“Docket No. 88-1431 SECRETARY OF LABOR,Complainant,v.SEALTITE CORPORATION,Respondent.OSHRC Docket No. 88-1431DECISIONBefore: FOULKE, Chairman, and WISEMAN, Commissioner.BY THE COMMISSION:Sealtite Corporation entered into a contract with the VeteransAdministration (\”VA\”) to remove asbestos insulation from a VA facility inBonham, Texas. While Sealtite was performing this work, a compliance officer of theOccupational Safety and Health Administration (\”OSHA\”) inspected the worksite.As a result of that inspection, the Secretary of Labor issued three citations, allegingwillful, serious, and other-than-serious violations of OSHA’s asbestos exposure standard,29 C.F.R. ? 1926.58(a). The Secretary proposed penalties totaling $47,500 for theseviolations.Sealtite timely notified the Secretary of its intent to contestthe citations, and the Secretary forwarded that notice of contest to this Commission. Thecase was docketed and assigned to one of the Review Commission’s administrative law judges(\”ALJ\”) for an adjudicative hearing. After Sealtite had failed to cooperate indiscovery proceedings or to file documents either required by our Rules of Procedure orordered by the Review Commission’s ALJ, the judge found that Sealtite’s pattern of failureto comply amounted to contumacious conduct, held Sealtite in default, and entered an ordervacating the notice of contests. That order was directed for review pursuant to section 12(j) of the Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970 (\”the Act\”), 29 U.S.C.? 661 (j). After extensive review of the record, we hold that the judge did not err infinding that Sealtite’s conduct was contumacious and that the judge did not abuse hisdiscretion in imposing the sanction of dismissal.I. When Sealtite’s notice of contest was docketed by theCommission, Sealtite was sent a copy of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure. In addition,Sealtite was sent a guide to the Review Commission’s procedures, a booklet which informedthe company of its duties in proceedings before the Commission.The Secretary filed a complaint within thirty days offorwarding Sealtite’s notice of contest to this Commission as required by Rule 34 (a) ofour Rules of Procedure, 29 C. F. R. ? 2200.34 (a). Ten days later, the Secretary filed anamended complaint, as was permitted by Rule 34 (f), since no answer had yet. been filed.29 C.F.R. ? 2200.34 (f) . Under the Review Commission’s Rules, Sealtite was required tofile its answer within thirty days of the date the amended complaint was filed. 29 C.F.R.? 2200.34 (d)(1) .When SeaItite failed to respond within the allotted time,Secretary filed a motion to have Sealtite held in default. In response to that motion,Sealtite wrote the Commission complaining that OSHA had not responded to its request forinformation made under the Freedom of Information Act (\”FOIA\”), 5 U.S.C. ? 552,and stating, \”[u]ntil we receive this detailed information of any alleged violationof regulations, it is impossible for us to answer your complaint.\” Sealtite allegedthat the inspection was instigated by a former employee who was a convicted criminal, whostole tools from the company.When Sealtite still had not filed an answer within anotherthirty days, the judge entered an order directing Sealtite to file an answer forthwith orto show cause within fourteen days why it should not be found in default. Five days later,Sealtite filed a \”Demur to Complaint,\” in which it alleged that: (1) the thework had been performed in strict accordance with the Veterans Administration contract;(2) OSHA had not responded to its FOIA request; (3) the company could not answer theallegations in the complaint because they were not specific as to how the asbestos airsampling tests were conducted; and (4) the company could not answer the complaint withoutknowing the dates and times of the testing and the names of the individuals present.Upon receiving Sealtite’s \”Demur,\” the judge enteredan order in which he explained to Sealtite that demurrers are not pleadings recognized bythe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which apply to proceedings before the ReviewCommission unless the Commission has adopted a different rule. Section 12(g) of the Act,29 U.S.C. ? 661(g). Because Sealtite had requested that the complaint be clarified, thejudge treated Sealtite’s document as a motion for a more definite statement under Rule21(e) of the Federal Rules. In his order ruling on that motion, the judge furtherdiscussed for Sealtite’s benefit the fact that the Review Commission has no jurisdictionover Sealtite’s FOIA request to OSHA. The judge also observed that the 16-page amendedcomplaint was very detailed and that Sealtite had been provided a copy of the complianceofficer’s inspection worksheet. In addition, the judge noted that the only informationrequested by Sealtite concerned how the air sampling was performed, who was present, andwhat kind of laboratory testing was done. After observing that Sealtite did not need theinformation to admit or deny the allegations contained in the complaint, the judgeinformed Sealtite that the information sought could be obtained through discovery ifSealtite needed it to prepare for the hearing. The judge therefore denied Sealtite’srequest for a more definite statement and ordered Sealtite to file an answer within tendays.A week later, Sealtite filed its answer to the Secretary’scomplaint. Although the answer addressed the allegations in the Secretary’s complaint, italso contained assertions about wage payment issues that are not involved in thisproceeding, and it further requested the release of payments withheld under its contractwith the VA, which is outside the jurisdiction of this Commission.Once the issues were framed by the complaint and the answer,the administrative law judge [[1\/]] set the case for hearing and entered a prehearingorder. That order directed each party to file, three weeks before the date set for thehearing, a statement of all legal and factual issues in dispute, all stipulations, a listof witnesses and documentary exhibits, and information about any expert witnesses to becalled.The Secretary then began to conduct prehearing discovery,serving on Sealtite a request for admissions that requested Sealtite to admit or deny theauthenticity of numerous documents pertaining to Sealtite’s performance of the work at theVA facility, including the contract between Sealtite and the Veterans Administration,copies of payroll forms Sealtite submitted to the VA, and copies of three stop-work ordersissued to Sealtite by the VA’s contracting officer because of Sealtite’s failure to complywith safety and health requirements.[[2\/]]At the same time the request for admissions was served, theSecretary also served on Sealtite a request for the production of documents requiringSealtite to provide the Secretary with a copy of a specific document within thirty-fivedays. When Sealtite failed to provide the Secretary with the requested document within thetime specified or to make a timely objection to its production, the Secretary filed amotion to compel the production document. The judge then entered an order requiringSealtite to produce the requested document by a specified date or to show cause why thejudge should not impose one or more of the sanctions specified in Rule 52(e) [[3\/]] of theCommission’s Rules of Procedure, 29 C.F.R. ? 2200.52(e). For Sealtite’s benefit, thejudge included another copy of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure with his order.The Secretary filed with the judge the prehearing statementrequired by the judge’s order and served a copy on Sealtite. When Sealtite failed torespond by the date set by the judge, the Secretary filed a motion to have Sealtite foundin default. Before the judge acted on this motion, the Secretary notified the judge thatSealtite had also failed to comply with the judge’s order because it had not produced thedocument that the Secretary had requested.At this point, the judge entered his order finding Sealtite indefault under Commission Rules 41 and 52, 29 C.F.R. ?? 2200.41 & 2200.52. [[4\/]] Inhis order, the judge recited Sealtite’s failures to comply with the Commission’s Rules andwith his orders. The judge found that Sealtite’s pattern of failure to comply constitutedcontumacious conduct. He therefore imposed the ultimate sanction, dismissal. The ALJ’sorder of dismissal is presently before us.In the two weeks after the judge entered his order ofdismissal, Sealtite filed a number of documents with the judge, including a\”Stipulation of Fact\” that stated that the judge’s decision was a miscarriage ofjustice, that it was based on hearsay, and that it was a violation of due process. Inaddition, Sealtite sent the judge a letter in which it stated that, if certain formeremployees \”attempt to create further problems, we will prosecute them under thefelony laws for their outrageous acts.\” The judge treated those filings as a notionto set aside the default. He reviewed the record in the case and concluded that Sealtitehad submitted nothing that would excuse its failure to comply with his orders.ll.This case again presents the difficult question of whatstandards will be required of employers who undertake to participate in our proceedingspro se, or not represented by an attorney.Congress appears to have intended that Commission proceedingsbe conducted in a manner similar to those in a federal court, with the appropriate rules,since it specifically provided that, unless the Commission has adopted a different rule,the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply to Commission proceedings. Section 12(g)of the Act, 29 U.S.C. ? 661(g). Congress also mandated that proceedings before theCommission shall be heard by in administrative law judge. Sections 12(j) and 12(e) of theAct, 29 U.S.C. ?? 661(j) & (e).However, many businesses, like Sealtite, elect to appear beforethe Commission represented by a company official who is not trained in the law or familiarwith legal procedure and evidence. The Commission has recognized the difficulties faced bythe non-lawyer participating in our proceedings.[[5\/]] E.g., Choice Electric Corp.,14 BNA OSHC 1899, 1901, 1987-90 CCH OSHD ? 29,141 (No. 88-1393, 1990); Monroe &Sons, Inc., 4 BNA OSHC 2016, 2017, 1976-77 CCH OSHD ? 21,470 (No. 6031, 1977).Moreover, the Commission has attempted to make allowances for pro se employers who havefailed, through ignorance of our rules and of legal procedures, to comply with itsprocedural requirements. See, e.g., Action Group Inc., 14 BNA OSHC 1934, 1987-90CCH OSHD ? 29,166 (No. 88-2058, 1990); Wes Jones & Son, Inc. 13 BNA OSHC 1277,1986-87 CCH OSHD ? 27,924 (No. 86-1095, 1987); Browar Wood Prod. Co., 7 BNA OSHC1165, 1979 CCH OSHD ? 23,326 (No 78-2230, 1979).The Commission has held that the ultimate sanction of dismissalshould be imposed on a party only when that party has been guilty of contumacious conductor the other party has been prejudiced in preparing or presenting its case by the conductof the noncomplying party. Noranda Aluminum, Inc., 9 BNA OSHC 1187, 1189, 1981 CCHOSHD ? 25,086, p.30,988 (No. 79-1059, 1980).In this case, the judge found that Sealtite’s conduct wascontumacious, that the company was deliberately trying to put off or avoid theconsequences of its failure to protect its employees from exposure to asbestos. The issuebefore us is whether his finding is correct.In his decision, the judge held that Sealtite consistently failed to file documentsrequired by the Commission’s rules and to comply with his orders until show-cause orderswere issued. The judge concluded that, given the pattern of failure to comply untilthreatened with default, Sealtite had deliberately ignored its obligations as a litigantin this proceeding.In reviewing an ALJ’s decision, we determine whether apreponderance of the evidence in the record supports the judge’s finding. E.g., UltimateDistribution Systems, Inc., 10 BNA OSHC a568, 1570, 1982 CCH OSHD ? 26,011, p. 32,653(No. 79-1269, 1982),citing Universal Camera v. NLRB, 34 U.S. 474 (1951). Havingexamined the record, we find that a preponderance of the evidence does support the judge’sdecision. It is apparent that Sealtite’s representative either failed to read the rulesand the judge’s orders or that he ignored then, perhaps in the hope of delaying theproceedings indefinitely.The documents filed by Sealtite were drafted as though Sealtitedid not understand the difference between OSHA and the Review Commission. In view of thesimilarity in the names of the two agencies, we could have understood Sealtite’s confusionif it were not for the fact that the judge and the Commission’s Executive Secretary hadinformed Sealtite that the two were completely separate and distinct agencies and that theCommission has no jurisdiction over Sealtite’s Freedom of Information Act request to OSHA.It is readily apparent that Sealtite either failed to read those communications or wasdeliberately attempting to confuse the issue. Whichever the case, Sealtite’s conductpassed the point at which we could excuse its actions.If we believed that Sealtite’s failures in this case wereresult of simple misunderstanding or confusion, we would make every effort to give thecompany its day in court. In addition, we would be more tolerant of Sealtite’s omissionsif we believed that the company had made a genuine effort to comply with our procedures.Review Commission hearings are adversary proceedings, like trials, and the judge andopposing counsel cannot be expected to give the opposing party assistance. However, ourexperience is that our judges are generally willing to provide procedural information to aPro se employer in order to allow the merits of the case to be heard. Indeed, the ordersin this case indicate that our administrative law judges made every effort to explain theCommission’s jurisdiction and procedures to Sealtite. Despite their efforts, the recordshows that Sealtite either failed to read those orders or chose to ignore them. We canonly conclude that Sealtite deliberately disregarded the attempts of the judges to informSealtite of its obligations under the Commission’s Rules and procedures governing theadjudication of this case. Furthermore, Sealtite made no attempt to address the safety andhealth issues that are the subject of this case. Instead, it alleged wrongdoing by theVeterans Administration, Sealtite’s own employees, the Secretary, and the administrativelaw judge.We do not necessarily expect a non-lawyer like Sealtite’s president to understand fullywhat issues and arguments are relevant in Commission proceedings or to be familiar withlegal precedent, such as the Supreme Court’s decisions holding that the Freedom ofInformation Act was not intended by Congress to be either a substitute or a supplement fordiscovery in legal proceedings. E.g., N.L.R.B. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.,437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S. Ct. 2311, 2327 (1978); U.S. v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465U.S. 792, 801, 104 S.Ct. 1488, 1494 (1984). However, we do expect that, after both anadministrative law judge and the Executive Secretary of the Commission have informed aparty that this agency has no jurisdiction over a FOIA request made to the Department ofLabor, that information will be accepted and that, once a party has been informed of thelimitations on the issues and on the Commission’s jurisdiction, it will cease makingdemands that the Commission answer its FOIA request.The judge’s orders fully informed Sealtite that it was requiredto participate in the prehearing exchanges of information and that it must produce thedocument requested by the Secretary or show cause why the judge should not imposesanctions for its failure to do so. Sealtite ignored both orders. Sealtite never filed therequired documents, and it failed to ask the judge what it had to do to comply. There is aconsistent pattern of failure to respond, of ignoring the issues of this case, and ofarguing issues that are not before the Review Commission or within its jurisdiction.[[6\/]]We find that the record amply supports the judge’s conclusion that Sealtite engaged incontumacious conduct. III.Having determined that the judge did not err in finding thatSealtite’s behavior was contumacious, we next consider whether the sanction imposed by thejudge was excessive. The test we apply in making this determination is whether the judgeabused his discretion.[[7\/]] National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club,427 U.S. 639, 642, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 2780 (1976). The judge has very broad discretion inimposing sanctions for noncompliance with his, orders; he will not be reversed if he stayswithin that discretion. Heat & Control, Inc. v. Hester Indus., 785 F.2d 1017,1022 (Fed. Cir. 1986).A review of the documents submitted by Sealtite on review, aswell as those before the judge at the time he entered his order, persuades us that alesser sanction likely would not have had the effect of focusing Sealtite’s attention onthe issues of this case. For example, Sealtite has persisted on review in attempting tolitigate its disputes over the rate of wages paid to its employees, despite having beeninformed that this agency has no jurisdiction to hear them. Nothing in Sealtite’ssubmissions to the judge or to the Commission suggests that, if the judge had imposed alesser sanction, Sealtite would have altered its pattern of conduct and confined itself tothe issues raised by the Secretary’s amended complaint. Under these circumstances, we willnot find that the judge abused his discretion by dismissing Sealtite’s notice of contest.In opposing the ALJ’s dismissal of its notice of contest,Sealtite argues that the asbestos removal work was completed to the satisfaction of theVeterans Administration and has been accepted by that agency. However, the fact that theVA accepted the work is irrelevant to the issues raised by the OSHA citation alleging thatSealtite’s employees were exposed to asbestos in violation of several provisions of 29C.F.R. ? 1926.58 or the issues presented to the Commission in its review of the judge’srulings.We recognize that, because Sealtite is liable for penalties of $47,500 without furtheropportunity to contest the existence or degree of the alleged violations or theappropriateness of the penalties assessed, our decision may be perceived as producing aharsh result. We therefore emphasize that Sealtite has been afforded ample opportunity topursue these issues, which it forfeited by its failure to obey the rules of the Commissionand the orders of the judge. We are not denying Sealtite due process of law; we are simplydenying Sealtite one more opportunity because it failed to take proper advantage of theother opportunities afforded it. Sealtite designated its president to act as itsrepresentative in these proceedings, and the company must be bound by his actions andomissions.IV.For the reasons stated, we find that the judge did not err infinding Sealtite’s conduct contumacious and that he did not abuse his discretion inimposing the sanction of dismissal. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of theadministrative law judge. The Secretary’s citations and the proposed penalties areaffirmed.Dated: June 28. 1991Edwin G. Foulke, Jr.ChairmanDonald G. WisemanCommissionerSECRETARY OF LABOR,Complainant,v.SEALTITE CORPORATION,Respondent.OSHRC DOCKET NO. 88-1431ORDEROn August 26, 1988, this case was assigned to Judge Dee C.Blythe. Prior to that time, the Secretary had filed both a complaint and a first amendedcomplaint. On September 16, 1988, the Secretary filed a motion to declare the Respondentin default, pursuant to Commission Rule 41(a)(2), due to its failure to file an answer. OnOctober 27, 1988, Judge Blythe ordered the Respondent to file an answer forthwith or toshow cause within 14 days why its notice of contest should not be vacated and judgmententered against it. Thereafter, on November 1, 1988, the Respondent filed a \”Demur(sic) to Complaint.\” In an order issued on November 30, 1988, Judge Blythe observedthat the Respondent had not filed an answer or otherwise responded to the order to showcause. However, the demurrer was treated as a motion for a more definite statement. Assuch, it was denied and the Respondent was given one more opportunity to file an answer.Respondent then filed an answer within the allotted time. Thereafter, on January 6, 1989, the parties were notified atthis case had been reassigned to the undersigned administrative law judge.[[1]] OnFebruary 15, 1989, the parties were given notice that a hearing would commence at 9:00a.m. on May 1, 1989, in Dallas, Texas. On the same date in February, a prehearing orderwas issued which required, among other things, that both parties file a response theretono later than April 10, 1989.On February 27, 1989, the Secretary served the Respondent witha request for production of documents (certain payroll records) for inspection andcopying.[[2]] Those records were to be produced to the Secretary in Dallas, Texas, onApril 3, 1989. On April 6, 1989, the Secretary filed a motion to compel the Respondent toproduce the requested documents, stating that the Respondent had failed to produce thosedocuments or to file a written response stating the reason for objection to the productionthereof. Thereafter, on April 10, 1989, the Respondent was ordered to produce the subjectdocuments to the Secretary’s representative in Dallas, Texas, at 9:00 a.m. on April 19,1989, or show cause why one or more of the sanctions set forth and\/or referred to InCommission Rule 52(e) should not be entered against the Respondent.[[3]] On April 19,1989, the Secretary filed a letter stating that the respondent has failed to produce thesubject documents.The Secretary filed her response to the prehearing order onApril 10, 1989 (the required date). The Respondent did not file the required response.Thereafter, on April 14, 1989, the Secretary filed a motion to declare the Respondent indefault, pursuant to Commission Rule 41(a).The Respondent’s failure to act has placed it in default underCommission Rules 41 and 52. In the order issued April 10, 1989, the Respondent’s attentionwas specifically called to those rules and the sanctions that may be imposed for a party’sfailure to comply with the terms thereof. A review of the history of this case leads toonly one conclusion. Respondent’s course of conduct is clearly of a contumaciousnature.[[4]] Accordingly, the ultimate sanction will be imposed. Respondent’s notice ofcontest, dated May 18, 1988, is VACATED.[[5]] All items of the three citations (other,serious and willful) issued on May 10, 1988, alleging violations of specified standards,are AFFIRMED. The civil penalties, as proposed, are ASSESSED.This proceeding is TERMINATED.Date: May 12, 1989E. CARTER BOTKINAdministrative Law JudgeFOOTNOTES: [[1\/]] Because the administrative law judge to whom this casewas originally assigned became seriously ill, the case was reassigned to another judge. Werefer to \”the judge\” in the singular, even though two different judges wereinvolved in handling this case.[[2\/]] Because Sealtite failed to deny the authenticity ofthese documents, they are taken as genuine.[[3\/]] Rule 52(e) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedureprovides:? 2200.52 General provisions governing discovery.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0*\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 *\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0*(e) Failure to cooperate; Sanctions. A party may apply for an order compellingdiscovery when another party refuses or obstructs discovery. For purposes of thisparagraph, an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer. If aJudge enters an order compelling discovery and there is a failure to comply with thatorder, the Judge may make such orders with regard to the failure as are just. The ordersmay issue upon the initiative of a Judge, after affording an opportunity to show cause whythe order should not be entered, or upon the motion of a party. The orders may include anysanction stated in Fed.R.Civ.P 37, including the following:(1) An order that designated facts shall he taken to be established for purposes of thecase in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining that order;(2) An order refusing to permit the disobedient party to support or to oppose designatedclaims or defenses, or prohibiting it from introducing designated matters in evidence;(3) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings untilthe order is obeyed; and (4) An order dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering ajudgment by default against the disobedient party.[[4\/]] Rule 41(a) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedureprovides: ? 2200.41 Failure to obey rules.(a) Sanctions. When any party has failed to plead or otherwise proceed as providedby these rules or as required by the Commission or Judge, he may be declared to be indefault either: (1) on the initiative of the Commission or Judge, after having beenafforded an opportunity to show cause why he should not be declared to be in default; or(2) on the motion of a party. Thereafter, the Commission or Judge, in their discretion,may enter a decision against the defaulting party or strike any pleading or document notfiled in accordance with these rules.[[5\/]] For example, in its Rules of Procedure the Commissionhas provided that the parties may agree to proceed under simplified proceedings, in whichpleadings generally are not permitted, discovery and motions are discouraged, and theFederal Rules of Evidence do not apply, as they do to regular Commission hearings. SeeRules 200 – 211, 29 C.F.R. ?? 2200.200 – 2200.211.[[6\/]] For example, Sealtite has repeatedly insisted that itneeds to know the identity of the person who made the complaint that led to theinspection, who Sealtite asserts was a disgruntled former employee who had been convictedof theft and drug use. Such information may not be relevant to the issues to be tried atthe hearing, however. The identity of the person who made a complaint to OSHA generally isirrelevant once an inspection has been conducted and an OSHA compliance officer hasobserved a violation, except in certain circumstances not present here, such as anallegation that the compliance officer acted in bad faith. See Quality Stamping Prod.Co., 7 BNA OSHC 1285, 1979 CCH OSHD ? 23,520 (No. 78-235, 1979); Brock v. BrooksWoolen Co., 782 F.2d 1066 (1st Cir. 1986). Even then, the identity of the party whofiled the complaint might be protected from disclosure by the informer’s privilege. Massman-Johnson(Luling), 8 BNA OSHC 1369, 1371-73, 1980 CCH OSHD ? 24,436, p. 29,804-06 (No.76-1484, 1980); Quality Stamping Prod. Co., 7 BNA OSHC at 1287-88, 1979 CCH OSHD atp. 28,504-505).[[7\/]] Abuse of discretion does not imply improper conduct bythe judge. It merely indicates that the judge erred as a matter of law in exercising hisdiscretion. Duquesne Light Co., 8 BNA OSHC 1218, 1221 n.17, 1980 CCH OSHD ?24,384, p. 29,718 n. 17 (No. 78-5034, 1980). Abuse of discretion is a term used by thecourts to describe more than a mere error or difference of judicial opinion. It occurswhen a judge’s decision is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful, when the decisionis based on erroneous conclusions of law, when the judge’s findings of fact are clearlyerroneous, or when the record contains no evidence on which the judge rationally couldhave based his decision. Heat & Control, Inc. v. Hester Indus., 785 F.2d 1017,1022 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Abuse of discretion occurs when a relevant factor that should havebeen given weight is not considered, when an irrelevant or improper factor is consideredand given significant weight, or when all proper factors are considered, no improperfactors are considered, but the judge commits a clear error of judgment in weighing thesefactors. U.S. v. Kramer, 827 F.2d 1174, 1179 (8th Cir. 1987).[[1]] It was reassigned due to the unavailability of JudgeBlythe.[[2]] On the same date, the Secretary filed a request foradmissions.[[3]] A copy of the Review Commission’s Rules of Procedure wereenclosed to the Respondent.[[4]] It is further noted that the Respondent failed to fileany response to the Secretary’s request for admissions. Therefore, each matter was deemedadmitted. Request for admission number 33, with attached exhibit number 31, discloses thatthe corporate Respondent is no stranger to legal matters or the possibility of defaulttherein.[[5]] The hearing, as scheduled, is cancelled.”