“Docket No. 79-3561_79-5543 SECRETARY OF LABOR, Complainant, v. KASTALON, INC. Respondent.OSHRC Docket No. 79-3561SECRETARY OF LABOR, Complainant, v. CONAP, INC., Respondent.OSHRC Docket No. 79-5543DECISIONBefore: BUCKLEY, Chairman, RADER and WALL, Commissioners.BY THE COMMISSION:These consolidated cases are before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commissionunder 29 U.S.C. ? 661(j), section 12(j) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of1970, 29 U.S.C. ?? 651-678 (\”the Act\”). The Commission is an adjudicatoryagency, independent of the Department of Labor and the Occupational Safety and HealthAdministration. It was established to resolve disputes arising out of enforcement actionsbrought by the Secretary of Labor under the Act and has no regulatory functions. Seesection 10(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. ? 659(c).Kastalon, Inc., and Conap, Inc., manufacture polyurethane products. Among the chemicalsthey use in the manufacturing process is 4,4′ -Methylene bis (2-chloroaniline), which iscommonly called \”MOCA.\”[[1]] MOCA has been shown to cause cancer in laboratoryanimals. The Secretary of Labor contends it must therefore be regarded as a cancer-causingagent (\”carcinogen\”) in humans and that exposure to it must be strictlycontrolled. The Secretary alleges that Kastalon and Conap violated the Act by failing totake adequate measures to protect their employees from exposure to MOCA. In particular,the Secretary alleges that the employers violated section 5(a)(1) of the Act, theso-called \”general duty clause.\”[[2]] The Secretary also alleges that Conapviolated standards governing the provision and use of personal protective equipment. Forthe reasons that follow, we conclude that the Secretary did not prove that the employersviolated the Act as alleged.IThe Act gives the Secretary two tools by which he can seek elimination of workplacehazards. First, the Secretary can promulgate occupational safety and health standards andissue citations to employers who fail to comply with those standards. 29 U.S.C. ? 655(authority to promulgate standards); 29 U.S.C. ? 654(a)(2) (employers are required tocomply with standards). Second, where no occupational safety or health standard isapplicable, the Secretary can attempt to obtain correction of a workplace hazard throughthe general duty clause, which requires that employers provide workplaces free ofrecognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm.The Act’s legislative history shows that Congress intended that the Secretary wouldprimarily rely on specific standards, rather than the broad mandate of the general dutyclause, to seek the correction of workplace hazards. See S. Rept. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong.,2d Sess. (1970) at 9-10, reprinted in Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92Cong., 1st Sess., Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,at 149-50 (Comm. Print, 1971); remarks of Rep. Steiger on conference bill, Id. at 1217(\”general duty requirement should not be used set ad hoc standards.\”); BriskWaterproofing Co., 73 OSAHRC 30\/E1, 1 BNA OSHC 1263, 1264, 1973-74 CCH OSHD ? 16,345, p.21,261 (No. 1046, 1973). \”Reliance upon the general duty clause was discouragedbecause to do so would provide little advance warning of what specifically is required inorder that employers could maintain a safe and healthful workplace.\” Id. Thus, theCommission has consistently held that the Secretary cannot rely on the general duty clausewhen a specific standard applies to the facts. Id.; Daniel International, Inc., 82 OSAHRC23\/D3, 10 BNA OSHC 1556, 1982 CCH OSHD ? 26,033 (No. 78-4279, 1982).No occupational safety or health standard governs MOCAexposure. In 1974, the Secretary did issue a detailed standard regulating workplace use ofMOCA, but that standard was ruled invalid because the Secretary had not conformed to theAct’s requirements in promulgating it. Synthetic Organic Chemical ManufacturersAssociation v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973, reh’gdenied, 423 U.S. 886 (1975).[[3]] In early 1975,the Secretary again proposed the samestandard and held a hearing on the proposal. The polyurethane industry, through thePolyurethane Manufacturers Association, a trade association that includes Kastalon andConap among its members, participated in the hearing and urged the Secretary to adopt amore reasonable standard governing MOCA. However, the Secretary took no action on theproposal. Beginning in 1976, the Secretary began to issue citations alleging thatemployers were in violation of the general duty clause for not taking adequate precautionsagainst MOCA exposure.[[4]] The alleged violations in Kastalon’s and Conap’s workplacesoccurred in late 1978 and early 1979.The administrative law judges, James H. Alesia in Kastalon andMary E. Cerbone in Conap, vacated the section 5(a)(1) citations primarily because theyconcluded that the Secretary was using the general duty clause to circumvent both thecourt’s decision holding the original MOCA standard invalid and the statutory requirementsfor promulgating standards. The judges noted that many of the abatement requirements theSecretary was seeking to have Kastalon and Conap implement were taken directly from theinvalid MOCA standard,[[5]] and they viewed the citations as an attempt by the Secretaryto enforce the invalid standard through the general duty clause.We are troubled, as were the judges, by the Secretary’sapparent attempt to enforce an invalidated standard through citations under the generalduty clause.\u00a0 As noted above, Congress contemplated that the Secretary would placeprimary reliance on standards to achieve safe and healthful workplaces and envisioned thatthe general duty clause would be used sparingly. Particularly in a situation like this,where a standard has been proposed and rulemaking proceedings have been conducted, theSecretary’s failure to complete the rule-making, coupled with his issuance of citationsunder the general duty clause, do not promote the goals of \”fairness and matureconsideration of rules of general application\” that the Act’s rulemaking provisionswere designed to foster.\u00a0 See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969).On the other hand, the Secretary contends that he did not issuea MOCA standard because he was simultaneously conducting a number of other rulemakingproceedings that had higher priority. The Secretary also maintains that his failure topromulgate a standard should not deny employees any protection that Congress intended themto have under the general duty clause. We recognize that the Secretary has discretion totake into account other rulemaking proceedings in which he is engaged in setting atimetable for issuing a particular standard. Public Citizen Health Research Group v.Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1157-58 (D.C. Cir. 1983). However, we question whether thisdiscretion coupled with the Secretary’s aim of protecting employee health justifies theuse of the general duty clause in effect to side step the procedural requirements of theAct and impose the requirements of the invalidated MOCA standard on employers. We neednot, however, decide whether the Secretary exceeded the limits of his discretion here.Assuming arguendo that the general duty clause citations were properly issued, we concludethat the Secretary failed to prove that Kastalon and Conap violated section 5(a)(1), andwe vacate the citations on that basis.IIKastalon and Conap both use MOCA as a raw material in themanufacture of polyurethane products. Both companies purchase MOCA in the form of drypellets about the size of kernels of corn. To manufacture polyurethane, MOCA is firstmelted and then mixed in proper proportions with another chemical, referred to as aprepolymer, to form liquid polyurethane. The liquid polyurethane is then molded into theshape of the part being fabricated. Employee contact with MOCA can occur when the chemicalis removed from its shipping container, when it is heated in order to melt it, and whenthe molten MOCA is mixed with the prepolymer. Spills of MOCA can also lead to employeecontact.By the time of the alleged violations, Conap had eliminatedhuman contact with MOCA in most of its MOCA-handling operations. Most of the polyurethaneproducts Conap fabricated were made in the following way. A closed drum of MOCA was placedin an enclosed chamber, with access to the MOCA provided through rubber gloves in one sideof the the chamber.\u00a0 A worker would place his hands in the gloves, remove the top ofthe MOCA barrel, and insert a vacuum tube. The dry MOCA would be sucked through the vacuumtube into a MOCA melter, from which it would be transferred without human contact to anautomatic process control (\”APC\”) machine. The melted MOCA would beautomatically mixed with the prepolymer in the APC machine, which would then discharge theliquid polyurethane into molds. Conap also used other processes in which the possibilityof employee contact with MOCA was present, but it was in the process of automating some ofthese processes. The company also provided personal protective equipment to minimizeemployee contact with MOCA.Kastalon used much less MOCA than did Conap, and itsMOCA-handling was not automated, as was Conap’s. However, after the MOCA was transferredfrom its original shipping container, all handling of MOCA was done under a ventilatedlaboratory hood. Kastalon also provided personal protective equipment to minimize employeecontact with the chemical and rotated the employees who handled MOCA, thus limiting theamount of MOCA to which any individual employee was exposed.Kastalon’s and Conap’s polyurethane manufacturing operationsresulted in employee exposure to MOCA.\u00a0 MOCA is readily absorbed through the skin,and the handling of MOCA in Kastalon’s and Conap’s plants resulted in some degree ofemployee skin contact with the chemical.\u00a0 Because it has an extremely low vaporpressure, MOCA does not present a hazard of airborne contamination except to the extentthat MOCA dust is generated and becomes airborne. The record indicates that certainoperations performed in Kastalon’s and Conap’s plants did generate visible quantities ofairborne MOCA dust for brief periods of time. The Secretary’s industrial hygienistmeasured the concentration of airborne MOCA to which two Kastalon employees were exposed.These measurements showed 8-hour time weighted average concentrations of 9.9 and 12micrograms per cubic meter. Wipe samples of surfaces in Kastalon’s plant showed that MOCAwas present on the surfaces in amounts ranging from 87 to 1830 micrograms per 100 squarecentimeters of surface area. In Conap’s plant, airborne samples, and wipe samples fromemployees’ skin taken during the inspection yielded no detectable amounts. However,measurements of the concentration of MOCA in the urine of certain of Conap’s employeesshowed that the employees were absorbing measurable amounts of MOCA. These measurementsshowed concentrations of MOCA ranging from 100 to 620 micrograms per liter of urine.To prove that an employer violated section 5(a)(1), theSecretary must show (1) that a condition or activity in the employer’s workplace presenteda hazard to employees, (2) that the cited employer or the employer’s industry recognizedthat hazard, (3) that the hazard was likely to cause death or serious physical harm, and(4) that feasible means existed to eliminate or materially reduce the hazard. PelronCorp., 86 OSAHRC ____, 12 BNA OSHC 1833, 1986 CCH OSHD ? 27,605 (No. 82-388, 1986); DaveyTree Expert Co., 84 OSAHRC 11\/D11, 11 BNA OSHC 1898, 1984 CCH OSHD ? 26,852 (No. 77-2350,1984).The threshold question in this case is whether the Secretaryproved that Kastalon’s and Conap’s employees were exposed to a hazard. The Secretaryargues that MOCA must be regarded as a human carcinogen based on experiments in whichcancer was induced in laboratory animals, and that any amount of exposure to a carcinogenis hazardous. Although the record does not support a finding that MOCA is a known humancarcinogen, it does establish that MOCA may be carcinogenic in man and therefore it shouldbe considered a suspect human carcinogen. Expert witnesses for both sides testified tothat effect. The mere fact that a chemical is a suspect human carcinogen, however, doesnot establish that a hazard exists within the general duty clause of the Act. In order toestablish the existence of a hazard, the Secretary cannot simply show that a suspect humancarcinogen is present in the workplace or that employees are exposed to it in somedetectable amounts. The Secretary must prove that the amount to which employees areexposed presents a significant risk of harm.Our conclusion that the evidence must establish that asignificant risk of harm exists at Kastalon’s and Conap’s workplaces rests on the SupremeCourt decision in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute,448 U.S. 607 (1980) (\”the Benzene Case\”). In the Benzene Case, the Supreme Courtconcluded that an OSHA standard governing exposure to benzene was invalid. Benzene is achemical that has long been known to cause nonmalignant diseases in sufficiently largeexposures. In order to protect against these diseases, the Secretary adopted a standard in1971 limiting exposure over an 8-hour time period to an average of 10 parts per million(\”ppm\”).[[6]] 448 U.S. at 617.In the 1970’s, evidence began to accumulate that benzene cancause leukemia as well as the nonmalignant diseases it had previously been known to cause.\u00a0 The Secretary thereupon initiated notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings aimedat lowering the permissible exposure limit. He proposed, and ultimately adopted, astandard limiting employee exposure to an 8-hour average of 1 ppm. In reducing thepermissible exposure by a factor of ten, the Secretary proceeded on the assumption that nosafe limit for exposure to a carcinogen could be established. He believed that the Actrequired him to establish as a permissible exposure limit the lowest limit that industrycould feasibly achieve in the absence of evidence establishing that a higher limit wassafe. Concluding that 1 ppm was a feasible limit, the Secretary established that as thepermissible exposure limit. 448 U.S. at 623-26.The Supreme Court concluded that the new standard was invalidbecause the Secretary had not justified reducing the permissible exposure limit from 10ppm to 1 ppm. The Court primarily criticized the Secretary’s reasoning that thepermissible exposure limit had to be set at the lowest feasible level if a safe level ofexposure could not be established. The Court noted that Congress did not intend the Act tocreate risk-free workplaces and it therefore concluded that a precondition to the adoptionof a standard under section 6(b) of the Act was a finding that workers were exposed to asignificant risk of harm under the conditions currently existing in the workplace. 448U.S. at 642. In issuing the new benzene standard, the Secretary had not made a findingthat benzene posed a significant risk at the preexisting permissible exposure limit of 10ppm. Instead, the Secretary had found that the evidence presented in the rule-makingrecord did not establish any level as safe, and therefore he presumed that exposure in anyamount was hazardous. This finding, under the Court’s reasoning, was insufficient topermit a new standard to be promulgated. Id. at 659.The Court’s observation that Congress did not intend for theAct to create risk-free workplaces applies equally to enforcement of the general dutyclause as well as to the Secretary’s authority to issue standards. Congress intended thatthe general duty clause would provide protection when no standard had yet been adopted,not provide protection that would go beyond what standards could permissibly provide.Indeed, the general duty clause is more restrictive than standards, for it applies only tohazards that are recognized by an employer or the employer’s industry and that are causingor are likely to cause death or serious physical harm. Thus, in order to prove theexistence of a hazard within the meaning of the general duty clause, the Secretary cannotmerely show that there may be some degree of risk to employees. He must show, at aminimum, that employees are exposed to a significant risk of harm. Cf. Anoplate Corp., 86OSAHRC, _____,12 BNA OSHC 1678, 1681, 1986 CCH OSHD ? 27,519, p. 35,680 (No. 80-4109,1986) (Secretary must show significant risk when standard requires proof of a hazard as anelement of the alleged violation).[[7]]The Secretary contends that the concept of \”significantrisk\” is already subsumed in the general duty clause in the requirement that a hazardbe \”recognized.\” He argues that the recognition requirement \”encompassesnotions of what workplace conditions reasonably prudent persons believe should be guardedagainst,\” and thus assures that conditions that do not present a significant riskwill not be subject to section 5(a)(1). Implicit in this argument is the suggestion thatany precautions employers take to protect the health or safety of their employees must bedirected at a significant risk of harm or the employers would not take them. We do notbelieve this is a valid premise. Employers may decide to limit the exposure of theiremployees to chemicals of unknown toxicity or to take other precautions against injury orillness out of an abundance of caution rather than a belief that the absence of suchprecautions would expose employees to a significant risk of harm. The mere fact thatemployers take certain precautions does not prove that those precautions are required byan occupational safety or health standard or by the general duty clause. The Commissionand courts have consistently held that it would be inappropriate to base a finding that ahazard exists solely on evidence that an employer has taken certain precautions because todo so would dissuade employers from taking voluntary protective measures beyond those thelaw requires. General Motors Corp., GM Parts Division, 84 OSAHRC 23\/A2, 11 BNA OSHC 2062,2066, 1984 CCH OSHD ? 26,961, p. 34,611 (No. 78-1443, 1984). aff’d, 764 F.2d 32 (1st Cir.1985); Cotter & Co. v. OSHRC, 598 F.2d 911, 915 (5th Cir. 1979); Diebold, Inc. v.Marshall, 585 F.2d 1327, 1338 (6th Cir. 1978); Cape & Vineyard Division v. OSHRC, 512F.2d 1148, 1154 (1st Cir. 1975). Accordingly, we reject the Secretary’s argument that the\”recognition\” element of section 5(a)(1) eliminates the need for him to showthat employees are exposed to a significant risk of harm in order to show that a hazardexists within the meaning of the general duty clause. We turn to whether the Secretary methis burden of proof in this case.IIIMOCA is a member of a family of chemicals referred to asaromatic amines. Several members of this group are known to cause cancer in humans. Todate, there is no evidence directly linking MOCA exposure to cancer in humans.[[8]]However, there is typically a long latency period, often 30 to 40 years, between humanexposure to a carcinogen and the onset of cancer. Therefore, the absence of directevidence that a chemical is a human carcinogen, particularly as when here the chemical hasnot been in use for a long period of time, is inconclusive evidence that the chemical isnot a human carcinogen.Because of the long latency period between human exposure to acarcinogen and the onset of cancer, humans may be exposed to a chemical for many yearsbefore it can be definitively established that the chemical is carcinogenic. See, e.g.,Society of the Plastics Industry v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (2d Cir. 1975) (vinylchloride, which began to be used in 1939, was found to be a carcinogen in the early1970’s). In order to determine whether a chemical may be a human carcinogen before casesof cancer occur in humans, scientists perform experiments in which they determine whetherlaboratory animals exposed to the chemical contract cancer. Their supposition is thatchemicals that induce cancer in small mammals are also likely to be human carcinogens.MOCA has been the subject of several laboratory experiments inwhich the chemical induced cancer in three species of laboratory mammals: rats, mice, andbeagles. The beagle study. performed by du Pont, demonstrated that beagles who ingestedMOCA contracted bladder cancer.[[9]] Expert witnesses for both sides, Dr. John D. Scribnerfor the Secretary and Dr. George T. Bryan for the employers, agreed that the induction ofbladder cancer in dogs strongly indicated that MOCA would also cause bladder cancer inhumans. Dr. Scribner noted that other aromatic amines — benzidine, beta napthalamine, and4 amilnobiphenyl — were known to cause bladder cancer in both dogs and humans. Dr. Bryan,a qualified expert in carcinogenicity, had been engaged by the Polyurethane ManufacturersAssociation (\”PMA\”) to evaluate the available data regarding MOCA, to advise itsmembers on how to deal with MOCA, and to assist it in the rule-making proceedingsinitiated by the Secretary. He believed that MOCA should be strictly regulated based onthe studies showing that it induced cancer in laboratory animals. He stated that \”nolevel of exposure to a carcinogenic substance, however low it may be, can bescientifically established . . . to be a ‘safe level’ for humans.\”The Secretary contends that these statements by Dr. Bryanconstitute evidence that an expert familiar with the polyurethane industry recognized thatMOCA is hazardous in any detectable exposure. However whether Dr. Bryan’s statements showthat the polyurethane industry \”recognized\” a hazard is not our initial inquiry.The first question we must address is whether the evidence shows any hazard at all; onlythen does the question of whether the hazard is \”recognized\” arise. Dr. Bryan’sstatement that no level of exposure to a carcinogen can be scientifically established as\”safe\” does not prove that Kastalon’s and Conap’s employees were exposed to asignificant risk of harm under the conditions present in their workplaces.[[10]] Thecentral point of the Benzene Case is that a significant risk at any level of exposurecannot be presumed simply because a \”safe\” level of exposure cannot beestablished. 448 U.S. at 652-53. The Court rejected the Secretary’s policy that, \”inthe absence of definitive proof of a safe level, it must be assumed that any level abovezero presents some increased risk of cancer.\” Id. at 635-36 (emphasis by the Court,footnotes omitted). The Secretary cannot impose this discredited policy on an industryunder the general duty clause simply by finding an expert familiar with the industry totestify that a safe level cannot be established for a carcinogen used by the industry. Theabsence of a \”safe\” level does not mean that there is a \”significantrisk\” of harm at any particular level. As the Court made plain, risk-free workplacesare not required by the Act.The Secretary also argues that industry recognition of a hazardshould be predicated on advice given by Dr. Bryan to the PMA that its members should\”insure\” that employees are not exposed to detectable quantities of MOCA. Thisis simply the \”no safe level\” argument in another guise. Moreover, we do notagree with the Secretary’s interpretation of the contents of the letter Dr. Bryan wrote tothe PMA. The relevant portion of the letter states: Tumors of the bladder frequently are produced in animals fedchemicals of the class called aromatic amines. Representative chemicals of this class are2-naphthylamine, 4-aminobiphenyl, and benzidine. Each of these chemicals are recognized ashuman urinary bladder carcinogens, and each has caused urinary tract tumors in dogs whenfed. These tumors are qualitatively similar to those produced by MOCA in dogs. Finally,MOCA is a member of the aromatic amine class of chemicals.I believe that these data will have a substantial impact on theMOCA regulation proceeding. They demonstrate that MOCA possesses the same carcinogenicpotential as other recognized human carcinogens. The inference that most will draw is thatindividuals working with MOCA are at definite risk of developing cancer. This inferencemight be blunted somewhat by a demonstration that under conditions of working with MOCApotentially exposed persons do not incorporate MOCA into their bodies, or excrete it orany of its metabolites into body fluids in detectable quantities. Additional evidencedesirable in support of the view that MOCA does not represent an actual hazard would be ademonstration that no detectable quantities of MOCA are present in the work environmentunder conditions of usual usage. If these are not possible or feasible, then MOCA must bedealt with as a known animal carcinogen and as a potential human carcinogen.This letter reiterates Dr. Bryan’s consistently expressed viewthat MOCA should be regarded as a suspect human carcinogen based on its carcinogenicactivity in animals. Although it says that a showing that employees are not exposed todetectable quantities of MOCA would negate any inference that a hazard exists, Dr. Bryandid not state that a hazard exists whenever there are detectable levels of MOCA. Also,contrary to the Secretary’s argument, the letter does not advise employers that employeesshould not be exposed to any detectable quantity of MOCA.The Secretary also argues that industry recognition of a hazardwas shown because industry generally recognized the need to take precautions against MOCAexposure. He particularly relies on recommended precautions for MOCA handling published bydu Pont, which was then the chemical’s primary manufacturer. Du Pont included with eachbarrel of MOCA it sold a booklet entitled \”Safe Handling of MOCA UrethaneCurative.\” This booklet recommended that MOCA users take certain precautions theSecretary alleges Kastalon and Conap failed to take. The Secretary also points out thatthe polyurethane industry, through the Polyurethane Manufacturers Association, was urgingboth the federal government and the State of California to adopt MOCA standards and wasinforming its members, through semiannual meetings and in publications, of the need tocontrol MOCA exposures. These PMA activities, the Secretary argues, show that thepolyurethane manufacturing industry recognized the need for controlling exposure to MOCA.The Secretary further argues that hazard recognition is shown by evidence that individualcompanies in the polyurethane industry took certain precautions when handling MOCA.The Secretary’s argument demonstrates that the evidence ofMOCA’s carcinogenicity is sufficiently compelling that reasonable people recognize it isnecessary to handle the chemical carefully. That evidence does not, however, show that thelevels of MOCA to which Kastalon’s and Conap’s employees were exposed presented asignificant risk of harm. An industry’s general recognition that a chemical may becarcinogenic in man and that exposure to it should be controlled does not eliminate theneed for the Secretary to prove that a particular employer’s employees are exposed todangerous levels in order to prove a violation of the general duty clause.[[11]]IVIn order to establish a significant risk in a section 5(a)(1)case involving a carcinogen, the Secretary must show the probability that employees willcontract cancer under the conditions present in the workplace. This is consistent with theSupreme Court decision in the Benzene Case. There the Court ruled that the Secretary mustestablish a significant risk exists through a body of reputable scientific thought. Itnoted that animal studies, epidemiological evidence and worker mortality rates could beused to establish the existence of a significant risk. 448 U.S. at 656 & n. 64.The only evidence in the record which tends to show theprobability of employees contracting cancer from exposure to MOCA is a quantitative riskassessment prepared by Dr. John D. Scribner, an expert in chemical carcinogenesis. Aquantitative risk assessment is an estimate of the probability that humans will contract adisease. It is often based on evidence gathered from animal tests.[[12]]Dr. Scribner’s quantitative risk assessment relied heavily onevidence gathered in the du Pont study that showed MOCA induced cancerous tumors inbeagles. In that study, six dogs were fed MOCA in their daily diet in an amount equal to14 milligrams per kilogram of body weight. One dog died early in the study. The remainingfive contracted lower urinary tract cancers–four bladder tumors and one tumor of theureter–after 8 to 9 years. Of a group of six control dogs, none contracted cancer withinthat same time span. Dr. Scribner calculated that each exposed dog had received a totallifetime dose of 14 grams of MOCA per kilogram of body weight, and he observed that thisdose produced a 100% chance of contracting cancer, as all the exposed dogs had done so.Dr. Scribner then attempted to correlate this information withevidence of human exposures. He noted that a MOCA rat study at the National Institute forOccupational Safety and Health showed that the rats excreted in their urine about 0.03% ofthe MOCA they consumed, and that this was approximately the same as the percentage ofbenzidine that a human excreted when benzidine was applied to his skin. Dr. Scribnertherefore estimated that the total amount of MOCA to which a person was exposed in a daywould be about 3000 times the amount the person excreted in his urine that day. Assumingthat a worker excreted 50 micrograms of MOCA per day in his urine and worked 250 days peryear, Dr. Scribner calculated that the worker would receive a total dose of 14 grams perkilogram of body weight after 39 years. As this was the total dose at which the beagledogs exhibited a 100% incidence of tumors, Dr. Scribner postulated that the worker wouldbe at a 100% risk of contracting cancer after 39 years. To buttress his estimate, Dr.Scribner noted that MOCA and benzidine were about equally potent at producing cancer indogs, and that a study had shown that 50% of workers had contracted bladder cancer after atotal exposure to benzidine of 5 grams per kilogram of body weight. Assuming that MOCA andbenzidine proved to be equally potent in humans, as they were in dogs, the humanexperience with benzidine demonstrated that workers exposed to similar amounts of MOCA asbenzidine would experience a significant risk of contracting cancer.The employers’ expert, Dr. Bryan, criticized the central assumption underlying Dr.Scribner’s risk assessment; that the quantitative response of humans and dogs to MOCAwould be equal. Dr. Bryan believed that quantitative estimates of the risk to humans fromanimal responses to a carcinogen could not be made with any reasonable degree ofscientific certainty. He noted that it was difficult to obtain the same quantitativeresponse even in different experiments with animals of the same species due to the manyvariables that enter into such experiments. It was even more difficult to extrapolate fromlaboratory animals to humans. Dr. Bryan stated, for example, that the animals used incancer experiments are genetically similar (homogeneous) while a typical group of exposedworkers would be genetically mixed (heterogeneous). Because an animal’s or human’s geneticstructure greatly affects its response to a carcinogen, one cannot assume that aheterogeneous group of humans will respond quantitatively in the same manner as ahomogeneous group of laboratory animals.Dr. Bryan was also critical of Dr. Scribner’s assumptions thatthe carcinogenic potential of MOCA in humans could be equated to that of benzidine. Dr.Bryan noted that humans are typically exposed to a variety of substances while laboratorytests on animals attempt to isolate the effect only one chemical produces in the animal.He postulated that the workers who had contracted bladder cancer after exposure tobenzidine had also been exposed to a number of other chemicals and that the high incidenceof bladder cancer should be attributed to the mixture of exposures and not solely tobenzidine exposure. Furthermore, if MOCA was as potent a carcinogen as benzidine, Dr.Bryan was of the opinion that human cases of bladder cancer would already have begun toappear among MOCA workers. The absence of any such cancers, as shown by the study of duPont workers in which no adverse health effects attributable to MOCA were found, indicatedthat Dr. Scribner had overestimated the risk of bladder cancer in humans from MOCA.Dr. Bryan’s reasons for believing that extrapolations fromanimal experiments to estimate human risks were not valid within a reasonable degree ofscientific certainty largely correspond to the reasons expressed by the Secretary forrejecting quantitative risk assessment in a rulemaking directed at developing a generalpolicy for regulating carcinogens. That policy, which the Secretary issued on January 22,1980, examined the considerations relevant to the regulation of carcinogens.\”Identification, Classification and Regulation of Potential OccupationalCarcinogens,\” 45 Fed. Reg. 5002 (1980). One of the principal issues considered in therulemaking was whether a substance’s carcinogenic potency should be considered inestablishing a permissible exposure level, i.e., whether quantitative risk assessmentcould reliably estimate the risk presented to workers by a carcinogen. After receivingnumerous expert opinions on both sides of the question, the Secretary rejected such anapproach, saying:Extrapolation from animal data to predict risks in humansintroduces many additional uncertainties. These include selection of appropriate scalingfactors for size, lifespan, and metabolic rate; differences in routes of exposure,duration and schedule of exposure, absorption, metabolism, and pharmacokinetics;differences in intrinsic susceptibility and repair capabilities; intra-populationvariation in susceptibility; and exposure to other carcinogens and intrinsic and extrinsicmodifying factors. At least theoretically, these factors can affect the relative responseof humans and animals by many orders of magnitude.[[13]]Id. at 5200. Thus, the Secretary has concluded that quantitative extrapolations fromanimal data are too speculative to provide useful estimations of human risk.The number of assumptions made by Dr. Scribner to extrapolatehuman risk from the animal studies on which he relied renders Dr. Scribner’s conclusionstoo speculative for purposes of section 5(a)(1). Moreover, some of the studies relied uponin making the quantitative risk assessment involved exposure to benzidine rather thanMOCA. Dr. Bryan’s testimony demonstrates that conclusions as to the carcinogenicity of onechemical cannot readily be drawn from experience with a different chemical. Dr. Scribner’srisk assessment was based on the assumption that the exposed workers would excrete 50micrograms of MOCA a day for 250 days per year. However, this assumption is based on theurine tests of only a few Conap employees on a single day. As to Kastalon, the record issilent on the amount of MOCA in the employees’ urine. We are therefore unable to correlateDr. Scribner’s risk assessment to the levels of MOCA to which the workers were exposed.Nor did Dr. Scribner take into consideration the information obtained from the du Pontstudy which showed no increase in the incidence of bladder cancer to du Pont workersexposed to MOCA. We therefore conclude that the quantitative risk assessment presented bythe Secretary is too speculative to establish that Kastalon’s and Conap’s employees wereexposed to a significant risk of harm within the meaning of section 5(a)(1) of the Act.Accordingly, we vacate the citations issued to Kastalon and Conap alleging violations ofthe general duty clause.Because we conclude that the Secretary failed to prove thatKastalon’s and Conap’s employees were exposed to a hazard, we need not and do not decidewhether the Secretary proved the remaining elements of a general duty clause violation.VWe now turn to the Secretary’s allegations that Conap violatedstandards governing the provision and use of personal protective equipment.As noted above, the primary means by which MOCA can enter thebody is through skin absorption. MOCA is only present as an air contaminant if handling ofthe chemical generates airborne dust. In the personal protective equipment citationsissued to Conap, the Secretary alleges that the company did not provide and\/or requireemployees to use equipment that would minimize skin contact and inhalation of MOCA. Thestandards cited by the Secretary, 29 C.F.R. ?? 1910.132(a) and 1910.134(a)(2), provideas follows: ? 1910.132 General requirements.(a) Application. Protective equipment, including personalprotective equipment for eyes, face, head, and extremities, protective clothing,respiratory devices, and protective shields and barriers, shall be provided, used, andmaintained in a sanitary and reliable condition wherever it is necessary by reason ofhazards of processes or environment, chemical hazards, radiological hazards, or mechanicalirritants encountered in a manner capable of causing injury or impairment in the functionof any part of the body through absorption, inhalation or physical contact.? 1910.134 Respiratory protection.(a) Permissible practice. * * *(2) Respirators shall be provided by the employer when such equipment is necessary toprotect the health of the employee. The employer shall provide the respirators which areapplicable and suitable for the purpose intended. The employer shall be responsible forthe establishment and maintenance of a respiratory protective program which shall includethe requirements outlined in paragraph (b) of this section.The Secretary alleges that Conap violated these standards because employees in variousareas of the plant were not using impervious gloves, impervious suits, shoe covers,goggles, head coverings, and appropriate respirators. One of the citation items alsoalleges that Conap violated section 1910.132(a) because MOCA was present on surfaces of apiece of equipment. In the Secretary’s view, that means the equipment was not maintainedin a sanitary or reliable condition, as the standard requires.We vacate these citation items for the same reason we vacatethe general duty clause citations: the Secretary failed to prove that Conap’s employeeswere exposed to a hazard. Section 1910.132(a) requires that personal protective equipmentbe provided and used \”wherever it is necessary by reason of hazards of processes orenvironment,\” and section 1910.134(a)(2) mandates that employers provide respirators\”when such equipment is necessary to protect the health of the employee.\” Thus,like the general duty clause, the Secretary must show that a significant risk to employeesis present as a necessary element of proof that an employer violated either standard. SeeDonovan v. General Motors Corp., 764 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1985) (significant risk test forproof of a hazard applies under section 1910.132(a)); Modern Drop Forge Co. v. Secretaryof Labor, 683 F.2d 1105, 1114-15 (7th Cir. 1982) (significant risk test applies wherestandard does not presume existence of a hazard); Anoplate Corp., 12 BNA OSHC at 1681,1986 CCH OSHD at p. 35,680 (where standard requires proof of a hazard, Secretary must showa significant risk to employees exists). As the Secretary failed to prove that MOCApresented a significant risk to employees at the exposure levels present in Conap’s plant,it follows that he failed to prove that Conap violated the personal protective equipmentand respirator standards.Although we vacate these items due to lack of proof of ahazard, we also note that there are other deficiencies in the Secretary’s evidence as tocertain items. In item 8 of the citation, the Secretary alleged that one employee wore anunapproved respirator and another wore no respirator at all. However, none of themeasurements made by the Secretary showed any detectable levels of airborne MOCA, so evenassuming that exposure to some amount of MOCA is hazardous, the Secretary failed to provethe need for respirators.[[14]]Conap also provided various items of protective equipment tominimize skin contact with MOCA, including polyethylene gloves, full-body impervious paperuniforms, and paper hats. Use of this equipment was left to the discretion of employees.The Secretary alleged in items 7(b), (d), and (e) of the citation that Conap violatedsection 1910.132(a) by not requiring that the equipment be used in various areas of theplant. The Secretary also alleged in items 7(a) and (c) that Conap violated section1910.132(a) because employees were not using goggles or other eye protection and were notwearing shoe covers to prevent spilled MOCA from being tracked throughout the plant.Some of these allegations involve employees who were notexposed to MOCA. For example, in subitems 7(b)(3), (c)(2), and (e)(2), the Secretaryalleged that employees in the room containing the Automatic Process Control machines(\”the APC room\”) were not wearing impervious gloves, shoe covers, and imperviousclothing. However, employees did not handle MOCA in the APC room. The MOCA was mixed withthe prepolymer in the APC machine before the mixture was discharged from the machines.Employees could contact the mixture after it came out of the machines, but there is noevidence that this would be harmful. To the contrary, Robert Turkington, an industrialhygienist who testified for the Secretary, stated that employees could not absorb MOCA bycontacting the mixture of MOCA and prepolymer. Thus, the Secretary failed to show thatthere was any possibility of employee absorption of MOCA in the APC room.The Secretary also alleged in item 7(b)(1) a violation ofsection 1910.132(a) because employees in the belts room did not wear gloves all the time.\u00a0 Employees weighed and melted MOCA in the belt room, but they also performed otheroperations there.[[15]] Although the record shows that employees in the room did not weargloves all the time, that does not prove that employees failed to wear gloves when theyhandled MOCA.The Secretary alleged in item 7(a) that employees did not weareye protection in two areas where MOCA was handled. However, there is no evidence thatMOCA presented any special danger to the eye. The precautions recommended by du Pont, onwhich the Secretary places so much emphasis, do not mention the need for eye protection.Thus, the Secretary failed to show any hazard necessitating eye protection.The Secretary alleged in item 7(c) that Conap violated section 1910.132(a) becauseemployees did not wear shoe covers in the plant areas where MOCA was used. According tothe Secretary, employees should have worn shoe covers in rooms where MOCA was used andshould have discarded them before leaving the room, thus preventing MOCA from beingtracked into areas of the plant where MOCA was not used. The Secretary did not show,however, that such a practice would significantly reduce employee exposure to MOCA. Thereis no evidence that MOCA was in fact being tracked throughout Conap’s plant. Also, weassume that all employees wore shoes, so even if MOCA was present on the floors, therewould appear to be little, if any chance, it could be absorbed through the skin ofemployees. Even under the Secretary’s argument that any measurable exposure to MOCApresents a hazard, the Secretary failed to prove the need for shoe covers.The Secretary alleged in item 6 that Conap failed to maintain aglove box in a sanitary and reliable condition. As described earlier, the glove box is oneof the devices Conap used to minimize employee contact with MOCA. It is an enclosedchamber into which a closed container of MOCA is placed and manipulated through rubbergloves installed on the side of the chamber. Wipe samples taken during the inspection ofConap’s plant revealed 3.6 micrograms of MOCA inside one glove, 9.9 micrograms inside theother. and 460 micrograms on top of the glove box. The Secretary argues that thesemeasurements show that the glove box was not maintained in a sanitary condition. We do notagree. The drums of MOCA used by Conap each contained 132 pounds of the chemical.Translated into micrograms, each drum contained approximately 60 billion micrograms.[[16]]To find a violation based on the presence of a few micrograms, or even a few hundredmicrograms, would impose on employers the duty to eliminate all traces of a chemical fromall surfaces employees may contact. Such a requirement is simply unrealistic. The purposeof the glove box was to minimize employee contact with MOCA, and the fact it did noteliminate such contact entirely does not show it was not maintained in a sanitarycondition.VIThe evidence in these cases strongly suggests that MOCA is ahuman carcinogen. Certainly it would be preferable not to be exposed to a carcinogen thanto be exposed to even a small amount. However, many substances to which people are exposeddaily are known carcinogens, and the Benzene Case recognizes that human activity cannot beguided by the sole objective of totally removing exposure to carcinogens. Instead, areasoned judgment must be made as to whether the amounts to which people are exposedpresent a significant risk of harm. In these cases, the Secretary alleges that Kastalonand Conap violated the general duty clause and certain general standards because theiremployees were exposed to MOCA. The Secretary has not, however, proven by a preponderanceof the evidence of record that the amounts of MOCA to which Kastalon’s and Conap’semployees were exposed were hazardous. We are therefore compelled to conclude that theSecretary has failed to sustain his burden of proof and to vacate the citations.From a broader perspective, to find violations here would bebeyond the limited adjudicatory role of the Commission. We would effectively beestablishing a permissible exposure limit through the adjudicatory process withoutregulated industries having the opportunity for input under the Act’s notice and commentrulemaking procedures. While this may be appropriate where appropriate exposure limitshave been firmly and scientifically established, see, e.g., American Smelting and RefiningCo. v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1974), it is not desirable where it requires\”findings . . . on the frontiers of scientific knowledge.\”Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 656. Such findings are uniquelysuited to rulemaking, in which the Secretary can \”make a policy judgment as towhether a specific risk of health impairment is significant in terms of the policyobjectives of the statute.\” Id. at 663 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Moreover, in arulemaking proceeding, all interested persons have the opportunity to be heard, and a rulegives employers notice of what they must do to provide safe and healthful workplaces. Ifthe Secretary believes that MOCA presents a significant risk in the workplace, he retainsthe authority under section 6(b) of the Act to complete the rulemaking he has alreadystarted.Finally, we note that Kastalon contends that the costs it wouldincur if the Secretary’s abatement order is enforced would render it uncompetitive withinits industry and thus put it out of business. Although it is not necessary to reach themerits of this contention, we mention it here because it reinforces the importance ofproceeding through rulemaking instead of the general duty clause where a decision can beexpected to have broad impact within an industry or industries. As the Court of Appealsfor the District of Columbia observed:[I]f adoption of the precaution would clearly threaten theeconomic viability of the employer, the Secretary should propose the precaution by way ofpromulgated regulations, subject to advance industry comment, rather than throughadventurous enforcement of the general duty clause.National Realty & Construction Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257,1266 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1973).The judges’ decisions are affirmed and the citations arevacated. FOR THE COMMISSION Executive Secretary DATED: JUL 23 1985The Administrative Law Judgedecision in this matter is unavailable in this format. To obtain a copy of this document,please request one from our Public Information Office by e-mail ( [email protected] ), telephone (202-606-5398), fax(202-606-5050), or TTY (202-606-5386).\u00a0\u00a0FOOTNOTES: [[1]] \”MOCA\” is a registered trade name of E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., which at one time was the chemical’s primarymanufacturer. Du Pont no longer manufactures MOCA.[[2]] Section 5(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. ? 654(a)(1), provides:Each employer shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employmentwhich are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death orserious physical harm to his employees.[[3]] Section 6(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. ? 655(b), providesthat the Secretary may promulgate occupational safety and health standards followingrulemaking proceedings in which interested persons are given notice of the proposed ruleand an opportunity to be heard. These notice-and-comment rulemaking provisions are similarto those in 5 U.S.C. ? 553, section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. ?551 et seq. (\”the APA\”), but impose additional requirements not found in theAPA. Among those additional requirements are provisions governing the use of advisorycommittees. The Secretary may convene such a committee to advise him regarding a standardunder consideration. Where he does so, he must publish a proposed standard within 60 daysof receiving the committee’s recommendations. Interested persons are given 30 days tosubmit comments and request a hearing. In the case of the MOCA standard, the Secretarypublished the proposed standard before receiving the advisory committee’s recommendations,and he held a hearing on the standard less than 30 days after receiving therecommendations. The court held that this procedure did not conform to the statutoryrequirements because it did not give interested persons an adequate opportunity to reviewthe committee’s recommendations before submitting comments on the standard andparticipating in the hearing.[[4]] The record indicates that two companies in addition toKastalon and Conap were cited. A 1976 citation issued to Roadway Tire & Rubber Companywas resolved in a settlement agreement. A citation issued in 1979 to Nazar Rubber Companywas vacated by an administrative law judge, and the Secretary did not seek review of thatdecision. Nazar Rubber Co., 81 OSAHRC 52\/D13, 9 BNA OSHC 1960, 1981 CCH OSHC ? 25,437(No. 79-4005, 1981).[[5]] This was particularly true in Kastalon, where theabatement requirements listed by the Secretary were largely taken verbatim from theinvalidated MOCA standard.[[6]] The Secretary adopted this standard under section 6(a) ofthe Act, 29 U.S.C. ? 655(a), which required him to summarily promulgate nationalconsensus standards and established federal standards as occupational safety and healthstandards within two years of the Act’s effective date without notice-and-commentrulemaking proceedings. The OSHA standard was originally adopted as a standard by theAmerican National Standards Institute in 1969.[[7]] We note that the United States Court of Appeals for theFifth Circuit has held that the significant risk test should not be applied in enforcingthe general duty clause. Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v. Donovan, 729 F.2d 317, 323-24 (5thCir. 1984). We respectfully disagree with that court’s conclusion. The Fifth Circuitreasoned that the Benzene Case dealt with the promulgation of standards and was thereforeof limited relevance in the different context of the general duty clause. We believe,however, that the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the Act was not intended to createrisk-free workplaces applies equally to the enforcement of the general duty clause as tothe promulgation of standards. As we have stated, Congress did not intend for the generalduty clause to provide broader protection than could be achieved through the promulgationof standards. Thus, a limitation on the Secretary’s authority to issue standardsnecessarily also limits the scope of the general duty clause.[[8]] The only record evidence regarding a specific study ofhuman exposure to MOCA involves a study by du Pont. Du Pont began development work withMOCA in 1954 and commenced full-scale commercial production in 1962. Between 1967 and1971, Du Pont studied the medical records of all its employees who had been involved withMOCA and found no adverse health effects attributable to MOCA.[[9]] In the du Pont study, six dogs were fed MOCA in theirdaily diet. One died early in the experiment from unrelated causes, and the remaining fiveall ultimately contracted cancer. None of the six dogs in the control group contractedcancer, indicating that MOCA had induced the cancers in the exposed group. See note 12infra.[[10]] The Secretary cites National Realty & ConstructionCo. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265 n. 32 (D.C. Cir. 1973), for the proposition that ahazard is recognized within the meaning of the general duty clause if \”safety expertswho are familiar with the circumstances of the industry or activity in question\”would have recognized the existence of a hazard. The court made this statement in thecontext of holding that the general duty imposed on employers by section 5(a)(1) was anachievable one, and that the test for recognition of the hazard was therefore an objectiveone. The court stated, in full, \”The standard would be the common knowledge of safetyexperts who are familiar with the circumstances of the industry or activity inquestion.\” Id.In this case, it is very doubtful whether Dr. Bryan’s opinions can be said torepresent the \”common knowledge\” of the polyurethane industry. Dr. Bryan did notwork in the industry, but was retained by the Polyurethane Manufacturers Association toprovide it with expertise the industry did not possess. In general, we think it would beunrealistic to hold an industry to the standard of knowledge of an outside expert itengages to provide it with specialized expertise. However, because we conclude that theevidence does not establish the existence of a hazard, we need not decide whether Dr.Bryan’s recognition of a hazard would be sufficient to find that the polyurethane industryrecognized the hazard.[[11]] We also note that the general knowledge that a chemicalis a suspect human carcinogen and should be controlled does not equate with recognitionthat exposure to any amount of the chemical is hazardous within the meaning of the generalduty clause. We, therefore, do not agree with the Secretary that the polyurethanemanufacturing industry recognized the existence of a hazard at any detectable level ofMOCA. Additionally, we note that Kastalon and Conap took considerable steps to reduce theexposure of their employees to MOCA. No employees had been known to suffer ill effectsfrom working with MOCA. There is no evidence that Kastalon and Conap believed the measuresthey took were inadequate or that they recognized that a hazard existed at theirworksites.[[12]] In a typical animal experiment, a certain number oflaboratory animals are exposed to a measured quantity of a chemical while a control groupof similar animals is maintained in a similar fashion but is not exposed to the chemical.If a larger number of exposed animals than control animals contract a disease and thedisparity is statistically significant, it can be concluded that the chemical causes thedisease. The statistical probability that an animal will contract the disease at theexposure level used in the experiment can also be calculated. If the experiment isconducted with different groups of animals exposed at several different levels, the degreeto which the probability of contracting the disease varies with the exposure level — the\”dose-response curve\” — can be obtained. In order to extrapolate thisquantitative animal data to determine the risk the chemical presents to humans, a numberof assumptions must be made. First some assumption must be made about the relativesensitivity to the chemical exhibited by humans and the experimental animals. Assumptionsmust also be made about differences in conditions under which humans and laboratoryanimals are exposed. For example, the experiment may involve animal ingestion of thesubstance, but human exposure may typically be through inhalation. In such a situation, anassumption must be made about the relative risk posed by the different exposure routes.Also, animal experiments often involve exposure levels that are much higher than humanstypically encounter in the workplace. In order to estimate the risk to humans from thedata gathered in such experiments, assumptions must be made about the relative risk athigh and low dosages. One possible assumption, for example, is that the risk is directlyproportional to the dosage–in technical terms, that the \”dose-response curve\”is a straight line. Experience shows, however, that it is extremely difficult to predictthe risk to humans at low dosages from the results of information gathered at highdosages, for substances that are toxic at high dosages are often relatively less harmfulor even completely safe at the typical dosages workers receive.[[13]] The Secretary noted that estimates of the probabilitythat humans could develop cancer from saccharin ingestion calculated by differentscientists assuming different models for cancer induction varied by seven orders ofmagnitude, i.e., by a factor of ten million. (One order of magnitude represents a tenfolddifference in the estimated risk; two orders of magnitude represents a hundredfolddifference). 45 Fed. Reg. at 5196-5200.[[14]] The Secretary also alleged in item 9 that Conap did notestablish and maintain a respiratory protection program because it did not train employeesin the use of respirators and did not have written respirator instructions. However,absent evidence of a hazard requiring the use of respirators, an employer cannot be foundin violation for failing to implement a respirator program. Gulf Oil Corp., 83 OSAHRC21\/A2, 11 BNA OSHC 1476, 1480, 1983 CCH OSHD ? 26,529, p. 33,819 (No. 76-5014, 1983).[[15]] Much of the Secretary’s evidence pertaining to the beltroom was directed at an operation in which the liquid mixture of MOCA and prepolymer waspoured over a mandrel on a lathe to form polyurethane belts. The evidence establishes thatthis was a \”very sloppy\” process and resulted in considerable spillage. However,as noted above, the evidence shows that there was no hazard of MOCA contact once the MOCAwas mixed with the prepolymer. Thus, the evidence of the sloppiness of the belt-formingoperation is irrelevant to whether there was a hazard of MOCA exposure in the belt room.[[16]] One pound equals 454 grams. Each gram contains onemillion micrograms. Thus, the number of micrograms in a drum is 132 multiplied by 454multiplied by one million.”