General Motors Corp., Delco Electronics Division

“Docket No. 88-1112 SECRETARY OF LABOR, Complainant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORP., DELCO ELECTRONICS DIVISION, Respondent.LOCAL 438, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, Authorized Employee Representative.OSHRC Docket No. 88-1112DECISION AND ORDERBEFORE: MONTOYA and WISEMAN, Commissioners.[[*\/]]BY THE COMMISSION:At issue in this case is an order by Administrative Law Judge Edwin G. Salyersapproving a settlement agreement between the Secretary and Respondent. Review was directedon a petition for review by one of the parties to this proceeding, the authorized employeerepresentative. Local 438 of the United Auto Workers (hereinafter \”the union\”)stated in its petition that it objected to the settlement agreement and requested ahearing. For the reasons that follow, we set aside the judge’s order and afford the uniona further opportunity to present its objections.The settlement agreement here stated that it was served on the union by mail on November18, 1988. Nevertheless, the judge entered his order approving the settlement agreement onNovember 23, two days after the judge’s office received a copy of the agreement. Thejudge’s action was contrary to Commission Rule 100(c),[[1\/]] which is intended to allowemployees or their representatives an opportunity to make their objections to thesettlement agreement known before the agreement is approved. See GeneralMotors Corp., 6 BNA OSHC 2056, 1978 CCH OSHD ? 23,126 (No. 78-1764P, 1978).The judge also acted prematurely because he approved the settlement agreement beforeit had been fully executed. At the time the judge approved the settlement agreement, theagreement itself was undated and was signed only by Respondent’s counsel. It was not untilNovember 23, 1988, the same day the judge issued his order approving the settlement, thatthe Secretary sent the judge a fully executed copy of the agreement, signed by bothcounsel, and dated November 22. The judge did not receive this fully executed copy untilNovember 28. In other words, not only did the judge fail to wait the prescribed 10 daysfollowing service on the union before acting on the settlement agreement, but he alsofailed to comply with the Commission’s rules, because he approved the agreement before ithad been fully executed and properly filed with him. See Babcock & WilcoxCo., 8 BNA OSHC 2102, 2107, 1980 CCH OSHD ? 24,812, p. 30,567 (No. 78-446, 1980)(union is entitled to receive a copy of the executed settlement agreement after ithas been filed with the judge) Furthermore, because the first copy of the settlementagreement signed by Respondent’s counsel had a postdated service date,[[2\/]] the judgecould not have been assured that the union was in fact served on that date. Thus, thejudge could not have known whether the union had in fact received the settlement agreementwhen he issued his order.[[3\/]]It is well-settled that, once the Secretary and aRespondent have executed and filed a settlement agreement that wholly or partiallyterminates the dispute between them, employees or their representatives may only object tothe reasonableness of the abatement period specified in that settlement agreement.[[4\/]] SeePan American World Airways, 11 BNA OSHC 2003, 1984-85 CCH OSHD ? 26,920 (No.83-249, 1984), and cases cited therein. See also 29 C.F.R.? 2200.100(b)& (c). Nevertheless, the procedural irregularities set forth above clearly demonstratethat the union was not afforded the opportunity to make any objections to the settlementagreement known to the judge in the manner required by the Commission’s rules. Based onthe facts and the case law, it is clear that the judge erred in approving the settlementagreement. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 6 BNA OSHC 2172, 1978CCH OSHD ? 23,200 (No. 76-2293, 1978) (a settlement agreement cannot be approved wherethere is reasonable doubt whether employee representatives were aware of the proposedterms of the settlement sufficiently in advance to enable them to render a consideredopinion).Accordingly, the Commission grants the union anadditional period of 10 days from the date of receipt of this Decision and Order to statewhether it objects to the length of time prescribed for abatement. If the union doesobject, it must do so in writing, identifying the particular abatement date or dates it isobjecting to and the reasons for its objections. This objection must be filed with theCommission’s Executive Secretary, and copies must be served on the representatives of theother parties to this proceeding, the Secretary and the Respondent. In the event that theunion does not state such an objection within this 10-day period, the judge’s orderapproving the settlement agreement will be reinstated.Velma MontoyaCommissionerDonald G. WisemanCommissionerDated: August 29, 1990SECRETARY OF LABOR, Complainant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, DELCO ELECTRONICS, Respondent, and UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW), LOCAL NO. 438, Authorized Employee Representative.OSHRC Docket No. 88-1112ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENTThis matter is before the undersigned upon asettlement entered into between the parties and duly executed. The parties advise that allmatters in dispute have been amicably resolved. After consideration, it is ORDERED:1. The settlement agreement is approved and the termsthereof are incorporated into this order.2. The citation, as modified, is affirmed. 3. No civil penalties are assessed.EDWIN G. SALYERS JudgeDate: November 23,1988FOOTNOTES: [[*\/]] Chairman Foulke did not participate in thisdecision.[[1\/]] In pertinent part the rule, which is publishedat 29 C.F.R. ? 2200.100(c), provides:[I]f party status has been elected [by an authorized employee representative or anaffected employee], an order terminating the litigation before the Commission because ofthe settlement shall not be issued until at least 10 days after service to consider anyaffected employee’s or authorized employee representative’s objection to thereasonableness of any abatement time.[[2\/]] The copy of the settlement agreement signed byRespondent’s counsel was mailed on November 16. The date of November 18 was written on thecertificate of service accompanying the agreement; in other words, that copy of theagreement, which is the copy the judge approved, could be interpreted as anticipatingservice on November 18.[[3\/]] Another procedural oversight in this case,which was noted in the direction for review, is that both the copy of the agreement onwhich the judge acted and the final, executed copy signed by both the Secretary andRespondent left blank the name of the authorized employee representative that was to beserved.[[4]] On the record before us, the Commission isunable to determine whether the union objects to the abatement dates prescribed in thesettlement agreement. The union’s letter objecting to the settlement agreement does notidentify either the particular provisions it disagrees with or the nature of itsobjections. Nor does the settlement agreement itself state whether the union objects tothe abatement dates. This omission is contrary to 29 C.F.R. ? 2200.100(b), which requiresthe Secretary and a Respondent to state in their settlement agreement \”whether anyaffected employees who have elected party status have raised an objection to thereasonableness of any abatement time.\””