“Docket No. 79-6060 SECRETARY OF LABOR,Complainant, v.BURK WELL SERVICE COMPANY,Respondent.OSHRC Docket No. 79-6060DECISION Before: BUCKLEY, Chairman; RADER and WALL, Commissioners. BUCKLEY, Chairman:This case is before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission under 29 U.S.C.? 661(i), section 12(j) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. ??651-678 (\”the Act\”). The Commission is an adjudicatory agency, independent ofthe Department of Labor and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. It wasestablished to resolve disputes arising out of enforcement actions brought by theSecretary of Labor under the Act and has no regulatory functions. See section 10(c) of theAct, 29 U.S.C. ? 659(c).The Secretary of Labor issued a citation to Burk Well Service Co. alleging that Burk hadwillfully violated section 5(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. ? 654(a)(1). Administrative LawJudge E. Carter Botkin affirmed the citation and assessed a penalty of $2,000.On review, Burk makes two arguments. First, it argues that the citation should be vacatedbecause the Secretary failed to introduce any evidence to establish that it was\”engaged in a business affecting commerce\” within the meaning of section 3(5) ofthe Act, 29 U.S.C. ? 652(5). That section states:Sec. 3 For the purposes of this Act–* * *(5) The term ’employer’ means a person engaged in a business affecting commerce who hasemployees, but does not include the United States or any State or political sub divisionsof a State.Second, Burk argues that the judge erred in finding the violation to have been willful. Weneed not address the willfulness issue because we find that the Secretary failed toestablish on the record before us that Burk is an employer engaged in a business affectingcommerce.In enacting the Occupational Safety and Health Act, Congress intended to exercise the fullextent of the authority granted by the commerce clause of the Constitution. Austin Road v.OSHRC, 683 F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1982). Accordingly, an employer comes under coverage of theAct by merely affecting commerce; it is not necessary that the employer be engageddirectly in interstate commerce. Austin Road, 683 F.2d at 907; United States v. DyeConstruction Co., 510 F.2d 78 (10th Cir. 1975). Nevertheless, the Secretary bears theburden of establishing the threshold jurisdictional fact. Although the Secretary’s burdenof persuasion is a light one, Austin Road, 683 F.2d at 907, he made no effort to meet ithere.In his complaint, the Secretary alleged that Burk produced goods for commerce, or handledor worked on goods that move in interstate commerce, and that Burk was therefore engagedin a business affecting commerce within the meaning of section 3(5) of the Act. Eventhough Burk specifically denied these allegations in its answer, the Secretary introducedno evidence whatsoever to support them. The record is devoid of any evidence bearing onthe jurisdictional question. On the record before us, any finding that Burk’s businessaffects commerce would be mere speculation. To paraphrase the Fifth Circuit in AustinRoad, perhaps Burk’s business does affect interstate commerce; but that essential fact isnot established on the record before us.Accordingly, the judge’s decision is reversed and the citation is vacated.FOR THE COMMISSIONRay H. Darling, Jr.Executive SecretaryDATED: December 12, 1985″