“Docket No. 10799 SECRETARY OF LABOR, Complainant, v.CHEVRON OIL COMPANY, Respondent.OSHRC Docket No. 10799DECISION Before:\u00a0\u00a0 ROWLAND, Chairman; CLEARY and COTTINE, Commissioners. BY THE COMMISSION:The Secretary of Labor issued to Chevron Oil Company three citations allegingthat Chevron had violated 29 U.S.C. ? 654(a)(1), section 5(a)(1) of the OccupationalSafety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. ?? 651-678 (\”the Act\”). [[1\/]]\u00a0Administrative Law Judge Henry F. Martin, Jr. vacated the citations.\u00a0 TheSecretary argues that the judge erred in vacating citations 1(a) and 2(a).[[2\/]]We agree.Citation 1(a)This citation, like citation 2(a), concerns structure A, an oil and natural gas productionplatform in the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Louisiana. [[3\/]]\u00a0 Structure A wasrectangular, measuring about 100 feet by 60 to 80 feet.\u00a0 It contained various pipesthat transported oil and gas under pressure.\u00a0 Citation 1(a) alleged that Chevronfailed to periodically inspect and test for internal and external corrosion on a four-inchdiameter gas lift supply line pipe.Judge Martin vacated the citation on the ground that the Secretary had failedto show that Chevron had periodically inspected pipes for internal and external corrosionin a manner contrary to procedures and practices engaged in by oil and gas operators ingeneral. The judge’s analysis reflected Chevron’s lengthy argument at the beginning of thehearing that the citations should be dismissed because the Secretary did not claim thatChevron’s inspection practices were different from that of its industry.\u00a0 TheSecretary argues that the judge’s approach was erroneous.\u00a0 We agree.The Commission has repeatedly held that the Secretary need not prove that thecited employer or his industry recognizes the abatement measures recommended by theSecretary.\u00a0 See Kansas City Power & Light Co., 82 OSAHRC 13\/A2, 10 BNA OSHC 1417,1422, 1982 CCH OSHD ? 25,957, p. 32,539 (No. 76-5255, 1982), and cases cited therein.\u00a0Because section 5(a)(1) requires that employees be furnished employment\”free\”–i.e., as free as feasible [[4\/]] –from recognized hazards, an abatementorder under section 5(a)(1) may require that work practices and safety precautions beupgraded to feasible levels, which may be greater than those taken by the employer or itsindustry. [[5\/]]\u00a0 For this reason, we agree with the Secretary that Chevron’sconformity with industry practice is not a basis for vacating the citation.To establish a violation of section 5(a)(1), the Secretary must show that anemployer failed to render its workplace free from a hazard that is recognized and likelyto cause death or serious physical harm to its employees.\u00a0 See Little Beaver CreekRanches, Inc., 82 OSAHRC 36\/A2, 10 BNA OSHC 1806, 1810, 1982 CCH OSHD ? 26,125, p. 32,878(No. 77-2096, 1982).\u00a0 The Secretary must also demonstrate that there were feasiblemeans available to abate or materially reduce the hazard.\u00a0 Id.; National Realty &Construction Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1973).\u00a0 See our discussion,infra.\u00a0 We conclude that the Secretary established these elements.We first consider whether the Secretary has shown that there was a\”hazard\” within the meaning of the Act.\u00a0 The pipes of this platform do notpresent an imminent explosion hazard until they have corroded to the extent that the pipewalls cannot withstand the internal pressure of their contents.\u00a0 Yet, it would beerroneous to conclude that until that point is reached there is no \”hazard\”within the meaning of the Act.\u00a0 Inasmuch as the primary purpose of the Act is toprevent injuries, it is sufficient to find, as we do here, that a condition will becomehazardous if left unchecked.\u00a0 It is undisputed that marine pipeline corrosion is aslow, continuous process that reduces the thickness of the pipe walls and, if unchecked,will lead to the hazard of explosion and fire from the ignition of gas or oil escapingfrom the corroded pipes. [[6\/]]\u00a0 For the purpose of brevity, we will refer to thehazard as pipeline corrosion. [[7\/]]We next consider whether the hazard was recognized.\u00a0 We first note that Chevron doesnot take issue with the Secretary’s claim that corrosion is an ever-present hazard onoffshore pipelines.\u00a0 Moreover, a piping manual published by Chevron’s parent company,Standard Oil Company of California, and produced by Chevron during discovery, shows thatChevron’s industry, if not Chevron itself, recognized the hazard of corrosion.\u00a0 Amongother things, the manual lists \”[d]eterioration of lines through normal use–externalor internal corrosion, deterioration of protective coatings, etc.\” as a\”[p]rimary area of inspection.\”\u00a0 The manual emphasizes the importance ofmaintaining the piping in a safe condition and also assigns responsibility for periodicinspections to the area supervisor and the division equipment inspector.\u00a0 Moreover,the foreword to the proposed advisory standard of the National Association of CorrosionEngineers, which was submitted into evidence by Chevron, states in part that \”[t]hecontrol of corrosion on offshore pipelines is important to the oil and gas industrybecause of the economic need to protect capital investments in manpower and materials . .. .\” This is sufficient to establish that the hazard of corroded pipes wasrecognized.The next element is whether the likely consequence would be death or seriousphysical harm if an explosion and fire occurred.\u00a0 An explosion and fire caused by therupture of a pipe at structure A resulted in the death of seven persons. [[8\/]] Thisevidence shows that death or serious physical harm was likely. [[9\/]]We also conclude that, despite’s Chevron’s efforts, the workplace was not\”free\” of the hazard. [[10\/]]\u00a0 Chevron argues that it had a program ofsystematic and periodic inspection of the outside of each pipe section that renderedstructure A free of the hazard. Chevron employees assigned to structure A on a regularbasis were instructed to look for and report any signs of external corrosion whileperforming their assigned duties.\u00a0 Chevron also had a safety committee for each ofthe two work shifts; each committee visited structure A once a month for approximately oneand one-half hours.\u00a0 The committees’ purpose was to find and prevent or correcthazards, including external corrosion.\u00a0 On one occasion, Chevron had conducted ariser-by-riser inspection for external corrosion. [[11\/]]\u00a0 In addition, structure Awas repainted every six to eight years.\u00a0 Repainting of necessity included aninspection of the pipe for external corrosion. When a structure was repainted, allexternal corrosion was removed by sandblasting and approximately five coats of rustresistant paint were applied to the pipes.As to internal corrosion, Chevron argues that it had an adequate program tomonitor and prevent internal corrosion.\u00a0 Chevron had a \”corrosion coupon\”at the pipeline terminal that was inspected monthly and monitored the amount of internalcorrosion.\u00a0 Chevron also injected a corrosion retardant chemical into the pipes.\u00a0 In addition, Chevron submitted evidence that chokes located in the pipe coming fromeach wellhead were visually inspected weekly and were a reliable means of detecting andmeasuring internal corrosion.Although these efforts were commendable, Chevron’s visual inspections werehaphazard and unsystematic and did not free the workplace of the hazard.\u00a0 As theSecretary points out, Chevron did not visually inspect every pipe section.\u00a0 Of equalimportance is the fact that the frequency of these visual inspections was not determinedin accordance with an estimation of the remaining safe life of each section. [[12\/]] Asenior construction engineer for Chevron testified that the safe life \”exceed[ed]ten, possibly twenty years.\”\u00a0 Yet, Chevron failed to implement an inspectionprogram based on safe life calculations.\u00a0 An area supervisor for Chevron testifiedthat he had never received any directives from the head office about safe lifeprojections.\u00a0 Not only was the remaining safe life not taken into account, butChevron also failed to maintain records of inspections, tests and corrective actions withrespect to each pipe section.\u00a0 This was a crucial omission.\u00a0 Chevron did nothave an adequate recordkeeping system whereby the information received from its variousmethods of detecting internal and external corrosion was centralized and analyzed in lightof other tests performed to detect corrosion. [[13\/]] Without such a recordkeeping system,Chevron did not have a means of comparing data so that the corrosion rate for each sectioncould be accurately measured and monitored.\u00a0 Chevron’s area supervisor testified thathe had not received any directives about maintenance of records of inspections, remedialwork needed, or monitoring of corrosion rates. [[14\/]]Chevron’s other measures also did not free the workplace of the hazard.\u00a0 The chemicalcorrosion inhibitor was used to slow internal corrosion, not to eliminate it entirely.\u00a0 Corrosion coupons showed the overall corrosion rate on the entire structure, butthey could not tell Chevron which pipe had more internal corrosion and which less unlessthe coupon was moved to different pipe sections to isolate the more rapidly corrodingsection.\u00a0 As the Secretary argues, inspecting chokes and corrosion coupons was oflittle use because Chevron had no system of recording the corrosion it did detect. \u00a0Much the same is true of Chevron’s sandblasting and repainting efforts; inasmuch asChevron did not know which pipe sections had been repainted many times and which fewtimes, it could not have known the extent to which any pipe section had suffered suchsevere external corrosion that it should be replaced or carefully monitored. [[15\/]]We now turn to the crux of this case:\u00a0 Are there additional steps thatChevron could take to satisfy its duty under section 5(a)(1) to render the worksite asfree as feasible from the hazard?\u00a0 An employer’s duty under section 5(a)(1) is not anabsolute one.\u00a0 Although the general duty clause speaks of providing a workplace\”free\” of recognized hazards, an employer is not required to take steps that arenot feasible.\u00a0 National Realty and Construction Co., 489 F.2d at 1266-67.\u00a0 Atthe same time, we have not required the Secretary to establish that his proposed abatementmethod would entirely free the workplace of the hazard.\u00a0 It is enough that theprescribed abatement method would materially reduce the hazard to employees.\u00a0 SeeLitton Systems, Inc., Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., 81 OSAHRC 101\/C12, 10 BNA OSHC 1179,1182, 1981 CCH OSHD ? 25,817, p. 32,270 (No. 76-900, 1981); Carlyle Compressor Co. v.OSHRC, 683 F.2d 673, 677 (2d Cir. 1982).The Secretary proposed the following steps to materially reduce the hazardposed by excessive internal and external corrosion of pipes:\u00a0 periodic and systematicvisual inspection of the outside of each pipe section, ultrasonic testing and x-rays ofthe interiors of a sample of pipe sections, and maintenance of records of all inspections,tests and corrective actions.\u00a0 We find that these are feasible and useful steps.Chevron does not take issue with the feasibility of a program of systematicand periodic inspection of the outside of each pipe section.\u00a0 Indeed, Chevronmaintains that it had already instituted such a program.\u00a0 Chevron argues that x-rayand ultrasonic tests would be neither feasible nor useful because the cost of testing eachpipe section would be prohibitive and because each test covers only a few inches of pipe.\u00a0 Chevron and Judge Martin also noted that the particular riser pipe that rupturedwould have been inaccessible to testing equipment.\u00a0 Yet, the Secretary has notproposed that x-rays and ultrasonic testing be used on each pipe section but only on alimited basis, i.e., on those pipe sections known or suspected from inspection records topose a hazard of rupturing due to excessive corrosion.\u00a0 Although these tests sampleonly a small area of pipe, and some pipe may be inaccessible, such as the gas riser thatburst in this case, the tests would nevertheless be useful in determining the condition ofaccessible pipe sections.\u00a0 As we have already said, the Secretary need not show thathis proposed abatement measures would entirely eliminate the hazard.We therefore affirm citation 1(a)’s requirements that Chevron institute aprogram of systematic and periodic inspection for external corrosion, that it use x-rayand ultrasonic tests in conjunction with its other methods for detecting internalcorrosion, and that it couple these efforts with a comprehensive recordkeeping program.[[16\/]]Citation 2(a)This citation alleged that Chevron \”failed to provide a fire detection system thatwould have automatically released liferafts or personal flotation devices into the wateraround the ‘A’ structure.\” [[17\/]]\u00a0 Structure A was not equipped with such anautomatic ejection system.\u00a0 Employees trying to evacuate the structure to escapeflames might jump as much as 20 feet from the platform into the water and would then lackliferafts and flotation devices.\u00a0 Judge Martin vacated this citation because theSecretary did not show that either Chevron or its industry equipped platforms with thesedevices, or recognized the necessity for such equipment.\u00a0 As we have said in ourdiscussion of citation 1(a), this approach was erroneous.Chevron does not dispute the existence of a hazard that is likely to causedeath.\u00a0 The only noteworthy dispute between the parties is whether the Secretaryestablished a feasible means of reducing or eliminating the hazard.\u00a0 As mentionedabove, it is not necessary for the Secretary to show that the hazard can be entirelyeliminated; a material reduction is sufficient.\u00a0 The Secretary established that afire detection system with automatically ejected flotation devices was feasible.\u00a0 Thecompliance officer testified that he had worked for the Exxon Corporation and that Exxonhad such fire detection systems with automatically ejected flotation devices on certain oftheir offshore platforms.\u00a0 This evidence taken alone would show that a feasibleabatement method exists that would provide protection against the hazard. [[18\/]]We have held, however, that an employer may rebut this showing by producingevidence that the use of the abatement method will cause consequences so adverse as torender their use infeasible.\u00a0 See Royal Logging Co., 79 OSAHRC 84\/A2, 7 BNA OSHC1744, 1751, 1979 CCH OSHD ? 23,914, p. 28,997 (No. 15169, 1979).\u00a0 Chevron’s onlyrebuttal testimony was that of the senior construction engineer who stated that \”itcould conceivably be a hazard to people jumping into the water or people already in thewater could be hit by such an object as it was dispensed from the structure.\”\u00a0This testimony is insufficient to rebut the Secretary’s showing.\u00a0 The presenceof flotation devices in the water would materially reduce the likelihood of an employeedrowning in the water.\u00a0 The benefit afforded by the use of flotation devices greatlyoutweighs the harm that could be caused in the unlikely event that one of these deviceswere to hit an employee.\u00a0 On balance, we are unconvinced by Chevron’s rebuttalevidence.\u00a0 We therefore reverse the judge and affirm citation 2(a).PenaltyWe agree with the Secretary that the violations were serious.\u00a0 For a violation to becharacterized as serious under section 17(k) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. ? 666(j),[[19\/]] theremust be a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result if anincident occurred; the probability that an incident will occur is irrelevant.\u00a0 SeeWright & Lopez, Inc., 81 OSAHRC 92\/D10, 10 BNA OSHC 1108, 1114, 1981 CCH OSHD ?25,728, p. 32,079 (No. 76-256, 1981).\u00a0 It is clear enough here that in the event ofan accident, death or serious harm would have been substantially probable.We now turn to the assessment of a penalty.[[20\/]]\u00a0 There was notestimony as to the size of Chevron’s business, but structure A was one of many platformsowned and operated by Chevron in the Gulf of Mexico.\u00a0 We also take official noticethat Chevron is a large employer, with approximately 1,930 employees. [[21\/]]\u00a0 Thegravity of the violations is moderate.\u00a0 As to good faith, we note that Chevron hadattempted to provide protection to employees.\u00a0 There is no testimony as to thehistory of previous violations.\u00a0 We assess $500 for each violation.Accordingly, we reverse in part the judge’s decision.\u00a0 Citations 1(a)and 2(a) are affirmed; a total penalty of $1,000 is assessed.SO ORDERED.FOR THE COMMISSIONRay H. Darling, Jr. Executive SecretaryDATED:\u00a0 APR 20 1983The Administrative Law Judgedecision in this matter is unavailable in this format. To obtain a copy of this document,please request one from our Public Information Office by e-mail ( [email protected] ), telephone (202-606-5398), fax(202-606-5050), or TTY (202-606-5386).FOOTNOTES: [[1\/]] Section 5(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. ? 654(a)(1), provides: Sec. 5(a) Each employer –(1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which arefree from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or seriousphysical harm to his employees.[[2\/]] Former Commissioner Moran issued a sua sponte, general direction forreview.\u00a0 Commissioner Cleary issued a specific direction for review of all parts ofthe three citations.\u00a0 The Secretary’s petition for review and brief address onlyitems 1(a) and 2(a). Because neither party has taken exception to the judge’s dispositionof citations 1(b), 2(b), 3(a), and 3(b), and there is no compelling public interest inreviewing those items, the Commission will not review them.\u00a0 Water Works InstallationCorp., 76 OSAHRC 61\/B8, 4 BNA OSHC 1339, 1976-77 CCH OSHD ? 20,078 (No. 4136, 1976);Abbott-Sommer, Inc., 76 OSAHRC 21\/A2, 3 BNA OSHC 2032, 1975-76 CCH OSHD ? 20,428 (No.9507, 1976).Chevron also argues that the citations were not issued with \”reasonablepromptness\” as required under section 9(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. ? 658(a).\u00a0 Theinspection occurred in June of 1974 and the citations were issued on October 18, 1974.\u00a0 Chevron argues that the Secretary had sufficient information to issue one of thetwo citations now before us in August, 1974.\u00a0 The Commission has held that anemployer must establish prejudice in the preparation of its defense in order to vacate acitation for lack of reasonable promptness.\u00a0 E.g., Stripe-A-Zone, 10 BNA OSHC 1694,1695, 1982 CCH OSHD ? 20,069, p. 32,781 (No. 79-2380, 1982).\u00a0 The fact that theSecretary delayed the issuance of two citations for two months until the third citationwas ready is not enough to establish prejudice.\u00a0 Chevron has not shown how this twomonth delay hampered the preparation of its defense.\u00a0 We therefore reject itsargument.[[3\/]] Chevron had claimed under section 4(b)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. ?653(b)(1), that the cited working conditions were exemptbecause the Department of Transportation had exercised statutory authority to adoptstandards or regulations covering the conditions.\u00a0 Judge Martin did not reach thisissue in his original decision.\u00a0 After the Commission remanded for findings on thematter, 77 OSAHRC 29\/A2, 5 BNA OSHC 1118, 1977-78 CCH OSHD ? 21,606 (1977), the judgerejected Chevron’s exemption claim on the basis of a stipulation reached by the parties.\u00a0 On review, Chevron states that as a result of the stipulation, its exemption claimas to citation 1(a) is no longer in issue.\u00a0 In view of this concession, we leaveJudge Martin’s rejection of Chevron’s claim as to citation 1 undisturbed.We discuss Chevron’s exemption argument as to citation 2(a) in note 17,infra.[[4\/]] National Realty & Construction Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1267(D.C. Cir. 1973).[[5\/]] Williams Enterprises, Inc., 79 OSAHRC 24\/A2, 7 BNA OSHC 1247, 1250, 1979 CCH OSHD? 23,478, aff’d, No. 79-1559 (D.C. Cir. June 9, 1980); Continental Oil Co., 78 OSAHRC63\/E1, 6 BNA OSHC 1814, 1816, 1978 CCH OSHD ? 22,903, p. 27,703 (No. 1829, 1978), aff’d,630 F.2d 446, 449 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); Southern Railway, 75OSAHRC 88\/C2, 3 BNA OSHC 1657, 1975-76 CCH OSHD ? 20,091 (No. 5960, 1975). Our holdingthat hazards ought not to be defined in terms of the proposed means of abatement reflectsthis view. See Kansas City Power & Light Co., 82 OSAHRC 13\/A2, 10 BNA OSHC 1417, 1422,1982 CCH OSHD ? 25,957, p. 32,539 (No. 76-5255, 1982); Beaird-Poulan, 79 OSAHRC 21\/D11, 7BNA OSHC 1225, 1229, 1979 CCH OSHD ? 23,493, p. 28,459 (No. 12600, 1979);Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 82 OSAHRC 102\/A2, 10 BNA OSHC 1242, 1245, 1982 CCH OSHD? 25,801, p. 32,244 (Nos. 76-4807 & 76-4808, 1981)(hazard defined in terms ofphysical agent that would injure employees), aff’d, No. 82-3015 (3d Cir. 1982).[[6\/]] We define the hazard in terms of the physical agents that could injureemployees rather than the means of abatement.\u00a0 See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.,note 5 supra.[[7\/]] The dissent states that \”the ‘recognized hazard’ under [thegeneral duty clause] must be defined in terms sufficiently specific to encompassconditions or practices over which the employer can reasonably be expected to exercisecontrol.\”\u00a0 See also the dissenting opinion in Kansas City Power & Light Co.,82 OSAHRC 13\/A2, 10 BNA OSHC 1417, 1423-24, 1982 CCH OSHD ? 25,957 at pp. 32,540-41 (No.76-5255, 1982).\u00a0 We disagree with the dissent’s definition of recognized hazardbecause it is duplicative of the requirement that the Secretary must show that a proposedmeans of abatement is feasible.\u00a0 In order for the Secretary to show that the proposedmeans of abatement is feasible he must of necessity show that the employer can exercisecontrol over the proposed abatement method.\u00a0 Implicit in the use of the word\”feasible\” is the idea that the employer can guard against only those hazardsthat are preventable.\u00a0 See National Realty and Construction Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d1257, 1265 (1973).The dissent also states that defining the hazard as pipeline corrosion is\”overly broad . . . . \”\u00a0 The dissent apparently believes that becausecorrosion is \”an inherent and unavoidable condition,\” it cannot be considered ahazard until it reaches a degree of corrosion which would threaten to release gas or oil.\u00a0 We find this approach neither logical nor consonant with the Act.\u00a0 There is nodispute that unchecked corrosion on pipelines will eventually cause the pipes to burst.\u00a0 When an entire industry, such as off-shore oil producers, is confronted with acondition that is always present and will, if unchecked, create an explosion and fire, asoccurred in this case, there is little doubt that a recognized hazard exists.[[8\/]] Tests conducted on the gas supply line pipe after the accident indicated that thewall of this pipe section had eroded to about 34 mils from an original thickness of about250 mils.[[9\/]] On the meaning of \”likely to cause,\” see R.L. Sanders Roofing Co., 79OSAHRC 61\/D7, 7 BNA OSHC 1566, 1979 CCH OSHD ? 23,756 (No. 76-2690), rev’d on anotherground, 620 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1980).\u00a0 We do not reach the Secretary’s additionalargument that, because corrosion caused serious injury, the \”causing\” element ofthe statute was met[[10\/]] The dissent disagrees with our reading of the record with respect toChevron’s efforts to free the worksite of the hazard. However, we have examined the recordas a whole and considered evidence in the context of its presentation. For example, when discussing Mr. Falgout’s testimony regarding the frequencyof \”inspections conducted by Chevron to determine corrosion,\” the dissent statesthat Mr. Falgout \”normally checked the condition of structure A twice eachweek.\”\u00a0 The implication is that there was some type of planned periodicinspection for corrosion.\u00a0 However, when reviewing the transcript, it is apparentthat such was not the case.\u00a0 To fairly represent the evidence, the dissent shouldhave included Mr. Falgout’s testimony that, as field foreman, he was responsible for\”producing and operating block 69 field\” and safety considerations constitutedonly one reason for his visiting structure A.\u00a0 There is no evidence that Falgout everconducted formal corrosion inspections.\u00a0 Mr. Falgout stated that he did not have aset schedule for visiting the structures and that before the accident he had been visitingstructure A at least once a week and \”mostly twice a week.\”\u00a0 To label sucha visit as an inspection for corrosion control misreads the record.The dissent also contradicts itself when discussing the detection andprevention of internal corrosion.\u00a0 The dissent states that the rate of internalcorrosion is uniform regardless of pipe location.\u00a0 Then, in the very next sentencethe dissent notes that if a coupon detected metal loss, it would be moved upstream tolocate exactly where the metal loss was occurring.\u00a0 If indeed the corrosion rate wasuniform, then it would never be necessary to pinpoint an area where internal corrosion wasgreater.[[11\/]] Chevron’s senior construction engineer testified that a\”riser\” is that section of pipe between the Gulf floor and the upper productiondeck of the platform.[[12\/]] A \”safe life\” is the amount of time a pipe wall remainsstrong enough to withstand normal operating pressure.\u00a0 Chevron noted that the pipingmanual recommended that periodic inspections for corrosion \”shall be equal toone-half of the calculated safe life . . .\” of the pipes on structure A.[[13\/]] We have fully considered the fact that Chevron had a recordkeepingsystem.\u00a0 However, we believe that its system was not adequate to materially reducethe hazard of pipeline corrosion.\u00a0 It is true that Chevron sent results of watersamples to the field office and to the main office.\u00a0 However, there is no testimonythat the results of coupon testing, visual inspections, and choke inspections were alsorecorded and sent to a central location where the information could be used to moreaccurately monitor corrosion.[[14\/]] Citation 1(b), which is not on review, exclusively concerned the lackof a recordkeeping system.\u00a0 In his brief on review, the Secretary discusses the lackof a recordkeeping system with respect to citation 1(a).\u00a0 Chevron does not object tothis and we agree with the Secretary’s implicit view that recordkeeping is integrallyrelated to citation 1(a).[[15\/]] Chevron argues that a violation may not be found here because theSecretary failed to show that Chevron knew or with the exercise of reasonable diligencecould have known of the presence of the violation.\u00a0 See Prestressed Systems, Inc., 81OSAHRC 43\/D5, 9 BNA OSHC 1864, 1869, 1981 CCH OSHD ? 25,358, p. 31,500 (No. 16147,1981)(? 5(a)(2) violation).\u00a0 Although Chevron’s argument is not sharply focused, itseems that Chevron maintains that it did not know and could not with the exercise ofreasonable diligence have known of the corroded condition of the pipe that burst. \u00a0Chevron’s argument is misplaced.\u00a0 The violation alleged here was not the bursting ofa pipe or even corrosion of a pipe; the violation alleged was Chevron’s failure to inspectand test for corrosion.\u00a0 Obviously, Chevron had actual knowledge of its owninspection and testing efforts.[[16\/]] Although we affirm these abatement requirements of citation 1(a), itbears emphasis that Chevron is not precluded from instituting other, equally effectivemethods as long as its alternative methods achieve at least as great a reduction of thehazard.\u00a0 See General Electric Co., 82 OSAHRC 56\/A2, 10 BNA OSHC 2034, 2040 n.6, 1982CCH OSHD ? 26,259, p. 33,165 n.6 (No. 79-504, 1982).\u00a0 For example, Chevron would befree to apply new technology to effectuate abatement.[[17\/]] Chevron originally claimed with respect to citation 2 that CoastGuard regulations on means of escape, life preservers, and ring life buoys on fixedoffshore platforms (33 C.F.R. ?? 143.05-5(b) and 144.10-l et seq.) covered the citedworking conditions. These regulations were adopted to implement the Outer ContinentalShelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.A. ?? 1301-1343 (1964), which authorizes the Department ofTransportation, including the Coast Guard, to adopt regulations for offshore platforms onthe outer continental shelf. See 33 C.F.R. ?? 140.01-1 (\”Purpose ofregulations\”) and 140.05-1 (\”Application\”; \”Artificial islands andfixed structures\”); 43 U.S.C.A. ?? 1333(a) and (e)(1)(1964).\u00a0 The \”outercontinental shelf\” begins three miles from the Louisiana coast. United States v.Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 81, 83 (1960); 43 U.S.C.A. ?? 1331(a), 1301(a)(2) and (b), and1312 (1964).\u00a0 Inasmuch as the record shows, and the parties agree, that structure Awas less than 3 miles off the Louisiana coast, Judge Martin held that the structure wasnot on the outer continental shelf and hence the working conditions were not covered bythe Coast Guard regulations. On review, Chevron does not directly attack the judge’sruling but instead seems to urge that the Commission approve the judge’s view that theCoast Guard regulations would be preemptive for platforms on the outer continental shelf.\u00a0 We decline Chevron’s invitation.\u00a0 It is enough to say that on the facts ofthis case, Judge Martin’s rejection of Chevron’s exemption claim was correct.[[18\/]] The dissent concludes that the Secretary failed to establish that the use ofautomatic ejection systems was feasible.\u00a0 According to the dissent, the Secretarymust show that automatic ejection systems existed and would materially reduce the hazardand he must also show that ejection systems \”would have been adaptable to Chevron’sstructure.\”\u00a0 However, we note that Chevron has not voiced this objection. \u00a0At the hearing, Chevron made no attempt to rebut the compliance officer’s testimony anddid not claim that its platforms were somehow different from Exxon’s and could not beequipped with the ejection devices.\u00a0 In short, the compliance officer’s unrebuttedtestimony is sufficient to establish feasibility.[[19\/]] Section 17(k), 29 U.S.C. ? 17(j), states:For purposes of this section, a serious violation shall be deemed to exist ina place of employment if there is a substantial probability that death or serious physicalharm could result from a condition which exists, or from one or more practices, means,methods, operations, or processes which have been adopted or are in use, in such place ofemployment unless the employer did not, and could not with the exercise of reasonablediligence, know of the presence of the violation.[[20\/]] Section 17(j), 29 U.S.C. ? 661(i), provides:The Commission shall have authority to assess all civil penalties provided inthis section, giving due consideration to the appropriateness of the penalty with respectto the size of the business of the employer being charged, the gravity of the violation,the good faith of the employer, and the history of previous violations.[[21\/]] 1 Standard & Poor’s Corp., Register of Corporations, Directorsand Executives 478 (1982).”