“SECRETARY OF LABOR,Complainant,v.SEALTITE CORPORATION,Respondent.OSHRC Docket No. 88-1431_DECISION_Before: FOULKE, Chairman, and WISEMAN, Commissioner.BY THE COMMISSION:Sealtite Corporation entered into a contract with the VeteransAdministration (\”VA\”) to remove asbestos insulation from a VA facilityin Bonham, Texas. While Sealtite was performing this work, a complianceofficer of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (\”OSHA\”)inspected the worksite. As a result of that inspection, the Secretary ofLabor issued three citations, alleging willful, serious, andother-than-serious violations of OSHA’s asbestos exposure standard, 29C.F.R. ? 1926.58(a). The Secretary proposed penalties totaling $47,500for these violations.Sealtite timely notified the Secretary of its intent to contest thecitations, and the Secretary forwarded that notice of contest to thisCommission. The case was docketed and assigned to one of the ReviewCommission’s administrative law judges (\”ALJ\”) for an adjudicativehearing. After Sealtite had failed to cooperate in discovery proceedingsor to file documents either required by our Rules of Procedure orordered by the Review Commission’s ALJ, the judge found that Sealtite’spattern of failure to comply amounted to contumacious conduct, heldSealtite in default, and entered an order vacating the notice ofcontests. That order was directed for review pursuant to section 12 (j)of the Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970 (\”the Act\”), 29 U.S.C. ?661 (j). After extensive review of the record, we hold that the judgedid not err in finding that Sealtite’s conduct was contumacious and thatthe judge did not abuse his discretion in imposing the sanction ofdismissal.I.When Sealtite’s notice of contest was docketed by the Commission,Sealtite was sent a copy of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure. Inaddition, Sealtite was sent a guide to the Review Commission’sprocedures, a booklet which informed the company of its duties inproceedings before the Commission.The Secretary filed a complaint within thirty days of forwardingSealtite’s notice of contest to this Commission as required by Rule 34(a) of our Rules of Procedure, 29 C. F. R. ? 2200.34 (a). Ten dayslater, the Secretary filed an amended complaint, as was permitted byRule 34 (f), since no answer had yet. been filed. 29 C.F.R. ? 2200.34(f) . Under the Review Commission’s Rules, Sealtite was required to fileits answer within thirty days of the date the amended complaint wasfiled. 29 C.F.R. ? 2200.34 (d)(1) .When SeaItite failed to respond within the allotted time, Secretaryfiled a motion to have Sealtite held in default. In response to thatmotion, Sealtite wrote the Commission complaining that OSHA had notresponded to its request for information made under the Freedom ofInformation Act (\”FOIA\”), 5 U.S.C. ? 552, and stating, \”[u]ntil wereceive this detailed information of any alleged violation ofregulations, it is impossible for us to answer your complaint.\” Sealtitealleged that the inspection was instigated by a former employee who wasa convicted criminal, who stole tools from the company.When Sealtite still had not filed an answer within another thirty days,the judge entered an order directing Sealtite to file an answerforthwith or to show cause within fourteen days why it should not befound in default. Five days later, Sealtite filed a \”Demur toComplaint,\” in which it alleged that: (1) the the work had beenperformed in strict accordance with the Veterans Administrationcontract; (2) OSHA had not responded to its FOIA request; (3) thecompany could not answer the allegations in the complaint because theywere not specific as to how the asbestos air sampling tests wereconducted; and (4) the company could not answer the complaint withoutknowing the dates and times of the testing and the names of theindividuals present.Upon receiving Sealtite’s \”Demur,\” the judge entered an order in whichhe explained to Sealtite that demurrers are not pleadings recognized bythe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which apply to proceedings beforethe Review Commission unless the Commission has adopted a differentrule. Section 12(g) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. ? 661(g). Because Sealtite hadrequested that the complaint be clarified, the judge treated Sealtite’sdocument as a motion for a more definite statement under Rule 21(e) ofthe Federal Rules. In his order ruling on that motion, the judge furtherdiscussed for Sealtite’s benefit the fact that the Review Commission hasno jurisdiction over Sealtite’s FOIA request to OSHA. The judge alsoobserved that the 16-page amended complaint was very detailed and thatSealtite had been provided a copy of the compliance officer’s inspectionworksheet. In addition, the judge noted that the only informationrequested by Sealtite concerned how the air sampling was performed, whowas present, and what kind of laboratory testing was done. Afterobserving that Sealtite did not need the information to admit or denythe allegations contained in the complaint, the judge informed Sealtitethat the information sought could be obtained through discovery ifSealtite needed it to prepare for the hearing. The judge thereforedenied Sealtite’s request for a more definite statement and orderedSealtite to file an answer within ten days.A week later, Sealtite filed its answer to the Secretary’s complaint.Although the answer addressed the allegations in the Secretary’scomplaint, it also contained assertions about wage payment issues thatare not involved in this proceeding, and it further requested therelease of payments withheld under its contract with the VA, which isoutside the jurisdiction of this Commission.Once the issues were framed by the complaint and the answer, theadministrative law judge [[1\/]] set the case for hearing and entered aprehearing order. That order directed each party to file, three weeksbefore the date set for the hearing, a statement of all legal andfactual issues in dispute, all stipulations, a list of witnesses anddocumentary exhibits, and information about any expert witnesses to becalled.The Secretary then began to conduct prehearing discovery, serving onSealtite a request for admissions that requested Sealtite to admit ordeny the authenticity of numerous documents pertaining to Sealtite’sperformance of the work at the VA facility, including the contractbetween Sealtite and the Veterans Administration, copies of payrollforms Sealtite submitted to the VA, and copies of three stop-work ordersissued to Sealtite by the VA’s contracting officer because of Sealtite’sfailure to comply with safety and health requirements.[[2\/]]At the same time the request for admissions was served, the Secretaryalso served on Sealtite a request for the production of documentsrequiring Sealtite to provide the Secretary with a copy of a specificdocument within thirty-five days. When Sealtite failed to provide theSecretary with the requested document within the time specified or tomake a timely objection to its production, the Secretary filed a motionto compel the production document. The judge then entered an orderrequiring Sealtite to produce the requested document by a specified dateor to show cause why the judge should not impose one or more of thesanctions specified in Rule 52(e) [[3\/]] of the Commission’s Rules ofProcedure, 29 C.F.R. ? 2200.52(e). For Sealtite’s benefit, the judgeincluded another copy of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure with his order.The Secretary filed with the judge the prehearing statement required bythe judge’s order and served a copy on Sealtite. When Sealtite failed torespond by the date set by the judge, the Secretary filed a motion tohave Sealtite found in default. Before the judge acted on this motion,the Secretary notified the judge that Sealtite had also failed to complywith the judge’s order because it had not produced the document that theSecretary had requested.At this point, the judge entered his order finding Sealtite in defaultunder Commission Rules 41 and 52, 29 C.F.R. ?? 2200.41 & 2200.52. [[4\/]]In his order, the judge recited Sealtite’s failures to comply with theCommission’s Rules and with his orders. The judge found that Sealtite’spattern of failure to comply constituted contumacious conduct. Hetherefore imposed the ultimate sanction, dismissal. The ALJ’s order ofdismissal is presently before us.In the two weeks after the judge entered his order of dismissal,Sealtite filed a number of documents with the judge, including a\”Stipulation of Fact\” that stated that the judge’s decision was amiscarriage of justice, that it was based on hearsay, and that it was aviolation of due process. In addition, Sealtite sent the judge a letterin which it stated that, if certain former employees \”attempt to createfurther problems, we will prosecute them under the felony laws for theiroutrageous acts.\” The judge treated those filings as a notion to setaside the default. He reviewed the record in the case and concluded thatSealtite had submitted nothing that would excuse its failure to complywith his orders.ll.This case again presents the difficult question of what standards willbe required of employers who undertake to participate in our proceedingspro se, or not represented by an attorney.Congress appears to have intended that Commission proceedings beconducted in a manner similar to those in a federal court, with theappropriate rules, since it specifically provided that, unless theCommission has adopted a different rule, the Federal Rules of CivilProcedure shall apply to Commission proceedings. Section 12(g) of theAct, 29 U.S.C. ? 661(g). Congress also mandated that proceedings beforethe Commission shall be heard by in administrative law judge. Sections12(j) and 12(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. ?? 661(j) & (e).However, many businesses, like Sealtite, elect to appear before theCommission represented by a company official who is not trained in thelaw or familiar with legal procedure and evidence. The Commission hasrecognized the difficulties faced by the non-lawyer participating in ourproceedings.[[5\/]] _E.g., Choice Electric Corp.,_ 14 BNA OSHC 1899,1901, 1987-90 CCH OSHD ? 29,141 (No. 88-1393, 1990); _Monroe & Sons,Inc._, 4 BNA OSHC 2016, 2017, 1976-77 CCH OSHD ? 21,470 (No. 6031,1977). Moreover, the Commission has attempted to make allowances for prose employers who have failed, through ignorance of our rules and oflegal procedures, to comply with its procedural requirements. _See,e.g., Action Group Inc_., 14 BNA OSHC 1934, 1987-90 CCH OSHD ? 29,166(No. 88-2058, 1990); _Wes Jones & Son, Inc._ 13 BNA OSHC 1277, 1986-87CCH OSHD ? 27,924 (No. 86-1095, 1987); _Browar Wood Prod. Co._, 7 BNAOSHC 1165, 1979 CCH OSHD ? 23,326 (No 78-2230, 1979).The Commission has held that the ultimate sanction of dismissal shouldbe imposed on a party only when that party has been guilty ofcontumacious conduct or the other party has been prejudiced in preparingor presenting its case by the conduct of the noncomplying party._Noranda Aluminum, Inc.,_ 9 BNA OSHC 1187, 1189, 1981 CCH OSHD ? 25,086,p.30,988 (No. 79-1059, 1980).In this case, the judge found that Sealtite’s conduct was contumacious,that the company was deliberately trying to put off or avoid theconsequences of its failure to protect its employees from exposure toasbestos. The issue before us is whether his finding is correct.In his decision, the judge held that Sealtite consistently failed tofile documents required by the Commission’s rules and to comply with hisorders until show-cause orders were issued. The judge concluded that,given the pattern of failure to comply until threatened with default,Sealtite had deliberately ignored its obligations as a litigant in thisproceeding.In reviewing an ALJ’s decision, we determine whether a preponderance ofthe evidence in the record supports the judge’s finding. _E.g.,__Ultimate Distribution Systems, Inc., _10 BNA OSHC a568, 1570, 1982 CCHOSHD ? 26,011, p. 32,653 (No. 79-1269, 1982),citing _Universal Camera v.NLRB, _34 U.S. 474 (1951). Having examined the record, we find that apreponderance of the evidence does support the judge’s decision. It isapparent that Sealtite’s representative either failed to read the rulesand the judge’s orders or that he ignored then, perhaps in the hope ofdelaying the proceedings indefinitely.The documents filed by Sealtite were drafted as though Sealtite did notunderstand the difference between OSHA and the Review Commission. Inview of the similarity in the names of the two agencies, we could haveunderstood Sealtite’s confusion if it were not for the fact that thejudge and the Commission’s Executive Secretary had informed Sealtitethat the two were completely separate and distinct agencies and that theCommission has no jurisdiction over Sealtite’s Freedom of InformationAct request to OSHA. It is readily apparent that Sealtite either failedto read those communications or was deliberately attempting to confusethe issue. Whichever the case, Sealtite’s conduct passed the point atwhich we could excuse its actions.If we believed that Sealtite’s failures in this case were result ofsimple misunderstanding or confusion, we would make every effort to givethe company its day in court. In addition, we would be more tolerant ofSealtite’s omissions if we believed that the company had made a genuineeffort to comply with our procedures. Review Commission hearings areadversary proceedings, like trials, and the judge and opposing counselcannot be expected to give the opposing party assistance. However, ourexperience is that our judges are generally willing to provideprocedural information to a Pro se employer in order to allow the meritsof the case to be heard. Indeed, the orders in this case indicate thatour administrative law judges made every effort to explain theCommission’s jurisdiction and procedures to Sealtite. Despite theirefforts, the record shows that Sealtite either failed to read thoseorders or chose to ignore them. We can only conclude that Sealtitedeliberately disregarded the attempts of the judges to inform Sealtiteof its obligations under the Commission’s Rules and procedures governingthe adjudication of this case. Furthermore, Sealtite made no attempt toaddress the safety and health issues that are the subject of this case.Instead, it alleged wrongdoing by the Veterans Administration,Sealtite’s own employees, the Secretary, and the administrative law judge.We do not necessarily expect a non-lawyer like Sealtite’s president tounderstand fully what issues and arguments are relevant in Commissionproceedings or to be familiar with legal precedent, such as the SupremeCourt’s decisions holding that the Freedom of Information Act was notintended by Congress to be either a substitute or a supplement fordiscovery in legal proceedings. _E.g._, _N.L.R.B. v. Robbins Tire &Rubber Co_., 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S. Ct. 2311, 2327 (1978); _U.S. v.Weber Aircraft Corp._, 465 U.S. 792, 801, 104 S.Ct. 1488, 1494 (1984).However, we do expect that, after both an administrative law judge andthe Executive Secretary of the Commission have informed a party thatthis agency has no jurisdiction over a FOIA request made to theDepartment of Labor, that information will be accepted and that, once aparty has been informed of the limitations on the issues and on theCommission’s jurisdiction, it will cease making demands that theCommission answer its FOIA request.The judge’s orders fully informed Sealtite that it was required toparticipate in the prehearing exchanges of information and that it mustproduce the document requested by the Secretary or show cause why thejudge should not impose sanctions for its failure to do so. Sealtiteignored both orders. Sealtite never filed the required documents, and itfailed to ask the judge what it had to do to comply. There is aconsistent pattern of failure to respond, of ignoring the issues of thiscase, and of arguing issues that are not before the Review Commission orwithin its jurisdiction.[[6\/]] We find that the record amply supportsthe judge’s conclusion that Sealtite engaged in contumacious conduct.III.Having determined that the judge did not err in finding that Sealtite’sbehavior was contumacious, we next consider whether the sanction imposedby the judge was excessive. The test we apply in making thisdetermination is whether the judge abused his discretion.[[7\/]]_National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club,_ 427 U.S. 639, 642,96 S.Ct. 2778, 2780 (1976). The judge has very broad discretion inimposing sanctions for noncompliance with his, orders; he will not bereversed if he stays within that discretion. _Heat & Control, Inc. v.Hester Indus._, 785 F.2d 1017, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1986).A review of the documents submitted by Sealtite on review, as well asthose before the judge at the time he entered his order, persuades usthat a lesser sanction likely would not have had the effect of focusingSealtite’s attention on the issues of this case. For example, Sealtitehas persisted on review in attempting to litigate its disputes over therate of wages paid to its employees, despite having been informed thatthis agency has no jurisdiction to hear them. Nothing in Sealtite’ssubmissions to the judge or to the Commission suggests that, if thejudge had imposed a lesser sanction, Sealtite would have altered itspattern of conduct and confined itself to the issues raised by theSecretary’s amended complaint. Under these circumstances, we will notfind that the judge abused his discretion by dismissing Sealtite’snotice of contest.In opposing the ALJ’s dismissal of its notice of contest, Sealtiteargues that the asbestos removal work was completed to the satisfactionof the Veterans Administration and has been accepted by that agency.However, the fact that the VA accepted the work is irrelevant to theissues raised by the OSHA citation alleging that Sealtite’s employeeswere exposed to asbestos in violation of several provisions of 29 C.F.R.? 1926.58 or the issues presented to the Commission in its review of thejudge’s rulings.We recognize that, because Sealtite is liable for penalties of $47,500without further opportunity to contest the existence or degree of thealleged violations or the appropriateness of the penalties assessed, ourdecision may be perceived as producing a harsh result. We thereforeemphasize that Sealtite has been afforded ample opportunity to pursuethese issues, which it forfeited by its failure to obey the rules of theCommission and the orders of the judge. We are not denying Sealtite dueprocess of law; we are simply denying Sealtite one more opportunitybecause it failed to take proper advantage of the other opportunitiesafforded it. Sealtite designated its president to act as itsrepresentative in these proceedings, and the company must be bound byhis actions and omissions.IV.For the reasons stated, we find that the judge did not err in findingSealtite’s conduct contumacious and that he did not abuse his discretionin imposing the sanction of dismissal. Accordingly, we affirm thedecision of the administrative law judge. The Secretary’s citations andthe proposed penalties are affirmed.Dated: June 28. 1991Edwin G. Foulke, Jr.ChairmanDonald G. WisemanCommissioner————————————————————————SECRETARY OF LABOR,Complainant,v.SEALTITE CORPORATION,Respondent.OSHRC DOCKET NO. 88-1431_ORDER_On August 26, 1988, this case was assigned to Judge Dee C. Blythe. Priorto that time, the Secretary had filed both a complaint and a firstamended complaint. On September 16, 1988, the Secretary filed a motionto declare the Respondent in default, pursuant to Commission Rule41(a)(2), due to its failure to file an answer. On October 27, 1988,Judge Blythe ordered the Respondent to file an answer forthwith or toshow cause within 14 days why its notice of contest should not bevacated and judgment entered against it. Thereafter, on November 1,1988, the Respondent filed a \”Demur (sic) to Complaint.\” In an orderissued on November 30, 1988, Judge Blythe observed that the Respondenthad not filed an answer or otherwise responded to the order to showcause. However, the demurrer was treated as a motion for a more definitestatement. As such, it was denied and the Respondent was given one moreopportunity to file an answer. Respondent then filed an answer withinthe allotted time.Thereafter, on January 6, 1989, the parties were notified at this casehad been reassigned to the undersigned administrative law judge.[[1]] OnFebruary 15, 1989, the parties were given notice that a hearing wouldcommence at 9:00 a.m. on May 1, 1989, in Dallas, Texas. On the same datein February, a prehearing order was issued which required, among otherthings, that both parties file a response thereto no later than April10, 1989.On February 27, 1989, the Secretary served the Respondent with a requestfor production of documents (certain payroll records) for inspection andcopying.[[2]] Those records were to be produced to the Secretary inDallas, Texas, on April 3, 1989. On April 6, 1989, the Secretary filed amotion to compel the Respondent to produce the requested documents,stating that the Respondent had failed to produce those documents or tofile a written response stating the reason for objection to theproduction thereof. Thereafter, on April 10, 1989, the Respondent wasordered to produce the subject documents to the Secretary’srepresentative in Dallas, Texas, at 9:00 a.m. on April 19, 1989, or showcause why one or more of the sanctions set forth and\/or referred to InCommission Rule 52(e) should not be entered against the Respondent.[[3]]On April 19, 1989, the Secretary filed a letter stating that therespondent has failed to produce the subject documents.The Secretary filed her response to the prehearing order on April 10,1989 (the required date). The Respondent did not file the requiredresponse. Thereafter, on April 14, 1989, the Secretary filed a motion todeclare the Respondent in default, pursuant to Commission Rule 41(a).The Respondent’s failure to act has placed it in default underCommission Rules 41 and 52. In the order issued April 10, 1989, theRespondent’s attention was specifically called to those rules and thesanctions that may be imposed for a party’s failure to comply with theterms thereof. A review of the history of this case leads to only oneconclusion. Respondent’s course of conduct is clearly of a contumaciousnature.[[4]] Accordingly, the ultimate sanction will be imposed.Respondent’s notice of contest, dated May 18, 1988, is VACATED.[[5]] Allitems of the three citations (other, serious and willful) issued on May10, 1988, alleging violations of specified standards, are AFFIRMED. Thecivil penalties, as proposed, are ASSESSED.This proceeding is TERMINATED.Date: May 12, 1989E. CARTER BOTKINAdministrative Law Judge————————————————————————FOOTNOTES:[[1\/]] Because the administrative law judge to whom this case wasoriginally assigned became seriously ill, the case was reassigned toanother judge. We refer to \”the judge\” in the singular, even though twodifferent judges were involved in handling this case.[[2\/]] Because Sealtite failed to deny the authenticity of thesedocuments, they are taken as genuine.[[3\/]] Rule 52(e) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure provides:? 2200.52 _General provisions governing discovery._ * * *(e) _Failure to cooperate; Sanctions._ A party may apply for an ordercompelling discovery when another party refuses or obstructs discovery.For purposes of this paragraph, an evasive or incomplete answer is to betreated as a failure to answer. If a Judge enters an order compellingdiscovery and there is a failure to comply with that order, the Judgemay make such orders with regard to the failure as are just. The ordersmay issue upon the initiative of a Judge, after affording an opportunityto show cause why the order should not be entered, or upon the motion ofa party. The orders may include any sanction stated in Fed.R.Civ.P 37,including the following:(1) An order that designated facts shall he taken to be established forpurposes of the case in accordance with the claim of the party obtainingthat order;(2) An order refusing to permit the disobedient party to support or tooppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting it from introducingdesignated matters in evidence;(3) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying furtherproceedings until the order is obeyed; and(4) An order dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, orrendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party.[[4\/]] Rule 41(a) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure provides: ?2200.41 _Failure to obey rules._(a) _Sanctions._ When any party has failed to plead or otherwise proceedas provided by these rules or as required by the Commission or Judge, hemay be declared to be in default either: (1) on the initiative of theCommission or Judge, after having been afforded an opportunity to showcause why he should not be declared to be in default; or (2) on themotion of a party. Thereafter, the Commission or Judge, in theirdiscretion, may enter a decision against the defaulting party or strikeany pleading or document not filed in accordance with these rules.[[5\/]] For example, in its Rules of Procedure the Commission hasprovided that the parties may agree to proceed under simplifiedproceedings, in which pleadings generally are not permitted, discoveryand motions are discouraged, and the Federal Rules of Evidence do notapply, as they do to regular Commission hearings. See Rules 200 – 211,29 C.F.R. ?? 2200.200 – 2200.211.[[6\/]] For example, Sealtite has repeatedly insisted that it needs toknow the identity of the person who made the complaint that led to theinspection, who Sealtite asserts was a disgruntled former employee whohad been convicted of theft and drug use. Such information may not berelevant to the issues to be tried at the hearing, however. The identityof the person who made a complaint to OSHA generally is irrelevant oncean inspection has been conducted and an OSHA compliance officer hasobserved a violation, except in certain circumstances not present here,such as an allegation that the compliance officer acted in bad faith._See Quality Stamping Prod. Co.,_ 7 BNA OSHC 1285, 1979 CCH OSHD ?23,520 (No. 78-235, 1979); _Brock v. Brooks Woolen Co._, 782 F.2d 1066(1st Cir. 1986). Even then, the identity of the party who filed thecomplaint might be protected from disclosure by the informer’sprivilege. _Massman-Johnson (Luling),_ 8 BNA OSHC 1369, 1371-73, 1980CCH OSHD ? 24,436, p. 29,804-06 (No. 76-1484, 1980); _Quality StampingProd. Co.,_ 7 BNA OSHC at 1287-88, 1979 CCH OSHD at p. 28,504-505).[[7\/]] Abuse of discretion does not imply improper conduct by the judge.It merely indicates that the judge erred as a matter of law inexercising his discretion. _Duquesne Light Co_., 8 BNA OSHC 1218, 1221n.17, 1980 CCH OSHD ? 24,384, p. 29,718 n. 17 (No. 78-5034, 1980). Abuseof discretion is a term used by the courts to describe more than a mereerror or difference of judicial opinion. It occurs when a judge’sdecision is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful, when thedecision is based on erroneous conclusions of law, when the judge’sfindings of fact are clearly erroneous, or when the record contains noevidence on which the judge rationally could have based his decision._Heat & Control, Inc. v. Hester Indus.,_ 785 F.2d 1017, 1022 (Fed. Cir.1986). Abuse of discretion occurs when a relevant factor that shouldhave been given weight is not considered, when an irrelevant or improperfactor is considered and given significant weight, or when all properfactors are considered, no improper factors are considered, but thejudge commits a clear error of judgment in weighing these factors. _U.S.v. Kramer_, 827 F.2d 1174, 1179 (8th Cir. 1987).[[1]] It was reassigned due to the unavailability of Judge Blythe.[[2]] On the same date, the Secretary filed a request for admissions.[[3]] A copy of the Review Commission’s Rules of Procedure were enclosedto the Respondent.[[4]] It is further noted that the Respondent failed to file anyresponse to the Secretary’s request for admissions. Therefore, eachmatter was deemed admitted. Request for admission number 33, withattached exhibit number 31, discloses that the corporate Respondent isno stranger to legal matters or the possibility of default therein.[[5]] The hearing, as scheduled, is cancelled.”