“SECRETARY OF LABOR,Complainant,v.BLOUNT lNTERNATIONAL, LTD.,Respondent.OSHRC Docket No. 89-1394*DECISION*BEFORE: FOULKE, Chairman; WISEMAN and MONTOYA, Commissioners.BY THE COMMISSION:*I. Introduction*Respondent, Blount International, Ltd. (\”Blount\”), was the generalcontractor under a $17 million government contract to build a hangar fora C5A Aircraft at Westover Air Force Base in Massachusetts. Adisagreement between Blount and its steel erection subcontractor oversome of the subcontractor’s actions had prompted the Army Corps ofEngineers (\”ACE\”) to issue a stop-work order on March 1, 1989. Afterthe ACE brought the situation to the attention of the OccupationalSafety and Health Administration (\”OSHA\”) Compliance Officer WalterCienaski, Jr., conducted an 11-day inspection of the construction site.The serious citation issued to Blount was comprised of seven items, allof which it contested. After a hearing on the merits, AdministrativeLaw Judge David G. Oringer affirmed four of the seven. These were forserious violations of one storage standard, two electrical standards andone crane standard. Blount petitioned for discretionary review and allfour of the items were directed for review. For the reasons set forthin this decision, we affirm the judge’s findings in three [29 C.F.R. ?1926.250(b)(9); ? 1926.404 (b)(1) and ? 1926.405 (b)(1)] of the fourcitations, and vacate the portion of the judge’s decision regarding thecrane standard violation [29 C.F.R. ? 1926.550(b)(2)] on the groundsthat the standard does not apply to the circumstances in this case.*II. Material Storage Standard*At issue is whether Blount violated 29 C.F.R. ? 1926.250(b)(9) byfailing to stack or block structural steel in order to prevent It fromspreading or tilting.[[1]]Compliance officer Cienaski testified in this case that stockpiled steeland pieces of channel iron were strewn about the site. Some steelmembers were 60 feet long, weighed as much as 800-1550 pounds and wereresting precariously approximately one foot off the ground on rottenwood and other weatherworn dunnage. The CO also testified of concernthat the alternately freezing and thawing temperatures could cause thesoil and the dunnage to settle unevenly, increasing the risk of materialslippage. Cienaski stated that any workers caught in this area whensteel members began to tilt or slide could suffer broken bones, or worse.Blount’s own project manager, Bobby C. Bailey, admitted that some of thepiles probably should have been straighter and that the rotted woodsupporting the pieces of a doorway truss should have been replaced.In light of this testimony, the judge found that the steel had remainedin place from March 6 through 17, including the time that the stop-workorder was in effect, during which no work was in progress. The judgefurther found that the steel in this case was \”stored\” as contemplatedby the standard, and that because the steel was stored in such a mannerthat would not prevent spreading or tilting, the citation and itsproposed penalty must be affirmed.On review, Blount claims that the material was not in storage, but wasin the process of being assembled for truss-related lifts. Blountfurther argues that even if the steel was in the storage, it was of suchweight and configuration that it would not have spread or tilted, andalso that the regulation imposes no specific obligations on how toarrange or store material.In a number of cases, the Commission has addressed the argument thatmaterial is not in storage and thus, not covered by a storage standard. In Whitcomb Logging Co., 2 BNA OSHC 1419, 1974-75 CCH OSHD ? 19,128 (No.1323, 1974) the Commission held that a hazardous materials storageregulation covers even material that is in temporary storage. In thatcase, the standard was violated when blasting caps and powder wereimproperly stored for three to four hours while employee attended toother duties elsewhere on the site. In Gary Concrete Products, Inc., 15BNA OSHC 1051, 1991-92 CCH OSHD ? 29,344 (No. 86-1087, 1991), theCommission held that a general industry materials handling standard wasviolated when a stack of improperly stored concrete pilings collapsedmoments after several pilings were removed for transfer off site. \”Anymaterial placed on a construction site is presumably for eventual use. Under the standard, however, all material is considered ‘stored’ untilit is in fact used.\” Sierra Constr. Co., 6 BNA OSHC 1278, 1280, 1978CCH OSHD ? 22,506, p. 27,158 (No. 13638, 1978) (citations omitted).The record in the instant case demonstrates that activity did increaseonce the stop work order was lifted, with workers reentering the area toengage in fabrication and bolting up work for the truss members. However, the record indicates that most of the steel available on thesite remained untouched during the course of the 11-day inspection. Weconclude, therefore, that the steel was in storage. Further, thetestimony of the CO and of Blount’s own project manager, along with thephotographic evidence, indicate that the steel was being stored in afashion that endangered workers due to the potential \”spreading\” or\”tilting\” contemplated by the regulation. Although the standard doesnot impose specific obligations on how to arrange material, Blount’s ownproject manager conceded that steps could have been taken to improvestorage.Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the judge’s decision regardingthis storage issue and find the accompanying $360 penalty to be appropriate.*IIl. Electrical Standards **(1) Ground-Fault Protection*At issue is whether Blount violated 29 C.F.R. ? 1926.404(b)(1)(ii) bynot equipping a panel distribution box with ground-fault circuitinterrupters (\”GFCl’s\”).[[2]] Compliance officer Cienaski testifiedthat, following an appropriate test, he discovered that some of thereceptacle outlets were protected by GFCI’s, while others were not. Hetestified that without some form of ground-fault protection, workersusing the temporary power supply on this worksite were vulnerable toinjury from electrical shock.The judge found that the violations were readily detectable, and thatBlount, with supervisory authority and responsibility for overalljobsite safety, could be reasonably expected to detect such violations.Blount disagrees, asserting that it did not know and could not have beenexpected to know of the violation. Blount argues that since TurnerElectric, Blount’s electrical subcontractor, had installed the system,it was Turner alone that created and controlled the hazard and Turneralone that should be held accountable. Blount asserts that it wasjustified in relying on its subcontractor and that expecting a generalcontractor to have detected and abated this hazard is unreasonable.In order to establish a violation of a standard, the Secretary must showthat the employer knew or, with the exercise of reasonable diligence,could have known of the violative condition. Ormet Corp., 14 BNA OSHC2134, 2135, 1990 CCH OSHD ? 29,254, p. 39,199 (No. 85-531, 1991). Inthis case, the Secretary charges Blount with failure to exercisereasonable diligence, given its capacity as general contractor withsupervisory authority. Thus, argues the Secretary, Blount hadconstructive knowledge of the GFCI hazard.The Commission addressed the question of responsibility for safety on amulti-employer worksite in the Anning-Johnson\/Grossman Steel line of cases:[T]he general contractor normally has responsibility to assure that theother contractors fulfill their obligations with respect to employeesafety which affect the entire site. The general contractor is wellsituated to obtain abatement of hazards, either through its ownresources or through its supervisory role with respect to othercontractors. It is therefore reasonable to expect the generalcontractor to assure compliance with the standards insofar as allemployees on the site are affected. Thus we will hold the generalcontractor responsible for violations it could reasonably have beenexpected to prevent or abate by reason of its supervisory capacity.Grossman Steel & Aluminum Corp., 4 BNA OSHC 1185, 1188, 1975-76 CCH OSHD? 20,691, p. 24,791 (No. 12775, 1976) (footnote omitted). TheAnning-Johnson opinion echoed that principle:[T]ypically a general contractor on a multiple employer projectpossesses sufficient control over the entire worksite to give rise to aduty under section 5(a)(2) of the Act either to comply fully with thestandards or to take the necessary steps to assure compliance.Anning-Johnson Co., 4 BNA OSHC 1193, 1199, 1975-76 CCH OSHD ? 20,690, p.24,784 (No. 3694, 1976) (consolidated cases) (footnote omitted).Although neither of those seminal cases involved the rights and dutiesof general contractors, the rules set forth in the Commission’sdiscussions of the role of such employers have been followed in latercases. In Red Lobster Inns of America, Inc., 8 BNA OSHC 1762, 1980 CCHOSHD ? 24,635 (No. 76-4754, 1980), the Commission confirmed theAnning-Johnson\/Grossman Steel principle that an employer is responsiblefor violations of other employers where it could be reasonably expectedto prevent or detect and abate the violations due to its supervisoryauthority and control over the worksite. Responsibility for complianceunder the Red Lobster test does not depend on whether the employeractually created the hazard or has the manpower or expertise to abatethe hazard itself.In Knutson Constr. Co., 4 BNA OSHC 1759, 1976-77 CCH OSHD ? 21,185 (No.765, 1976), aff’d, 566 F.2d 596 (8th Cir 1977) (\”Knutson\”), theCommission relieved a general contractor of liability for failing todetect a one-inch crack on the underside of a scaffolding platformbefore it collapsed.The Commission stated:The duty we imposed upon a general contractor in Grossman Steel &Aluminum Corp. and Anning-Johnson Co. is a reasonable one; that is, wewill not hold a general contractor liable for violations which it couldnot reasonably be expected to detect or prevent.Id., 4 BNA OSHC at 1761, 1976-77 CCH OSHD at p. 25,481. In Knutson, theinability of the general contractor and of the steel erectionsubcontractor that rented the defective scaffold to observe the crackduring their inspections, combined with the unforeseen casualrelationship between the crack and the collapse of the scaffold, led theCommission to find a lack of knowledge. In the instant case, the GFClproblem–like many electrical hazards–was by nature latent and hiddenfrom view. The CO acknowledged in his testimony that one could not tellsimply by looking at the box which of the receptacle outlets wereenergized or, of those, which were protected by GFCI’s. A tester wouldbe required to identify any particular unprotected outlets. The CO alsoagreed that the general contractor is not expected to know every minutedetail of the electrical system at all times. He maintained, however,that a general contractor ought to have \”general knowledge of generalelectrical requirements,\” and described a GFCI system as \”basicknowledge to every job site.\”Unlike the steel erection subcontractor in Knutson, the electricalsubcontractor in this case likely would have assisted the generalcontractor in ascertaining how safe the worksite was. To determinewhether Blount had some minimal degree of familiarity with the powersupply on its site, the CO turned to the Blount engineer. The engineerwas unable to answer even the most elementary questions about theelectrical panel box. The CO inferred from this that Blount had neitherperformed its own tests nor consulted with its electrical subcontractorto assure itself that the system was in working order before requiringemployees to use it. The evidence shows that the set of GFCI’sinstalled by Turner Electric was from the outset inadequate for thenumber of outlets in that box, that the box was never in compliance withthe applicable standard, and that Blount remained unaware of thesituation. From this, the CO gathered that Blount had failed to fulfillits fundamental responsibilities as a general contractor charged withoverseeing jobsite safety.Blount, on the other hand, offered no evidence on the GFCI issue atall. The record does not reveal (1) whether Turner Electric presentedBlount with any evidence of Turner’s own inspections or with otherassurances, (2) other information or statements that the electricalpanel boxes met the required safety and electrical standards, (3) oreven whether any Blount representative inspected the box at any time. In addition, the record before the Commission is silent on whetherBlount took any precautionary measures to protect workers on the siteand silent on how Turner Electric was selected as a competent electricalsubcontractor; in short, the record is silent on why, as Blount asserts,it was reasonably entitled to rely on Turner’s having performed the workit was assigned to do. Blount may well have had its reasons, but theyare not reflected in the record.We therefore conclude that the Secretary has demonstrated that Blount’sreliance on Turner was unreasonable and that Blount could have known ofthe GFCI problem with the exercise of reasonable diligence.[[3]] Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the judge’s decision regarding theGFCI violation. We find the $150 penalty, as modified by the judge,appropriate under the circumstances.*(2) Weatherproof Box*At issue is whether Blount violated 29 C.F.R. ? 1926.405(e)(1) byfailing to weatherproof an outdoor distribution panel box.[[4]]Compliance officer Cienaski testified that he observed an outdoordistribution panel box and associated knockout-type receptacle boxloosely draped with \”raggedy polyethylene material.\” He testified thatwithout a waterproof enclosure, water could accumulate, energizing thenon-current carrying parts that, in turn, could cause a full circuitline shock, resulting in a worker’s electrocution. Cienaski testifiedthat typical New England weather in March consisted of snow, rain, fogand ice, leading him to classify the outdoor box as being in a wetlocation. He testified that the plastic tarp partially covering the boxwas therefore inadequate to protect the energized parts from moisture. He also testified that directly below the tarp-covered box wereapproved, properly encased, waterproof-type boxes.On review, Blount argues, as it did before the judge, that the box wasweatherproofed with a \”heavy-duty plastic cover,\” and posed no danger toany employee. Finding this overall assertion to be unsupported by theevidence, the judge ruled that the violation was readily observable, andthat because of its responsibility for overall jobsite safety, Blountreasonably should have known of the violation. Therefore, the judgeaffirmed the violation and the $300 penalty proposed by the Secretary.The evidence shows that the box was not weatherproof and that watercould enter, jeopardizing worker safety. Blount’s minimal efforts fellfar short of the level of protection required by the standard. Accordingly, we affirm the weatherproofing citation and find theproposed $300 penalty to be appropriate.*IV. Crane Standard*Lastly, at issue is whether Blount violated a crane safety standardincorporated by reference in 29 C.F.R. ? 1926.550(b)(2) by permitting acrane operator to abandon a crane with a suspended load.[[5]]The evidence in this case reveals that by the time the complianceofficer Cienaski arrived at the construction site in response to theACE’s notification, the ACE had rescinded its stop-work order and Blounthad resumed the steel erection work that had been left uncompleted. Contrary to industry practice, a 68-ton J-line roof truss, 278 feet longand 80 feet high, had been raised before it’s companion H-line truss wasready. However, the J-truss was connected to its vertical \”bents\” orlegs, most of its bolts had been tightened, and guy wires had beenattached. For additional support, two 150-ton cranes had been leftattached to the truss, a temporary arrangement intended to stabilize theJ-truss until the H-truss could be prepared for erection and connection.That the cranes were unmanned for over a week–between the time theJ-truss was lifted and the time the H-truss was lifted–is undisputed. The Secretary claims that the cranes kept the truss from falling over,that there was visible tension on the line, and that the truss should beconsidered a \”suspended load\” requiring the presence of operators duringthe time in question. Blount concedes that the lines attached to thetruss were taut, not slack, but challenges the Secretary’scharacterization of the load as \”suspended,\” contending that the cranelines were functioning in the capacity of guy lines to stabilize the truss.The CO testified that an unattended crane, while under load, could slip,whether by inadvertent activation of the controls or faulty brake\/clutchmechanisms. Moreover, he speculated that without the cranes to supportit, the truss could have blown over or fallen to the ground. Hesuggested that to abate the hazard, Blount could have put the truss backdown on the ground, manned the two cranes while employees were in thearea or kept employees out of the area.[[6]] Blount maintains that thestandard does not apply because the load was not suspended.The judge acknowledged that the subcontractor had created the situationin which the cranes were left to support the truss, but found thatBlount was nevertheless obligated to provide safe working conditions foremployees exposed to the hazard. He also found that there was noevidence that the bents could have supported the entire weight of thetruss without the aid of the cranes. Because of the dangers attendantto an unmanned crane while under load, as enumerated by the CO, thejudge concluded that the purposes of the standard would not be served byadopting Blount’s argument.The Secretary cites Farthing & Weidman, Inc., 11 BNA OSHC 1069, 1983-84CCH OSHD ? 26,389 (No. 78-5366, 1982) (\”F&W\”), in support of herposition that the load was suspended. In that case, one end of a tankhad been lifted when an employee crawled underneath and was killed whenthe sling ripped and the tank fell on him. The employer argued thatthe load had not been \”lifted\” within the meaning of the standardbecause only one end of the load had been raised into the air. TheCommission held that the employer was liable for a violation of astandard requiring that a load be well secured and properly balanced inthe sling or lifting device before it is lifted more than a few inches. The Commission reasoned:To say that the tank involved here was \”lifted\” hardly strains themeaning of the word, and indeed, accords well with its plain meaning. In any event, we must construe this standard in light of its purpose: to prevent loads from falling to the ground.Id. at 1071, 1983-4 CCH OSHD at p. 33,491 (footnote omitted).The parallels the Secretary urges us to draw between F&W and the case onreview are forced. In this case, the truss had long since been liftedand then settled down into its bents and bolted up. To say that thetruss, the load here, was still \”suspended\” would strain the plainmeaning of the word. Moreover, construing the provision cited here inlight of its purpose–to prevent loads from dropping to the groundinjuring workers below–does not undermine our rationale because theload was already on the ground. In this case, both cranes would havehad to malfunction at the same time for the truss to lose what supportthe cranes provided. Even then, there is little evidence either way onthe likelihood of the truss actually collapsing. [[7]] Thus, the factsin the case before us are distinguishable from F&W.We note that neither the Secretary nor Blount argues outright that thepertinent crane standard is ambiguous. Under Martin v. OSHRC (CF&ISteel Corp.), 111 S. Ct. 1171 (1991), the Supreme Court held that theSecretary’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous regulation isentitled to deference. Whether the regulation is ambiguous is athreshold question for analysis under CF&I Steel Corp. Frankly, we viewthe term \”suspended\” as it is used here as an unlikely candidate forgenuine ambiguity. For our purposes, the term is narrowly defined,leaving little room for interpretation. [[8]] Therefore, CF&I SteelCorp. does not apply to this case.We conclude that the word \”suspended\” in the standard underconsideration is not ambiguous, that it does not describe the positionof the load and that the provision of ANSI B30.5-1968 incorporated byreference in section 1926.550(b)(2) does not apply to thesecircumstances. We therefore vacate the portion of the judge’s decisionregarding the crane standard violation.Accordingly, items 1, 3 and 4 are affirmed. Penalties of $360 for item1, $150 for item 3 and $300 for item 4 are assessed. Item 5 is vacated.Edwin G. Foulke, Jr.ChairmanVelma MontoyaCommissionerDated: September 18, 1992WISEMAN, Commissioner, dissenting in part:I concur with my colleagues’ decision regarding all citation items inthis case, with the exception of the item alleging a violation of 29C.F.R. ? 1926.404(b)(1)(ii) due to Blount’s alleged failure to equip apanel distribution box with sufficient ground-fault circuit interrupters(\”GFCI’s’). As my colleagues stated in the majority opinion, theSecretary must show that Blount knew, or with the exercise of reasonablediligence, could have known, of the presence of the violativecondition. Ormet Corp., 14 BNA OSHC 2134, 2135, 1989-90 CCH OSHD ?29,254, p. 39,199 (No. 85-531, 1991). My colleagues find that apreponderance of the evidence demonstrates that Blount, with theexercise of reasonable diligence, could have known that several of thereceptacle outlets were not protected by GFCI’s and therefore Blount hadconstructive knowledge of the resulting hazard. I disagree.The operative term here is \”reasonable diligence.\” While it is truethat Commission precedent establishes that a general contractor isresponsible for hazards he could reasonably be expected to prevent orabate by reason of his supervisory capacity even though none of his ownemployees were exposed to the hazards, e.g., Gil Haugan, d\/b\/a HauganConstr. Co., 7 BNA, OSHC 2004, 1979 CCH OSHD ? 24,105 (No. 76-1512,1979) (consolidated cases) (\”Gil Haugan\”) (general contractor heldliable for failing to notice a missing guardrail and ladder, along withscaffolding planks that were too long or too short to be safe), it isalso true that the Commission, in determining whether a generalcontractor has exercised reasonable diligence, has based its decisionson whether the hazardous condition was obvious, whether it was visible,and whether it could have been observed by the general contractor duringhis inspections. Knutson Constr. Co., 4 BNA OSHC 1760, 1976-77 CCH OSHD? 21,185 (No. 765, 1976), aff’d, 566 F.2d. 598 (8th Cir. 1977)(\”Knutson\”). Where the answer to these questions has been yes, such aswhen a guardrail or a ladder is missing, the Commission has held that itwould be reasonable to expect the general contractor to discover thehazardous condition, e.g., Gil Haugan, 7 BNA OSHC at 2006, 1979 CCH OSHDat p. 29,290; however, where the answer to these questions has been nosuch as when an invisible crack on the underside of scaffolding makes ithazardously weak, the Commission has held that the general contractorcould not see the hazardous condition and therefore was not responsiblefor the exposure of his subcontractors’ employees to the hazard. Knutson, 4 BNA OSHC at 1761, 1976-77 CCH OSHD at p.25,481.Such a rule has served to promote the interests of safety onmulti-employer construction sites due to the fact that the generalcontractor can be in the best position to discover visible hazards andobtain abatement thereof. Unfortunately, the majority is broadeningthat rule to include invisible hazards. The majority indicates thatBlount was obligated to apprise itself of which safety efforts itsspecialty subcontractor had chosen to make by, either (1) buying atester on its own initiative and personally testing each receptacleoutlet or (2) consulting with its electrical subcontractor to assureitself that the system was in proper working order. The Commission isnow sending a contradictory message to general contractors. On the onehand, general contractors are being told that they cannot rely on theskill and expertise of their subcontractors and that they must duplicatethe ongoing compliance requirements of their subcontractors, i.e.,testing each receptacle outlet, no matter how obscure suchsubcontractor’s violation may be. On the other hand, generalcontractors are being told that they can rely on a verbal assurance fromtheir subcontractors as to that subcontractor’s own skill, expertise,and proper handling of certain situations. Of course, to rely on asubcontractor’s verbal assurance, the general contractor now has theburden of acquiring sufficient expertise in order for him to have theability to ask the appropriate questions.Despite the contradictory aspects of the two options now offered togeneral contractors, the result is the same: general contractors mustnow be experts in every facet of the job in order to identify everypotential invisible hazard so that they can run tests, or inquirespecifically about the unknown hazard.Why should a general contractor hire an expert if that expert’sreputation and judgment cannot be relied upon? Furthermore, why shoulda general contractor hire a soil expert to conduct studies of a trenchlocation, in order to determine adequate shoring, if that expert’sjudgment cannot be relied upon?When we begin to make general contractors, in their general supervisorycapacity, liable for hazards resulting from invisible defects,detectable only by testing, we are dangerously close to a strictliability test which was never intended by the Act.Blount could not reasonably be expected to detect this particular hiddenelectrical hazard and consequently did not have constructive notice thatthe GFCI’s were defective. Accordingly, I would vacate the citation.Donald G. WisemanCommissionerDated: September 18, 1992————————————————————————SECRETARY OF LABOR,United States Department of Labor,Complainant,v.BLOUNT INTERNATIONAL, LTD.,Respondent.OSHRC Docket No. 89-1394_Appearances: _FOR COMPLAINANT:John Casler, Esq.Office of the SolicitorFOR RESPONDENT:Lynn Lloyd Laughlin, Esq.Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman_Decision and Order_ORINGER, J: This is a proceeding brought under section 10(c) of theOccupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (84 Stat. 1590, 29 U.S.C. ?651 et seq., hereinafter sometimes referred to as (‘the Act’) to reviewcitations issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to ? 9(a) and aproposed assessment of penalties thereon issued pursuant to ?10(a) ofthe Act.Due to a March 6 through 17 inspection of Respondent’s work site locatedat Westover Air Base in Chicopee, Massachusetts, CompIainant issued aserious citation alleging six violations of the construction standardsand an other-than-serious citation containing one item on March 29,1989. Respondent timely filed with the Secretary of Labor anotification of intent to contest the citation and proposed penalties.A hearing on the matter was held in Boston, Massachusetts on November 29and 30, 1989._BACKGROUND_Blount, International, Ltd. (‘Blount’) was the general contractor forthe construction of a hangar for a C5A Aircraft stationed at WestoverAir Force Base, a project for which it had responsibility for overalljob site safety (Tr. 241, 321). Carrie Construction Company (‘Carrie’)was the subcontractor initially responsible for steel erection at thesite (Tr. 13, 49). Due to Carrie’s failure to abide by the contract andengineering specifications, Blount assumed the steel erection process onMarch 7 (Tr. 15).During the first week in March, Blount had approximately seven employeesat the site: a project manager, project engineer, office engineer, fieldengineer, steel engineer, steel superintendent, and an office manager(Tr. 241). In late February, Carrie was preparing to set up a \”J-linetruss,\” a 68 ton roof truss (Tr. 116). William Walker, an inspectorfor the Corps of Engineers, testified that the engineering planscontemplated by Blount directed that the J-line truss would be lifted bycranes, placed on two vertical bents and bolted into place. All boltswere to be fully tightened at the truss supports prior to the release ofthe cranes as the bolts were \”slip critical\”, not load-bearing (Tr. 214,226; R-2). The J-line truss was not to be lifted until an \”H-linetruss\” was ready to be lifted as well. The plans provided that the twotrusses were to be connected by steel bridging to provide Iateralsupport for the entire structure.Bobby C. Bailey, project manager for Blount, testified that he met withJoe Cavanas, project engineer for Carrie, on February 27 to discussproblems with the project. Because the H-line truss was not completedand difficulties with welding and other work on the J-line truss arose,Carrie was told by Blount and the Corps of Engineers not to lift theJ-line truss. Despite these verbal warnings, Carrie proceeded to liftthe J-line truss (Tr. 245-248). By February 28, the J-line truss hadbeen landed on the vertical bents and half its bolts tightened (Tr.250). Two 4000W Manitowoc, 150 ton cranes and a third crane wereattached to the J-truss and left in place to stabilize it (Tr. 251).On March 1, Carrie continued to tighten the bolts so that, as Baileyattested, 90-95% of the bolting was complete (Tr. 252). A meeting washeld between the Corps of Engineers and Blount to discuss possibleaction to be taken in light of Carrie’s malfeasance (Tr. 347-348). OnMarch 2, a stop-work order was issued by the Corps of Engineers toBlount due to the manner in which Carrie had deviated from contract andsafety requirements (Tr. 259; R- 1). [[1]] Bailey understood this orderto mean that no more work was to be performed on the J-line truss andthat they were not to lift the H-Iine truss (Tr. 264). [[2]] Blountsubmitted a written response to this order on March 2 (R-2).Based on a referral from the Corps of Engineers on March 6, 1989,Compliance Safety and Health Officer Walter Cienaski, Jr. was assignedto inspect the site. By March 6, the two 4000W Manitowoc cranes and thethird rig remained attached to the J-line truss, and stayed in thatposition until March 9. By March 7, Blount had assumed Carrie’s steelerection function (Tr. 15, 263).On March 8, the stop-work order was rescinded (R-3). Blount lifted theH-Iine truss on March 9, and installed the wind girds, or bridgingtruss, between the J-line and H-line trusses (Tr. 271, 272). A craneremained on the J-line truss until the H-line truss, wind girds, andwind trusses were fully installed (Tr. 284)._Citation One, Item 1: Alleged serious violation of 29 CFR?1926.250(b)(9)._The standard at 29 CFR ?1926.250(b)(9) provides:(b) Material storage.(9) Structural steel, poles, pipe, bar stock, and other cylindricalmaterials, unless racked, shall be stacked and blocked so as to preventspreading or tilting.Compliance officer Cienaski testified that trusses and steel members instorage were not set up on grillage suitable for the loads that wereimposed. Photographic exhibits C-1a through C-11 depict the conditionshe observed: wide flange members were stockpiled and pieces of channeliron, weighing from 800-1550 pounds, rested on cribbing material, orgrillage, such that slippage could occur (Tr. 26, 208-210). Thephotographs depict support sections for a 157 ton doorway truss restingon rotted wood (Tr. 32).Cienaski also testified that the weather and ground conditions at tilesite varied in March, causing the ground to repeatedly freeze and thawfacilitating the settling of dunnage and creating more instability andunevenness in the support of the flange and channel iron (Tr. 31, 39,40). He suggested that the proper practice in the construction industryis to store this material individually and properly spaced, on theirflanges, on dunnage material, in order that they do not tip and fall(Tr. 35).General construction work took place in this area: fabrication andbolting up work for the truss members and the inspection of trusses (Tr.33). Because employees performed work in this area, Cienaski claimedthat if this material fell over, it could result in the crushing ofbones (Tr. 26, 208-210).While project manager Bailey denied that a lateral load could cause thestockpiled steel to tilt or tip because of its weight, he agreed thatsome of the stockpiled steel should have been straighter and that therotted wood supporting the pieces of the doorway truss should have beenreplaced (Tr. 311).Respondent contends that the cited standard applies only to materials in\”storage\” and not to \”work-in-progress\”, citing Majestic WileyContractors, Ltd., 10 BNA OSHC 1951 (No. 81-2545, 1982); SierraConstruction Corp., 6 BNA OSHC 1278 (Rev.Comm. 1978). It maintains thatthe steel was in the process of being assembled for the H-line trusslift \”and other truss-related lifts\” and was thus, not in storage. Thisargument was specifically rejected in Sierra Construction, supra, whenthe employer contended that the concrete form material placed in a workarea where it was available for \”immediate use\” was not \”stored\” asintended by the standard. The Review Commission held that ”[a]nymaterial placed on a construction site is presumably for eventual use. Under the standard, however, all material is considered ‘stored’ untilit is in fact used.\” Sierra Construction, supra, citing Brennan v.Underhill Construction Corp., 513 F.2d 1032 [2 OSHC 1641] (2nd Cir.1975); Whitcomb Logging Co,. 74 OSAHRC 89\/F7, 2 BNA OSHC 1419, 1974- 75CCH OSHD ?19,128 (No. 1323, 1974).In Majestic Wiley, the employer was engaged in the construction of a 92mile portion of the Alaskan pipeline. While welds and joints of thepipeline were being inspected, a piece of pipeline rolled off of its\”skids\” (wooden cribbing used to elevate the pipeline) resulting in anemployee fatality. At the time, the pipe was in the process of beingwelded together. Majestic Wiley held that after work had begun onwelding the pipe, it could no longer be deemed \”in storage\”; the pipe\”could not spread since it is a single pipeline, or tilt, since it isone continuous pipeline 800 feet long.\” Majestic Wiley, supra, at 1953.Further, there was no evidence that the skids were inadequate to supportthe pipeline.The facts in the instant case are clearly distinguishable from those inMajestic Wiley and in alignment with those in Sierra Construction. Thesteel had remained in place from March 6 through 17 including the timethat a stop-work order had been issued and no work was, as Respondentcontends, \”in progress.\” The steel in this case was \”stored\” ascontemplated by the standard; because the steel was stored in such amanner that would not prevent spreading or tilting, I find that thisitem and its proposed penalty must be affirmed and assessed._Citation One, Item 2: Alleged serious violation of 29 CFR ? 1926.251(a) (1) ._The standard at 29 CFR ?1926.251(a)(1) provides:(a) General. (1) Rigging equipment for material handling shall beinspected prior to use on each shift and as necessary during its use toensure that it is safe. Defective rigging equipment shall be removedfrom service.The violation alleged by the Secretary concerns Blount’s failure todetect a missing \”softener\” [[3]] on a rig and its failure to take thelift out of service because of the missing softener. Cienaski testifiedthat on March 9, one of the two 4000W Manitowoc cranes was beingreplaced by a 140-ton Link Belt to support the already raised J-linetruss and in doing so, one of the softeners on one leg of the sling wasnot put back into place (C-2A, C-2B, C-2D, C-2E). Cienaski pointed thisout to the erection foreman who promised to attend to it (Tr. 54).Cienaski testified that the crane used to stabilize the J-line truss hada strain imposed on it, which was evident in the lack of slack of thecable. He did not determine the weight of the load, however estimatesof 35,000 pounds and 5,000 pounds were made by the crane operator and arepresentative of Carrie, respectively (Tr. 166, 168, 187). Thesoftener, he claimed, would have taken the alleged strain off the wires,and its use is absolutely necessary in all lifting requirements used bywire rope (Tr. 79).[[4]] Cienaski implied that if the equipment hadbeen properly inspected, the absence of a softener would have beendetected (Tr. 95, 96).Bailey testified that Blount’s procedure is to inspect equipment priorto and after each use (Tr. 293). Bailey stated that Blount’s fieldengineer, Pete Johnson and Corps of Engineers representative Rick Walkerinspected the crane attached to the J-line truss when it was ready to berelieved after the H-line truss was in place (Tr. 294). He testifiedthat no defective rigging equipment was found between March 6 and March10. Bailey contended that \”his people\” told him that the softener\”slipped out\” while up in the air and attached to the steel (Tr. 338).Under 29 CFR ?1926.251(a)(1), an employer is under a duty to inspectrigging equipment prior to use to ensure that it is safe. DyeConstruction Company, 9 BNA OSHC 1215 (1980), aff’d, 698 F.2d 423 [11OSHC 1104] (10th Cir. 1983). Inspection \”requires a careful andcritical examination and is not satisfied by a mere opportunity to viewequipment.\” Austin Commercial v. OSHRC, 610 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1979)citing Dawson Company Manufacturers v. Cleveland Costume Co., 3 BNA OSHC1534 (1975).In Dye Construction, a violation of this standard was affirmed when anemployee in charge knew that a spreader bar lacked a safety pin but,regardless of this knowledge, decided to proceed with moving a concretemanhole. The court found that the bar was inspected, but used in anunsafe manner causing serious injury to an employee.Respondent’s witness established that Blount regularly inspectedequipment. There was no testimony to establish that the sling orrigging equipment were defective or damaged by the accidental absence ofthe softener which would have required its removal from service. A-1Aggregates & Excavating, Inc., 12 BNA OSHC 1448 (1985). The Secretaryfailed to meet its burden of establishing a violation of the standard,therefore, I find that this item must be vacated._Citation One, Item 3: Alleged serious violation of 29 CFR?1926.404(b)(1)(ii)._The standard at 29 CFR ?1926.404(b)(1)(ii) provides:1926.404 Wiring design and protection.(b) Branch circuits— (1) Ground fault protection (ii) Ground faultcircuit interrupters.All 120-volt, single-phase, 15-and 20-ampere receptacle outlets onconstruction sites, which are not a part of the permanent wiring of thebuilding or structure and which are in use by employees, shall haveapproved ground-fault circuit interrupters for personnel protection. Receptacles on a two-wire, single phase portable or vehicle-mountedgenerator rated not more than 5kW, where the circuit conductors of thegenerator are insulated from the generator frame and all other groundedsurfaces, need not be protected with ground-fault circuit interrupters.The power that ran through the electrical lines at the site wasstandard: 120-volt, single phase, 60-hertz power (Tr. 111). Cienaskitestified that on March 6, with the aid of a ground fault circuitinterrupter (GFCI) tester, he tested the temporary electricaldistribution panels and outlets used by employees at the site. Heconcluded that only some receptacles did not have ground faultprotection; in lieu of the GFCI, Cienaski testified that there was noassured ground conductor program (Tr. 98, 99, 103; C-3A, C-3B, C-3C). In absence of either GFCI or an assured ground conductor program, hetestified that electric shock could occur (Tr. 104).Turner Electric was the subcontractor who installed and maintained thesetemporary boxes (Tr. 192). Respondent contends that since theelectrical work was within the domain of the subcontractor’s field ofexpertise, that Blount did not know, nor could it reasonably have knownof the absence of GFCI protection. Cienaski maintained, however, thatBlount, as general contractor with overall job site responsibility forsafety could have discovered these alleged violations by observation, byasking the electrical contractor or using an inexpensive ground faulttester (Tr. 197). [[5]]Respondent cites Cuthers Corp. d\/b\/a Woodland Construction, 13 BNA OSHC1986 (1988) for the proposition that when a cited employer did notcreate or control the cited hazard, nor was it aware of the violativecondition, that it should be justified in relying on the expertise ofthe electrical contractor responsible for the hazardous condition. TheReview Commission has held, however, that an employer is responsible forviolations of a subcontractor where it could be reasonably expected toprevent or detect and abate violations by virtue of its supervisoryauthority and control over the work site. Red Lobster Inns of America,Inc., 8 BNA OSHC 1762 (Rev. Comm. 1980). See also Anning-Johnson Co., 4BNA OSHC 1193 (Rev.Comm. 1976).It is indisputable that Blount had supervisory authority andresponsibility for overall job site safety. The evidence establishedthat these violations occurred. Because these violations were readilydetectable and Blount could be reasonably expected to detect suchviolations, I find that this item must be affirmed and a proposedpenalty assessed but in this instance ameliorated._Citation One, Item 4: Alleged serious violation of 29 CFR ?1926.405(e)(1)._The standard at 29 CFR ?1926.405(e)(1) provides:1926.405 Wiring methods, components, and equipment for general use.(e) Enclosures for damp or wet locations (1) Cabinets fittings, andboxes. Cabinets, cutout boxes, fittings, boxes, and panelboardenclosures in damp or wet locations shall be installed so as to preventmoisture or water from entering and accumulating within the enclosures. In wet locations the enclosures shall be weatherproof.Compliance officer Cienaski testified that Temporary Box Number One (thedistribution panel box and associated knockout-type receptacle boxes)which was located outdoors, was designed for indoor use and was notwaterproof. This was particularly hazardous, he claimed, in light ofthe precipitation occurring in the month of March (Tr. 111; C-3B, C-4). The absence of weatherproofing, he testified, could cause a full circuitline shock, resulting in electrocution or death, as the accumulation ofwater could energize the noncurrent-carrying parts of the panel box (Tr.113, 114). Below the panel boxes, however, approved waterproof-typeoutlet boxes were used (Tr. 112, 114).The boxes were semi-covered with what Cienaski described as \”raggedypolyethylene material\” that did not provide protection for the energizedparts. The polyethylene material is shown in exhibits C-3A, C-3B, andC-4 to be wide open, exposing the panel box. Respondent’s assertionthat the electrical boxes were covered with \”heavy-duty plastic covers\”is not supported by the evidence (see C-3A, C-3B, C-4).[[6]] Thisviolation was readily observable; because of its responsibility foroverall job site safety, Respondent reasonably should have known of theviolation. Therefore I find that this item and its proposed penaltymust be affirmed._Citation one, Item 5: Alleged serious violation of 29 CFR ? 1926.550(b) (2) _The standard at 29 C.F.R. ?1926.550 (b) (2) provides in pertinent part:1926.550 Cranes and derricks.(b) Crawler, locomotive, and truck cranes.(2) All crawler, truck, or locomotive cranes in use shall meet theapplicable requirements for design, inspection, construction, testing,maintenance and operation as prescribed in the ANSI B30.5-1968 SafetyCode for Crawler, Locomotive and Truck Cranes ….The ANSI standard referred to in this section, 5-3.2.1.3, reads:Holding the load.(a) The operator shall not leave his position at the controls while theload is suspended.There is no dispute between the parties concerning the factualcircumstances surrounding this item. As discussed, supra, two 4000WManitowoc crawler cranes were attached to the 68 ton J-line roof trusswhile it was elevated to approximately 80-90 feet above ground. Theengineering plans called for the J-line truss to be lifted by thecranes, set upon two vertical bents, and bolted into place. The bolts,which were not load-bearing, were to be fully tightened prior to therelease of the cranes from their load. Further, the J-line truss wasnot to be lifted until the H-line truss was prepared to be lifted andthe two connected by bridging so as to provide greater lateral supportfor the structure. Carrie did not follow these procedures despitewarnings from Blount and the Corps of Engineers to the contrary.Between March 6 and March 8, the J-line truss was approximately 90-95%bolted to the vertical bents (Tr. 284). During the period of March 6through March 9, the two cranes, in addition to guy lines, were attachedto the J-line truss at all times until, on the 9th, the J-line andH-line trusses were tied together and both ends of the truss were boltedinto the vertical bents.Cienaski testified that Blount personnel were exposed to the potentialhazard of falling material when he observed that cranes were unattendedfrom time to time (Tr. 129, 136; C-5A, C-5B, C-5C, C-5D). Baileycorroborated this observation, by stating that cranes did not haveoperators in them at all times between March 6 and March 8 (Tr. 261,276). The crane operator surmised that the cranes carried a Ioad of35,000 pounds, while a Carrie representative estimated the load to be5,000 pounds (Tr. 155, 168).The issue to be determined is whether the roof truss was, in fact,\”suspended\” from the cranes during the period in question. TheSecretary and Respondent disagree on the resolution of this issue.Respondent claims that at no time was the J-line truss suspended fromthe crane, but rather, that \”the crane line was functioning in thecapacity of a guy line\” to stabilize the truss (Respondent’s Brief,p.19). The dictionary definition of \”suspended\” presented by Respondentis as follows:Hang; esp. to hang so as to be free on all sides except at the point ofsupport (ex., a ball by a thread) …. [[7]]The Secretary counters that while the capacity of the J-line truss toswing at random was significantly limited by its having been bolted tothe bents, the presence of the crane prevented the truss from fallingover. She contends that the roof truss should be considered to havebeen suspended by the cranes until it was \”safely supported.\”Cienaski explained that an unattended crane, while under load, couldcause the inadvertent activation of controls, faulty brake\/clutchmechanisms, or hoist brake slippage (Tr. 122). He testified thataccepted practice in the New England construction industry is to havemanned control stations in the cab whenever a Ioad is suspended.[[8]]There is no decisional law to clarify what was meant by the word\”suspend.\” Because of the hazards enumerated by the compliance officerattendant to an unmanned crane while under load, and in light ofRespondent’s failure to protect employees in the area when the craneswere unattended, I find that the purposes of the standard would not beserved by adopting Respondent’s argument. The record established thatthe bolts on the vertical bents were not load bearing; there was noevidence to show that the bents could have supported the entire weightof the truss in the event that the crane malfunctioned as a result ofbeing left unmanned. While I acknowledge that the subcontractor createdthe situation in which the cranes were left to support the truss,Respondent was nevertheless obligated to provide safe working conditionsfor employees exposed to this hazard. Accordingly, I find that thisitem and its proposed penalty must be affirmed and assessed._Citation One, Item 6: Alleged serious violation of 29 CFR ?1926.751(c)(2)_The standard at 29 CFR ?1926.751(C)(2) provides:?1926.751 Structural steel assembly.(2) Where longspan joists or trusses, 40 feet or longer, are used, acenter row of bolted bridging shall be installed to provide lateralstability during construction prior to slacking of hoisting line.Cienaski testified that the J-line truss was 278 feet long, and was setin place 80 feet above ground without being tied in with bridging to anadjacent truss (Tr. 139, 164: C-6A through C-6F). Lateral bridging wasnot set up until March 9, although the J-line truss was hoisted by ahoisting line with tension on it from February 28 through March 8 (Tr.288). Blount personnel worked underneath and in the immediate area tothe elevated J-line truss (Tr. 163).Respondent urges this tribunal to consider the predicament in which itwas forced to ameliorate Carrie’s intransigent actions. After Carrielifted the J-line truss, Blount determined that the safest work practicewould be to leave the crane lines guyed to the truss while preparing tolift the H-line truss into place.I agree with the Respondent’s defense.Moreover, the Secretary proposes that both she and Respondent cannotprevail on both items 5 and 6 of Citation Number One, as arguments foreither affirming or vacating both items are mutually exclusive: as theSecretary notes,Respondent’s argument as to Item 5, that the \”J\” truss was no longersuspended from the cranes amounts to an admission that it had indeedslacked the hoisting lines prior to tying in the truss, thus violating29 CFR 1926.751(c)(2). At the same time… Complainant’s position that\”J\” truss was still suspended would, if accepted by the Court, absolveRespondent of the alleged violation in Item 6.Respondent makes a similar argument, claiming that the Secretary cannotassert both that the line was both taut, suspending a load, as well asslackened.For the preceding reasons, I find that this item and its proposedpenalty must be vacated._Citation Two, Item 1: Alleged other-than-serious violation of 29 CFR?1926.403 (h)._The standard at 29 CFR ?1926.403(h) provides:1926.403 General requirements(h) Identification of disconnecting means and circuits. Eachdisconnecting means required by this subpart for motors and appliancesshall be legibly marked to indicate its purpose, unless located andarranged so the purpose is evident. Each service, feeder, and branchcircuit, at its disconnecting means or overcurrent device, shall belegibly marked to indicate its purpose, unless located and arranged sothe purpose is evident. These markings shall be of sufficientdurability to withstand the environment involved.Cienaski testified that on Temporary Panel Box Number One, each servicefeeder and branch circuit was not legibly marked at its disconnectingmains or overcurrent device to indicate its purpose. Cienaski explainedthat if breakers do not indicate which circuit they control, an employeewould be exposed to danger in the event that there was a power failureor if power on a particular tool in use were to be disconnected (Tr.146, 147). Respondent did not present evidence to rebut this charge,therefore I find that this item must be affirmed._FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW_The findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in this opinionare incorporated herein in accordance with Rule 52 (a) of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure._ORDER_In view of the foregoing, good cause appearing therefore, it is ORDEREDthat:1. The allegation of serious violation by this respondent of thestandard set forth at 29 CFR 1926.250 (b) (9) and found in CitationNumber One, item 1, is affirmed and a penalty of $360 assessed.2. The allegation of serious violation by this respondent of thestandard set forth at 29 CFR 1926.251 (a) (1) and found in CitationNumber One, item two is vacated.3. The allegation of serious violation by this respondent of thestandard set forth at 29 CFR 1926.404 (b) (1) (ii) and found in CitationNumber One, item 3, is affirmed and a penalty of $150 assessed.4. The allegation of serious violation by this respondent of thestandard set forth at 29 CFR 1926.405 (e) (1) and found in CitationNumber One, item 4 is affirmed and a penalty of $300 assessed.5. The allegation of serious violation by this respondent of thestandard set forth at 29 CFR 1926.550 (b) (2) and found in CitationNumber One, item 5 is affirmed and a penalty of $300 assessed.6. The allegation of serious violation by this respondent of thestandard set forth at 29 CFR 1926.751(c) (2) and found in CitationNumber One, item 6 is vacated.7. The allegation of other than serious violation by this respondent ofthe standard set forth at 29 CFR 1926.403 (h) and found in CitationNumber Two, item 1 is affirmed.IT IS SO ORDEREDDAVID G. ORINGER, Judge, OSHRCDated: November 19,1990Boston, MassachusettsFOOTNOTES:[[1]] The cited standard, 29 C.F.R. ? 1926.250(b)(9), provides:29 C.F.R.? 1926.250 General requirements for storage.(b) Material storage.(9) Structural steel…. unless racked, shall be stacked and blocked soas to prevent spreading or tilting.[[2]] The cited standard, 29 C.F.R. ? 1926.404 (b)(1), allows for twoalternative forms of ground-fault protection on the worksite. Blount’ssite was wired with a system of ground-fault circuit interrupters(\”GFCl’s\”), as the standard permits:29 C.F.R. ? 1926.404 Wiring design and protection.(b) Branch circuits — (1) Ground-fault protection….(ii) Ground-fault circuit interrupters. All 120-volt single-phase,15-and 20- ampere receptacle outlets on construction sites, which are not apart of the permanent wiring of the building or structure and which arein use by employees, shall have approved ground-fault circuitinterrupters for personnel protection.[[3]] At the same time, we are cognizant of the role of specialtysubcontractors in running a safe, efficient construction project. Ageneral contractor may reasonably rely on its subcontractor’sexpertise. Sasser Elec., & Mfg Co., 11 BNA OSHC 2133, 1984-85 CCH OSHD? 26,982 (No. 82-178, 1984). Far from requiring the contractingemployer to duplicate the safety efforts of the specialist, the Actdemands only that general contractors apprise themselves of which safetyefforts their specialty subcontractors have chosen to make in completingtheir assignments.[[4]] The applicable standard, 29 C.F.R. ? 1926.405(e)(1), calls forcertain prophylactic measures:29 C.F.R. ? 1926.405 Wiring methods, components, and equipment forgeneral use.(e) Enclosures for damp or wet locations [.] (1) Cabinets, fittings,and boxes. Cabinets, cutout boxes, fittings, boxes, and panelboardenclosures in damp or wet locations shall be installed so as to preventmoisture or water from entering and accumulating within the enclosures. In wet locations, the enclosures shall be weatherproof.[[5]] The applicable regulation, 29 C.F.R. ? 1926.550(b)(2), provides:29 C.F.R. ? 1926.550 Cranes and derricks.(b) Crawler …cranes(2) AlI crawler… cranes in use shall meet the applicable requirementsfor … operation as prescribed in the ANSI B30.5-1968, Safety Code forCrawler, Locomotive and Truck Cranes.The ANSI B30.5-1968 Safety Code incorporated by reference includes thefollowing section:5-3.2.4 Holding the Load (a) The operator shall not leave his positionat the controls while the load is suspended.(Emphasis added).[[6]] A fourth option, of course, would have been simply to detach thecranes from the truss. This alternative, however, while technicallyabating any alleged hazard, would have jeopardized worker safety.[[7]] While the record shows that the crane lines were under sometension, there is no evidence that the cranes were supporting the entireweight of the truss. To the contrary, the testimony indicates that theload on the cranes was between 5,000 and 35,000 pounds at most, only onequarter of the weight of the truss. The standard does not require thatoperators be present whenever the crane is under load, only when theload is suspended. Had the Secretary demonstrated that the cranes weresupporting the entire weight of the truss, or close to it, this casemight more reasonably be considered under F&W.[[8]] In the absence of much case law, the parties and the judgeresorted to the dictionary for guidance, finding nearly identicaldefinitions e.g., \”suspend: Hang; esp to hang so as to be free on allsides except at the point of support (ex.,…. a ball by a thread).\” The word’s denotation was not debated; its potential connotations, inlight of the purpose of the standard, were.[[1]] The Corps of Engineers’ stop-work order enumerated fourteenviolations which caused the order to be issued. These included:1. The failure to follow safety and quality control requirementspertaining to the erection of trusses,2. Connections of truss column \”J\” at Column line 12 were not fullyimpacted prior to truss erection,3. Failure to fully tension 100% of the bolts at the truss supportsprior to the release of the cranes….5. Workers were working under truss being erected after having beenrepeatedly warned not to do so….10. Insufficient operators and standby operators for cranes…(See R-1).[[2]] The Secretary notes that despite the stop-work order, workcontinued to be performed by Carrie on the H-line truss on March 6 (Tr.369).[[3]] A softener, as described by the compliance officer, is a piece ofmaterial such as wire, rope, or fabric, placed underneath riggingequipment to preclude damage to the equipment by the sharpness of themember being lifted (Tr. 51).[[4]] C-7, The Handbook for Crane Operators, issued by the InternationalUnion of Operating Engineers, Local No, 98, states that \”wire ropeslings should be protected from sharp bends and cutting edges by meansof corner saddles, burlap padding, or wood blocking.\”[[5]] Cienaski testified that this violation was readily observablewithout the use of a tester:THE WITNESS: … let’s see, four receptacles that I can pick out realquick had ground fault circuit interrupters provided on it. The rest ofthem didn’t. They’re sitting in side-by-side boxes.Two receptacles on one side of the box had GFCI, two on the other sidedidn’t.When you looked at the panel, they had two GFCI’s installed and the restof them were circuit breakers.Q. [By Mr. Casler] So this was something that could be observed by thenaked eye?A That’s how I looked at them. I walked up to the box and looked at it,because the door was broken off. (Tr. 107-108).[[6]] Respondent also engages in a battle of semantics: it claims thatthe Secretary is attempting to hold Respondent to a higher standard,that of \”waterproof\” rather than the less exacting one of \”weatherproof\”as required by the standard. The former, it contends, means \”able towithstand exposure to weather without damage or loss of function\” whilethe latter is defined as \”impervious to water.\” The standard enunciatesthat such panel boxes in damp or wet locations \”shall be installed so asto prevent moisture or water from entering and accumulating within theenclosures.\” The makeshift polyethylene shown in the photographicexhibits depicts neither \”weatherproof\” nor \”waterproof\” protection.[[7]] The Secretary’s definition is nearly identical: \”To hang by asupport from above, so as to be free on all sides except at the point ofsupport.\”[[8]] Respondent notes the 1982 version section 5-3.2.1.3(d) of ANSI B30.5 as reflecting common industry practice:(d) As an exception to (a) above, under those circumstances where a loadis to be held suspended for a period of time exceeding normal liftingoperations, the operator may leave the controls provided that prior tothat time, the appointed individual and operator shall establish therequirements for restraining the boom hoist, telescoping, load, swing,and outrigger functions, and provide notices, barricades, or whateverother precautions may be necessary. [Emphasis added].This section, however, was specifically omitted by the OSHA standard,which refers only to the 1968 ANSI standard. Further, Respondentpresented no evidence to show that it complied with this alternativeexception to the standard, by providing notices or barricades to protectemployees.”