“SECRETARY OF LABOR,Complainant,v.ALASKA TRAWL FISHERIES, INC.,Respondent.OSHRC Docket No. 89-1017 & 89-1192*DECISION*Before: FOULKE, Chairman; WISEMAN and MONTOYA, Commissioners.BY THE COMMISSION:The respondents, Alaska Trawl Fisheries, Inc. (\”Alaska Trawl\”), andGolden Age Fisheries, a partnership (\”Golden Age\”), operate fishing andfish processing vessels. Two of these vessels, one belonging to eachcompany, were inspected by the Occupational Safety and HealthAdministration (\”OSHA\”) of the Department of Labor. As a result ofthese inspections, the Secretary of Labor issued citations to eachcompany alleging violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of1970, 29 U.S.C. ?? 651-678 (\”the Act\” or \”the OSH Act\”), and ofstandards promulgated pursuant to that statute.[[1]] Both companiestimely contested the citations, and the cases were assigned to anadministrative law judge of this Commission.The two cases were consolidated and submitted to the judge onstipulations. The only issue remaining in dispute between the partieswas whether OSHA had jurisdiction over the cited workingconditions.[[2]] The judge held that OSHA had jurisdiction, and thecompanies petitioned to have the judge’s decision reviewed by theCommission. The judge’s decision was directed for review pursuant tosection 12(j) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. ? 661(j).I. INTRODUCTIONAt the time of the inspections and issuance of the citations, bothcompanies were engaged in fishing and fish processing activities in andaround Dutch Harbor, Alaska. These activities included cleaning,processing, freezing, and packaging fish products for shipment todestinations in Alaska and outside of that state. Alaska Trawl operatedthe F\/T Endurance; Golden Age operated the F\/T Browns Point. The shipsin question were classified by the Coast Guard as \”uninspected vessels,\”meaning that, at the time of OSHA’s inspections and the issuance of thecitations, they were subject to limited regulation by the Coast Guard.See 46 U.S.C. ?? 4101-4116. [[3]]In September 1988, the Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Act of1988, 46 U.S.C. ?? 4501-4508 (\”CFIVSA\”), which requires the Coast Guardto regulate the operation of fishing trawlers such as the two vesselscited here, was enacted into law. At the time OSHA conducted itsinspections of the two vessels in February 1989, the Coast Guard had notyet taken any official action to follow that mandate. The citationswere issued in March of 1989, and the judge issued his decision in theseconsolidated cases in November 1989. The following year, in April 1990,the Coast Guard issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to adoptstandards under the new statute.[[4]]Review was directed on the following issue: Whether OSHA hadjurisdiction over the cited working conditions. The respondents maketwo arguments in support of their claim that OSHA had no jurisdiction,each based on a different statute. Their first argument is premised ontheir contention that Congress intended in CFIVSA to vest the CoastGuard with exclusive jurisdiction over all safety matters aboardcommercial fishing vessels. Thus, they argue that, under the rules ofstatutory construction, if the provisions of CFIVSA conflict with thoseof the OSH Act, CFIVSA must prevail because it is a subsequent statutethat more specifically addresses the conditions in question than doesthe earlier, more general OSH Act. The respondents’ second argument isthat OSHA was preempted, under the provisions of section 4(b)(1) of theAct, 29 U.S.C. ? 653(b)(1),[[5]] because the United States Coast Guardhas acted to regulate the cited working conditions.[[6]]Having examined the two statutes in question and the applicableregulations in effect when the citations were issued and considered thearguments of the parties and the amicus curiae, we conclude that thejudge correctly decided the issue. We affirm his decision for thereasons set forth below.II. ISSUESA. PREEMPTION BASED ON CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO STATUTESAlaska Trawl and Golden Age assert that the central issue in this caseis one of statutory interpretation and Congressional intent, namelywhether CFIVSA grants the Coast Guard exclusive jurisdiction over allsafety matters aboard the cited vessels. According to the respondents,there is a conflict between the two statutes because Congress intendedto vest the Coast Guard with exclusive jurisdiction over all aspects ofsafety on commercial fishing vessels, thereby depriving OSHA of anyjurisdiction. The judge concluded that there was no such conflictbecause CFIVSA was intended to govern navigational safety, thetraditional area of Coast Guard expertise, not safety in the fishprocessing activities aboard factory ships such as those cited here. Hefound that the operation of a ship in navigation and the processing ofthe fish were separate and distinct operations.The respondents do not assert that the Act never governed activitiesaboard uninspected vessels such as the ones cited here. Prior to theenactment of CFIVSA, OSHA clearly had the statutory authority toregulate the working conditions of employees aboard uninspectedvessels. Donovan v. Red Star Marine Servs., 739 F.2d 774, 780 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). Therefore, OSHA’s authoritycontinues unless some specific provision in CFIVSA or anothermore-recently-enacted statute has preempted it.The respondents assert that nothing in CFIVSA limits the Coast Guard’sauthority under that statute to purely navigational matters. Therespondents argue that this failure to limit the Coast Guard’s authoritydemonstrates Congress’ clear intent for the Coast Guard to develop acomprehensive program for establishing safe working conditions for thecrews of commercial fishing vessels and fish processing vessels. Therespondents further assert that, if there is any ambiguity as to theintent of Congress, it is resolved by examining the legislative historyof CFIVSA, citing references in the legislative history.The respondents’ arguments state correct legal tenets. The basicprinciples for interpreting two statutes in pari materia (dealing withthe same subject) are:It is assumed that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has inmind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter. In theabsence of any express repeal or amendment, the new provision ispresumed in accord with the legislative policy embodied in those priorstatutes. Thus, they all should be construed together….When two statutes are involved each of which by its terms applies to thefacts before the court, the statute which is the more recent of the twoirreconcilably conflicting statutes prevails. Where a conflict existsthe more specific statute controls over the more general one….Provisions in one act which are omitted in another on the same subjectmatter will be applied when the purposes of the two acts are consistent. Prior statutes relating to the same subject matter are compared withthe new provision; if it is possible by reasonable construction, bothare construed so that effect is given to every provision in all of them. . .Statutes for the same subject, although in apparent conflict, areconstrued to be in harmony if reasonably possible. However, it has beenheld where two statutes deal with the same subject matter, the morerecent enactment prevails as the latest expression of legislative will. If there is an irreconcilable conflict between the new provision and theprior statutes, the new provision will control as it is the laterexpression of the legislature.2B N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction ? 51.02 (5th ed.,rev. 1992).These principles of statutory construction apply, however, only if thereis uncertainty as to the meaning of language used in one of thestatutes. When the terms of a statute are not ambiguous, there is noneed for further inquiry. Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 483 (1981),Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (where the languageis plain and admits of no more than one meaning, the duty ofinterpretation does not arise and rules which are to aid doubtfulmeanings need no discussion); McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 614-15(D.C. Cir. 1980). We may therefore look to the legislative history onlyif there is ambiguous language in the statute itself which suggests, butdoes not explicitly state, that the Coast Guard is to have exclusivejurisdiction. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 n.29 (1978) (citing Exparte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949) and cases cited therein) (whenstatute is unambiguous on its face, a court should not look tolegislative history for its meaning). We therefore conclude that, ifthe statute does not suggest on its face that the intent of Congress wasto exclude OSHA from all regulatory activities in this field, it isneither necessary nor proper to look to secondary sources.Having examined CFIVSA, we find nothing to indicate that Congressintended to vest exclusive jurisdiction over working conditions aboardcommercial fishing vessels to the Coast Guard so as to preempt OSHA fromregulating those conditions. Congress vested the Coast Guard withauthority to regulate safety aboard such vessels, but there is nothingin the statute that excludes other federal agencies from regulatingmatters that come under their jurisdiction. [[7]] In fact, we note that,in its amicus curiae brief, the Coast Guard has disputed therespondents’ assertion that the two statutes are in conflict. The CoastGuard states that, after CFIVSA was enacted, an amendment to anotherbill was introduced in Congress that would have specified that the CoastGuard was the agency responsible for all aspects of safety aboardfishing and fish processing vessels and that this amendment was rejected.The Coast Guard argues that CFIVSA does not expressly provide that theCoast Guard has exclusive jurisdiction and that it cannot be interpretedto say that the Act no longer applies to fishing vessels. In contrast,the Coast Guard argues, CFIVSA clearly delineates the areas that theCoast Guard has authority to regulate, areas which are limited totraditional maritime safety items, not factory conditions. The CoastGuard concludes that there is no basis in CFIVSA or its legislativehistory to support the limits on OSHA’s jurisdiction put forth by therespondents.The Secretary of Labor also contends that there is no conflict betweenCFIVSA and the Act.When federal agencies assert that they do or do not have statutoryauthority to regulate particular working conditions, the Commissiongives considerable weight to the agency’s representations. SeeNorthwest Airlines, Inc., 8 BNA OSHC 1982, 1988, 1980 CCH OSHD ? 24,751,p. 30,487 (No. 13649, 1980). While such statements by a federal agencyare not controlling, the Commission will limit its inquiry todetermining whether the statute reasonably supports the agency’sassertions. Id. Accordingly, while we give considerable weight to theassertions of the Department of Transportation and the Department ofLabor that the provisions of CFIVSA and the Act are not in conflict, wehave independently reviewed the provisions of both statutes and reacheda similar conclusion.Although Alaska Trawl and Golden Age assert that there is a conflictbetween the statutes and that the intent of Congress was for the CoastGuard to have exclusive jurisdiction, we find no support for either ofthese contentions. Nowhere in their brief or their reply brief have thecompanies pointed to any specific language in the statute that indicatesthat Congress intended the Coast Guard to have exclusive jurisdictionover the working conditions aboard commercial fishing vessels that wouldpreempt the jurisdiction OSHA exercises under the Act. Without a clearexpression by Congress that its intent was to preempt OSHA’sjurisdiction over the cited working conditions, we are unwilling toinfer such an intent.B. PREEMPTION UNDER SECTION 4(b)(1)The next question is whether OSHA’s jurisdiction over the cited workingconditions is precluded by the provisions of section 4(b)(1) of the Actdesigned to prevent regulatory duplication.The fact that another federal agency possesses the statutory authorityto regulate the cited working conditions does not constitute theexercise of statutory authority meant by section 4(b)(1); under thatsection, the other agency must have taken some action to exercise thatauthority. E.g., In re Inspection of Norfolk Dredging Co., 783 F.2d1526 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1986); Columbia Gas ofPennsylvania, Inc. v. Marshall, 636 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1980); SouthernPac. Transp. Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,434 U.S. 874 (1977); Southern Ry. v. OSHRC, 539 F.2d 335 (4th Cir.),cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976); Baltimore & O.R.R v. OSHRC, 548 F.2d1052 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Organized Migrants in Community Action, Inc. v.Brennan 520 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Indiana Harbor Belt R.R., 4 BNAOSHC 2006,1976-77 CCH OSHD ? 21,473 (No. 12420, 1977). We musttherefore determine whether the Coast Guard has exercised its statutoryauthority by promulgating standards or regulations having the force andeffect of law that govern the cited working conditions. NorthwestAirlines, Inc., 8 BNA OSHC at 1989-91, 1980 CCH OSHD at pp. 30,487-89. Both the Coast Guard and the Secretary of Labor assert that the CoastGuard had not exercised its statutory authority over the cited workingconditions at the time the citations in these cases were issued, whilethe companies assert that it had.When another federal agency has the statutory authority to regulate thesafety and health of employees, an exemption under section 4(b)(1)exists only as to those working conditions that the other federal agencyhas exercised its statutory authority to regulate; and the employerclaiming the exemption has the burden of proving that the agency hasexercised its authority to regulate the working conditions in question. Puget Sound Tug & Barge, 9 BNA OSHC 1764, 1774, 1981 CCH OSHD ? 25,373,p. 31,594 (No. 76-4905,1981).In support of their claim to an exemption, Alaska Trawl and Golden Ageassert that each of the working conditions for which they werecited[[8]] is sufficiently subject to the Coast Guard’s exercise ofauthority to exempt those conditions under section 4(b)(1). CitingDunlop v. Burlington Northern R.R., 395 F.Supp. 203 (D. Mont. 1975), adecision of the federal district court in Montana, they also assert thatthe Coast Guard’s issuance of draft regulations subsequent to theissuance of the citation constitutes sufficient exercise of authority tocreate an exemption, because CFIVSA required the Coast Guard to follow alengthy procedure before it could issue them. The companies cite astatement in Dillingham Tug & Barge Corp., 10 BNA OSHC 1859, 1982 CCHOSHD ? 26,166 (No. 77-4143, 1982), that, in certain circumstances,section 4(b)(1) can create an industry-wide exemption. They claim thatthe Coast Guard’s activity in regulating the maritime industrygenerally, and the commercial fishing industry in particular, createsuch an industry- wide exemption for the fishing industry.The companies’ arguments place considerable reliance on events thatoccurred after the citations were issued, particularly the Coast Guard’sApril 1990 notice of proposed rulemaking. Our inquiry, however, islimited to determining whether the Coast Guard took sufficient action toregulate the cited working conditions before the citations were issuedto have exempted the companies from OSHA’s jurisdiction underConsolidated Rail Corp., 10 BNA OSHC 1851, 1982 CCH OSHD ? 26,165 (No.78-238, 1982). See also Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Usery (proposingfuture regulations not sufficient to create exemption).We conclude that the actions taken by the Coast Guard in this case werenot sufficient to give rise to an exemption from OSHA’s jurisdiction. Under Consolidated Rail Corp., the issuance of proposed regulations doesnot, as a matter of law, constitute an exercise of statutory authorityto prescribe or enforce standards or regulations within the meaning ofsection 4(b)(1). Even if we were to hold that the issuance of proposedregulations, by itself, was sufficient action to preempt OSHA, we wouldnot find preemption on these facts. At the time the citations wereissued, the Coast Guard had not yet issued even proposed regulations,much less promulgated final regulations having the force and effect oflaw. Thus, because the proposed regulations did not have the force andeffect of law, we need not look at the proposed regulations to determinewhether they would, as the companies assert, govern each of the citedworking conditions. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 8 BNA OSHC at 1990, 1980CCH OSHD at p. 30,488.III. RELATED ISSUESThere are two remaining issues that require the Commission’s attention.First, there is a controversy as to the effect of the Commission’sdecision in Dillingham Tug & Barge in the section 4(b)(1) issue. TheSecretary urges us to overrule that decision; the companies assert thatit controls the situation here. We believe, however, that the Commissiondid not hold in Dillingham that an industry-wide exemption had beencreated. The Commission observed that, under certain circumstances,such a situation could exist, but its disposition of the case was basedon a finding that the Coast Guard had, in fact, exercised its statutoryauthority to regulate the working conditions that were the subject ofthe Secretary’s citation, the hazard of a seaman’s falling into thewater while engaged in navigational, docking, or mooringactivities.[[9]] Because the Coast Guard had already regulated thegeneral hazard addressed by OSHA’s citation, the same result would havebeen found under the existing case law, and it was unnecessary for themajority in Dillingham to go as far as it did. To the extent that thediscussion in Dillingham went beyond what was strictly necessary toadjudicate the issues presented by that case, it constituted obiterdictum (remarks not necessary to decide the case) and therefore is notcontrolling here.[[10]]Second, the Secretary filed a letter on December 2,1991, which raisesseveral possible problems. The letter states that on September 15,1991, after this case had been directed for review, the Coast Guardacted to exercise its statutory authority by adopting regulations togovern certain of the cited working conditions and that, as a result ofthe Coast Guard’s action, the Secretary withdraws the abatement ordersfor some of the items covered by the citations. Our first reservationabout the Secretary’s action is that we are not at all confident thatthe Commission has the authority under the Act to find a violation(other than a de minimis violation) and not require it to beabated.[[11]] Assuming that the Commission does have that authority,would the assessment of the penalties stipulated to by the partieswithout requiring abatement of the violative conditions, as theSecretary seeks in her letter, make the Commission’s order penal ratherthan remedial? If so, would the Commission have to follow therequirements for a criminal proceeding? These cases were submitted tothe judge on a stipulated record. We are uncertain of the admissibilityof any admissions by the companies if adequate criminal proceduralsafeguards were not followed.Another factor that troubles the Commission is that the Secretaryappears to be attempting, by letter, to alter the terms of thestipulations agreed to by all parties and submitted to the judge. Thecompanies have objected to the filing of the letter, although not onthis specific ground. We are therefore unwilling to act on theSecretary’s letter without affording the parties an opportunity toaddress the questions it raises. Accordingly, we will remand thesecases to the administrative law judge for him to rule on the argumentsthe parties address to these questions.Before the judge, the parties may also wish to address the question ofwhether it is appropriate for them to enter into an agreement requiringthe companies to abate the violations but providing that compliance withthe new Coast Guard regulations will be deemed to constitute abatementfor the purposes of these cases.IV. CONCLUSIONFor the reasons set out above, we find that the administrative law judgedid not err in denying the companies’ motions to dismiss. We affirm thejudge’s decision finding that OSHA had jurisdiction over the citedworking conditions and affirming the citations on the basis of theparties’ stipulations. We do, however, remand these cases for theparties to address before the judge the questions raised by the letterfiled by the Secretary on December 2, 1991.Accordingly, these cases are remanded for further proceedings consistentwith this decision.Edwin G. Foulke, Jr.ChairmanDonald G. WisemanCommissionerVelma MontoyaCommissionerDated: June 18, 1992———————————————————————— FINAL ORDERThe Stipulation of the Parties on Remand and the Settlement Agreementsare approved.Sidney J. Goldstein Judge, OSHRCDated: October 2, 1992LYNN MARTIN, SECRETARY OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,Complainant, v. ALASKA TRAWL FISHERIES, INCORPORATED, Respondent.OSHRC DOCKET NO. NO. 89-1017LYNN MARTIN, SECRETARY OF LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Complainant, v.GOLDEN AGE FISHERIES, Respondent.OSHRC DOCKET NO. 89-1192STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES ON REMANDCome now the parties, by and through their undersigned counsel ofrecord, and in response to the Decision entered herein on June 18, 1992,and remanding this consolidated proceeding, do represent, agree andstipulate as follows:Whereas, the Decision has raised questions relating to the abatement ofthe alleged violations at issue herein and to the nature and content ofany prospective abatement order to be entered as well as to theauthority of the Review Commission in this regard, andWhereas, each of the alleged violations at issue herein has been abatedin accordance with the applicable cited OSHA safety and health standardsprior to September 15, 1991 (the date upon which certain U.S. CoastGuard occupational safety and health standards became effective), as setforth in the two Settlement Agreements and Stipulations for Entry ofFinal Order previously filed in each of the individually docketedproceedings.1. The parties stipulate and agree that all questions relating to theabatement of the alleged violations at issue herein have been resolvedbetween the parties prior to September 15, 1991;2. No controversy or dispute warranting resolution, order or any furtheraction by the Review Commission currently exists between the partieswith respect to any matters of abatement; and3. This matter may be concluded upon entry of a further final order inaccordance with the agreement of the parties as set forth in theaforesaid Settlement Agreements and Stipulations for Entry of a FinalOrder filed herein.Marshall J. BregerSolicitor of LaborDaniel W. TeehanRegional SolicitorRobert A. FrielAssociate Regional SolicitorWilliam W. KatesAttorneyU.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABORAttorneys for ComplainantDated September 3, 1992.ALASKA TRAWL FISHERIES, INC. GOLDEN AGE FISHERIESJames P. Walsh, of,Davis Wright TremaineAttorneys for RespondentDated September 11, 1992.William W.TattlesU.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR Attorneys for ComplainantDated September 11, 1992.FOOTNOTES:[[1]] Alaska Trawl Fisheries was issued two citations. One citationalleged that the company had committed two violations of section 5(a)(1)of the Act, 29 U.S.C. ? 654(a)(1), and serious violations of a number ofstandards promulgated by OSHA, including 29 C.F.R. ?? 1910.212(a)(1),1910.215(a)(4), 1910.215(b)(9), 1910.219(d)(1), 1910.219(e)(1)(i),1910.219(f)(3), and 1910.243(c)(3). The other citation alleged a numberof other-than-serious violations of OSHA standards, including 29 C.F.R.?? 1903.2(a)(1), 1910.22(b)(1), 1910.1200(e)(1), 1910.1200(g)(1), and1200(h)(1). The Secretary proposed that Alaska Trawl Fisheries pay atotal of $2280 in penalties.Golden Age was cited for serious violations of 29 C.F.R. ??1910.215(a)(4), 1910.215(b)(9), and 1910.243(c)(3), andother-than-serious violations of 29 C.F.R. ?? 1904.2(a), 1904.5(a),1910.22(b)(1), 1910.252(a)(2)(iv)(c), 1910.1200(e)(1), 1910.1200(g)(1),and 1910.1200(h)(1), with a total penalty of $500 proposed.[[2]] The parties have stipulated that, if the working conditions citedare not exempt from OSHA’s jurisdiction, both companies were inviolation of the Act as alleged. The companies also stipulated to theappropriateness of the penalties.[[3]] For the provisions governing inspected vessels, see 46 U.S.C. ??3301-3318 and the standards in Parts 90-96 of 46 C.F.R.[[4]] The Coast Guard has adopted regulations that went into effect onSeptember 15, 1991, while this case was on review. On December 2, 1991,the Secretary filed a letter informing the Commission of that fact andmaking certain other representations. The respondents have objected tothe filing of that letter, arguing that it contains legal argument andtherefore constitutes a brief filed in violation of Rule 93(b)(3) of theCommission’s Rules of Procedure, 29 C.F.R. ? 2200.93(b)(3). Therespondents have filed a motion asking for the alternative remedies ofreturning the letter to the Secretary or allowing the respondents tofile a brief in response to cure the Secretary’s violation of therules. We deny the remedies requested. The Commission will, however,afford a remedy not requested in respondents’ motion. Specifically, theCommissioners have not considered any representations or argumentscontained in the Secretary’s letter during the Commission’sdeliberations on the issue directed for review, namely whether OSHA hadjurisdiction to regulate the cited working conditions.[[5]] Section 4(b)(1) provides:Nothing in this Act shall apply to working conditions of employees withrespect to which other Federal agencies, and State agencies acting undersection 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C.2021), exercise statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards orregulations affecting occupational safety or health.[[6]] The Coast Guard has filed an amicus curiae brief presentingarguments contrary to those made by the companies.[[7]] While we do not refer to the legislative history of CFlVSA forassistance in making our decision on this issue, we note with interestthat respondents’ brief states that nowhere in that document or in thelegislative history of a 1984 statute dealing with commercial fishingvessels is there any discussion of OSHA.[[8]] The citations involved the guarding of machines, belts, andpulleys, clearance in passageways, recordkeeping, storage of combustiblegases used in welding, and violations of the hazard communication standard.[[9]] In Dillingham, a crewman on a tugboat climbed onto a mooring buoyto fasten a line while the tug was assisting a tanker mooring at anoffshore anchorage. He was injured when he fell into the water and wascaught between the buoy and the tug. While the Coast Guard’sregulations did not address the specific facts of this accident, theyaddressed the broader situation. It is well-established that, whenanother federal agency has acted to regulate specific working condition,it is not necessary that it act in the same manner or in an equallystringent manner as OSHA in order for an exemption to arise undersection 4(b)(1). Northwest Airlines, Inc., 8 BNA OSHC at 1990, 1980 CCHOSHD at p. 30,489; Pennsuco Cement & Aggregates, Inc., 8 BNA OSHC 1378,1980 CCH OSHD ? 24,478 (No. 15462, 1980); Mushroom Transp. Co., 1 BNAOSHC 1390, 1392, 1973-74 CCH OSHD ? 16,881 at p. 21,591 (No. 1588, 1973).[[10]] Even if the discussion in Dillingham were not dictum, that caseis distinguishable from the one before us. The employee in Dillinghamwas a sailor engaged in the operation of the ship, the traditional areaof Coast Guard expertise. The vessels involved here are called \”factoryships\” because they perform the same function at sea that a canningfactory performs ashore. The operations cited here were all activitiesinvolving fish processing and required neither knowledge nor skills ofseamanship. The Coast Guard has stated that the working conditionscited are outside its area of expertise and that, when these casesarose, it had taken no steps to regulate them. We could therefore findthat the policy reasons underlying section 4(b)(1), to avoid theduplication of regulation which subjects employers to unnecessary andconfusing requirements and wastes government resources, would notrequire that an exemption be found here. The Coast Guard claims noexpertise in regulating the conditions of factory workers, whetherashore or afloat, while OSHA does. To find an exemption here would notfurther the purposes of workplace safety, which is, after all, theobject of both CFIVSA and the Act.[[11]] Section 9(a) of the Act requires the citation to fix a reasonabletime for the abatement of the violation. Section 10(c) of the Act givesthe Commission jurisdiction over employee contests of the reasonablenessof the abatement period, which clearly demonstrates that the Commissionmay establish a different abatement date. The Commission also has theauthority to find that there was a violation but that abatement is notrequired when it finds that a violation is de minimis. The questionthat has not been answered is whether the Commission can find aviolation that is not de minimis and hold that abatement is notrequired. It is not at all clear that the provision in section 10(c) ofthe Act empowering the Commission to grant \”other appropriate relief\”would cover this situation.”