“UNITED STATES OF AMERICAOCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION \u00a0 SECRETARY OF LABOR, \u00a0 ???????????????????????????????????????????? Complainant, \u00a0 ???????????????????????? v. OSHRC DOCKET NOS.? 5989, 5990, & 6317 SECHRIST-HALL COMPANY \u00a0 ????????????????????????????????????????????? Respondent. \u00a0 \u00a0March20, 1975ORDER OF REMANDBeforeMORAN, Chairman; VAN NAMEE and CLEARY, CommissionersVANNAMEE, COMMISSIONER:This matter is before the Commission onmy order directing review of a decision made by Judge J. Paul Brenton. TheJudge vacated three citations on the ground that they were not issued withreasonable promptness as required by section 9(a) of the Occupational Safetyand Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.; hereinafter ?the Act?). Becausein vacating the citations Judge Brenton misconstrued our decision in ChicagoBridge & Iron Co., OSHRC Docket No. 744, BNA 1 O.S.H.C. 1485, CCHEmploy. S. & H. Guide para. 17,187 (Jan. 24, 1974), appeal docketed,No. 74?1214, 7th Cir., Mar. 18, 1974, we reverse and remand.Respondent is engaged in theconstruction business in Corpus Christi, Texas. During the second half of 1973,Respondent conferred and corresponded with Complainant?s offices in CorpusChristi and Houston concerning the applicability of 29 C.F.R. 1926.500(d)(1).Complainant contended that the standard requires guarding on flat roofs.Respondent took the position that the standard was inapplicable to flat roofs.[1]Compliance officers from the district office in Corpus Christi inspected threeof Respondent?s worksites in late November and December. Inspection reportswere forwarded to the area office in Houston nine, eleven, and twelve workingdays after the inspections, and citations were issued by the Area Directorwithin one to two working days thereafter.[2]Judge Brenton vacated the citations,sustaining Respondent?s objections that Complainant had not issued thecitations with reasonable promptness. The Judge acknowledged that the 72-hourrule we announced in Chicago Bridge[3]does not apply to the process involved in forming a belief that a violation hasoccurred. He concluded, however, that there was no need for such a processfollowing these inspections because the parties had solidified their positionsbefore the inspections took place. Accordingly, he concluded that the 72 hourrule was in force from the date of the inspections and consequently he deemedthe citations untimely.His holding was clearly erroneous. Itdoes not follow that because an area director believes that a standard willapply as a matter of law that he has also formed a belief that a violation hasoccurred. Obviously, the question of whether a violation has occurred mustdepend on the facts of each case. For example, in the roofing cases we havesaid that the standard cited herein applies to flat roofs (S. D. Mullins Co.,supra n. 1), but we have also indicated that the standard is not violated if itmakes performance of the work impossible. See Universal Sheet Metal Corp.,9 OSAHRC 742, BNA 2 O.S.H.C. 1061, CCH E.S.H.G. para. 18,163 (1974); W. B.Meredith II, Inc., 9 OSAHRC 245, BNA 1 O.S.H.C. 1782, CCH E.S.H.G. para18,003 (1974). Clearly then, an area director being the person authorized toissue a citation, cannot form a belief that a violation has occurred in a givenfactual situation such time as he is apprised of the facts of the situation.In this case, the area director had noknowledge of the facts until such time as he received the reports of hiscompliance officers. He then issued citations within one to two working days ineach case. The citations were therefore timely issued under the ChicagoBridge rule.Having disposed of the cases as he did,the Judge did not reach the merits.Accordingly, the Judge?s report isrejected and the matter is remanded for a report on the merits of each case. Itis so ORDERED.?CLEARY,COMMISSIONER, concurring:I concur in the order remanding thiscase for a decision on the merits. I would reverse the Judge?s decision for thereasons stated in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., No. 744 (January 24,1974) (Cleary, Commissioner, dissenting).?MORAN,CHAIRMAN, dissenting:Whatever the lead opinion offers aspossible reasons for an area director?s delay in issuing a citation isirrelevant to the instant case. The facts of record overwhelmingly show, andthe Judge correctly holds, that the area director?s belief as to the existenceof a violation was formulated well before the inspections ever took place.For 5 months the parties, including thearea director, had undergone an extensive series of communications concerningthe question of whether or not the standard at issue was applicable to flatroofs. The area director?s superior notified respondent that he considered thestandard to be applicable, and respondent in turn notified the complainant thatit would not abide by that opinion. In spite of this uncontroverted evidence,the lead opinion asserts that ?the area director had no knowledge of the facts untilsuch time as he received the reports of his compliance officers.???????????? While the lead opinion suggests afew possible factors the complainant may have wanted to consider before issuinga citation, none of these factors were advanced by the complainant himself.Where a respondent has raised the issue that the citation was not issued withreasonable promptness, the burden shifts to the complainant to show when hisdecision that a violation existed was formulated. Resting merely on the factthat the citations were sent out within 3 days of the area director?s receiptof them is clearly insufficient under the facts of this case.The Judge?s decision should be affirmedin all respects.In addition, I emphasize once more thatthe safety standard codified in 29 C.F.R. ? 1926.500(d)(1) is inapplicable toroofs. Secretary v. S. D. Mullins et al., 4 OSAHRC 1415, 1419?1422.\u00a0\u00a0UNITED STATES OF AMERICAOCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION \u00a0 SECRETARY OF LABOR, \u00a0 ???????????????????????????????????????????? Complainant, \u00a0 ???????????????????????? v. OSHRC DOCKET NOS.? 5989, 5990, & 6317 SECHRIST-HALL COMPANY \u00a0 ????????????????????????????????????????????? Respondent. \u00a0 \u00a0August13, 1974BRENTON,JUDGE:This is a proceeding pursuant tosection 10 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 USC 651 etseq., hereafter called the Act) contesting three citations, heretoforeconsolidated for trial, issued by the complainant against the respondent underthe authority vested in complainant by section 9(a) of that Act.Each citation alleges that therespondent has violated section 5(a)(2) of the Act by failing to comply withcertain occupational safety and health standards promulgated by the Secretaryof Labor pursuant to section 6 thereof.Each citation also alleges that theviolation resulted from a failure to comply with certain standards promulgatedby the Secretary by publication in the Federal Register on December 16, 1972(37 F.R. 243), and codified in 29 CFR Part 1926.The citation in Docket No. 5989, issuedon December 14, 1973, lists the location of respondent?s workplace as 4109Ocean Drive, Corpus Christi, Texas, and describes it as follows: ?waterproofingthe roof of the chapel.?The citation in Docket No. 5990, issuedon December 17, 1973, lists the location of respondent?s workplace as 2402Leopard Street, Corpus Christi, Texas, and describes it as follows: ?work onroof deck of canapy [sic].?The citation in Docket No. 6317, issuedon January 9, 1974, lists the location of respondent?s workplace as 2534International Boulevard, Brownsville, Texas, and describes it as follows:?roofing the Brownsville high school.?The description of the allegedviolations contained on said citations state as follows: Docket No. 5989 Item 1 29 CFR 1926.500(d)(1) Employees working adjacent to open-sided floor (flat roof) not guarded by a standard railing or the equivalent as specified in Paragraph (f)(1) of this section exposing employees to a fall of approximately 22 feet. The above condition located on the roof of the chapel. \u00a0 Docket No. 5990 Item 1 29 CFR 1926.500(d)(1) Employees working adjacent to open-sided floor (flat roof) not guarded by a standard railing or the equivalent as specified in Paragraph (f)(1) of this section exposing employees to a fall of approximately 22 feet. The above condition located on roof deck of canapy [sic] on west side of building. \u00a0 Item 1 29 CFR 1926.450(a)(9) Side rails of ladder did not extend at least 36 inches above the landing. When this is not practical, grab rails which provide a secure grip for an employee moving to or from the point of access shall be installed. No grab rails were installed, located on west side of building from ground to top of roof deck canapy [sic]. \u00a0 Docket No. 6317 Item 1 \u00a0 29 CFR 1926.500(d)(1) Employees working adjacent to open-sided floor (flat roof) not guarded by a standard railing or the equivalent as specified in Paragraph (f)(1) of this section exposing employees to a fall approximately 16 feet.? The above condition located on the roof of the Brownsville high school. \u00a0 \u00a0Thestandards as promulgated by the Secretary provide as follows:\u00a0 Docket 5989 Item 1 Section 1926.500 Guardrails, handrails, and covers. (d) Guarding of open-sided floors, platforms, and runways. (1) Every open-sided floor or platform 6 feet or more above adjacent floor or ground level shall be guarded by a standard railing, or the equivalent, as specified in paragraph (f)(i) of this section, on all open sides, except where there is entrance to a ramp, stairway, or fixed ladder. The railing shall be provided with a standard toeboard wherever, beneath the open sides, persons can pass, or there is moving machinery, or there is equipment with which falling materials could create a hazard. \u00a0 Docket 5990 Item 1 Section 1926.500 Guardrails, handrails, and covers. (d) Guarding of open-sided floors, platforms, and runways. (1) Every open-sided floor or platform 6 feet or more above adjacent floor or ground level shall be guarded by a standard railing, or the equivalent, as specified in paragraph (f)(i) of this section, on all open sides, except where there is entrance to a ramp, stairway, or fixed ladder. The railing shall be provided with a standard toeboard wherever, beneath the open sides, persons can pass, or there is moving machinery, or there is equipment with which falling materials could create a hazard. \u00a0 Item 1 Section 1926.450 Ladders (a) General requirements. (9) The side rails shall extend not less than 36 inches above the landing. When this is not practical, grab rails, which provide a secure grip for an employee moving to or from the point of access, shall be installed. \u00a0 Docket 6317 Item 1 Section 1926.500 Guardrails, handrails, and covers. (d) Guarding of open-sided floors, platforms, and runways. (1) Every open-sided floor or platform 6 feet or more above adjacent floor or ground level shall be guarded by a standard railing, or the equivalent, as specific in paragraph (f)(i) of this section, on all open sides, except where there is entrance to a ramp, stairway, or fixed ladder. The railing shall be provided with a standard toeboard wherever, beneath the open sides, persons can pass, or there is moving machinery, or there is equipment with which falling materials could create a hazard. \u00a0 \u00a0Pursuant to the enforcement proceduresset forth in section 10(a) of the Act, Respondent was notified by letters datedDecember 14, 1973, December 17, 1973, and January 9, 1973, from Thomas T.Curry, Area Director of the Houston, Texas Area, Occupational Safety and HealthAdministration, U.S. Department of Labor, proposed to assess a penalty for theserious violation at Item No. 1 under Docket No. 5989 in the amount of $800.00,for the serious and nonserious violations alleged at Item No. 1 under DocketNo. 5990 in the amounts of $800.00 and $70.00 respectively, and for the seriousviolation alleged at Item No. 1 under Docket No. 6317 in the amount of $500.00.After respondent contested thesecitations, and a complaint and a First Amended Answer had been filed by theparties, the consolidated cases came on for hearing at Corpus Christi, Texas,on April 25, 1974.FINDINGS OF FACT1. Respondent stipulated on the recordthat its business activities engaged it in commerce between states at the time andplace its workplace in each case was inspected.2. At the time of inspectionsrespondent was engaged in the following activities: roofing a new structure onOcean Drive, Corpus Christi, Texas, Docket No. 5989; placing and weldingcorrugated metal form sheets to a three foot structural deck on a new structureon Leopard Street, Corpus Christi, Texas, Docket No. 5990; and roofing aschoolhouse on International Boulevard, in Brownsville, Texas, Docket No. 6317.Respondent?s home office is Corpus Christi, Texas.3. During the course of several monthsimmediately preceding the inspections of November 29, 1973, complainant andrespondent held conferences and corresponded concerning the applicability of 29CFR 1926.500(d)(1) to roofers working on flat surfaces. At the conclusionthereof complainant advised respondent that he would enforce this standard ashaving application to flat roofs and respondent?s counsel advised that thisstandard neither contained a prohibition nor a requirement in respect to flatroof worksites.4. Corpus Christi, Texas, is a districtoffice of the complainant and its duties and functions are governed bycomplainant?s area office located in Houston, Texas, where the area director islocated. Normal and unusual procedures and practice requires the area directorto issue citations under his signature.5. The Houston Area Office maintained aprocedural policy which directed the Corpus Christi district office to submitits reports and citations to the area office within 10 working days followinginspection.6. In Docket No. 5989 the districtoffice forwarded its reports and citation to the area director on the 9thworking day following the inspection and the citation was issued on the 2ndsucceeding working day thereafter.7. In Docket No. 5990 the districtoffice forwarded its reports and citations to the area director on the 11thworking day following the inspection and the citation was issued on the nextsucceeding working day.8. In Docket No. 6317 the districtoffice forwarded its reports and citation to the area director on the 12thworking day following the inspection and the citation was issued on the nextsucceeding working day.9. In each case complainant presentedhis credentials to the agent in charge for the prime contractor, stated thepurpose of his visit and requested this person accompany him on the walkaround,which he did. Upon reaching respondent?s work area in each case complainant wasintroduced to the foreman on the job for respondent and here again he explainedhis mission and proceeded to inspect respondent?s activities and conductthereabouts.10. The roof on Ocean Drive, 22 feetabove the ground, where four employees were engaged in roofing activities, wasconstructed with a parapet completely around its edge, from this point itsconstruction was shaped to form a curb and gutter, the latter sloping upwardand inward for 5 feet from which point it flattens out, all of which forms amansard roof. (See Exh. C?1)a. There was no standard railingconstructed and maintained around the outside edges of this roof.b. Complainant ordered immediateabatement on the job site at the time of inspection and permitted the use ofsafety belts by the roofers as an equivalent means of protection in lieu of thestandard railing.c. But for the fact respondentfurnished the safety belts in complainant?s presence complainant would haveissued the citation on the job at the time of inspection.11. The surface of the work area, 22feet above the ground, on Leopard Street, where three employees were engaged inlaying corrugated metal sheets, was a deck canopy 3 feet in width whichconsisted of steel girders perpendicular to the building upon which boards werelaid for which to walk, which produced openings the size of which are unknown.One means of access to his deck canopy, which was observed to be used fordescent by these three employees, at about quitting time, was a ladder whichdid not extend 36 inches above the canopy and there were no grab railsthereabouts. This ladder was owned by the prime contractor which had beenplaced, where observed, by him for his crew only minutes before.a. This inspection occurred about threehours after the Ocean Drive inspection.b. Complainant characterized the factsituation concerning the deck canopy as a flat roof violation of 29 CFR1926.500(d)(1).c. At the time of inspectioncomplainant ordered immediate abatement by means of a standard railing or someother equivalent means. It was observed by complainant?s compliance officer tohave been abated to his satisfaction prior to forwarding his reports andhandwritten citation to his area director.12. The roof on the Brownsvilleconstruction site was 16 feet above the ground, flat and no guard railing atits edges. Four employees were engaged in roofing activities at the time ofinspection. Only two were required to be near its edge in the performance oftheir work.a. In this case there was no order toabate at the time of inspection.b. The conduct of the work here wasadministered by respondent?s Harlingen, Texas, office.13. In each case the complainant,through his compliance officer, found that there existed in each place ofemployment a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm couldresult from the hazard of falling off the edge of a flat unguarded roof, andthat respondent was aware thereof.14. In proposing penalties to beassessed complainant gave no credit for good faith in the Ocean Drive andLeopard Street cases.15. In each case the compliance officerprepared in his own handwriting OSHA 2A form ?Citation for Serious Violation?which was forwarded to the Area Director, Thomas Curry, in Houston, Texas.There in each case a typed copy was prepared and mailed to respondent.16. Each alleged violation on the threecitations carried an abatement date reading ?immediately upon receipt of thiscitation.???????????? 17. Notification of proposed penaltyto be assessed accompanied each citation when issued.ISSUE OF REASONABLE PROMPTNESSWas there a failure by the complainantto issue the citation in each case with reasonable promptness in accordancewith the command of section 9(a) of the Act.DISCUSSIONIRespondent relies upon Secretary ofLabor v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., OSAHRC Docket No. 744, for reliefin these cases. In that case the Review Commission laid down the broadproposition that a citation has not been issued with reasonable promptness ifmore than 72 working days? time elapse between the time the complainant or hisauthorized representative has formed a belief that a violation has occurred andthe time the citation is issued absent exceptional circumstances.Here the facts conclusively show thatcomplainant, his regional director, area director, district officer in charge,and the compliance officers involved together with the regional solicitor andhis superiors in the national office had collectively concluded before thealleged violations were ever observed that 29 CFR 1926.500(d)(1) would beenforced against the respondent wherever respondent was found with employeesworking on flat roofs. The parties including their respective legal advisorsand the several authorized representatives of the complainant has heldconferences and corresponded for almost five months in an effort to resolve theconflict as to the applicability of this standard. In concluding the matter theregional director so notified respondent?s attorney by letter (Exh. C4); andcomplainant?s representatives on the firing line in Corpus Christi, Texas,importuned respondent to guard its employees working on flat roofs with astandard railing or some equivalent means such as safety belts, safety nets,life lines, etc., none of which is the equivalent as spelled out in paragraph(f)(i) of section 1926.500. The latter is not to say that their suggestion wasnot a practical solution.On the other hand respondent throughits attorney concluded that the standard was not applicable to roofers or sheetmetal workers on flat roofs and complainant was so notified the standrespondent was adhering to.Moreover, everyone involved in thisentire situation knew that if the chance of a fall from an unguarded flat roofwas 16 feet or more such would be a serious violation, because it wasundisputed that in such an event there is a substantial probability that deathor serious physical harm could result therefrom and of course everyone alsoknew that complainant intended to enforce the standard wherever and wheneverthe occasion demanded.Now, therefore, it is abundantly clearthat the totality of the record is replete with substantial evidence that norepresentative of the complainant, regardless of his position or duty, wouldever have to think, as his decisional process would be automatic, that is, uponobserving respondent?s roofers or sheet metal workers engaged in work on a flatroof 16 feet or more above the ground, respondent is in serious violation of 29CFR 1926.500(d)(1). This also applies to the Area Director, Thomas Curry, whoin fact did rubber stamp each citation upon receipt.Furthermore, in the first case, OceanDrive, the compliance officer would have issued the citation for seriousviolation of 29 CFR 1926.500(d)(1) on the spot if he had not seen evidence thatsome kind of abatement was in progress by respondent immediately after he soordered. He had this authority by virtue of chapter V K. of the ComplianceOperations Manual which is particularly geared to construction inasmuch as somesuch worksites are likely to move locations in a relatively few days and evenhours. All of which tends to place the compliance officer in the position ofbeing tantamount to the arresting office, the judge, and the jury, all in onepackage, with an on the spot verdict from whence the road to relief, if any, islong, rough, and rugged.IIComplainant attempts to explain hisdelay in issuing the citations in each case upon the workload of the complianceofficers. But this had nothing to do with the decisional process of forming abelief that the facts observed represented serious violations for failure toguard flat roofs, or in the Leopard Street case with respect to the additionalnonserious violation for failure to extend the ladder 36 inches above thelanding. And as has been observed above when the area director received thehandwritten citations he simply rubber stamped them by having them typed,affixing his signature and mailing. There is no direct evidence as to the dateand time the area director received the reports and citations from hiscompliance officers but there is evidence that the citations were issued on thefirst working day following the day it was forwarded in two of the cases and onthe second working day in the other. The logical inference from these factsfortifies the conclusion that in each instance in all these cases belief that aviolation had occurred was registered the moment it was observed, and that byreason of the facts and circumstances here that belief is imputed to the areadirector.Because Leopard Street occurred withinthree hours of Ocean Drive complainant argues that part of the delay had to dowith concern whether Leopard Street was a repeated violation and, further, waseither willful, because of the facts and circumstances surrounding theprotracted discussions and the contrary conclusions reached by each party as tothe flat roof violations. But a willful or repeated violation is a type ofviolation the same as is a serious, nonserious, or de minimus. Type ofviolation doesn?t have anything to do with forming as to whether or not anemployer has violated a requirement of section 5 of the Act, of any standard,rule, or order promulgated pursuant to section 6 of the Act, or of anyregulations prescribed pursuant to the Act.In Chicago Bridge & Iron Co.,supra, the area director because of his workload required two to threeweeks to act in forming a belief on the kind of recommendations he receivedfrom his compliance officer and the additional delay in issuing the citationwas unexplained. In the instant case the belief had been formed by the areadirector before the violations were committed as he had been so instructed byhis regional director, the latter having been, in effect, so instructed by thecomplainant. And of course the area director had so informed his complianceofficers who came upon the respective scenes in each of these three cases. Atthe very least, then, the decisional process of forming a belief that aviolation had occurred with respect to each case ended with the conclusion ofeach inspection.IIIThus, are there any exceptional or unusualcircumstances existing in any one of the cases that will extend the time forissuance of any one of the citations beyond three working days. Complainantalso relies on its Houston area office?s policy of permitting the complianceofficer to take up to ten days to submit his investigation and long handcitation for action as being reasonable and within the spirit and intent of theAct. In light of Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., supra, there is nojustification for the existence of the policy, unless it relates solely to thedecision making process in forming a belief that a violation has occurred.Consequently this thrust in complainant?s argument cannot relate to exceptionalcircumstances because the decisional process ended with the inspection. In sucha situation the compliance officer has surely been invested with delegatedexecutive authority and he is the area director?s instrumentality to perfectthe remaining ministerial tasks which in these cases was simply to write outthe citation. OSHA?2A Form, in longhand and forward to the area director fortyping, signing, and mailing. It is inferred from viewing each citationtogether with the knowledge exhibited and convictions expressed by eachcompliance officer that less than an hour?s time would have been required tofill out OSHA?2A Form in each case including mailing it to Houston. It is alsoinferred that the area director receives them on the succeeding working day andin these cases could, without any difficulty, complete his ministerial tasks,including mailing to the employer, on that same day. The fact that otherreports, notes, and memoranda of the compliance officer are required in eachcase is neither an excuse nor exceptional circumstances as all such may beforwarded another day, as none of it was required to form a belief that aviolation had occurred.In the Brownsville case complainantargued that his compliance officer remained there for a week making otherinspections and that he was obliged to take some annual leave. It just seemsthat neither is an exceptional circumstance. And in each case while therespective workloads may have been formidable none was insurmountable to theextent that any one of them qualified as an exceptional circumstance excusingdelays of 8 to 10 working days in the issuance of the citations.IVThe impact of the proposition of lawpronounced in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., supra, is made self-evident in thedissenting opinion by this significant statement: ?At the heart of themajority?s opinion is the proposition that a citation must be issued withinthree working days from the moment that the area director has formed a beliefthat a violation has occurred.?This tribunal is compelled to indicatethat it has mixed emotions concerning this rule of law but is, nevertheless,constrained to follow it wherever and whenever the facts of a case demand itsapplication.In each of the three cases respondentby its first amended answer in each case raised the issue of reasonablepromptness with respect to the command of section 9(a) of the Act and requestedvacation of each citation.CONCLUSIONAccordingly the citation and proposedpenalty to be assessed in each case here under consideration should be vacated.Having reached this conclusionconsideration of the merits of the citations and the other affirmative defensesraised by the answer and the second amended answer is rendered unnecessary.CONCLUSIONS OF LAW1. Respondent admitted that itsbusiness activities and conduct effect commerce thereby reposing jurisdictionof these causes in the Review Commission.2. Where the evidence is conclusivethat the complainant and his authorized representatives have individually andcollectively concluded that flat roofs must be guarded in accordance with 29CFR 1926.500(d)(1) and have so notified the employer the decisional process informing a belief that a violation has occurred ends when the compliance officerobserves the employer?s workmen performing their job tasks on an unguarded flatroof.3. Complainant?s failure to showexceptional circumstances for delay in the issuance of a citation exceedingthree working days from the time an observation is made under the facts andcircumstances related in the preceding conclusion of law and as more fullydiscussed elsewhere hereinabove is a violation of the reasonable promptnesscommand of section 9(a) of the Act in accordance with the role or propositionof law as laid down in Secretary of Labor v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co.,OSAHRC Docket No. 744.ORDERWherefore, it is ORDERED that:The citations and proposed penalties tobe assessed in the three cases consolidated herein be and each, all andsingular, is hereby vacated.?Itis so ORDERED.[1]Inseveral cases we have sustained Complainant?s position. See e.g., S. D.Mullins Co., OSHRC Docket No. 364, BNA 1 O.S.H.C. 1364, CCH E.S.H.G. para.16,803, appeal docketed, No. 73?3705, (5th Cir., November 14, 1973).\u00a0[2] A November 29th inspection of Respondent?s Ocean Driveworksite resulted in a citation for serious violation of 1926.500(d)(1) issuedon December 14, 1973 (Docket No. 5989). The November 29th inspection ofRespondent?s Leopard Street site prompted a citation for serious violation of1926.500(d)(1) and a non-serious citation for a 1926.450(a)(9) violation,issued December 17, 1973 (Docket No. 5990). The December 18th inspection ofRespondent?s Brownsville site resulted in a January 9, 1974 citation forserious violation of 1926.500(d)(1) (Docket No. 6317). The cases wereconsolidated for hearing.\u00a0[3]Weheld that ?absent exceptional circumstances Complainant or his authorizedrepresentative must perform the ministerial tasks in issuing a citation within72 hours from the time he has formed his belief that a violation has occurred.?”