UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION Secretary of Labor, Complainant, v. OSHRC Docket No. 15-1879 Mid-Ohio Pipeline Services, LLC, Respondent. ORDER GRANTING: 1) SECRETARY’S MOTION TO AMEND CITATION AND COMPLAINT AND 2) RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE I. FACTS On August 26, 2015, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) inspected the work site of Mid-Ohio Pipeline Services, LLC (Respondent). Following the inspection, OSHA issued a three item serious citation with a total proposed penalty of $17,000. The citation alleges Respondent failed to: 1) adequately protect employees from loose rock that lay at the edge of the excavation wall, 2) conduct daily inspections of excavations to address the inadequate ingress and egress points that were obstructed by large rock and debris, and 3) provide an adequate protection system to protect employees from cave-ins of the excavation. On December 28, 2015, the Secretary of Labor (Complainant or Secretary) filed a Complaint in this matter. On January 14, 2016, Respondent filed its Answer along with 15 Affirmative Defenses. A pre-hearing scheduling conference was conducted by the Court on December 18, 2015 by telephone. By Notice of Hearing and Scheduling Order dated January 7, 2016 (Scheduling Order), motions to amend pleadings were due by July 23, 2016. On July 19, 2016, the Secretary filed his Motion to Amend Citation and Complaint (Motion to Amend).1 The Secretary seeks to amend: 1) Citation 1, Item 1 to allege a violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.651(j)(2) instead of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.651(j)(1) and 2) Citation 1, Item 3 to allege a willful violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652(a)(1) with a proposed penalty of $70,000.2 The Secretary asserts that the proposed amendments arise out of the same conduct set forth in the original complaint and do not materially alter the nature of the alleged violative conditions at issue. He further asserts that Respondent is not prejudiced by the amendments since the hearing of this matter is over two months away and discovery is ongoing. On August 2, 2016, Respondent filed its Response to the Secretary’s Motion to Amend. Respondent asserts both of the proposed amendments are improper because they are outside the statute of limitations under Section 9(c) of the Act and the Secretary has failed to comply with the Court’s meet and confer requirements. Specifically, as to amending Citation 1, Item 1, Respondent argues that “when an amended complaint alleges new facts, the amendment is tantamount to issuing a new citation and must be made within six months of the violation.” Respondent states that the proposed amendment’s change of the violation from 29 C.F.R. § 1926.651(j)(1) to 29 C.F.R. § 1926.651(j)(2) requires the Secretary to “alter the essential factual allegations of the citation.” Respondent asserts that section 1926.651(j)(2) addresses protection from excavated or other materials or equipment that could pose a hazard by falling or rolling into excavations and section 1926.651(j)(1) addresses protection from loose rock or soil that could pose a hazard by falling or rolling from an excavation face. Respondent further argues that 29 C.F.R. § 1926.651(j)(1) and 29 C.F.R. § 1926.651(j)(2) “discusses completely separate methods of protection.” Specifically, Respondent asserts that the Secretary’s amending Citation 1, Item 3, from an allegation of a “Serious” violation to a “Willful” violation, “alleges additional facts that make the amendment improper;” e.g., the Secretary has the burden of providing facts that show Respondent’s heightened awareness of the illegality of the conduct or conditions and by a state of mind, i.e., conscious disregard or plain indifference for the safety and health of employees. Respondent also opposes the Secretary’s proposed amendments because granting the amendments would result in undue prejudice as it: a) has already issued discovery requests that did not address the matters raised in the amended Citation and b) did not address the proposed amended standard when it deposed the Compliance Officer (CO) Daniel Hughes on May 26, 2016.3 Lastly, with regard to the Secretary alleged failure to comply with the Court’s meet and confer requirements, Respondent specifically asserts that pre-motion to amend discussions between the parties that included discussions pertaining to the proposed amendments and the Secretary’s assertion in his Motion to Amend that “Respondent has been informed of this motion, and Respondent objects” were inadequate to satisfy the meet and confer obligations of the Secretary before he filed his motion to amend. On August 1, 2016, Respondent filed its Motion for Continuance. Respondent seeks to postpone the trial for an unspecified amount of time in order to provide it with additional time to conduct discovery relating to the Secretary’s proposed amendments to the Citation and Complaint. On August 8, 2016, the Secretary filed his opposition to Respondent’s Motion for Continuance. Complainant argues Respondent had, and has, plenty of time to propound discovery within the remaining time allowed for discovery under the Court’s current Scheduling Order. The Secretary further asserts that Respondent has failed to timely serve written discovery requests. He also notes that he has offered to respond to additional interrogatories within a shortened time frame to accommodate the impending close of discovery. Discovery closes on August 27, 2016. The trial commences on September 21, 2016. II. DISCUSSION A. Complainant has satisfied the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 15. FRCP Rule 15, which governs amendments to pleadings, requires leave of the court to amend the Secretary’s complaint.4 Before trial, “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Rule 15(a)(2), FRCP. Rule 15 “reinforce[s] the principle that cases ‘should be tried on their merits rather than the technicalities of pleadings.’” Moore v. City of Padicah, 790 F.2d 557, 559 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Tefft v. Seward, 689 F.2d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 1982)). The rule assumes a liberal policy of permitting amendments to pleadings. Ellison v. Ford Motor Co., 847 F.2d 297, 300 (6th Cir. 1988). See also Holman v. Rock Fin. Corp., 388 F.3d 930 (6th Cir. 2004). It is well established that the Commission has allowed the “liberal amendment of pleadings” and that view has been upheld by the Circuit Courts. See Long Mfg. Co. v. OSHRC, 554 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1977); Usery v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 568 F.2d 902 (2nd Cir. 1977). Alternative pleadings pursuant to Rule 8(d)(2) of the FRCP have similarly been liberally accepted by the Review Commission. See Donovan v. Royal Logging Co., 645 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1981), affirming 7 BNA OSHC 1744; Usery v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., supra. Courts are required to ensure that fair notice was given when granting leave to amend. Reed Eng’g. Group, Inc., 21 BNA OSHC 1290, 1291 (No. 02-0620, 2005).5 A court may ensure fair notice by providing a continuance. See, e.g., United Cotton Goods, Inc., 10 BNA OSHC 1389, 1390 (No. 77-1892, 1982) (continuance could cure any possible prejudice). Here, both 29 C.F.R. § 1926.651(j)(1) and 29 C.F.R. § 1926.651(j)(2) fall under section 1926.651(j) Protection of employees from loose rock or soil. Both standards seek to protect employees from material “that could pose a hazard by falling or rolling into excavations.” Both deal with protection from loose rock or soil. Both call for the provision of protection by means that provide protection. The alleged violations of both standards are alleged to have occurred at the same date, time, and location. They are similar enough to satisfy any fair notice requirement. Respondent primarily relies upon Timken Co., 20 BNA OSHC 2034 (No. 97-1457) and Midway Excavators, Inc., No. 79-3667, 1980 WL 10173 (O.S.H.R.C.A.L.J. April 21, 1980) to support its argument that the proposed amendments are not permissible. Neither case helps Respondent’s cause. In Timken Co., one of the citation items alleged a violation of section 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147(d)(2) for not completely locking out equipment at the #3 tube mill. “[L]ong after the record had been closed[,]”6 the Secretary moved for the first time in her post-hearing reply brief, after Timken challenged the applicability of section 1910.147(d)(2) in its post-hearing brief, to allow the Secretary to ask that the Citation item be affirmed, in the alternative, under section 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147(d)(4).7 Without specifically granting the Secretary’s motion to amend the Citation item, now Chief Judge Rooney then considered the Secretary’s legal theory and affirmed the lockout application requirement at section 1910.147(d)(4). Timken Co.,20 BNA OSHC at 2050-51, n.15. Chief Judge Rooney followed applicable FRCP, Rule 15(b), that allows issues not raised by the pleadings to be tried by the express or implied consent of the parties, when affirming the Citation item. Id. Moreover, the Timken Co. decision cited by Respondent ordered the vacation of the Commission’s earlier direction for review because its members were at an impasse. The reported decision contains the separate opinions of the two Commission members. Chief Judge Rooney’s affirmance of the two Citation items at issue, including the affirmance of the violation under section 1910.147(d)(4), became “a final appealable order of the Commission with the precedential value of an unreviewed judge’s decision.” Id. at 2035. Likewise, the Midway Excavators, Inc. decision is readily distinguishable from the case at bar. It is an unreviewed judge’s decision that deals with a sudden amendment first raised by the Secretary at trial. It has no precedential impact on this case. The Secretary originally alleged “Midway committed a willful violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652(b) because the trench in which Midway was laying pipe was not shored, braced, sloped or otherwise supported.” This standard required the Secretary to show that the soil was soft, something the Secretary could not do at trial. Midway Excavators, Inc., 1980 WL 10173, at **1-2. During the course of the trial, the Secretary moved to amend the complaint to allege a violation under § 1926.652(c) “which is applicable to trenches in which there is hard or compact soil.” The Judge vacated the citation because “it would be prejudicial to the Respondent to suddenly [at trial] be required to defend against an alleged violation of a standard which has difference requirements.” Here, the Court finds that Respondent has received fair notice. To avoid any prejudice, the Court also Grants Respondent’s Motion for Continuance and allows Respondent to re-depose CO Daniel Hughes in order to ascertain information relating to the amended Citation and Complaint items.8 B. The amendments are not barred by the six-month statute of limitations. Section 9(c) of the Act prohibits the issuance, not the amendment, of a citation more than six months after the occurrence of the violation. CMH Co., Inc., 9 BNA OSHC 1048, 1052 (No. 78-5954, 1980). Under FRCP Rule 15(c), amendments that relate back to the date of the original pleading are not barred by section 9(c) of the Act. 9 Higgins Erectors and Haulers, Inc., 7 BNA OSHC 1736, 1738 (No. 78-3398, 1979).10 See also, Bloomfield Mech. Contracting, Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1257, 1262-63 (3rd Cir. 1975). In Miller Brewing Co., 7 BNA OSHC 2155 (No. 78-3216, 1980), the Commission agreed that the Secretary should be allowed to amend his citation to allege violations of two specific standards in addition to the general duty clause violation originally alleged. The Secretary had moved to amend the citation three days before the scheduled start of the trial. Although the trial date was postponed due to counsel’s illness, the judge denied the Secretary’s motion to amend on the date the hearing was originally scheduled to occur. Granting the Secretary’s petition of interlocutory appeal, the Commission stated that “[w]here fair notice is given, administrative pleadings are liberally construed and easily amended.” Id. at 2157. Respondent relies upon the judge’s order in Reytec Constr. Res., Inc., No. 13-1541 (O.S.H.R.C.A.L.J. Mar. 13, 2014) (order denying Complainant’s Motion to Amend Complaint and Citation) to support its position that section 9(c) of the Act prohibits the Secretary’s proposed amendment of Citation 1, Item 1, because it alleges new facts that are tantamount to issuing a new Citation that must have been issued within six months of the violation. In Reytec Constr. Res., the Secretary originally alleged the company violated 29 C.F.R. § 1926.501(b)(15), a violation of the construction industry’s fall protection standard. Nearly eight months before the scheduled trial, the judge denied the Secretary’s Motion to Amend Citation and Complaint. The Secretary sought to amend the original citation item to instead allege a violation under 29 C.F.R. § 1926.853(g).11 In its Opposition to the Secretary of Labor’s Motion to Amend Citation and Complaint, Respondent stated it assumed that the Secretary intended to reference a violation of a demolition standard under section 1926.859(g), instead of section 1926.853(g). The Judge did not address Respondent’s assumption or discrepancy in his order disposing of the Secretary’s Motion to Amend. Instead, the judge found that the proposed amendment did not arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original citation item, and did “not relate back to the original date of the issuance of the citation under FRCP 15(c)(1)(B).” He stated: [t]he hazard described in the proposed amendment differs from the hazard originally cited. In the cited citation the hazard was an employee working on a surface six feet above a lower level. In the proposed amendment the proposed hazard is working on weakened or deteriorated floors, or walls, or loosened materials. The abatement required under the cited standard is implementation of a personal fall arrest system. Under the proposed amendment the abatement required is shoring or bracing the work deck. The factual basis has now changed from one of a personal fall arrest system to having the deck shored or braced. Reytec Constr. Res., order denying Complainant’s Motion to Amend Complaint and Citation at p. 4. The Judge found that the original citation did not provide Respondent with fair notice of its obligations under 29 C.F.R. § 1926.853(g) that the violation was based on the lack of having deck shored or braced. The facts and circumstances in Reytec Constr. Res. are readily distinguishable from the case before this Court, and the result is different. Here, the original citation and complaint gave Respondent adequate notice of the allegedly hazardous conditions at issue. The general test for determining where there is a change in the cause of action is whether the original and the amended charges arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence. The Court finds that the need to insure that protection from excavated or other materials or equipment shall be provided is sufficiently related to the initial charge relating to the provision of protection from loose rock or soil. Both are alleged to have occurred at the same date, time, and location. The Court finds that the proposed amendments arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence of the original citation item and thus relate back under FRCP Rule 15(c). Accordingly, Respondent’s argument that section 9(c) of the Act is a jurisdictional bar to amendment of Citation 1, Item 1, of the complaint after the expiration of the six month period is rejected. C. Granting the amendment now does not result in undue prejudice to Respondent. Respondent alleges that the proposed amendment would result in undue prejudice as it: a) has already issued discovery requests and b) did not address the proposed amended standard when it deposed CO Hughes seven weeks before the filing of the Secretary’s Motion to Amend. Respondent argument of prejudice is unsubstantiated. Amendments made during the time frame permitted by the Scheduling Order, as here, will generally not prejudice the Respondent. See Morrison-Knudsen & Associates, 8 BNA OSHC 2231, 2236 (No. 76-1992, 1980)(amendments made well before the hearing will rarely result in prejudice.), Higgins Erectors and Haulers, Inc., 7 BNA OSHC at 1738. Complainant timely filed his Amended Complaint pursuant to the Court’s Scheduling Order. Respondent had sufficient and fair notice of the proposed amended complaint in mid-July, 2016. Moreover, when the Secretary filed his Motion to Amend, discovery remained open through August 27, 2016 and the Court has granted Respondent’s Motion for Continuance extending discovery for at least three and one-half months depending on the actual new trial date. D. The Secretary may amend Citation 1, Item 3, from a Citation item alleging a serious violation to one alleging a willful violation of the same standard. The Secretary’s proposed amendment of Citation 1, Item 3, from a Citation item alleging a serious violation to one alleging a willful violation of the same standard is permitted because the underlying nature of the charge remains the same and Respondent is not prejudiced. The general test for determining whether there is a change in the cause of action is whether the original and the amended charges arise out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrences. Diamond Eng’g. Co., 2 BNA OSHC 1585 (No. 4217, 1975); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). The “willful” characterization of a violation is addressed only in the penalty section of the Act. Inasmuch as the appropriateness of the penalty is always before the Commission in a contested case, an amendment to allege a willful rather than a serious violation does not change the underlying cause of action. It merely serves to charge a more severe violation of the same standard. P.A.F. Equip. Co., Inc., 7 BNA OSHC 1209, 1212 (No. 14315, 1979). Whether or not the Secretary has to show additional facts to satisfy his burden that show Respondent’s heightened awareness of the illegality of Respondent’s conduct or conditions does not change the fact that the changed characterization of the violation arises out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrences, and deals with the same standard. Furthermore, Respondent is not prejudiced by the amendment of the complaint and citation to allege a willful rather than a serious violation. In Long Mfg. Co., 554 F.2d at 907, the Court approved an amendment of the citation and proposed penalty in the complaint where the initial charge involved repeated violations with penalties of $350 and the amendment alleged failure to abate previously cited violations with a proposed penalty of $8,700. In rejecting the employer’s claim that the amendment was improper, the court stated: Petitioner was not surprised or prejudiced in any way by the change in the nature of the charge, and it was not prejudiced by the increase in the amount of the proposed penalty except in the sense that if petitioner had accepted the initial proposal it would probably not have been faced with a higher proposal later. That however, is not legal prejudice.  Id. at 907-08. The court further stated: An employer may accept the citation and proposed penalty without protest if he chooses to do so, but in our view if he chooses to contest the matter before the Commission, he does not have any vested right to go to trial on the specific charge mentioned in the citation or to be free from exposure to a penalty in excess of that originally proposed. Id. at 907. In the present case, evidence concerning the factors relevant to the issue of willfulness, such as Respondent’s intent to comply or carelessness in not complying, its good faith or lack of good faith, and its history of previous inspections and violations is readily available to the Respondent. Since the Court has granted Respondent’ Motion for Continuance, Respondent’s assertion that the amendment of the charge from serious to willful deprives it of adequate notice and opportunity to prepare its defense is without legal or factual basis.  P.A.F. Equip. Co., Inc., 7 BNA OSHC at 1213. E. The Secretary marginally satisfied the meet and confer requirements before filing his Motion to Amend. Respondent asserts that pre-motion to amend discussions between the parties that included discussions pertaining to the proposed amendments and the Secretary’s assertion in his Motion to Amend that “Respondent has been informed of this motion, and Respondent objects” were inadequate to satisfy the meet and confer obligations of the Secretary before he filed his motion to amend. Respondent points to the Court’s Order Denying Without Prejudice Respondent’s Motion to Compel Rule 30(b)(6) Testimony where the Court denied, without prejudice to refiling, Respondent’s discovery-related motion for failing to meet and confer beforehand.12 There, Respondent had no actual discussions with the Secretary before pre-maturely filing its Motion to Compel 30(b)(6) Testimony. Instead, there was a simple exchange of a few emails between the parties. In these emails, Respondent stated it did not “have time to email you [Secretary’s counsel] about this repeatedly[,]” and refused to provide any more detail as to what information Respondent was seeking. The Secretary confirmed by email that he “could not yet state whether he opposed conducting the 30(b)(6) deposition.” Without waiting to ascertain the Secretary’s position, Respondent filed its Motion to Compel 30(b)(6) Testimony two days later. Here, Respondent admits that the parties engaged in discussions about the Secretary’s contemplated Motion to Amend. During these discussions, Respondent told the Secretary that it objected to the Secretary’s Motion to Amend. The Motion to Amend before the Court is also not a discovery-related motion. The information before the Court marginally satisfies the meet and confer obligations of the Secretary with regard to his Motion to Amend. F. Respondent has shown good cause to justify its Motion for Continuance. In its Motion for Continuance, Respondent seeks to postpone the trial for an unspecified amount of time in order to provide it with additional time to conduct discovery relating to the Secretary’s proposed amendments to the Citation and Complaint. The Secretary opposes Respondent’s motion for continuance and argues Respondent had, and has, plenty of time to propound discovery within the remaining time allowed for discovery under the Court’s current scheduling order. Under these circumstances, Respondent has shown good cause to extend discovery and continue the hearing date. The Secretary’s proposes amendments are significant and transform a case that originally involved three serious citations to a case that now includes a willful citation, as well. The proposed amendments also significantly increase the overall penalties proposed by the Secretary from $17,000 to $80,000. III. CONCLUSION Justice requires that the complaint be allowed to be amended in this instance. Respondent has been given fair notice. Any prejudice is cured by the Court extending discovery and granting a continuance of the hearing date. IV. ORDER WHEREFORE IT IS ORDERED THAT the Secretary’s Motion to Amend is GRANTED; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Secretary shall serve his Amended Citation and Complaint upon Respondent by August 17, 2016. The Secretary’s amended Citation and Complaint are the operative Citation and Complaint for the hearing and all other purposes; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Respondent shall file its answer to the Amended Citation and Complaint within twenty days after service of the Amended Citation and Complaint by Complainant upon Respondent; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Complainant shall make CO Hughes available for a one day deposition for up to seven hours13 should Respondent wish to continue its deposition of CO Hughes, with the Secretary paying the costs of the Court Reporting services at any such continued deposition by Respondent; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Respondent’s Motion for Continuance is GRANTED; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT parties shall participate in a conference call to be conducted by the Court on August 12, 2016 at 10:00 a.m., E.D.T., to discuss changes to the litigation schedule to allow Respondent additional time to conduct discovery on the amended citation and complaint and new trial dates.14 The parties are advised that the Court is next available to conduct the trial during: 1) January 4-5, 2017, 2) January 24-26, 2017, or 3) February 28-March 2, 2017. SO ORDERED. /s/ The Honorable Dennis L. Phillips U.S. OSHRC Judge Dated: August 9, 2016 Washington, D.C. 1 The Secretary included a copy of the Amended Complaint in his Motion to Amend. 2 The Secretary is not abandoning his position that the violation is also a Serious violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651, et seq. (the Act). 3 With discovery set to close on August 26, 2016, Respondent argues there is “insufficient time to conduct the additional required discovery.” 4 Under the Commission procedural rules, the standard applicable to amending the citations and complaint is FRCP Rule 15. Rule 15 (a) provides: (a) Amendments Before Trial. (1) Amending as a Matter of Course. A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e) or (f) whichever is earlier. (2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party' s written consent or the court' s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires. 5 In Reed Eng’g. Group Inc., the Secretary moved to amend the citation and complaint four days before the start of the trial. At the commencement of the hearing, Reed’s counsel argued that it would be prejudiced because defending the amended citation required a proof of different facts and there had been no time to conduct further discovery. The Commission upheld the judge’s decision to grant an amendment, but concluded that the judge erred in granting the amendment without also granting a continuance to allow Reed a reasonable opportunity to develop its defense. The Commission remanded the case to allow Reed time to conduct discovery and present evidence in defense of the amended citation. Reed Eng’g. Group, Inc., 21 BNA OSHC at 1291. 6 Timken Co., 20 BNA OSHC at 2040. 7 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147(d)(4) states in part that “lockout or tagout devices shall be affixed to each energy isolating device authorized employees.” Timken Co., 20 BNA OSHC at 2049, n12. 8 Because of the timing of CO Hughes deposition; i.e., May 26, 2016, and the filing of the Motion to Amend on July 19, 2016, the Court will order the Secretary to pay for the Court reporting costs associated with Respondent re-deposing CO Hughes on matters relating to the Amended Citation and Complaint. 9 FRCP Rule 15(c) provides: (c) Relation Back to Amendments. (1) When an Amendment Relates Back. An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when: … (B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out – or attempted to be set out – in the original pleading; or …. 10 In Higgins Erectors and Haulers, Inc., the Secretary sought to amend his original complaint that alleged a violation of section 5(a)(1) of the Act with an allegation that Higgins alternatively violated 29 C.F.R. § 1926.500(b)(1). The Commission noted that the requirements in the alternative pleading were very similar to the deficiencies alleged in the citation and original complaint and that Higgins was put on notice of the allegedly hazardous condition to which its employees were exposed. Higgins Erectors and Haulers, Inc., 7 BNA OSHC at 1737. 11 The Court, here, notes that there is no standard at 29 C.F.R. § 1926.853(g). (emphasis added). 12 The Court’s Order Denying Without Prejudice Respondent’s Motion to Compel Rule 30(b)(6) Testimony stated: “A party bringing a discovery-related motion in this case must include with the motion a certification that the parties have discussed the matter or made a good faith effort to settle the matter. [emphasis added] (Order, at p. 3). 13 See FRCP 30(d)(1). 14 At the designated time, the parties are to each dial Access Number 1 - (877) 446-3914, and then enter the participate Passcode 311541#. This will enable the telephone conference to proceed. The conference call may be recorded. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ - 15 -