SECRETARY OF LABOR, Complainant, v. SEIBEL MODERN MANUFACTURING & WELDING CORPORATION, Respondent. OSHRC Docket No. 88-0821 DECISION Before: FOULKE, Chairman; MONTOYA and WISEMAN, Commissioners. BY THE COMMISSION: At issue is a single serious citation item alleging that "[h]elpers or attendants" did not have "proper" eye protection while performing tack welding operations.[[1/]] The administrative law judge vacated the citation item on the basis that the helpers involved in this case were not exposed to hazards necessitating eye protection. The judge did not reach other issues, including the employer's affirmative defenses. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judge's decision and remand the case for a determination consistent with the principles of law discussed herein. I. _The Employer's Tack Welding Operation_ During several months in late 1987 and early 1988, Gordon DeLeys, a compliance officer with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"), of the United States Department of Labor, conducted an inspection of Seibel Modern Manufacturing & Welding Corporation ("Seibel" or "the employer") [[2/]] Seibel manufactures industrial-size, metal battery cases at a fabrication shop in Lancaster, New York. On five separate occasions at the shop during his inspection, Compliance Officer DeLeys observed a tack welding operation performed by two welders with two helpers, working in pairs.[[3/]] Each pair of employees, a welder and a helper, were fitting together, and tack welding into position, metal pieces of battery cases. Tack welding holds the metal pieces precisely in place for the next step in the manufacturing process, continuous welding. Seibel has two tack welding operations, a one-employee operation for small battery cases (30-50 pounds), and the two-employee operation at issue here, handling large battery cases (up to 1,000 pounds or more). In the two-employee operation, which Compliance Officer DeLeys observed, the welders were wearing welding helmets having appropriately shaded lenses. However, the helpers eye protection consisted solely of, at best, street-wear prescription spectacles having clear (unshaded) lenses. Because the welders and helpers were the same distance (approximately two feet) from the arcs, Compliance Officer DeLeys believed that the helpers, like the welders, should be equipped with appropriately shaded lenses. The risk created by the absence of this protection was welding flash--that is, corneal burns which, if repeated, could lead to blindness. Seibel's president, Leon Seibel, who testified at the hearing, was "not personally aware of any cases of weld[ing] flash that either of my two [helpers] have indicated to me." One helper had worked in the tack welding operation for eight years; and the other had worked for twenty-five years. President Seibel suggested that helpers did not need shaded lenses because the metal pieces being welded often shielded the arc from view and, in any instance where metal was not successfully shielding an arc, the welder could usually cup a gloved hand around it, to block the helper's view. Nevertheless, Compliance Officer DeLeys observed the helpers looking toward bare arcs and, on the basis of these observations, estimated that the arcs were unshielded 25 percent of the time. President Seibel acknowledged a possibility that the arcs were not always shielded, and he posited that a helper could, as a last resort, look away from an arc. However, as we will describe in greater detail, the president's testimony describing the operation tends to confirm that a helper generally needs to watch whether the metal pieces are fitting together correctly. Compliance Officer DeLeys testified along the same lines, that a helper frequently must look toward the arc to assure that he is holding the metal pieces in the correct position. President Seibel testified that the helpers use rulers and must be able to see well enough for precision within plus or minus 1/32 inch. Therefore, according to the president and the employer's expert witness, Gary Howard, of Mills Welding Supply, the helpers could not wear the safety glasses or goggles with deep shaded lenses that were suggested by Compliance Officer DeLeys.[[4/]] President Seibel particularly noted that deep-shaded lenses would prevent a helper from seeing the ruler markings while he is lining up the metal pieces and fitting them together. According to President Seibel, a welder wears a deep-shaded lens while making a tack weld only in order to be able to see during that short time: "[T]he light [from the arc] is generally so bright that [a welder] would not be able to see what he [is] doing unless he ha[s] a shaded lens." But, President Seibel indicated, if a helper were required at all times to wear safety glasses or goggles having deep-shaded lenses, he would not be able to see during the process of assembling the metal pieces, which is done in ordinary light, in preparation for the tack welding. Compliance Officer DeLeys suggested that this difficulty could be eliminated by having the helpers wear welding helmets or flip down shades, and flip these temporary forms of eye protection down only when ready for a tack weld. President Seibel indicated, in reply, that a helper cannot "shake his head down similar to what a welder does" (to cause a flip-down helmet to fall into place over the face). A helper's hands are occupied with keeping the large, often warped metal pieces from shifting, and the action of flipping a helmet into position could contribute to imprecision: Q. What, if anything, would prevent your [helper] from lining up the material with the ruler or measuring device, [then] when he had it lined up, putting on a dark shaded eye protection, and then communicating to the tack welder, proceed? A. He would not be able to see what the material has done as soon as he put his eye shade on compared to when the tacking operation commences. Q. He has already lined it up, what is there for him to-- A. It doesn't--it doesn't stay lined up as easily as you are alluding to....[I]t is essentially level material and when it is sheared, it in most cases will get a slight bow to it and in doing so[,] when we put the material together, certain force has to be exerted to spring the material into position and [to hold it] there at the instantaneous point where it has to be tacked. And if he were to have a dark shade on, he would not be able to see the ruler operation[:] the ruler dimension he is trying to [adhere to] as he is holding the material and trying to spring it in[to] position. The rulers used by Seibel were yellow with black markings. In response to questioning by the Secretary's attorney, Seibel's president testified that Seibel had not tried using "magnified rulers.[[5/]] Nor had Seibel tried using a jig, which is a mechanical device used to hold pieces of metal in the correct position while they are being assembled. President Seibel testified, however, that a helper could not be replaced with a jig because, for the largest battery cases, the jig would have to be "enormous." Also, a jig would need to be adjustable to fit many different-size cases, or there would need to be many different-size jigs: [W]e have about 5,000 different sizes and we only run these battery cases sometimes one or two at a time[,] maybe five or ten at a time. A jig operation is out of the question. Specifically: [W]e can not have a jig for every size. We get new sizes constantly, new dimensions constantly[;] the dimensions are [often] changed and it would be strictly inappropriate to be able to jig up that particular material and if we could, we would have a long time ago, believe me. Moreover: You can not make [a jig] adjustable for as many varied sizes and types. They are not all square steel boxes. Some are rectangular, some have indentations in them, some have appurtenances that have to be added to them[;] they have different types of hinging on them in some cases. Lifting apparatuses have to be attached to them. Without you knowing the operation, it is extremely difficult for me to try to describe all the different things that go on in that particular operation to a point in time. Q. Correct me if I am wrong. But what you are saying is not [that] it would be impossible, but rather [that] it would be very time consuming and therefore very costly. A. No. I am saying it would be impossible. President Seibel went on to note that making adjustments to a jig on a piece-by-piece basis "sounds very simple the way you are describing it and I wish it could be that simple, but it is not." The most substantial problem would be that the jig could not properly hold in place the many heavier metal pieces that are "slightly bowed," therefore requiring pressure to force (or "spring") them into the precise position. In addition, President Seibel suggested that there could be an increased risk of welding flash if helpers began to depend on flip-down eye protection. According to President Seibel's testimony, a helper without any eye protection could shield himself behind the metal pieces and, if that proved ineffective, the welder could cup his gloved hand around the arc. However, if a helper had eye protection to put on, neither he nor the welder would concentrate any longer on providing shielding; instead, the welder might proceed with the weld while the helper was still trying to adjust his flip-down lenses or shake down his helmet. As President Seibel stated: "If a [helper] mistimes his helmet coming down to when he tells the [welder] to tack the two pieces of metal and my [welder] does not use a hand over the arc flash as they have alluded to, then we would have more probability of having weld[ing] flash to my [helpers]." II. _The Secretary's Proof of a Violation_ To establish a violation of a standard, the Secretary must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the cited standard applies, (2) its terms were not met, (3) employees had access to the violative condition, and (4) the employer knew or could have known of it with the exercise of reasonable diligence. See, e.g., Walker Towing Corp., 14 BNA OSHC 2072, 2074, 1991 CCH OSHD ¶ 29,239, p. 39,157 (No. 87-1359, 1991). In this case, there is no question of applicability, as the cited standard covers "all arc welding" operations and covers "[h]elpers"; no question of access, as the helpers could and did look toward the welding arcs in the normal course of tack-welding work; and no question of knowledge, as Seibel knew of the conditions under which the helpers were working. The one question relating to the Secretary's burden of proof is whether the terms of the standard were not met, that is, specifically, whether Seibel failed to comply with the cited standard's requirement for "proper eye protection." Seibel contends that clear lenses were sufficient eye protection for the helpers, and therefore "proper" within the meaning of the standard, because of a relative lack of hazard from the welding operation as it was performed at Seibel's fabrication shop. Former Administrative Law Judge Foster Furcolo agreed, concluding that the "uncontradicted testimony that the Respondent's method of welding had been carried on for some 25 years without any accident or injury to any employee" shows "that its method of welding is non[ ]hazardous." For the following reasons, we set aside the judge's decision and hold that the cited standard was violated in this case. The cited standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.252(e)(2)(i)(a), governs the "selection" of "[e]ye protection" for employees involved in welding. It explicitly requires that "[h]elmets or hand shields shall be used during all arc welding operations" and that "[h]elpers or attendants shall be provided with proper eye protection." See note 1 supra. The standard does not specify that the degree of protection "proper" for helpers is the same as for welders, but in a nearby, related standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.252(e)(2)(ii), there are apparently comprehensive "[s]pecifications for protectors" that imply that lenses having a degree of shading are part of "proper" eye protection. In other words, the specifications indicate that clear lenses are not "proper" protection. Notably, two of the specifications are the following: Lenses shall bear some permanent distinctive marking by which the source and shade may be readily identified. The following is a guide for the selection of the proper shade numbers. These recommendations may be varied to suit the individual's needs.[[6/]] Also, the final specification of 1910.252(e)(2)(ii) states: All filter lenses...shall meet the test for transmission of radiant energy prescribed in ANSI Z87.1-1968--American National Standard Practice for Occupational and Educational Eye and Face Protection. The significant piece of information to be gleaned from the referenced ANSI test is that clear lenses are not "filter lenses," and are not meant to give the same type of protection. ANSI section 6.3.3.3.3 states that "[c]lear lenses shall transmit not less than 89 percent of the incident luminous radiation" (emphasis added). But ANSI section 6.3.3.3.2 states that "[f]ilter lenses shall meet the radiant-energy-transmission requirements specified in Table 1." Filter lenses, as defined by the latter ANSI section, are shade numbers 4 through 14. Shade numbers 1.7 through 3 are "[a]bsorptive lenses," according to section 6.3.3.3.1, which also specifies that this type of lens must meet the "radiant-energy-transmission requirements" of Table 1. The table limits not only luminous transmissions but infrared and ultraviolet. Actually, according to the table, even the lightest shade number--1.5 (which apparently is not even an absorptive lens)--cuts luminous transmittance to 55-67 percent, infrared to 25 percent, and ultraviolet to 0.2 to 65 percent (different percentages for four different wavelengths). In sum, these lenses--filter, absorptive, and other shades--must meet specific requirements limiting transmittance across the full spectrum of light. Clear lenses, however, are not subject to these requirements and actually must not fail to transmit most of the luminous portion of the spectrum. On review, [[7]] Seibel maintains that the cited standard does not state or imply that shaded lenses are "proper" eye protection in an arc welding operation employing an electrode smaller than the ones listed in the guide accompanying the cited standard, _see_ note 6 _supra_, and Seibel endorse the judge's rationale that the Secretary failed to prove a hazard. As we have discussed, however, and as the Secretary argues, the cited standard implicitly presumes a hazard where clear lenses, only, are being used. For every employee involved in arc welding, welders and helpers alike, the standards, requires a degree of eye protection that includes shaded lenses. _CF._ _Vanco Construction, Inc._, 11 BNA OSHC 1058, 1071, 1983-84 CCH OSHD ¶ 26,372, p. 33,454 (No. 79-4945, 1982), _aff'd_, 723 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1984) (a broadly worded eye protection standard is not vague because there is a "guide in the selection of eye and face protection" that informs employers of appropriate protection for various operations). The fact that smaller electrodes of the size used by Seibel are not listed in the guide associated with the cited standard does not mean that helpers exposed to arcs from such electrodes may work without protection. The "guide" is exactly that, a guide, and employers must make reasonable efforts apply its guidance to their own operations. _Cf._, _Towne Construction Co._, 12 BNA OSHC 2185, 2188-89, 1986-87 CCH OSH ¶ 27,760, pp. 36,310-11 (No. 83-1262, 1986), _aff'd_ 847 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1988) (load chart listing some weight limits applicable to specified situations provides sufficient notice to use an extrapolation method to determine the precise limit in other situations).[[8/]] Because the cited standard presumes a hazard where clear lenses rather than shaded lenses are being used, the employer is not free to leave helpers unprotected. The Secretary has established that Seibel was not using a "proper" degree of protection. III. Seibel's Reliance upon Previous OSHA Inspections Seibel's brief raises a defense based on several earlier OSHA inspections, which did not result in any citations concerning eye protection for the helpers. President Seibel states in the brief: Since the other, much more experienced, compliance officers in more comprehensive inspections did not find any safety problems whatsoever in this area, and since the manner of assembling these battery cases is continuous throughout the work day and has not changed in forty years, I would assume [that Compliance Officer DeLeys'] inexperience and obvious lack of immediate knowledge led him to an erroneous conclusion. Also, at the hearing, President Seibel had testified: [I]n all the previous inspections[,] and we have had more thorough and comprehensive inspections the last 2 or 3 times than what we received this particular time, and none of those operations which have not changed, have they ever minutely mentioned anything at all concerning our assembly and welding operations. Regarding shading for the fitters, in no way did they mention anything regarding eye protection for the two man operation and they have viewed that operation completely. In short, Seibel infers from the uneventful prior inspections that there must have been no hazard, and Seibel asks us to draw the same inference against OSHA, despite the cited OSHA standard's presumption of a hazard. We should not, Seibel basically contends, hold the employer liable where OSHA had earlier opportunities to issue citations but chose not to do so. In other cases, the Commission has rejected essentially the same contention, that is, that the failure of OSHA to cite certain conditions deprived the employer of notice that those conditions were either hazardous or in violation of OSHA standards. The Commission has cautioned employers against freely drawing such inferences from uneventful inspections, however, for "[c]ertainly, an employer is required to comply with a standard regardless of whether it has previously been informed that a violation exists." Simplex Time Recorder Co., 12 BNA OSHC 1591, 1596, 1984-85 CCH OSHD ¶ 27,456, p. 35,572 (No. 82-12, 1985). In Columbian Art Works, Inc., 10 BNA OSHC 1132, 1133, 1981 CCH OSHD ¶ 25,737, p. 32,102 (No. 78-29, 1981), the Commission more pointedly warned: "OSHA's failure to issue a citation following an inspection does not grant an employer immunity from enforcement of applicable occupational safety and health standards." That the employer lacked notice of any noncompliance was the argument rejected in Columbian Art Works and a related case, GAF Corp., 9 BNA OSHC 1451, 1457, 1981 CCH OSHD ¶ 25,281, pp. 31,246-47 (No. 77-1811, 1981). These cases implicitly rule against deducing from uneventful prior inspections that particular operations are nonhazardous. See also International Harvester Co. v. OSHRC, 628 F.2d 982, 985 n.3 (7th Cir. 1980) (earlier failure to cite for violation of a particular standard is not a decision that the employer was complying). Cf. Cedar Construction Co. v.OSHRC, 587 F.2d 1303, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("[w]e believe that recognizing such a right [to rely on uneventful prior inspections] would discourage self-enforcement of the Act by businessmen who have far greater knowledge about conditions at their workplaces than do OSHA inspectors"). In Cardinal Industries, 14 BNA OSHC 1008, 1011, 1989 CCH OSHD ¶ 28,510, p. 37,801 (No. 82-427, 1989), the Commission upheld an employer's view that "the circumstances of the earlier OSHA inspections deprived it of fair notice" of a requirement to use safety belts. However, the earlier inspection had produced a citation for the very same condition as was later cited, the earlier compliance officer had actually indicated approval of the very form of abatement that was later alleged to be insufficient, and "it was far from clear that any OSHA standard addressed that particular fall hazard." 14 BNA OSHC at 1011-12, 1989 CCH OSHD at p. 37,801.[[9/]] In Cardinal, there was a second lack-of-notice argument, which is more closely analogous to the situation now before us. The Commission rejected this second argument because the earlier citation had not included the condition and had not prescribed its abatement. During the earlier inspection and during a follow-up inspection, the compliance officer had been in the vicinity of the condition, but "the mere fact of Mershon twice inspecting this area and not detecting violations does not exculpate Cardinal." 14 BNA OSHC at 1013, 1989 CCH OSHD p. 37,803. In rejecting the employer's argument, the Commission cited _Columbian Art Works_ and _Lukens Steel Co._, 10 BNA OSHC 1115, 1981 CCH OSHD ¶ 25,742 (No. 76-1053, 1981). _Lukens_ is particularly pertinent to the case now before us: According to Respondent, this [prior] failure to issue a citation [for] the pouring platform supports an inference that the employees wore appropriate equipment. We disagree. The Commission's function is to decide the cases before it, not to rule on the propriety of the Secretary's actions in other cases . . . . Accordingly, we will not speculate on the Secretary's determinations in an earlier inspection. Further, because compliance with the Act is a continuing obligation, an employer cannot deny the existence of or its knowledge of a cited hazard by relying on the Secretary's earlier failure to cite the condition. . . . Consequently, the Secretary's failure to cite conditions on the pouring platform during the earlier inspection does not "exculpate" the Respondent or preclude a finding that the violation now before us was willful. 10 BNA OSHC at 1126, 1981 CCH OSHD at p. 32,122 (case cites omitted). In essence, the mere fact of prior inspections does not give rise to an inference that OSHA made an earlier decision that there was no hazard, and does not preclude the Secretary from pursuing a later citation. For this reason, Seibel's argument must be rejected. In this case, the Secretary could properly cite Seibel for violating the OSHA standard. Also, as we have discussed, the Secretary has established a violation. We turn therefore to Seibel's other affirmative defenses, which the judge did not consider. IV. _The Affirmative Defense of Greater Hazard _ A. _Contentions of the Parties_ Seibel contends that the wearing of shaded lenses would have endangered the fitters. "[A]ny uncovered weld would have to be timed exactly... so that the shaded lens[es] in the helmets are in position at the correct time," otherwise the employer "might have occur[re]nces of weld[ing] flash whereas now we have had none." Also, if a helper cannot "see what he is doing, the situation to him becomes more dangerous since the materials are quite heavy with sharp corners and edges." [[10/]] The Secretary contends that Seibel's argument is "mere speculation." She argues: Respondent seems to assert that having no shaded lenses at all would be better than having shaded lenses which possibly may not be in the proper position one hundred percent of the time... [T]he Commission has rejected an all-or-nothing approach. Moreover . . . welders have often failed to cover the weld arc with their hands even when helmets were not worn by the fitters. In view of the incidence of exposure presently occurring, it cannot be said that respondent has demonstrated an increased hazard. The Secretary further notes that, "[b]ecause the welding operation is a regular part of respondent's business, no excuse appears for Seibel's failure to seek a variance if it believed its claim had merit." B. _The Elements of the Defense_ To establish a defense of greater hazard, an employer must prove that: (1) the hazards created by complying with the standard are greater than those of noncompliance, (2) other methods of protecting employees from the hazards are not available, and (3) a variance is not available or application for a variance is inappropriate. See Spancrete Northeast, Inc., 15 BNA OSHC 1020, 1022-23, 1991 CCH OSHD ¶ 29,313, pp. 39,356-39,357 (No. 86-521, 1991). These three elements are now well-established in court precedent. Id. at n. 3 (listing cases). An employer's proof of the unavailability or inappropriateness of a variance is particularly important. E.g., PBR, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 643 F.2d 890, 895 (1st Cir. 1981). In this case, Seibel has not presented any evidence of the unavailability or inappropriateness of a variance. On the contrary, the fact that the citation involves a regular and recurring operation at a permanent workplace strongly suggests that a variance application would be appropriate. Therefore, Seibel has not established this defense. V. _The Affirmative Defense of Infeasibility _ A. _Contentions of the Parties_ Seibel contends that shaded lenses at number 5 or greater would prevent a fitter from seeing what he is doing. "Our fitter has to measure accurately," Seibel states. In testimony, President Seibel drew the conclusion that production errors could become more frequent if a fitter had to put on shaded lenses because, as Seibel argues, a fitter has to "handle the material with both hands to effect the required gaps, [overlapping] of [the] material, etc. as the tacks are performed." The fitters function could not be supplanted by the use of jigs: [It is] out of the question except for the very smallest cases that are ordered in quantities of twenty-five or more at a time. In that case, we do utilize a jig fixture with one person to handle, assemble and tack a case. But, arguing the infeasibility of jigs for the two-person tack welding operations, Seibel asserts that "[w]e have reviewed our battery case assembly operation continuously for forty years," thereby implying that Seibel's own studies of its operations have continuously revealed that the functions now performed by helpers cannot instead be performed by jigs. The Secretary contends that Seibel, never having tried to use either appropriate eye protection or jigs, cannot simply assert that there would always be operational impediments to the use of eye protection The Secretary points out that: Even if . . . shaded lenses would have some effect on the fitter's ability to keep the [metal battery case] pieces lined up, there is no real evidence as to what number of defective welds could be expected . . . . Nor is there evidence as to the consequences of misaligned pieces. Can the pieces be rewelded or must they be scrapped? Is there a rejection/repair rate that reasonably must be borne? Also: Since respondent's expert agreed that even a 1.5 or 1.7 shade lens is 'certainly better than a clear lens,' and since there is no evidence negating the possible use of at least a 1.5 or a 1.7 lens, a violation is established on this basis alone. Similarly, the Secretary claims that jigs probably could be used to a "substantial" extent: Seibel's testimony indicates that the weight of the finished battery cases ranges from 30 pounds up to 1000 pounds, but there is no evidence of the numbers of cases manufactured in various size categories. There is similarly no indication of the relative numbers of cases with an irregular configuration. These gaps in the evidence work against respondent, which bears the burden of proving its affirmative defense. The Secretary asserts that an employer must do at least as much as is capable of being done, citing Bratton Furniture Manufacturing Co., 11 BNA OSHC 1433, 1434, 1983-84 CCH OSHD ¶ 26,538, p. 33,858 (No. 81-799-S, 1983). B. _The Case Law Defining Infeasibility_ From the outset of the Act's enforcement, the Commission has been faced with employers' claims that technological or economic problems precluded compliance with cited standards. Until relatively recently, our cases ruling on such claims stated that the employers must show that the abatement method required under the terms of the standard is "impossible" to use, in that it is physically impossible to implement or, if implemented, would preclude performance of necessary work. E.g., M.J. Lee Construction Co., 7 BNA OSHC 1140, 1144, 1979 CCH OSHD ¶ 23,330, p. 28,227 (No. 15094, 1979). In the mid-1980's, however, the Commission re-examined its precedent, and the many court cases stemming from it, and articulated a potentially less stringent test, "infeasibility". Dun-Par Engineered Form Co. , 12 BNA OSHC 1949, 1956-59, 1986-87 CCH OSHD ¶ 27,650, pp. 36,020-024 (No. 79-2553, 1986), rev'd in part, 843 F.2d 1135 (8th Cir. 1988) ("Dun-Par I-A"); compare Spancrete Northeast, Inc., 15 BNA OSHC at 1023, 1991 CCH OSHD at p. 39,357 (employer might have basis to assert infeasibility in a case where impossibility had not been raised) . That is, an employer could establish a defense by showing that compliance would be "infeasible under the circumstances." Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., 13 BNA OSHC 2209, 2213, 1987-90 CCH OSHD ¶ 28,494, p. 37,761 (No. 84-593, 1989), citing Dun-Par I-A, 12 BNA OSHC at 1953-56, 1986-87 CCH OSHD at pp. 36,021-024. The Secretary asserts in this case that Dun-Par I-A changed nothing but the terminology.[[11/]] In the Secretary's view, infeasibility necessarily means impossibility since the Supreme Court, in American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) ("ATMI"), defined "feasible" as "capable of being done." Thus the Secretary cautions in her brief herein: [I]f the Commission in Dun-Par intended the defense to be one of impracticality rather than impossibility, then this is a significant change. See Century Steel Erectors v. Dole, [888 F.2d 1399 (D. C. Cir. 1989)] ("practical" defined as "relating to, or manifested in practice or action; not theoretical or ideal"; the term "applies to things and to persons and implies proven success in meeting the demands made by actual living or use"; "feasible" means "capable of being done or carried out"). Contending that an impossibility test would be "more consonant with the Act," the Secretary points to court decisions rejecting considerations of "difficulty," such as interference with existing work practices. One such decision is the law of the circuit of this case: Brennan v. OSHRC (Underhill Construction Corp.), 513 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1975) ("Underhill'). There, the cited standard prohibited materials storage within 10 feet of an open floor edge, but the cited subcontractor maintained that compliance would interfere with a customary work practice, that of allowing reusable shoring and braces to overhang an open floor edge so that cranes could lift them to other floors. The Second Circuit observed: "[E]ven if the employer could raise [a] defense [of interference with work practices], on this record he did not meet his burden of showing that other means, e.g., strapping, chains, harnesses or the like, were not useable to permit ready crane removal of the shoring or steel braces." 513 F.2d at 1036 (emphasis added). The court indicated that employers should carefully consider other "useable" work practices. We conclude that there is no conflict between the law of the circuit and Commission precedent concerning this element of the infeasibility defense; neither requires proof of impossibility. In fact, the view of the Second Circuit in Underhill is entirely consistent with the Commission's in Dun-Par I-A. There, the question was "whether Dun-Par established that guardrails could not have been installed or would have disrupted the work to such a degree that there was no feasible way to use guardrails to protect Dun-Par's employees." 12 BNA OSHC at 1959, 1986-87 CCH OSHD at p. 36,027 (emphasis added). The Commission found that the use of guardrails was "theoretically possible" because it was physically possible to install them, but not "feasible" because they were incapable of being used anywhere for a sufficient length of time to serve any practical purpose of protection. 12 BNA OSHC at 1959-60, 1986-87 CCH OSHD at p. 36,027-028.[[12/]] Compare Dun-Par Engineered Form Co., 12 BNA OSHC 1962, 1966-67, 1985-87 CCH OSHD ¶ 27,651, pp. 36,033-2 to 36,033-3 (No. 82-928, 1986) ("Dun-Par II") (infeasibility defense rejected because the employer failed to demonstrate that the costs would be "unreasonable" or that the use of guardrails would be "unreasonable or senseless"; also, the work practices involving use of a crane to lift shoring materials off a floor could have been altered to accommodate guardrails). These cases show that employers must alter their customary work practices to the extent that alterations are reasonably necessary to accommodate the abatement measures specified by OSHA standards. That is, employers cannot generally avoid abatement by relying on industry custom and practice alone. These cases do not stand for the proposition, however, that employers cannot rely on genuinely practical circumstances revealing the unreasonableness of an abatement measure. An abatement measure must be useable, during employees' work activities, for its intended purpose of protecting employees. If there is no way to use a measure for its intended purpose without unreasonably disrupting the work activities, the mere fact that the measure's installation is physically possible does not in our view mean that we should compel the employer to install the measure. This is why we do not see fit to apply in a literal manner the ATMI definition of feasibility--"capable of being done"--and why we believe that the infeasibility test articulated in Dun-Par I-A is the only reasonable test. C. _The Burden of Proof on the Feasibility of Alternative Measures _ Early Commission precedent pertaining to affirmative defenses, in particular, the affirmative defense of infeasibility and the affirmative defense of greater hazard, which we have already discussed, established that employers must either implement the abatement methods prescribed by the OSHA standards or, to the extent the abatement methods prove unworkable because of infeasibility or greater hazard, implement an alternative protective measure.[[13/]] As is traditionally the case with affirmative defenses, the burden of proof under the early Commission precedent rested with the cited employer who believed that both duties, that is, the duty to comply with the standard and the duty to provide alternative protection, were incapable of performance because of physical conditions or work operations that were ongoing and inalterable, or counterproductive because of greater hazards. E.g. M.J. Lee, 7 BNA OSHC at 1144, 1979 CCH OSHD at p. 28,227. Cf., Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., 9 BNA OSHC 2126, 2131 n.16, 1981 CCH OSHD ¶ 25,578, pp. 31,901 n.16 (No. 78-6247, 1981) (burden of proof in Commission adjudication's is the preponderance of the evidence). In particular, to establish the affirmative defense that was known as the impossibility defense, an employer had to show "that (1) compliance with the requirements of the cited standard either would be functionally impossible or would preclude performance of required work, and (2) alternative means of employee protection are unavailable." Id. Prior, to the inspection in this case, however, the Commission's decision in Dun-Par I-A changed the defense from impossibility to infeasibility, as we have discussed, and altered the burden of proof with respect to the two elements of the defense, in that they were divided between the parties. That is, if an employer showed the infeasibility of the cited standard's abatement measure, the burden of proof shifted to the Secretary to show the feasibility of an alternative abatement measure. Dun-Par I-A, 12 BNA OSHC at 1956-59, 1986-87 CCH OSHD at pp. 36,024-27. The question of whether the Commission should reconsider its reallocation of the burdens of proof arose in April 1988 (prior to the November 1988 hearing in this case), when the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in response to the Secretary's appeal of Dun-Par I-A, reversed the Commission's ruling, holding that the Commission had erred in reallocating the burden of proof on alternative means of employee protection. Secretary v. Dun-Par Engineered Form Co., 843 F. 2d at 1137-40. The court's decision does not apply directly to the Seibel case, which arose in a different circuit, but in April 1989 (after the hearing in this case, but before the parties filed their arguments on review), a two-member Commission, in a decision implementing the court's decision and remand order, confirmed only tentatively that the commission would continue to follow its reallocation of the burden of proof. Dun-Par Engineered Form Co, 13 BNA OSHC 2147, 2150, 1987-90 CCH OSHD ¶ 28,495, p.37,764 (No. 79-2553, 1989) ("Dun-Par I-B").[[14/]] The parties in this case were directed to file their review briefs in late 1989. The Secretary relied on the Eighth Circuit's opinion to justify having not shouldered the burden of proof as to alternative measures for the purpose of the infeasibility defense: The Secretary disagrees with the Commission's reallocation of the burden of proof . . . . [T]he Commission overruled long-standing precedent that . . . the employer must show . . . there are no alternative abatement methods. . . . For the reasons set forth in the Eighth Circuit's decision . . . the employer must retain the burden . . . . Seibel, appearing pro se and apparently unaware that the law had changed, argued only that it had established the infeasibility of alternative measures. We now overrule Dun-Par I-A to the extent that it reallocates the burden of proof regarding the infeasibility of any alternative measures. For the reasons given in the Eighth Circuit's opinion, with which we agree, we hold that any employer seeking to be excused from implementing a cited standard's abatement measure on the basis of its infeasibility has the burden of establishing either that an alternative protective measure was used or that there was no feasible alternative measure. As noted, the parties have tried and argued this time is though the Commission never reallocated the burden or prove. Therefore, there remains only the matter of making appropriate findings of fact and conclusion of law as to whether Seibel has met the burden of proof. D. _Remand for Factual Findings and Legal Conclusion on the Affirmative Defense of Infeasibility._ As our recitation of the facts at the outset of this opinion suggests, Seibel's affirmative defense of infeasibility is highly fact-dependent; there are close questions of fact that are difficult to resolve. The administrative law judge did not examine the evidence and did not decide whether the employer met the standard of proof regarding both elements of the defense, i.e., the infeasibility of the abatement measure required by the cited standard (shaded lenses) and the infeasibility of any alternative measure (jigs). Therefore, a remand is appropriate.[[15/]] Compare, Kaspar Wire Works, Inc., 13 BNA OSHC 1261, 1262, 1986-87 CCH OSHD ¶ 27,882 p. 36,554-55 (No. 85-1060, 1987) (remand for the judge to address affirmative defenses apparently overlooked in his decision). Seibel is appearing pro se and expresses a legitimate concern to minimize its litigation expenses. Therefore, we particularly note that Seibel need not refile the arguments that have already been extensively presented to us and that our primary objective in remand is to put the case back before an administrative law judge for the purpose of resolution of Seibel's infeasibility defense. Our intent is to assure that Seibel and the Secretary are not denied the careful and complete factual review that is provided by orderly administrative procedures. VII. _Order_ Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the judge and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including an appropriate disposition of Seibel's affirmative defense of infeasibility. Edwin G. Foulke, Chairman Velma Montoya Commissioner Donald G. Wiseman Commissioner Dated: August 9, 1991 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SECRETARY OF LABOR, Complainant v. SEIBEL MODERN MANUFACTURING AND WELDING COMPANY Respondent OSHRC DOCKET NO. 88-0821 _DECISION AND ORDER_ This case arose under 29 USC, sec. 651 et seq. of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (the Act). As a result of an inspection by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration [OSHA] of the Respondent's premises, Citation #1 was issued charging that the Respondent violated sec. 5(a)(2) of the Act by the serious violation of the standard at 29 CFR 1910.252(e)(2)(i)(a), respectively item #3 of Citation #1. On or about April 6, 1988, the Respondent filed Notice of Contest to said item 3 of Citation #1 and the penalty proposed therefor. The pertinent sections of the Act and the standard are appended to this decision under appropriate titles. _PRELIMINARY_ There is little disagreement about the facts. The alleged hazard concerned employees who were engaged in welding. One employee, called a "tacker", would do the actual welding on material held by another employee, called a "fitter". The tacker and fitter worked at a table facing each other with the part being assembled between them on the table. The tacker wore a shield but the fitter wore no special protective glasses [some employees wore regular glasses]. The tacker wore a glove (on one hand). Both the tacker and fitter were about 24 inches from the radiant energy of the welding, which was in plain view of management personnel in the area. _TESTIMONY _ Seibel, the Respondent's president, testified that in 3/4ths of the welds, the material itself is between the welding arc and the fitter; and that the gloved hand of the tacker is cupped over the weld entirely in most cases ...Tr. 57, 63-68. In his opinion, the operation was not hazardous and he is not aware of any cases of weld flash even though one fitter worked for 25 years and one for 8 years ... Tr. 63. The Compliance Officer, DeLeys, testified that there were times when the fitter was not protected by either the glove or the material ... Tr. 100. He also conceded that his inspection was the first time he had ever seen a 2-man welding operation... Tr. 28. The Respondent's witness, Howard, testified that he had been a welder and fitter for 8 years and that the Respondent's operation gives the fitter adequate protection... Tr. 77-82. _RECORD OF INJURIES_ The mere absence of any injury does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that there is no hazard; however, it is at least of some weight on the question of whether a hazardous condition exists. And the fewer the number of injuries and the greater the length of time without injury are both of some consequence in answering that question. In the instant case, there is uncontradicted testimony that the Respondent's method of welding had been carried on for some 25 years without any accident or injury to any employee. That record certainly supports the Respondent's contention that its method of welding is nonhazardous. _DISCUSSION _ I was very favorably impressed by the Compliance officer (DeLeys). However, he had the burden of proof. He had to overcome the opinion of the Respondent's president [Seibel] and the Respondent's expert [Howard] who had both had years of experience whereon the Compliance Officer had never before seen a 2-man operation. In addition, the opinion of the Respondent's witnesses was corroborated by the Respondent's years of operation without injury or accident. It was simply too much to be overcome by the Compliance Officer. I find that the Complainant has not sustained the burden of proving that the Respondent violated the standard at 29 C.F.R. 1910.252(e)(2)(i)(a). _CONCLUSIONS OF LAW_ 1. At all times concerned, the Respondent was an employer engaged in a business affecting commerce within the meaning of the Act; and the Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. 2. The Complainant has not sustained the burden of proving the Respondent violated Sec. 5(a)(2) of the Act (See. 654). _ORDER_ The whole record having been considered, and due consideration having been given to 29 U.S.C. Sec. 666(j), it is ordered: 1. Item 3 of Citation #1 is vacated, together with the proposed penalty. So ordered. FOSTER FURCOLO Judge, OSHRC Dated: March 28, 1989 Boston, Massachusetts _APPENDIX_ _THE ACT_ 1. Section 654 [section 5(a)(2)] Employer" ... shall comply with occupational safety and health standards ... " 2. Section 666 [section 17(b)] "... employer who has received a citation for a serious violation... of this Act ... shall be assessed a civil penalty of up to $1,000 for each such violation." 3. Section 666 [section 17(k)] "... a serious violation shall be deemed to exist ... if there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result... unless the employer did not, and could not ... know of the presence of the violation." _THE STANDARD_ 29 CFR 1910.252(e)(2)(i)(a): "Helmets or hand shields shall be used during all arc welding ... Helpers or attendants shall be provided with proper eye protection." ------------------------------------------------------------------------ FOOTNOTES: [[1/]] The cited standard is 29 C.F.R. § 1910.252(e)(2)(i)(a), which provides: Helmets or hand shields shall be used during all arc welding or arc cutting operations, excluding submerged arc welding. Helpers or attendants shall be provided with proper eye protection. [[2/]] We have amended the caption of this case to correct an apparent error as to the employer's name, which was originally docketed as "Seibel Modern Manufacturing & Welding Company." The employer's briefs and other submissions state the name as "Seibel Modern Manufacturing & Welding Corp." [[3/]] In testimony, the welders were called "tackers," and the helpers, "fitters." In this decision, however, we will use the terminology of the cited standard. [[4/]] Lens shades are numbered (1.5 through 14) to designate progressively deeper shades. Compliance Officer DeLeys and OSHA's technical support group, which he consulted, believed that Seibel's helpers should wear shade number 10, which Seibel's welders wore. Expert Howard testified that shade number 10 is appropriate for welders who are using 85-90 amp welding equipment, which is the kind of welding equipment that Seibel was using. Expert Howard and President Seibel both believed, however, that even shade number 5 would be too dark for Seibel's helpers to wear. [[5/]] President Seibel further testified that he was "not sure there is a magnified ruler that can be used in this particular instance." Their use was not further explored. [[6/]] The guide to which the latter provision refers recommends a shade number 12 for "[g]as-shielded arc welding (ferrous)" using electrodes ranging from 5/32 down to 1/16 inch. Seibel's gas-metal arc welding or MIG (metal inert gas) welding process employed a smaller electrode than the guide mentions. Seibel's electrode was .035 inch, closer to 1/32 than 1/16 inch (which is .0625 inch). Compliance Officer DeLeys and the OSHA technical support group that he consulted therefore recommended a shade number 10, rather than shade number 12, as specified by the guide. [[8/]] Moreover, aside from the guidance given in the standard, in this case there is opinion evidence suggesting that this employer could actually have recognized the need for shaded lenses. Seibel's expert witness testified that shade numbers 1.5 or 1.7 would be advisable for the helpers. (Compliance officer DeLeys testified, however, that he would not have accepted such a slight shade.) Also, president Seibel had already realized that the welders needed shaded lenses, and Union Carbide, the manufacturer of Seibel's welding equipment, recommended shaded lenses for "observers" of welding. [[9/]] See also Hamilton Die Cast, Inc., 11 BNA OSHC 2169, 2172, 1984-85 CCH OSHD ¶ 26,983, p. 34,690 (No. 79-1686, 1984) (''[i]n view of the general nature of the cited standard and the lack of any express language specifically addressing die casting machines, HDC cannot reasonably be said to have been on notice of a requirement to guard....once the Secretary had informed HDC that guarding was not needed at such times"). [[10/]] President Seibel first made this point in argument, but it finds some support in his testimony and other record evidence. He had discussed the matter of a helper's not being able to see through shaded lenses, and he had described the unwieldiness of the metal battery case pieces their large size, considerable weight, awkward shape and bowed condition. He had also offered into evidence photographs of fitters holding large, flat and thin pieces of metal with sharp corners and ragged edges. The photographs show that the fitters can sometimes wear gloves but do not always do so: for example, one photograph shows a fitter wearing one glove (on the hand holding a metal piece) and having one hand bare (holding pliers onto another metal piece); another photograph shows the same fitter holding a metal piece with his bare hands. [[11/]] The Secretary did not appeal the part of Dun-Par I-A that dealt with an employer's burden to establish the infeasibility of the abatement method specified in a cited standard. [[12/]] Therefore, the Commission decided that it would be unreasonable to limit the employers' defense to impossibility: "Strict application of an 'impossibility' defense does not accommodate considerations of reasonableness or common sense, or reflect the strong sense of the practical." 12 BNA OSHC at 1955, 1986-87 CCH OSHD at p. 36,023. [[13/]] See Universal Sheet Metal, 2 BNA OSHC 1061, 1062, 1973-74 CCH OSHD ¶ 18,163, p. 22,341 (No. 657, 1974) (safety belts used in alternative to guardrails); George A. Hormel and Co., 2 BNA OSHC 1190, 1192-93, 1974-75 CCH OSHD ¶ 18,685, pp. 22,582-83 (No. 1410, 1974) (safety harness as alternative to guardrails); American Bridge, 2 BNA OSHC 1222, 1223, 1974-75 CCH OSHD ¶ 18,702, p. 22,593 (No. 2249, 1974) (factual indication that neither cited abatement nor alternative was usable); Cimpl Packing, 2 BNA OSHC 1436, 1437 n.2, 1974-75 CCH OSHD ¶ 19,127, p. 22,847 n.2 (No. 1987, 1974) (failure to explore use of alternative measure); Garrison & Associates, Inc., 3 BNA OSHC 1110, 1974-75 CCH OSHD ¶ 19,550, p. 23,344 (No. 4235, 1975) (cited standard's additional measure-- hand tools--used in alternative to required machine guarding, which might have been unusable); Central Steel and Tank, 3 BNA OSHC 1711, 1712, 1975-76 CCH OSHD ¶ 20,172, p. 24,017 (No. 2346, 1975) ("[e]ven accepting the validity of this claim"--that the cited standard's methods of machine guarding could not be used--"the record does not establish that no practical means of protecting against the hazard exists"). See also Taylor Building Associates, 5 BNA OSHC 1083, 1085 n.6, 1977-78 CCH OSHD ¶ 21,592, p. 25,910 n.6 (No. 3735, 1977) and other cases cited therein, especially Grossman Steel & Aluminum Corp., 4 BNA OSHC 1185, 1975-76 CCH OSHD ¶ 20,691 (No. 12775, 1976) , and Anning-Johnson Co., 4 BNA OSHC 1193, 1975-76 CCH OSHD ¶ 20,690 (No. 3694, 1976), which involve the multiple-employer worksite defense. [[14/]] Former Commissioner Arey stated: "I leave for another day the question of whether current Commission precedent is correct; or whether the Eighth Circuit's position should be adopted. Commission precedent still places the burden on the Secretary of showing a feasible alternative means of protection when literal compliance with a standard is infeasible." Former Chairman Buckley stated: "I concur with Commissioner Arey's disposition of this case, given the mandate imposed on the Commission by the Eighth Circuit . . . . " and "[I]t is with reluctance that I follow the Eighth Circuit's decision . . . . " 13 BNA OSHC at 2151 & 2153, 1987-90 CCH OSHD at pp. 37,766 & 37,767. [[15/]] "[T]he Commission is the fact-finder, and the judge is an arm of the Commission for that purpose." Accu-Namics, Inc. v. OSHRC, 515 F.2d 828, 834 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 903 (1976) (emphasis in the original). The Commission has authority to make factual findings where the administrative law judge did not, Accu-Namics, 515 F.2d at 834, but ordinarily an administrative law judge does resolve these factual issues first and the Commission then exercises a review function. This bi-level procedure within an administrative agency was conceived to benefit the parties, and the benefits of it are particularly evident in cases of close questions of fact. Cf., Ed Taylor Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 931 F.2d 1458, 1462-64 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation item vacated because vacancies on the Commission denied the employer an opportunity for Commission review of the administrative law judge's factual findings, under the preponderance of the evidence test). At the next level of adjudication--review by a federal court of appeals--the factual findings of the Commission are conclusive as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a).