“SECRETARY OF LABOR,Complainant,v.ARCO CHEMICAL CO.,Respondent.OSHRC Docket No. 88-2484SECRETARY OF LABOR,Complainant,v.LYONDELL PETROCHEMICAL CO.,Respondent.OIL, CHEMICAL & ATOMICWORKERS INTERNATIONALUNION, LOCAL 4-227Intervenor.OSHRC Docket No. 88-2567_ORDER OF REMAND_Before: FOULKE, Chairman; MONTOYA and WISEMAN, Commissioners.BY THE COMMISSION:For the reasons set forth below, the Commission hereby vacates theDirection for Review in _Lyondell Petrochemical Co., _OSHRC Docket No.88-2567, and remands that case, along with Arco Chemical Co., OSHRCDocket No. 88-2484, to the Deputy Chief Administrative Law Judge forassignment and further proceedings consistent with the recent decisionof the Third Circuit in Dole v. Arco Chemical 921 F.2d 484 (3d Cir. 1990).Both of these cases arose from a fatality inspection of LyondellPetrochemical Company’s facility in Houston, Texas, by the OccupationalSafety and Health Administration (\”OSHA\”) of the United StatesDepartment of Labor. A fire extinguisher had exploded at Lyondell’sfacility while an Arco employee was attempting to charge it during afire control training exercise. The employee was killed as a result ofthe explosion.Following the OSHA inspection, the Secretary issued a citation to Arco.The citation, as amended by the Complaint, alleged that Arco had failedto properly inspect the fire extinguisher, in violation of 29 C.F.R. ?1910.157(e)(1), and had failed to perform hydrostatic testing upon thefire extinguisher, in violation of ? 1910.157(f)(4). Arco contestedthose allegations and moved for summary judgment before the judge on theground, among others, that it did not own or control the equipment. TheSecretary then moved to amend the Complaint to delete the ?1910.157(f)(4) item and to allege instead a violation of ? 1910.156 (d).The latter provision covers fire brigades, and states in part that[f]ire fighting equipment that is in damaged or unserviceable conditionshall be removed from service and replaced.\”The judge denied the motion to amend and granted summary judgment toArco, without articulating the reasoning for his rulings. He merelystated that Arco’s arguments were \”well taken.\” The case was notdirected for review. (There were no members of the Commission thenserving.) On appeal, the Third Circuit concluded that the judge abusedhis discretion in failing to allow the Secretary to amend her Complaint.It remanded the case to the Commission for further proceedings. 921 F.2dat 484-85.Lyondell was cited for noncompliance with, among other provisions, thefire extinguisher testing requirement at 29 C.F.R. ? 1910.157(e)(2), andthe hydrostatic testing requirement at ? 1910.157(f)(4). Lyondellcontested the citation and moved for summary judgment on the ground thatit was not responsible because, among other reasons, the fireextinguisher was not provided for use by its own employees. It alsoargued that the ? 1910.157(f)(4) charge could not be sustained becausethe Secretary had not offered \”new evidence of corrosion or mechanicalinjury,\” which is required to prove a violation of that subsection. Thesecretary argued in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.Without entering any findings or conclusions in support of his ruling,the judge granted summary judgment to Lyondell. Following theSecretary’s petition, Chairman Foulke directed the case for review.Normally, when a judge fails to state the reasons for his decision, theappropriate course for the Commission to take is to remand the case foran adequate statement of reasons_. See, e.g., Stripe-A-Zone, Inc.,_ 12BNA OSHC 1192, 1193, 1984-85 CCH OSHD ? 27,184, p. 35,090 (No. 79-2380,1985). A remand also is appropriate when there exist material factualissues which require a hearing for resolution. _See, e.g., Anderson v.Liberty Lobby, Inc._, 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510(1986); _Chen v. Metropolitan Ins. and Annuity Co._, 907 F.2d 566,567-68, 570 (5th Cir. 1990); _Todaro v. Bowman,_ 872 F.2d 43, 46, 50 (3dCir. 1989). Summary judgment may be granted only where \”there is nogenuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party isentitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c) ._See also, e.g., LTV Steel Co., _13 BNA OSHC 1090, 1986-87 CCH OSHD ?27,826 (No. 86-449A, 1987) (Commission remanded to judge portion of caseon which judge had issued partial summary judgment, and noted strongFederal policy against confusion, overlapping decisions, and wastedeffort that often result from piecemeal adjudication of cases). _Seegenerally,_ 10A C. Wright, A. Miller M. Kane, _Federal Practice andProcedure_, ? 2725 (1983).The Secretary has asserted that there are genuine issues of materialfact in Arco as to whether that company controlled the hazards. Arco hasargued that the Secretary failed to provide sufficient evidence ofcontrol to avoid summary judgment. It is appropriate for a judge toexpressly resolve this controversy, stating the reasons upon which herelies. 5 U.S.C. ? 557(c).There also may be factual issues in Lyondell which require a hearing forresolution. The Third Circuit noted that Arco and Lyondell both weresubsidiaries of Atlantic Richfield Co. at the time of the fatality, andthat they occupied adjacent plants. Arco, 921 F.2d at 485 n.1. Thefacts, regarding the corporate relationship between Arco and _Lyondell_may be relevant to the decision. Furthermore, as noted above, theparties dispute whether the Secretary has offered \”new evidence ofcorrosion or mechanical injury,\” regarding the ? 1910.157(f)(4) item. Itis appropriate for a judge to expressly resolve these matters, statingthe reasons upon which he relies.Accordingly, the direction for Review in _Lyondell_ is vacated, and both_Arco_ and _Lyondell_ are remanded to the Deputy Chief AdministrativeLaw Judge for assignment and further proceedings consistent with thisdecision and with the Third Circuit’s decision in _Arco._Edwin G. Foulke, Jr.ChairmanVelma MontoyaCommissionerDonald G. WisemanCommissionerDated: April 26, 1991————————————————————————“