referred to a common practice by both the Review Commission and its judges
to hold various standards of the Secretary invalid for a variety of announced
reasons. In each case the challenge to the standard was in the Commission
proceedings and the real basis for the holding was that the Secretary was
acting in excess of his statutory power and authority in adopting the standard.
A few examples were given.
Of
equal—or greater—importance is the fact that implicit in every finding of a
violation of an occupational safety or health standard under Section 5(a)(2) of
the Act, is a holding that the standard is valid—that it was enacted by the
Secretary in a proper exercise of his legislative power and authority.
The
Commission is directed to ‘affirm’ a citation and proposed penalty in some
cases. If a standard is questioned and can be held valid only by a ‘judicial’
court; the Commission might find itself in the completely untenable position of
being required to affirm a penalty without a finding that the standard is
valid.
Can
this be the intention of the Congress? We think not.
(4)
Not only does it have sole power to find violations of the law and standards
with respect to occupational safety and health, but ‘The Commission shall have
authority to assess all civil penalties.....’ (Sec. 17(j)). This is not a
review—it is the first adjudicatory act with respect to the penalty.
(5)
Contempt powers are granted as under the National Labor Relations Act (Sec.
12(i)).
(6)
The Chairman is authorized to ‘appoint such hearing examiners..... as he deems
necessary to assist in the performance of the Commission’s functions.....’
(Sec. 12(e)). Some of these functions are enumerated (Sec. 12(j)). As stated
above, and for the purpose of this inquiry, the duties and powers of a hearing
examiner (judge) are no greater or less at the hearing level than are those of
the Review Commission at the review level.
(7)
A direct method of review is provided of all decisions of the Commission to the
United States Court of Appeals. Section 11(a) provides:
‘JUDICIAL
REVIEW
SEC. 11. (a) Any
person adversely affected or aggrieved by an order of the Commission issued
under subsection (c) of section 10 may obtain a review of such order in any
United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the violation is
alleged to have occurred or where the employer has its principal office, or in
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, by filing in such
court within sixty days following the issuance of such order a written petition
praying that the order be modified or set aside. A copy of such petition shall
be forthwith transmitted by the clerk of the court to the Commission and to the
other parties, and thereupon the Commission shall file in the court the record
in the proceeding as provided in section 2112 of title 28, United States Code.
Upon such filing, the court shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and of
the question determined therein, and shall have power to grant such temporary
relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, and to make and enter
upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth in such record a
decree affirming, modifying, or setting aside in whole or in part, the order of
the Commission and enforcing the same to the extent that such order is affirmed
or modified. The commencement of proceedings under this subsection shall not,
unless ordered by the court, operate as a stay of the order of the Commission. No
objection that has not been urged before the Commission shall be considered by
the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be
excused because of extraordinary circumstances. The findings of the Commission
with respect to questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the
record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive. If any party shall apply to
the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and shall show to the
satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and that
there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the
hearing before the Commission, the court may order such additional evidence to
be taken before the Commission and to be made a part of the record. The Commission
may modify its findings as to the facts, or make new findings, by reason of
additional evidence so taken and filed, and it shall file such modified or new
findings, which findings with respect to questions of fact, if supported by
substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive,
and its recommendations, if any, for the modification or setting aside of its
original order. Upon the filing of the record with it, the jurisdiction of the
court shall be exclusive and its judgment and decree shall be final, except
that the same shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United
States, as provided in section 1254 of title 28, United States Code. Petitions
filed under this subsection shall be heard expeditiously.’
Two
provisions are particularly worthy of note here. First, no objection that has
not been urged before the Commission can be considered by the Court of Appeals.
Thus, if there has been no question, or decision, on the validity of a
standard; it cannot be considered by the Court of Appeals on review.
Secondly,
additional evidence may be ordered in exceptional circumstances. In this case
it is taken ‘before the Commission,’ which may thereafter modify its findings
or make new ones; and any review thereafter shall be considered as from the
beginning.
The
foregoing should show without question the intent of Congress to allow the
Review Commission the right to pass on the validity and legality of standards
adopted by the Secretary; and also require that they be challenged in
the Review Commission proceedings. Perhaps viewing the question from a somewhat
different angle might be helpful.
As
a practical matter, how would an employer test the validity of a standard
promulgated by the Secretary in a ‘court’ rather than before the Review
Commission?
He
could not make his first request for a ruling on review to the United States
Court of Appeals under Section 11(a) of the Act after a Commission decision.
This Section provides:
‘No objection that
has not been urged before the Commission shall be considered by the
court,.....’
Should
the employer then start an action in the United States District Court seeking
an injunction? Again, this action would fail. On the state of the record of
every one of the cases I now have before me, relief would be denied because of
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Perhaps not all decisions would be
on exactly the same basis as that of the three judge panel in Lance Roofing Co.
vs. Hodgson, Secretary of Labor (1972), 1 OSHC 1012, 343 F.Supp. 685. Good
reasons exist in all for holdings other than on the identical ground. For a
variety of holdings involving the principle of exhausting administrative
remedies, see cases cited in Davis-Administrative Law Treatise, Chapter 20.
An
action for declaratory judgment would meet no better fate. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies applies alike to such actions. In Lance
Roofing, supra, the plaintiffs sought declaratory—as well as injunctive—relief.
The
question was asked as to how an employer wishing to challenge the validity of a
standard now may go about doing it in a ‘judicial’ court. The obvious
answer is that he has no way of doing it. The first challenge must be made
before the trial judge at the hearing stage of the Review Commission
proceeding. Failing this, a Respondent will necessarily be held to have failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies.
We
believe the implication is so clear that the Review Commission Proceeding is
not only the proper, but the exclusive forum for a current
challenge to the validity of a standard of the Secretary, there should be no
need to resort to legislative history as an aid in reaching this conclusion.
Since the Act does not so provide by its express terms, however, a contention
considered by some to be reasonable might be made that it is subject to
construction to the extent that legislative history may be invoked, and we
shall therefore turn in this direction for additional assistance.
In
the Legislative History, there are references carrying a clear implication of
the Congressional intent that the legality and validity of a regulation
(standard) of the Secretary may be tested and decided by the Review Commission.
These are in two contexts. First, in reference to the fact that Section 6(f) of
the Act is a pre-enforcement remedy only and that the standard may be tested in
an enforcement proceeding. Secondly, in emphasis on the adjudicatory function
of the Review Commission.
Two
such references have already been cited. Following are additional expressions
of Congressional intent.
For
example, in the Index itself, under ‘Standards’, is the following:
‘Standards,
pre-enforcement review. (See Section 6(f) in Section-by-Section Index,
‘Judicial Review of Standards’)’
In
a Section by Section analysis and comparison of the Committee reported Bill
S.2193—containing the pertinent language of the present Act—and substitute Bill
S.4044, is this reference to the former:
‘6. Judicial
Review of Standards Judicial review of standards is provided in the various
United States Courts of Appeals. This right may be exercised up to 60 days
after the standard is promulgated. (sec. 6(f)). Judicial review or standards
would also be possible in enforcement proceedings.’ (Emphasis supplied)
(Legislative
History, p. 304)
Representative
Steiger of Wisconsin made the following statement with respect to the specific
language of the Bill which became part of the law having to do with the Raview
Commission and its adjudicatory procedures:
‘Persons aggrieved
by a citation of the Secretary of Labor will appeal to the Commission rather
than to the Secretary, as is the case in the committee bill. We will, with this
amendment, provide for a separation of powers. Standards will be promulgated by
the Secretary of Labor and contested citations will be considered by an
independent court, so to speak, an independent review commission.’
(Legislative
History, p. 1074)
In
preparing this decision, we are not unmindful of the decision in Secretary
of Labor vs. Boise Cascade Corporation, Docket 2944. By stipulation of
counsel, Judge Kennedy had before him a transcript of a major portion of the
proceedings in our cases, (three of four days of the supplemental hearing), but
none of the 17 exhibits.
This
brings us to the heart of the case. We are faced squarely with the necessity of
deciding the merits of Respondents challenge to particular sections of 29 CFR
1910.213—and only those sections as they apply to the facts in this record.
Perhaps
a word of caution—and of limitation—might be appropriate here. Not only have
there been inferences, but also broad sweeping statements that the effect of
this action may be to establish the validity or invalidity of all parts of
subsection 213 of Part 1910. These are all the sections having to do with
machine guarding of woodworking machinery. Hopefully such statements were
inadvertent, but at best that show a disregard of the actual effect of
decisional law.
Neither
this forum nor any other can do more than pass on the precise questions before
it in a particular case, here the validity or invalidity of enumerated sections
or subsections of standards; and then only with reference to the record before
it. The practical effect of some holdings may go much farther; but the
adjudications themselves are so limited.
Before
going into a detailed consideration of the specific sections of the standards
and the grounds on which they are challenged, a brief review of some of the
evidence in the record would seem to be in order.
I
called six witnesses who testified at the supplemental hearing. They are:
Patrick F.
Cestrone, Silver Springs, Maryland; Consultant, Occupational Safety and Health
Associates. In 1971, Mr. Cestrone was Director of the Office of Safety and
Health Standards, United States Department of Labor. He was charged with the
responsibility of what has been aptly termed a ‘crash program’ to develop
national consensus standards and established Federal standards for the
Secretary to ‘. . . by rule promulgate as occupational safety or health’
standards under Section 6(a) of the Act.
Nixon deTarnowsky,
Scarsdale, New York; Standards Coordinator for Safety and Health Standards,
American National Standards Institute, New York City.
David Zabriskie,
Fairlawn, New Jersey; Manager of Construction Safety Division, Engineering and
Safety Services, American Insurance Association, New York City; Secretary of
the ANSI 01 Committee since June of 1970.
Lewis R. Morrison,
Ardsley, New York, Corporate Safety Manager, ACF Industries, Inc., New York
City. As an employee of the Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Company of Chicago and
as a representative of the National Association of Mutual Casualty Companies,
he was a member of the ANSI 01 Committee at the time ANSI 01.1 was adopted in
1954.
A. A. Skonning, Riverside,
Illinois; retired Senior Engineer, Western Electric Company; 29 years’-experience
in safety engineering, particularly woodworking; representative of the National
Safety Council on the ANSI 01 Committee in 1954 and 1961.
Joseph J.
Prabulos, Woodbury, Connecticut; retired Safety Director, National Distillers
and Chemical Corporation; member of ANSI 01 Committee in 1954, 1961 and 1971;
representative on the committee of a trade association, Associated Cooperage
Industries.
Dan Adair,
Portland, Oregon; Vice President of consulting firm, Hearing Conservation and
Noise Control, Inc.; representative of National Safety Council on ANSI 01
Committee in 1954 and 1961.
In
addition, Respondent Weyerhaeuser called Thaden Demas, Assistant Director for
the Division of Products Approval, American Plywood Association, Tacoma,
Washington.
There
is no conflict in evidence on any material fact in the case.
ANSI
does not write standards. In case of a consensus standard, one of its prime
functions is to certify that standards presented to it are in fact
representative of a ‘consensus’ of those parties who have an interest in the
subject covered.
Usually
the standards are written by committees of the organization, commonly sponsored
by one or more members. There are 160 national organizations and 1,000
individual company dues paying members. The areas of activity of the
organization in promulgating standards and approving them are very broad. The
Safety Technical Advisory Board involved with the standard here under
consideration is only one of 26 such advisory boards, each concerned with its
own category of standards.
In
this case, the 01 Committee was sponsored by the Association of Casualty and
Surety Companies, a large trade association of the biggest stock casualty
companies in the country (new a part of the American Insurance Association by
reason of merger with the National Board of Fire Underwriters); and the
International Association of Government Labor Officials.
When
a request is made for permission to sponsor a standard, and certain formalities
have been completed, such as a finding by ANSI of the need for such a standard,
approval of its scope, the competence of the proposed sponsors, membership of
the committee, including competence and comprehensive interests of committee
members (usually trade associations or other organizations of groups of
companies rather than individual companies, along with labor and governmental
organizations); the committee is pretty much left alone to do its job of
writing the standard. In the process, technical assistance is supplied by the
ANSI organization only on request. Committee members are usually highly skilled
experts in the field in which they are working.
When
the job is completed and the proposed standard. approved by a ‘consensus’ of
the committee, it then undergoes further scrutiny. In this case the Safety
Technical Advisory Board passed on the technical competence of the standard and
the Board of Standards Review on whether it represented a ‘consensus.’ Involved
in the process now is a public review and comment period following distribution
of the proposed standard to recipients of ‘ANSI Resporter.’ This has a
circulation of 10,000, including The Bureau of National Affairs, Commerce
Clearing House, National Safety Council, and other publishers of trade
periodicals.
Early
in 1971, Patrick F. Cestrone had completed about 31 years of government service
as a professional safety engineer, most of it in supervisory capacities. He was
Director of the Office of Safety and Health Standards, United States Department
of Labor. For more than 2 years, Cestrone and those under his supervision had
worked on planning for the Labor Department in anticipation of some type of
comprehensive Federal occupational safety and health law.
The
‘crash program’ to which reference was made was principally the preparation of
a comprehensive set of occupational safety and health standards promulgated by
the Secretary of Labor under Section 6(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970. These were published on May 29, 1971 in 36 Federal Register,
commencing at page 10466.
Adoption
of these standards by the Secretary was mandated by Section 6(a) of the Act.
They were of two kinds, ‘national consensus standards’ and ‘established Federal
standards.’ As the man primarily responsible for ‘putting together the package’
Cestrone was familiar with all the details of the project.
Cestrone
does not remember specifically the details of rewriting ANSI 01.1 and its
adoption as 29 CFR 1910.213 and 214. Nor does he have a definite recollection
of considering and eliminating the headnote previously quoted at the beginning
of Section 4, ‘Woodworking Machinery’, on page 9 of the ANSI printed standard
(Respondent’s Exhibits S–1 and S–3); or the reason for its omission from
Section 213 of Part 1910. He does recall ANSI 01.1, and that it was adopted as
a national consensus standard.
Among
the objectives of the group headed by Mr. Cestrone was to make no changes in
either the scope or the substance of any national consensus standard. Part of the
job also was to eliminate any consensus standards that were advisory, or
recommended. No provision was intended to be included in the final product
unless its requirements were mandatory.
Neither
Cestrone nor, so far as he knew, anyone else engaged in the project took any
steps to insure the legality of the standards being adopted; for example, to
determine whether the national consensus standards met the statutory
definitions of Section 3 (9) of the Act. As to ANSI 01.1 there were two reasons
for this.
First,
the Secretary was not only under a mandate of the statute (Section 6(a)) to
adopt national consensus standards produced by ANSI and the National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA); but the legislative history of the Act contained
numerous committee reports and other comments urging speed and purporting to
explain why the standards, having already met the ‘consensus principle’, could
and should be adopted without further ado.
Further
scrutiny will show that the language of the legislative history tending to show
compliance of the ANSI standards with the statutory definition of a national
consensus standard was in error.
In
his testimony, Mr. Cestrone referred to several such passages from the
legislative history:
‘Q. What part of
the legislative history, and to what part of the legislative history do you
refer there, if you know?
A. May I sit and
refer and to my notes?
Q. Yes, yes, refer
to any notes you have.
A. With respect to
support of the legislative history and support of interim standards, my
reference is to report 21–82, starting on page 141, which accompanied the
Senate version of the bill S 2193, particularly legislative history starting on
page 146–6.
Q. Is that in the
legislative history?
A. It’s in the
green June book, and I can read to you if you want me.
Q. If you have the
pertinent language it might be good to put it in the record.
A. Senate Report
91–1282, page 141, calendar number 1300; Accompanying Senate Bill S 2193, page
146–6. ‘The purpose of this procedure is to establish as rapidly as possible
National Occupational Safety and Health standards with which industry is
familiar. These standards may not be as effective or up to date as is
desirable, but they will be useful for immediately providing a nation wide
minimal level of safety and health. Two private organizations are the major
sources of consensus standards; the American National Standards Institute,
Incorporated and the National Fire Protection Association. By the Act’s
definition a consensus standard is one which has been adopted under procedures
which have given diverse views an opportunity to be considered, and which
indicated interested and affected persons have reached substantial agreement on
its adoption.’
Q. Pardon me, sir.
I’m interested in the part before ‘affected persons.’
A. Which indicate
that interested and affected persons have reached substantial agreement on its
adoption.
Q. This is saying
what has been done and the statute says it must be done, is that correct, sir?
A. Yes, sir, and
if I may finish this last phrase, the point I wanted to make here. I don’t know
whether I left what I thought was non-applicable language out but it follows
that, ‘It is appropriate to permit the Secretary to promulgate such standards
without regard to the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act. The bill
also provides for the issuance in similar fashion of those standards—
Q. Are you guoting
now?
A. Yes, sir. ‘. .
. which have been issued under other federal standards and which under this Act
may be applicable to additional employees who are not under the protection of
such other federal laws. Such standards have already been subjected to the
procedural scrutiny mandated by law under which they were issued. Such
standards moreover in large part represent the incorporation of voluntary
industrial standards.’
Your Honor, in the
House Report 911291 which accompanied HR 16785 starting on page 831, but the
pages of specific reference are page 847. The intent of this interim standards
provision is to give the Secretary of Labor a speedy mechanism to promulgate
standards with which industry is familiar. These may not be as effective as the
current standards promulgated under formal procedures but they will be useful
for immediately providing a nation-wide minimum level of health and safety.
Section 6—
Q. Does that refer
to the reference or standards referred to by the terms of the statement
elsewhere? Did those include ANSI national consensus standards?
A. Yes.’
(Tr.
S54, S55, S56 and S57)
As
to the adoption of ANSI 01.1 as a national consensus standard, Cestrone
recalled believing the legality of the standard was protected not only by the
congressional mandate of the statute and congressional urgency in reports and
debates, but also by the fact that the Labor Department’s Solicitor advised
that the standard had been adopted ‘by reference under the Walsh-Healy Act.
There
is some question as to was intended by the witness when he referred to adoption
‘by reference.’
Cestrone
referred specifically to the provisions of Section 4(b)(2) of the Act. This
simply purported to ‘blanket in’ all existing Walsh-Healy regulations—as well
as those under other safety Acts—as Occupational Safety and Health standards;
by ‘deeming’ all such—without further identification or reference—to be
occupational safety and health standards.
The
witness may have been referring to the adoption ‘by reference’ in 41 CFR
50.204–2. This reference applies to the general machine guarding requirements
for all machines and states that all standards on this subject produced by the
four named major standards-producing organizations are effective under the
Walsh-Healy Act; without specific reference to any such privately produced
standards, their provisions, or their application.
This
section was mentioned by the Solicitor at the beginning of the supplemental
hearing on the Secretary’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the pleadings. It was
not urged thereafter by the Solicitor except in connection with his argument
that 29 CFR 1910.213 is in fact a national consensus standard.
The
fact is ANSI 01.1954 (R 1961) was taken apart and reassembled, under the
direction of Mr. Cestrone, to become 29 CFR 1910.213 and 214. (See Respondent’s
Exhibit G–3, showing details of the dismantling and reassembling job.) It was
then adopted as a national consensus standard. In the process the
headnote at the beginning of Section 4 was removed and appears nowhere in the
Occupational Safety and Health standards.
There
was no intent or effort to adopt any standard in the alternative, or as
both a national consensus standard and an established Federal standard.
‘The new Part 1910
contains Occupational Safety and Health standards which are either national
consensus standards or established Federal standards.’
36
Fed. Reg. 10466, May 29, 1971)
The
Secretary’s own regulation showing source—29 CFR 1910.221—shows that both
Sections 213 and 214 were derived from ‘ANSI—01.1—1954—(R–1961)—Safety Code for
Woodworking Machinery.’
There
is no statutory authority to promulgate the standard except as one or the
other.
Thus,
the standard under scrutiny in this case—or portions of it—is either a valid
general industry occupational safety and health standard adopted as a
national consensus standard; or so far as we are here concerned, it has no
relevance.
We
now come to consideration of the three principal questions to be answered by
this decision.
The
first is the effect of deleting the headnote to Section 4.0 ‘Woodworking
Machinery’, page 9, ANSI 01.1 1954 (R 1961). It is as follows:
‘NOTE:
It is recognized that the standards for saw guards in 4.1 are not perfectly
applicable to all operations for which saws are used. The standards given are
those which woodworkers have agreed are most generally useful. Since there are
a considerable number of cases not satisfactorily met by these standards, the
enforcing authority should exercise rather wide latitude in allowing the use of
other devices which give promise of affording adequate protection. It may be
expected that by so doing further progress in saw guarding will be encouraged.’
The
record shows a similar note to have been part of the 01.1 standard in 1944.
Another is a part of the 1971 revision.
The
record further shows that at a meeting in the summer of 1973, for the first
time the ANSI 01 Committee considered removing the text of the note as it has
appeared and placing its provisions as part of the text of the various sections
applicable. (See Secretary’s Exhibit S–2.)
A
number of undisputed facts should be considered.
First,
all of the provisions of 29 CFR 1910.213 are mandatory. The headnote is not.
The
note is not ‘explanatory’, ‘preliminary’, ‘a suggestion’, ‘a recommendation’,
‘for informational purposes’, or even an ‘exhortation.’ It is an integral part
of the standard itself.
‘JUDGE WATKINS:
Mr. Ehlke, I forgot to ask Mr. deTarnowsky something. If you want to cover it,
okay; if not, ‘I’ll ask him again.
I want to make
sure he testified as to whether the headnote that we’ve been talking about is a
part of the standard. Would you cover that?
Mr. EHLKE: That’s
my next question.
Q. (By Mr. Ehlke)
Turn to page 9 of that document, sir. Is there a note at the beginning of
section 4 entitled ‘Woodworking Machinery?’
A. Yes, it is.
Q. What type of
note would that be, sir?
A. We call it a
headnote.
Q. Are headnotes
an integral part of the standards?
A. Yes.
Q. Is this
headnote an integral part of that standard?
A. Yes, it is.’
(Tr.
S172)
There
is considerably more evidence in the record to the same effect. There is no evidence
to the contrary.
The
saws covered by Section 213 of Part 1910 simply cannot be used for many jobs
they are designed to do while guarded as required by the standard. This
evidence is also undisputed and from expert and technically competent witnesses—members
of the Committee.
All
Committee members stated that ANSI 01.1 would not be—and could not be—a
‘consensus’ standard with the headnote removed. Those asked stated they would
not have voted for it as a consensus standard in the absence of the headnote.
It
is interesting to note the difference in the method used by the Secretary in
adopting ANSI 01.1 in the Construction. Standards, from the used here in the
General Industry Standards.
Subpart
I of the Construction Standards covers ‘Tools—Hand and Power’, and includes 29
CFR 1926.300 ‘General Requirements’, through Section 305: Section 304 of Part
1926, entitled ‘Woodworking Tools’, has some specific requirements for
portable, power driven circular saws (subparagraph (d)); and then provides:
‘(f) Other
requirements. All woodworking tools and machinery shall meet other applicable
requirements of American National Standards. Institute, 01.1–1961. Safety Code
for Woodworking Machinery.’
Leaving
aside other questions for the purpose of discussion; the result is the adoption
of ANSI 01.1 with its headnote. This is a procedure—and the result—intended
by Congress in Sec. 6(a) of the Act.
Whatever
may be the good or bad things about mandatory standards, or the validity or
invalidity of adoption by reference; this was the enactment of what appeared on
its face to be a national consensus standard—as such; not as changed. With the
headnote still a part of the standard, enforcement of Construction standards
must consider that all parts of Section 4.1 of ANSI 01.1 are optional—not
mandatory.
In
adopting Part 1910, including Section 213, on the other hand, the Secretary
states in Volume 36, No. 105, Federal Register, page 10466, May 29, 1971:
‘The national
consensus standards contain only mandatory provisions of the standards
promulgated by those two organizations. The standards of ANSI and NFPA may also
contain advisory provisions and recommendations, the adoption of which by
employers is encouraged, but they are not adopted in Part 1910.’
Perhaps
the Secretary made a mistake in including Section 213 of Part 1910. With the
headnote, provisions of Section 4.1 of ANSI 01.1: ‘are not perfectly applicable
to all operations for which saws are used.’ The standards are only those ‘which
woodworkers have agreed are most generally useful.’ ‘........ there are a
considerable number of cases not satisfactorily met by these standards.’
With
the headnote, ANSI 01.1 is not mandatory. Without the headnote, all
provisions as they appear in 29 CFR 1910.213 are mandatory. The answer
is that simple.
The
Secretary exceeded his statutory authority in failing to retain the headnote as
it was—an integral part of the standard.
The
second and third questions for consideration are whether, in two respects, ANSI
01.1 1954 (R 1961) meets the statutory definition of national consensus
standard.
The
Act provides:
‘SEC.3. For the
purposes of this Act—
(9) The term
‘national consensus standard’ means any occupational safety and health standard
or modification thereof which (1), has been adopted and promulgated by a
nationally recognized standards-producing organization under procedures whereby
it can be determined by the Secretary that persons interested and affected by
the scope or provisions of the standard have reached substantial agreement on
its adoption, (2) was formulated in a manner which afforded an opportunity for
diverse views to be considered and (3) has been designated as such a standard
by the Secretary, after consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies.’
Although
Section 3 (9) of the Act contains only three numbered subsections, as we view
it two requirements are contained in the first. There are therefore, four
requirements for a standard to meet this statutory definition.
(1)
It must have been ‘adopted and promulgated by a nationally recognized
standards-producing organization.’
(2)
‘Under procedures whereby it can be determined by the Secretary that persons
interested and affected by the scope or provisions of the standard have reached
substantial agreement on its adoption.’
(3)
‘Was formulated in a manner which afforded an opportunity for diverse views to
be considered.’
(4)
‘Has been designated as such a standard by the Secretary, after consultation
with other appropriate Federal agencies.’
Respondent
Konkolville argues in its brief that the first and fourth requirements are not
met. We find it unnecessary to decide these questions because we hold that ANSI
01.1 does not meet the statutory definition of a national consensus standard
under the second.
A
word about the fourth (has been designated, etc.) is in order, however, because
it has significance in our holding that the standard under discussion was
adopted as a national consensus standard. It was designated as such, and as
nothing else. Further, it was ‘. . . by rule promulgated’ as such by the
Secretary, as provided by Section 6(a) of the Act.
In
the Federal Register adopting Part 1910, ‘Occupational Safety and Health
Standards’ (36 Fed. Reg. 10466, May 29, 1971), the Secretary states:
‘The national
consensus standards are occupational safety and health standards adopted and
promulgated either by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) or by
the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) under procedures whereby it can
be determined that persons interested and affected by the scope or provisions
of the standards have reached substantial agreement on their adoption. I have
determined that those standards have been adopted and promulgated under such
procedures. Accordingly, pursuant to this determination, after consultation
with other appropriate Federal agences, and in accordance with section 3 (9) of
the Act, I do hereby designate as national consensus standards those
standards in Part 1910 which are standards adopted and promulgated by either
the American National Standards Institute or the National Fire Protection
Association.’ (Emphasis added)
The
first question which must be decided under this statutory definition (the
second of the principal questions in the case) is whether the standard was
promulgated
‘under procedures
whereby it can be determined by the Secretary that persons interested and
affected by the scope or provisions of the standard have reached substantial
agreement on its adoption.’
Assuming
first of all that the ‘procedures’ are those of ANSI—the standards-producing
organization—a number of other unanswered questions are immediately apparent.
For example,
(1)
Who are persons interested and affected by the scope or provisions of the
standards?
(2)
How many such persons are there?
(3)
How many must ‘have reached substantial agreement on its adoption?
(4)
What is ‘substantial agreement on its adoption?’
It
might be pointed out there is no requirement that the Secretary find or
‘determine’ that the persons contemplated have reached substantial agreement.
Rather the requirement is that the circumstances of adoption of the standard be
such that these things ‘can be determined by the Secretary.’
The
Secretary does purport to so find in the Federal Register cited. His statement
to this effect is in the last quotation from it.
We
may assume the Secretary cannot find that which is untrue. He cannot
‘determine’ that something happened when in fact it did not happen. Thus,
although the statute does not require the Secretary to ‘determine’ the specific
facts regarding the adoption of the standard by ANSI; those facts must exist so
that the Secretary could so determine them. Those facts are ‘that
persons interested and affected by the scope or provisions of the standard have
reached substantial agreement on its adoption,’
Who
are ‘persons interested and affected by the scope or provisions of the
standard?’ Little time need be spent in answering this question. The record
shows so many thousands of persons who are clearly within this class we need
not concern ourselves with the niceties of deciding in a borderline case
whether or not a particular person or class of persons is within it.
For
example, these are shown by the record:
Workmen
who operate the machinery
Labor
organizations to which the workmen belong
Employers
who hire the workmen
Trade
associations of those employers
Workmens
compensation or industrial insurance carriers who insure the employers and
workmen, both by reason of their financial interest in the safety of the
workmen and the insurance companies’ traditional interest in safety.
Trade
associations of the workmens compensation insurance carriers
Governmental
organizations with an interest in employee safety
Private
safety organizations, for example, the National Safety Council
Producers
of safety standards, such as ANSI
The
last two questions posed above present greater difficulties of solution. How
many ‘persons interested and affected’ must have agreed on the adoption of an
ANSI standard? The literal language of the statute would be satisfied if the
answer were either ‘two’ or ‘all.’ Either answer is ridiculous.
Might the answer be ‘a
representative number’; or ‘a substantial number’; whatever either of these
expressions means? I have been unable to find anything in the Legislative
History helpful in trying to answer this question.
It
would rather seem from numerous passages in the history that Congress became
enamored of its own definition and began to assume that both ANSI and NFPA
standards met it. At the same time, from some of the testimony, one might draw
the inference that ANSI began to believe its standards met the Congressional
definition.
As
will be shown, the answer to the question is academic. Since we are talking
about ‘consensus’ standards, however, would it not be sensible to believe
Congress intended that ‘a consensus’ of ‘persons interested and affected’
agreed to the adoption of the standard?
Consensus means
‘General
agreement.’ ‘Collective opinion. The judgment arrived at by most of those
concerned.’
(Webster—3rd
Unabridged)
‘Majority of
opinion.’
(Random
House—College Edition)
DeTarnowsky
quoted from one of ANSI’s principal publications, ‘Consensus implies much more
than a concept of a simple majority, not necessarily unanimity.’
Perhaps
it would be helpful to delve slightly deeper into ANSI procedures, particularly
in its method of ‘obtaining a consensus.’ There is reference to the question in
the testimony of Mr. deTarnowsky:
‘Q. (By Judge) The
other day when we had—well, that was Tuesday—and we had this meeting with all
of us there, I asked, I believe, if there is an ANSI—if ANSI defines consensus
anywhere. I didn’t ask then, but I meant it, of course, as a guide. You then
consulted your files, and would you tell us what you found about that?
A. The term
‘consensus in standardization practice is achieved when substantial agreement
is reached by concerned interests according to the judgment of duly appointed
authority.’
Q. Then we ought
to identify it. I’m reading in a different place.
A. I’m reading
from the ‘Guide of the Development of American National Standards’, dated
November 2, 1972, page 6, the third paragraph, ‘Consensus Principle.’ I better
read the whole paragraph.
Q. Go ahead, sir.
A. The title of
this paragraph is ‘Consensus Principle’, ‘The basic principle underlying ANSI
approval of a standard is that a consensus must be reached of those having
substantial concern with its scope and provisions. In standardization practice
a consensus is achieved when substantial agreement is reached by concerned interests
according to the judgment of a duly appointed authority. Consensus implies much
more than a concept of a simple majority, not necessarily unanimity.’
(Tr. S164–165)
From
the record it is not clear who is the ‘duly appointed authority’ whose judgment
is used to determine when a ‘consensus is achieved’ by ‘substancial agreement.’
Although the Board of Standards Review of ANSI is charged with only one
function—to determine whether or not the standard ‘represents a
consensus’—other procedures of ANSI apparently also go into the determination.
First
there is the selection and approval of the committee which is to write the
standard and the determination that it was as broad a base in the particular
field as possible. One factor not considered at length in testimony is the theory
of planning somewhat unusual duties and responsibilities on members of ANSI,
and their individual committee members, to keep the member organization
informed of the work of ANSI committees in writing standards. At the same time
the individual is charged with the responsibility of interpreting the attitude
of the organization he represents—and its members—in the development of the
standards work.
Testimony
of Committee members does not disclose any particular attention having been paid
to these responsibilities.
The
following quotation from ‘The ASA System’ (Secretary’s Exhibit S–1) is of
interest in this connection.
‘These principles
require thoroughgoing responsibility on the part of cooperating bodies and
their representatives—responsibility in three senses, viz:
(a) Responsibility
in representation. It is the duty of a representative (1) to keep sufficiently
in touch with his organization so that he can correctly interpret its attitude
in the development of the work and can participate in decisions in committees;
(2) to keep his organization informed of developments; (3) to act as a leader in
the formulation of the policies of his organization in regard to the matters
with which he is dealing; and (4) to refer back to his organization questions
upon which he feels unauthorized to speak for it;.....’
The
statement was made above that the number of ‘persons interested and affected’
who reach ‘substantial agreement’ on the adoption of the standard is academic.
The fact is, nobody reaches substantial agreement—or any other
kind of agreement—on the adoption of an ANSI consensus standard except the
individual committee members writing the standard and the organizations
they represent.
The
organizations are usually not the employers but trade or other associations, or
the like. ‘Substantial agreement’ could also be said to be reached by
subsequent reviewing authorities within the ANSI organization itself.
It
is not only a matter of common knowledge, but it is the uncontradicted evidence
in this record; that except in unusual circumstances not here shown, no member
of a trade association or similar organization allows the organization to act
for it, agree to anything for it, to speak for it, to express an opinion for
it, or to commit it in any way.
The
evidence in this record does not include all the 13 or 14 organizations
constituting the ANSI 01 committee in 1954 and 1961. It does, however, include
the following:
Nixon deTarnowsky testified that ANSI’s members do not
authorize the organization to make any decision for them involving judgment or
to speak for them on any matter involving the technical content of a standard.
He is familiar with the operation and practices of trade associations and has
represented at least one. With respect to the representative and in connection
with ANSI procedures, he testified:
‘Q. But he
normally speaks for the association and industry or the trade association only,
not for individual members?
A. That’s right.
He’s a representative of the association. This is his function.
Q. I wonder if it
isn’t usually the practice for a trade association representative to be very
careful not to speak in the names of the individual members?
A. That is
correct, they do. They must remember they are speaking for an association and
not for their company or themselves.’
(Tr. S166–167)
David
Zabriskie is an employee of the American Insurance Association and Secretary of
the ANSI Committee. ‘Roughly’ all company members who subscribe to the
engineering and safety services of the Association write workmens compensation
insurance. These are the largest stock casualty companies in the country
(formerly constituting the Association of Casualty and Surety Companies).
Zabriskie testified that there are some mutual companies who are now members.
There
are 150 to 160 of these companies writing workmen’s compensation insurance. The
record does not show how many million policy holders they have or how many such
policy holders own or operate saws of the type covered by the woodworking
machine guarding standards in question. A fair inference can be drawn the
number is very large.
Neither Zabriskie nor any other representative of the
American Insurance Association has authority from any member company to ‘agree’
to anything, to speak for it, or to make any decision or express an opinion on
the question of the adoption of any safety standard. If the committee member is
a company employee, he is authorized to speak and vote for the Association
only, not for his company. This situation is often the case. Nelson, the
current chairman of the ANSI 01 Committee, is an employee of St. Paul Fire and
Marine. Steinman, the previous Chairman, was an employee of the United States
Fidelity and Guaranty Company.
No
company member of the American Insurance Association has authority from any
policy holder to speak for it, ‘agree’ for it, take any position for it or
express any opinion for it on any matter having to do with a safety standard.
Every policy holder (in case of its insurance company) and every company (in
case of its trade association) jealously guards its own right to ‘agree’,
‘assent’, ‘take a position’, ‘take action’, or withhold it, and in all respects
to form its own opinions and conclusions and to express them on all
matters—including safety.
Lewis
R. Morrision was a representative of the National Association of Mutual
Casualty Companies on the ANSI 01 Committee in 1954. He was an employee of the
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company of Chicago. The trade association he
represented was made up of the large mutual companies writing workmens
compensation insurance.
The
same facts are true with respect to Mr. Morrison as with Mr. Zabriskie. He
spoke for—voted for—only the trade association—not his employer or any other
company. No company member of the trade association had authority to take any
action or position or express any view on behalf of any of its policy holders.
A.
A. Skonning, Senior Engineer, Western Electric Company, was a representative on
the committee in 1954 and 1961 for the National Safety Council. Dan Adair, an
employee of the Safety Council, was also a representative. Both were active in
the work of the committee for a considerable number of years.
In
1970, the National Safety Council had 9,000 members, 8,000 of them industrial concerns.
Others included labor unions and insurance companies. In 1963, a listing was
developed of 28,000 industrial plants involved in memberships of the National
Safety Council.
No
member of the National Safety Council authorized either Skonning or Adair to
speak for it, act for it, or do anything else in connection with safety. As a
member of the committee, Mr. Skonning voted only on behalf of the National
Safety Council, not on behalf of Western Electric.
Joseph
J. Prabulos represented the Associated Cooperage Industries, a trade
association, on the committee in its work resulting in the revision of the
standard in 1954, its reaffirmation in 1961 and its further revision in 1971.
He was employed as Safety Director of the National Distillers and Chemical
Corporation.
Prabulos’
recollection was that the trade association had about 130 member companies. As
a committee member, he spoke and voted only for the trade association, not for
his employer. In other respects his testimony is the same as that of the witnesses
just mentioned except that, in addition, he had no specific instructions or
authorization from the trade association on how to cast any vote with respect
to the standard.
As
with the other witnesses, Mr. Prabulos had no contact or communication with the
member companies of his trade association, or with his own company, with
respect to the work of the ANSI committee.
In
fact, each committee member who testified was an expert in his field, and used
his own judgment in casting his vote in a manner that caused the committee to
be in substantial agreement.
It
would serve no useful purpose to speculate on the precise meaning of
‘substantial agreement’ to the extent of framing a definition. Certainly it
means much less than formal and recorded agreement, either written or oral. It
might be inferred from inaction—with knowledge of essential facts—rather than
from any positive action.
At
a minimum there must be some communication—or chance to communicate—by a person
held to be in ‘substantial agreement.’ In any event, to hold that many
thousands of people are in ‘substantial agreement’ means more than the best
judgment of safety experts about what they are thinking; when the experts have
received no communications from them as to what they are thinking, and no
authority from anyone to take or withhold any action.
At
the conclusion of the first three days of testimony and at the request of
counsel for Respondent, the case was continued to September 17. Although not so
limited, this was principally for the purpose of obtaining further evidence
tending to improve the record as to the number of ‘persons interested and
affected by the scope or provisions of the standard.’
Most
of the evidence we have is general—some of it vague. From the total, however,
certain valid inferences may be drawn, particularly with respect to minimum
numbers of persons who may be so interested and affected.
A
number of documents, or portions of them, were introduced in evidence. With the
background record of the insurance and cooperage industries, the National
Safety Council, and the ANSI members, perhaps reference to one and a
stipulation in connection with it would be sufficient for our present purpose.
Mr.
George J. Tichy, counsel for Konkolville, did not testify. By stipulation,
however, the equivalent of his testimony was received.
It
was stipulated that, based on Respondent’s Exhibit S–8, that portion having to
do with lumber, sawmills and wood products, Mr. Tichy would testify if he were
called as a witness, and based upon his experience in the industry, not only as
counsel but also including extensive experience as a workman; that in 1954,
1961, 1971 and 1973 there were no less than 30,000 industrial users of the
types of saws found in Section 4.1 of ANSI 01.1 1954 (R 1961) and adopted
thereafter as 29 CFR 1910.213. The stipulation was further that on each of the
dates the number of such saws in use was no less than 50,000.
It
was further agreed that the stipulation might be accepted in lieu of Mr.
Tichy’s testimony, that he was qualified to testify to the facts stated, and
that the stipulation might be so used even though Tichy was in court and could
have taken the witness stand.
It
is of interest to note that so far as all the logging and sawmill, as well as
the Northwest Plywood industries are concerned; there was no
representative—either company or trade association—on the ANSI 01 Committee.
One of the reasons assigned for this was that at the time a ‘vertical’ standard
for sawmills was being considered and prepared. (29 CFR 1910.265)
From
the foregoing it is abundantly clear that the ANSI national consensus standard
here under consideration does not meet the definition of Section 3(9)(1) of the
Act, as having been adopted ‘under procedures whereby it can be determined by
the Secretary that persons interested and affected by the scope or provisions
of the standard have reached substantial agreement on its adoption.’
One
can but conclude that Congress mandated the use of national consensus standards
as occupational safety and health standards under the Act, espoused their
adoption as interim regulations and under abbreviated procedures, sought to
speed their promulgation and implementation; and at the same time adopted a
statutory definition that no national consensus standard could meet. At least
the standard here under consideration does not meet it.
The
third question for decision is whether the ANSI 01.1 1954 (R 1961) standard
‘was formulated in a manner which afforded an opportunity for diverse views to
be considered.....’.’
In
an earlier explanation of the working of ANSI, reference was made to ‘a public
review and comment period.’ References to this procedure under the same or
similar language are in several places in the Legislative History.
Nixon
deTarnowsky testified the present system started in 1969. Previous efforts,
while not haphazard, were much less complete.
‘The old ASA
system did not include a public review and comment period such as we have now.
The old system relied exclusively on the membership of the ASA system. It was
published in the Magazine of Standards, however, which was given general
distribution, and was subscribed to by a great many more companies, but as I
understand it the public review and comment, as we have it today, did not exist
at the time 01 was promulgated.’
(Tr. S154–155)
The
Magazine of Standards was published by ANSI. Its circulation is not shown.
Other trade publications reproduced proposals with respect to the adoption of
standards.
Mr.
Cestrone testified he had no difficulty in knowing of any ANSI action
contemplated in which he was interested over the years. At the same time, however,
it appears that for many years he was active in ANSI and served on many of its
committees and bodies.
In
general, the record indicates dissemination of information about proposed
actions regarding standards before the change in 1969. The change brought about
a much wider and more selective distribution of information, and also brought
into effect a number of new procedures with respect to comments received.
The
statute does not designate whose ‘diverse views’ are to be considered;
or who must be ‘afforded an opportunity.’ If the ‘opportunity’ and
‘diverse views’ are limited to safety professionals, there would be compliance
with the statute.
Nor
is there a specific provision about who is to do the ‘considering.’ By
implication, however, this would be some part of the ANSI organization.
There
is no indication Congress intended that a procedure such as that provided by
Section 6(b) of the Act was thought to be required of private
standards-producing organizations. No attempt is made to spell out times, places,
manners of publication or other dissemination of information or methods used.
Under
all the circumstances, we feel there was no failure on the part of ANSI to meet
the requirements of Section 3(9)(2) in its adoption or promulgation of the
standard here under consideration.
In
order that there may be no misunderstanding, I should like to make it clear
there is no intention in this decision to criticize anybody.
First,
the Secretary of Labor was required by Section 6(a) of the Act to adopt
national consensus standards as occupational safety and health standards
‘unless he determines that the promulgation of such a standard would not result
in improved safety or health for specifically designated employees.’
There
are numerous references in the Legislative History to the assumption—stated as
fact—that national consensus standards of ANSI and NFPA met the tests of the
definition Section of the Act; even though the ANSI standard here under review
did not. All the Congressional views were known to the people in the Labor
Department charged with the responsibility of developing the program.
Mr.
Cestrone and his organization of about 60 people did a monumental job in about
34 days in putting together the package. There must have been many other people
in the Department of Labor under similar pressure. It just happens their
identities and efforts have not come to our attention.
Least
of all do we consider this decision any criticism of the American National
Standards Institute; its philosophies, its procedure or its results. The
procedures have been tested by time and found to be in the public interest, and
specifically in the interest of occupational safety and health. Nothing here
should be construed as in any way reflecting on the integrity or effectiveness
of ANSI or of any of its procedures or results. It simply has a statutory
definition of ‘consensus’ that its procedures cannot meet—nor could those of
any other private organization setting out to do the same job.[3]
The
Citation and Proposed Penalty must be vacated and the Complaint of the
Secretary dismissed with prejudice.
Based
upon a review of the entire record in this case, the undersigned hereby makes
the following
FINDINGS
OF FACT
I
Respondent
Juhr & Sons is a general partnership with its principal place of business
in Portland, Oregon. It is engaged in the contracting business. On January 19,
1973, it was one of several general contractors constructing an Administrative
Services Building on the campus of the University of Oregon at Eugene. At its
worksite there it had 25 employees and in its entire organization, about 30.
II
At
all times material to this case Respondent used building materials, machinery
and other goods brought into the state of Oregon from points outside the state.
It used the mails, telephone and other facilities in interstate commerce. It
was engaged in a business affecting commerce.
III
On
January 19, 1973 Respondent’s worksite at Eugene, Oregon was inspected by a
Compliance Officer of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, United
States Department of Labor. As a result a citation was issued on February 16,
1973 alleging Respondent was in violation of Section 5(a)(2) of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 by failing to comply with the
machine guarding standard for woodworking machinery set out in 29 CFR
1910.213(h)(1), in having its employees use at the worksite a radial arm saw
with no guard covering the lower portion of the blade. Respondent gave
Complainant timely notice of contest of the citation and of the proposed
penalty in the amount of $550.00.
IV
On
January 19, 1973 the radial arm saw described was at Respondent’s worksite,
available for use by its employees. There is no evidence it was used that day,
but by admitting the facts constituting the violation, such use is admitted.
There is some evidence it was used other times, but no evidence as to when, by
how many employees or in what manner. The employees who used it were
experienced and well trained in its use.
V
The
Secretary purported to promulgate 29 CFR 1910.213 as a national consensus
standard by publication on May 29, 1971 in 34 Fed. Reg. 10466. The source
standard is one of the American National Standards Institute, adopted in 1954
and reaffirmed in 1961, commonly known as ANSI 01.1 1954 (R 1961).
VI
A
headnote to ANSI 01.1 1954 (R 1961) at the beginning of Section 4.1 thereof
provides:
‘NOTE: It is
recognized that the standards for saw guards in 4.1 are not perfectly
applicable to all operations for which saws are used. The standards given are
those which woodworkers have agreed are most generally useful. Since there are
a considerable number of cases not satisfactorily met by these standards, the
enforcing authority should exercise rather wide latitude in allowing the use of
other devices which give promise of affording adequate protection. It may be
expected that by so doing further progress in saw guarding will be encouraged.’
Section
213(h)(1) of Part 1910 was derived from Section 4.1.9 RADIAL SAWS (a) Hoods and
Guards of ANSI 01.1 1954 (R 1961). The headnote is an integral part of Sec. 4.1
and every sub-section and part thereof. Section 4.1.9(a) with the headnote
produces the result that the use of lower blade guards for radial arm saws is
optional. Section 213(h)(1) of Part 1910 has the effect of requiring the use of
lower blade guards for all radial arm saws, at all times used. Its requirements
are mandatory. The meaning, scope and application of the source standard are
thereby materially changed.
VII
ANSI
01.1 1954 (R 1961) before its purported adoption by the Secretary, had not been
adopted and promulgated by a nationally recognized standards-producing
organization under procedures whereby it could be determined by the Secretary
that persons interested and affected by the scope or provisions of the standard
had reached substantial agreement on its adoption. In fact, only the 13 or 14
organizational members of the committee writing the standard—not the
corporations or other persons constituting such organizations—and the
individuals representing them, along with members of the Safety Technical
Advisory Board and the Board of Standards Review of ANSI had reached such
substantial agreement.
VIII
ANSI
01.1 1954 (R 1961) was formulated in a manner which afforded an opportunity for
diverse views to be considered.
Based
upon the foregoing and upon all facts admitted, stipulated, or proved by
uncontradicted substantial credible evidence, the undersigned hereby makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW
I
Respondent
is engaged in a business affecting commerce within the provisions of 3(3) of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. The Review Commission has
jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter of this action.
II
ANSI
01.1 1954 (R 1961) was not enacted in part as 29 CFR 1910.213(h)(1) because the
Secretary was acting in excess of his statutory authority in the deletion of
the headnote to Sec. 4.1.
III
ANSI
01.1 1954 (R 1961) is not a national consensus standard as defined in Sec. 3
(9) of the Act.
IV
29
CFR 1910.213(h)(1) was not a valid enactment by the Secretary of a national
consensus standard, under Sec. 6(a) of the Act. 29 CFR 1910.213(h)(1) is
invalid and unenforceable.
The
Respondent is entitled to an Order vacating the citation and proposed penalty,
and dismissing the Complaint of the Secretary with prejudice.
ORDER
Based
upon the foregoing:
I
IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED:
That
the Citation for Serious Violation issued by Complainant to Respondent February
16, 1973 and reciting therein the operation of a radial arm saw in Eugene, Oregon
on January 19, 1973 in violation of 29 CFR 1910.213(h)(1) and the proposed
penalty in the amount of $550.00 be and the same hereby are Vacated.
II
IT
IS FURTHER ORDERED:
That
the Complaint of the Secretary be and the same hereby is dismissed with prejudice.
Dated: April 16, 1976
GARL WATKINS, Judge
[1] Respondent’s
notice of contest did not contest the non-serious citation or penalties. Judge
Watkins so found and we agree.
[2] Wording of the
decision from this point will probably be identical to that covering the same
questions in the decisions of the other cases.
Footnotes will point out the start and finish of the decisional language
repeated in each case.
[3] This end that
part of the decision which is the same as a number of others, as mentioned in
footnote 1.