“SECRETARY OF LABOR,Complainant,v.BURK WELL SERVICE COMPANY,Respondent.OSHRC Docket No. 79-6060DECISIONBefore: BUCKLEY, Chairman; RADER and WALL, Commissioners. BUCKLEY, Chairman:This case is before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commissionunder 29 U.S.C. ? 661(i), section 12(j) of the Occupational Safety andHealth Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. ?? 651-678 (\”the Act\”). The Commission isan adjudicatory agency, independent of the Department of Labor and theOccupational Safety and Health Administration. It was established toresolve disputes arising out of enforcement actions brought by theSecretary of Labor under the Act and has no regulatory functions. Seesection 10(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. ? 659(c).The Secretary of Labor issued a citation to Burk Well Service Co.alleging that Burk had willfully violated section 5(a)(1) of the Act, 29U.S.C. ? 654(a)(1). Administrative Law Judge E. Carter Botkin affirmedthe citation and assessed a penalty of $2,000.On review, Burk makes two arguments. First, it argues that the citationshould be vacated because the Secretary failed to introduce any evidenceto establish that it was \”engaged in a business affecting commerce\”within the meaning of section 3(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. ? 652(5). Thatsection states:Sec. 3 For the purposes of this Act–* * *(5) The term ’employer’ means a person engaged in a business affectingcommerce who has employees, but does not include the United States orany State or political sub divisions of a State.Second, Burk argues that the judge erred in finding the violation tohave been willful. We need not address the willfulness issue because wefind that the Secretary failed to establish on the record before us thatBurk is an employer engaged in a business affecting commerce.In enacting the Occupational Safety and Health Act, Congress intended toexercise the full extent of the authority granted by the commerce clauseof the Constitution. Austin Road v. OSHRC, 683 F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1982).Accordingly, an employer comes under coverage of the Act by merelyaffecting commerce; it is not necessary that the employer be engageddirectly in interstate commerce. Austin Road, 683 F.2d at 907; UnitedStates v. Dye Construction Co., 510 F.2d 78 (10th Cir. 1975).Nevertheless, the Secretary bears the burden of establishing thethreshold jurisdictional fact. Although the Secretary’s burden ofpersuasion is a light one, Austin Road, 683 F.2d at 907, he made noeffort to meet it here.In his complaint, the Secretary alleged that Burk produced goods forcommerce, or handled or worked on goods that move in interstatecommerce, and that Burk was therefore engaged in a business affectingcommerce within the meaning of section 3(5) of the Act. Even though Burkspecifically denied these allegations in its answer, the Secretaryintroduced no evidence whatsoever to support them. The record is devoidof any evidence bearing on the jurisdictional question. On the recordbefore us, any finding that Burk’s business affects commerce would bemere speculation. To paraphrase the Fifth Circuit in Austin Road,perhaps Burk’s business does affect interstate commerce; but thatessential fact is not established on the record before us.Accordingly, the judge’s decision is reversed and the citation is vacated.FOR THE COMMISSIONRay H. Darling, Jr.Executive SecretaryDATED: December 12, 1985————————————————————————“