“Docket No. 89-1017 89-1192 SECRETARY OF LABOR,Complainant, v.ALASKA TRAWL FISHERIES, INC.,Respondent.OSHRC Docket No. 89-1017 & 89-1192DECISION Before: FOULKE, Chairman; WISEMAN and MONTOYA,Commissioners. BY THE COMMISSION:The respondents, Alaska Trawl Fisheries, Inc.(\”Alaska Trawl\”), and Golden Age Fisheries, a partnership (\”GoldenAge\”), operate fishing and fish processing vessels.\u00a0 Two of these vessels, onebelonging to each company, were inspected by the Occupational Safety and HealthAdministration (\”OSHA\”) of the Department of Labor.\u00a0 As a result of theseinspections, the Secretary of Labor issued citations to each company alleging violationsof the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. ?? 651-678 (\”theAct\” or \”the OSH Act\”), and of standards promulgated pursuant to thatstatute.[[1]]\u00a0 Both companies timely contested the citations, and the cases wereassigned to an administrative law judge of this Commission.The two cases were consolidated and submitted to thejudge on stipulations.\u00a0 The only issue remaining in dispute between the parties waswhether OSHA had jurisdiction over the cited working conditions.[[2]]\u00a0 The judge heldthat OSHA had jurisdiction, and the companies petitioned to have the judge’s decisionreviewed by the Commission.\u00a0 The judge’s decision was directed for review pursuant tosection 12(j) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. ? 661(j).I. INTRODUCTIONAt the time of the inspections and issuance of thecitations, both companies were engaged in fishing and fish processing activities in andaround Dutch Harbor, Alaska.\u00a0 These activities included cleaning, processing,freezing, and packaging fish products for shipment to destinations in Alaska and outsideof that state.\u00a0 Alaska Trawl operated the F\/T Endurance; Golden Age operated the F\/TBrowns Point.\u00a0 The ships in question were classified by the Coast Guard as\”uninspected vessels,\” meaning that, at the time of OSHA’s inspections and theissuance of the citations, they were subject to limited regulation by the Coast Guard. See46 U.S.C. ?? 4101-4116. [[3]]In September 1988, the Commercial Fishing IndustryVessel Safety Act of 1988, 46 U.S.C. ?? 4501-4508 (\”CFIVSA\”), which requiresthe Coast Guard to regulate the operation of fishing trawlers such as the two vesselscited here, was enacted into law.\u00a0 At the time OSHA conducted its inspections of thetwo vessels in February 1989, the Coast Guard had not yet taken any official action tofollow that mandate.\u00a0 The citations were issued in March of 1989, and the judgeissued his decision in these consolidated cases in November 1989.\u00a0 The followingyear, in April 1990, the Coast Guard issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to adoptstandards under the new statute.[[4]]Review was directed on the following issue:\u00a0Whether OSHA had jurisdiction over the cited working conditions.\u00a0 The respondentsmake two arguments in support of their claim that OSHA had no jurisdiction, each based ona different statute.\u00a0 Their first argument is premised on their contention thatCongress intended in CFIVSA to vest the Coast Guard with exclusive jurisdiction over allsafety matters aboard commercial fishing vessels.\u00a0 Thus, they argue that, under therules of statutory construction, if the provisions of CFIVSA conflict with those of theOSH Act, CFIVSA must prevail because it is a subsequent statute that more specificallyaddresses the conditions in question than does the earlier, more general OSH Act. \u00a0The respondents’ second argument is that OSHA was preempted, under the provisions ofsection 4(b)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. ? 653(b)(1),[[5]] because the United States CoastGuard has acted to regulate the cited working conditions.[[6]]Having examined the two statutes in question and theapplicable regulations in effect when the citations were issued and considered thearguments of the parties and the amicus curiae, we conclude that the judge correctlydecided the issue.\u00a0 We affirm his decision for the reasons set forth below.II. ISSUESA. PREEMPTION BASED ON CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO STATUTES Alaska Trawl and Golden Age assert that the central issue in this case is one of statutoryinterpretation and Congressional intent, namely whether CFIVSA grants the Coast Guardexclusive jurisdiction over all safety matters aboard the cited vessels.\u00a0 Accordingto the respondents, there is a conflict between the two statutes because Congress intendedto vest the Coast Guard with exclusive jurisdiction over all aspects of safety oncommercial fishing vessels, thereby depriving OSHA of any jurisdiction.\u00a0 The judgeconcluded that there was no such conflict because CFIVSA was intended to governnavigational safety, the traditional area of Coast Guard expertise, not safety in the fishprocessing activities aboard factory ships such as those cited here.\u00a0 He found thatthe operation of a ship in navigation and the processing of the fish were separate anddistinct operations.The respondents do not assert that the Act nevergoverned activities aboard uninspected vessels such as the ones cited here.\u00a0 Prior tothe enactment of CFIVSA, OSHA clearly had the statutory authority to regulate the workingconditions of employees aboard uninspected vessels.\u00a0 Donovan v. Red Star MarineServs., 739 F.2d 774, 780 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). \u00a0Therefore, OSHA’s authority continues unless some specific provision in CFIVSA or anothermore-recently-enacted statute has preempted it.The respondents assert that nothing in CFIVSA limitsthe Coast Guard’s authority under that statute to purely navigational matters.\u00a0 Therespondents argue that this failure to limit the Coast Guard’s authority demonstratesCongress’ clear intent for the Coast Guard to develop a comprehensive program forestablishing safe working conditions for the crews of commercial fishing vessels and fishprocessing vessels.\u00a0 The respondents further assert that, if there is any ambiguityas to the intent of Congress, it is resolved by examining the legislative history ofCFIVSA, citing references in the legislative history.The respondents’ arguments state correct legaltenets. The basic principles for interpreting two statutes in pari materia (dealing withthe same subject) are:It is assumed that whenever the legislature enacts aprovision it has in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter.\u00a0 Inthe absence of any express repeal or amendment, the new provision is presumed in accordwith the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes.\u00a0 Thus, they all shouldbe construed together….When two statutes are involved each of which by itsterms applies to the facts before the court, the statute which is the more recent of thetwo irreconcilably conflicting statutes prevails.\u00a0 Where a conflict exists the morespecific statute controls over the more general one….Provisions in one act which are omitted in another onthe same subject matter will be applied when the purposes of the two acts are consistent.\u00a0 Prior statutes relating to the same subject matter are compared with the newprovision; if it is possible by reasonable construction, both are construed so that effectis given to every provision in all of them. . .Statutes for the same subject, although in apparentconflict, are construed to be in harmony if reasonably possible. However, it has been heldwhere two statutes deal with the same subject matter, the more recent enactment prevailsas the latest expression of legislative will.\u00a0 If there is an irreconcilable conflictbetween the new provision and the prior statutes, the new provision will control as it isthe later expression of the legislature.2B N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction ?51.02 (5th ed., rev. 1992).These principles of statutory construction apply,however, only if there is uncertainty as to the meaning of language used in one of thestatutes. \u00a0 When the terms of a statute are not ambiguous, there is no need forfurther inquiry.\u00a0 Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 483 (1981), Caminetti v. UnitedStates, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (where the language is plain and admits of no more thanone meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise and rules which are to aid doubtfulmeanings need no discussion); McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 614-15 (D.C. Cir.1980).\u00a0 We may therefore look to the legislative history only if there is ambiguouslanguage in the statute itself which suggests, but does not explicitly state, that theCoast Guard is to have exclusive jurisdiction.\u00a0 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 n.29(1978) (citing Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949) and cases cited therein) (whenstatute is unambiguous on its face, a court should not look to legislative history for itsmeaning). \u00a0 We therefore conclude that, if the statute does not suggest on its facethat the intent of Congress was to exclude OSHA from all regulatory activities in thisfield, it is neither necessary nor proper to look to secondary sources.Having examined CFIVSA, we find nothing to indicatethat Congress intended to vest exclusive jurisdiction over working conditions aboardcommercial fishing vessels to the Coast Guard so as to preempt OSHA from regulating thoseconditions. \u00a0 Congress vested the Coast Guard with authority to regulate safetyaboard such vessels, but there is nothing in the statute that excludes other federalagencies from regulating matters that come under their jurisdiction. [[7]] In fact, wenote that, in its amicus curiae brief, the Coast Guard has disputed the respondents’assertion that the two statutes are in conflict.\u00a0 The Coast Guard states that, afterCFIVSA was enacted, an amendment to another bill was introduced in Congress that wouldhave specified that the Coast Guard was the agency responsible for all aspects of safetyaboard fishing and fish processing vessels and that this amendment was rejected.The Coast Guard argues that CFIVSA does not expresslyprovide that the Coast Guard has exclusive jurisdiction and that it cannot be interpretedto say that the Act no longer applies to fishing vessels. In contrast, the Coast Guardargues, CFIVSA clearly delineates the areas that the Coast Guard has authority toregulate, areas which are limited to traditional maritime safety items, not factoryconditions. The Coast Guard concludes that there is no basis in CFIVSA or its legislativehistory to support the limits on OSHA’s jurisdiction put forth by the respondents.The Secretary of Labor also contends that there is noconflict between CFIVSA and the Act.When federal agencies assert that they do or do nothave statutory authority to regulate particular working conditions, the Commission givesconsiderable weight to the agency’s representations.\u00a0 See Northwest Airlines, Inc., 8BNA OSHC 1982, 1988, 1980 CCH OSHD ? 24,751, p. 30,487 (No. 13649, 1980).\u00a0 Whilesuch statements by a federal agency are not controlling, the Commission will limit itsinquiry to determining whether the statute reasonably supports the agency’s assertions.\u00a0 Id.\u00a0 Accordingly, while we give considerable weight to the assertions of theDepartment of Transportation and the Department of Labor that the provisions of CFIVSA andthe Act are not in conflict, we have independently reviewed the provisions of bothstatutes and reached a similar conclusion.Although Alaska Trawl and Golden Age assert thatthere is a conflict between the statutes and that the intent of Congress was for the CoastGuard to have exclusive jurisdiction, we find no support for either of these contentions.Nowhere in their brief or their reply brief have the companies pointed to any specificlanguage in the statute that indicates that Congress intended the Coast Guard to haveexclusive jurisdiction over the working conditions aboard commercial fishing vessels thatwould preempt the jurisdiction OSHA exercises under the Act.\u00a0 Without a clearexpression by Congress that its intent was to preempt OSHA’s jurisdiction over the citedworking conditions, we are unwilling to infer such an intent.B. PREEMPTION UNDER SECTION 4(b)(1)The next question is whether OSHA’s jurisdiction over the cited working conditions isprecluded by the provisions of section 4(b)(1) of the Act designed to prevent regulatoryduplication.The fact that another federal agency possesses thestatutory authority to regulate the cited working conditions does not constitute theexercise of statutory authority meant by section 4(b)(1); under that section, the otheragency must have taken some action to exercise that authority.\u00a0 E.g., In reInspection of Norfolk Dredging Co., 783 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834(1986); Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Marshall, 636 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1980);Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Usery, 539 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.874 (1977); Southern Ry. v. OSHRC, 539 F.2d 335 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999(1976); Baltimore & O.R.R v. OSHRC, 548 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Organized Migrantsin Community Action, Inc. v. Brennan 520 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Indiana Harbor BeltR.R., 4 BNA OSHC 2006,1976-77 CCH OSHD ? 21,473 (No. 12420, 1977).\u00a0 We musttherefore determine whether the Coast Guard has exercised its statutory authority bypromulgating standards or regulations having the force and effect of law that govern thecited working conditions.\u00a0 Northwest Airlines, Inc., 8 BNA OSHC at 1989-91, 1980 CCHOSHD at pp. 30,487-89.\u00a0 Both the Coast Guard and the Secretary of Labor assert thatthe Coast Guard had not exercised its statutory authority over the cited workingconditions at the time the citations in these cases were issued, while the companiesassert that it had.When another federal agency has the statutoryauthority to regulate the safety and health of employees, an exemption under section4(b)(1) exists only as to those working conditions that the other federal agency hasexercised its statutory authority to regulate; and the employer claiming the exemption hasthe burden of proving that the agency has exercised its authority to regulate the workingconditions in question.\u00a0 Puget Sound Tug & Barge, 9 BNA OSHC 1764, 1774, 1981 CCHOSHD ? 25,373, p. 31,594 (No. 76-4905,1981).In support of their claim to an exemption, AlaskaTrawl and Golden Age assert that each of the working conditions for which they werecited[[8]] is sufficiently subject to the Coast Guard’s exercise of authority to exemptthose conditions under section 4(b)(1).\u00a0 Citing Dunlop v. Burlington Northern R.R.,395 F.Supp. 203 (D. Mont. 1975), a decision of the federal district court in Montana, theyalso assert that the Coast Guard’s issuance of draft regulations subsequent to theissuance of the citation constitutes sufficient exercise of authority to create anexemption, because CFIVSA required the Coast Guard to follow a lengthy procedure before itcould issue them.\u00a0 The companies cite a statement in Dillingham Tug & BargeCorp., 10 BNA OSHC 1859, 1982 CCH OSHD ? 26,166 (No. 77-4143, 1982), that, in certaincircumstances, section 4(b)(1) can create an industry-wide exemption.\u00a0 They claimthat the Coast Guard’s activity in regulating the maritime industry generally, and thecommercial fishing industry in particular, create such an industry- wide exemption for thefishing industry.The companies’ arguments place considerable relianceon events that occurred after the citations were issued, particularly the Coast Guard’sApril 1990 notice of proposed rulemaking.\u00a0 Our inquiry, however, is limited todetermining whether the Coast Guard took sufficient action to regulate the cited workingconditions before the citations were issued to have exempted the companies from OSHA’sjurisdiction under Consolidated Rail Corp., 10 BNA OSHC 1851, 1982 CCH OSHD ? 26,165 (No.78-238, 1982).\u00a0 See also Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Usery (proposing futureregulations not sufficient to create exemption).We conclude that the actions taken by the Coast Guardin this case were not sufficient to give rise to an exemption from OSHA’s jurisdiction.\u00a0 Under Consolidated Rail Corp., the issuance of proposed regulations does not, as amatter of law, constitute an exercise of statutory authority to prescribe or enforcestandards or regulations within the meaning of section 4(b)(1).\u00a0 Even if we were tohold that the issuance of proposed regulations, by itself, was sufficient action topreempt OSHA, we would not find preemption on these facts.\u00a0 At the time the citationswere issued, the Coast Guard had not yet issued even proposed regulations, much lesspromulgated final regulations having the force and effect of law.\u00a0 Thus, because theproposed regulations did not have the force and effect of law, we need not look at theproposed regulations to determine whether they would, as the companies assert, govern eachof the cited working conditions.\u00a0 Northwest Airlines, Inc., 8 BNA OSHC at 1990, 1980CCH OSHD at p. 30,488.III. RELATED ISSUESThere are two remaining issues that require the Commission’s attention.First, there is a controversy as to the effect of the Commission’s decision in DillinghamTug & Barge in the section 4(b)(1) issue.\u00a0 The Secretary urges us to overrulethat decision; the companies assert that it controls the situation here. We believe,however, that the Commission did not hold in Dillingham that an industry-wide exemptionhad been created.\u00a0 The Commission observed that, under certain circumstances, such asituation could exist, but its disposition of the case was based on a finding that theCoast Guard had, in fact, exercised its statutory authority to regulate the workingconditions that were the subject of the Secretary’s citation, the hazard of a seaman’sfalling into the water while engaged in navigational, docking, or mooring activities.[[9]]\u00a0 Because the Coast Guard had already regulated the general hazard addressed byOSHA’s citation, the same result would have been found under the existing case law, and itwas unnecessary for the majority in Dillingham to go as far as it did.\u00a0 To the extentthat the discussion in Dillingham went beyond what was strictly necessary to adjudicatethe issues presented by that case, it constituted obiter dictum (remarks not necessary todecide the case) and therefore is not controlling here.[[10]]Second, the Secretary filed a letter on December2,1991, which raises several possible problems.\u00a0 The letter states that on September15, 1991, after this case had been directed for review, the Coast Guard acted to exerciseits statutory authority by adopting regulations to govern certain of the cited workingconditions and that, as a result of the Coast Guard’s action, the Secretary withdraws theabatement orders for some of the items covered by the citations.\u00a0 Our firstreservation about the Secretary’s action is that we are not at all confident that theCommission has the authority under the Act to find a violation (other than a de minimisviolation) and not require it to be abated.[[11]] Assuming that the Commission does havethat authority, would the assessment of the penalties stipulated to by the parties withoutrequiring abatement of the violative conditions, as the Secretary seeks in her letter,make the Commission’s order penal rather than remedial?\u00a0 If so, would the Commissionhave to follow the requirements for a criminal proceeding?\u00a0 These cases weresubmitted to the judge on a stipulated record.\u00a0 We are uncertain of the admissibilityof any admissions by the companies if adequate criminal procedural safeguards were notfollowed.Another factor that troubles the Commission is thatthe Secretary appears to be attempting, by letter, to alter the terms of the stipulationsagreed to by all parties and submitted to the judge.\u00a0 The companies have objected tothe filing of the letter, although not on this specific ground.\u00a0 We are thereforeunwilling to act on the Secretary’s letter without affording the parties an opportunity toaddress the questions it raises.\u00a0 Accordingly, we will remand these cases to theadministrative law judge for him to rule on the arguments the parties address to thesequestions.Before the judge, the parties may also wish toaddress the question of whether it is appropriate for them to enter into an agreementrequiring the companies to abate the violations but providing that compliance with the newCoast Guard regulations will be deemed to constitute abatement for the purposes of thesecases.IV. CONCLUSIONFor the reasons set out above, we find that the administrative law judge did not errin denying the companies’ motions to dismiss.\u00a0 We affirm the judge’s decision findingthat OSHA had jurisdiction over the cited working conditions and affirming the citationson the basis of the parties’ stipulations.\u00a0 We do, however, remand these cases forthe parties to address before the judge the questions raised by the letter filed by theSecretary on December 2, 1991.Accordingly, these cases are remanded for furtherproceedings consistent with this decision.Edwin G. Foulke, Jr. ChairmanDonald G. Wiseman CommissionerVelma Montoya CommissionerDated: June 18, 1992\u00a0FINAL ORDERThe Stipulation of the Parties on Remand and the Settlement Agreements are approved.Sidney J. Goldstein Judge, OSHRCDated: October 2, 1992LYNN MARTIN, SECRETARY OF LABOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,Complainant, v. ALASKA TRAWL FISHERIES, INCORPORATED, Respondent.OSHRC DOCKET NO. NO. 89-1017LYNN MARTIN, SECRETARY OF LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OFLABOR, Complainant, v.GOLDEN AGE FISHERIES, Respondent.OSHRC DOCKET NO. 89-1192STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES ON REMANDCome now the parties, by and through theirundersigned counsel of record, and in response to the Decision entered herein on June 18,1992, and remanding this consolidated proceeding, do represent, agree and stipulate asfollows:Whereas, the Decision has raised questions relatingto the abatement of the alleged violations at issue herein and to the nature and contentof any prospective abatement order to be entered as well as to the authority of the ReviewCommission in this regard, and Whereas, each of the alleged violations at issue herein has been abated in accordance withthe applicable cited OSHA safety and health standards prior to September 15, 1991 (thedate upon which certain U.S. Coast Guard occupational safety and health standards becameeffective), as set forth in the two Settlement Agreements and Stipulations for Entry ofFinal Order previously filed in each of the individually docketed proceedings.1. The parties stipulate and agree that all questionsrelating to the abatement of the alleged violations at issue herein have been resolvedbetween the parties prior to September 15, 1991; 2. No controversy or dispute warranting resolution, order or any further action by theReview Commission currently exists between the parties with respect to any matters ofabatement; and3. This matter may be concluded upon entry of a further final order in accordance with theagreement of the parties as set forth in the aforesaid Settlement Agreements andStipulations for Entry of a Final Order filed herein.Marshall J. BregerSolicitor of Labor Daniel W. Teehan Regional Solicitor Robert A. FrielAssociate Regional Solicitor William W. KatesAttorneyU.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABORAttorneys for ComplainantDated September 3, 1992.ALASKA TRAWL FISHERIES, INC. GOLDEN AGE FISHERIESJames P. Walsh, of,Davis Wright TremaineAttorneys for RespondentDated September 11, 1992.William W.TattlesU.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR Attorneys for ComplainantDated September 11, 1992. FOOTNOTES: [[1]] Alaska Trawl Fisheries was issued twocitations. One citation alleged that the company had committed two violations of section5(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. ? 654(a)(1), and serious violations of a number ofstandards promulgated by OSHA, including 29 C.F.R. ?? 1910.212(a)(1), 1910.215(a)(4),1910.215(b)(9), 1910.219(d)(1), 1910.219(e)(1)(i), 1910.219(f)(3), and1910.243(c)(3).\u00a0 The other citation alleged a number of other-than-serious violationsof OSHA standards, including 29 C.F.R. ?? 1903.2(a)(1), 1910.22(b)(1), 1910.1200(e)(1),1910.1200(g)(1), and 1200(h)(1). \u00a0 The Secretary proposed that Alaska Trawl Fisheriespay a total of $2280 in penalties.Golden Age was cited for serious violations of 29C.F.R. ?? 1910.215(a)(4), 1910.215(b)(9), and 1910.243(c)(3), and other-than-seriousviolations of 29 C.F.R. ?? 1904.2(a), 1904.5(a), 1910.22(b)(1), 1910.252(a)(2)(iv)(c),1910.1200(e)(1), 1910.1200(g)(1), and 1910.1200(h)(1), with a total penalty of $500proposed.[[2]] The parties have stipulated that, if theworking conditions cited are not exempt from OSHA’s jurisdiction, both companies were inviolation of the Act as alleged.\u00a0 The companies also stipulated to theappropriateness of the penalties.[[3]] For the provisions governing inspected vessels,see 46 U.S.C. ?? 3301-3318 and the standards in Parts 90-96 of 46 C.F.R.[[4]] The Coast Guard has adopted regulations thatwent into effect on September 15, 1991, while this case was on review.\u00a0 On December2, 1991, the Secretary filed a letter informing the Commission of that fact and makingcertain other representations.\u00a0 The respondents have objected to the filing of thatletter, arguing that it contains legal argument and therefore constitutes a brief filed inviolation of Rule 93(b)(3) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure, 29 C.F.R. ?2200.93(b)(3).\u00a0 The respondents have filed a motion asking for the alternativeremedies of returning the letter to the Secretary or allowing the respondents to file abrief in response to cure the Secretary’s violation of the rules.\u00a0 We deny theremedies requested.\u00a0 The Commission will, however, afford a remedy not requested inrespondents’ motion. Specifically, the Commissioners have not considered anyrepresentations or arguments contained in the Secretary’s letter during the Commission’sdeliberations on the issue directed for review, namely whether OSHA had jurisdiction toregulate the cited working conditions.[[5]] Section 4(b)(1) provides:Nothing in this Act shall apply to working conditionsof employees with respect to which other Federal agencies, and State agencies acting undersection 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2021), exercisestatutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards or regulations affectingoccupational safety or health.[[6]] The Coast Guard has filed an amicus curiaebrief presenting arguments contrary to those made by the companies.[[7]] While we do not refer to the legislativehistory of CFlVSA for assistance in making our decision on this issue, we note withinterest that respondents’ brief states that nowhere in that document or in thelegislative history of a 1984 statute dealing with commercial fishing vessels is there anydiscussion of OSHA.[[8]] The citations involved the guarding ofmachines, belts, and pulleys, clearance in passageways, recordkeeping, storage ofcombustible gases used in welding, and violations of the hazard communication standard.[[9]] In Dillingham, a crewman on a tugboat climbedonto a mooring buoy to fasten a line while the tug was assisting a tanker mooring at anoffshore anchorage.\u00a0 He was injured when he fell into the water and was caughtbetween the buoy and the tug.\u00a0 While the Coast Guard’s regulations did not addressthe specific facts of this accident, they addressed the broader situation.\u00a0 It iswell-established that, when another federal agency has acted to regulate specific workingcondition, it is not necessary that it act in the same manner or in an equally stringentmanner as OSHA in order for an exemption to arise under section 4(b)(1).\u00a0 NorthwestAirlines, Inc., 8 BNA OSHC at 1990, 1980 CCH OSHD at p. 30,489; Pennsuco Cement &Aggregates, Inc., 8 BNA OSHC 1378, 1980 CCH OSHD ? 24,478 (No. 15462, 1980); MushroomTransp. Co., 1 BNA OSHC 1390, 1392, 1973-74 CCH OSHD ? 16,881 at p. 21,591 (No. 1588,1973).[[10]] Even if the discussion in Dillingham were notdictum, that case is distinguishable from the one before us.\u00a0 The employee inDillingham was a sailor engaged in the operation of the ship, the traditional area ofCoast Guard expertise. The vessels involved here are called \”factory ships\”because they perform the same function at sea that a canning factory performs ashore.\u00a0 The operations cited here were all activities involving fish processing andrequired neither knowledge nor skills of seamanship.\u00a0 The Coast Guard has stated thatthe working conditions cited are outside its area of expertise and that, when these casesarose, it had taken no steps to regulate them.\u00a0 We could therefore find that thepolicy reasons underlying section 4(b)(1), to avoid the duplication of regulation whichsubjects employers to unnecessary and confusing requirements and wastes governmentresources, would not require that an exemption be found here.\u00a0 The Coast Guard claimsno expertise in regulating the conditions of factory workers, whether ashore or afloat,while OSHA does.\u00a0 To find an exemption here would not further the purposes ofworkplace safety, which is, after all, the object of both CFIVSA and the Act.[[11]] Section 9(a) of the Act requires the citationto fix a reasonable time for the abatement of the violation.\u00a0 Section 10(c) of theAct gives the Commission jurisdiction over employee contests of the reasonableness of theabatement period, which clearly demonstrates that the Commission may establish a differentabatement date.\u00a0 The Commission also has the authority to find that there was aviolation but that abatement is not required when it finds that a violation is de minimis.\u00a0 The question that has not been answered is whether the Commission can find aviolation that is not de minimis and hold that abatement is not required.\u00a0 It is notat all clear that the provision in section 10(c) of the Act empowering the Commission togrant \”other appropriate relief\” would cover this situation.”