“\ufeff\t\t IMPERIAL LUMBER COMPANY, Docket No. 12699 \t\t\t\t p.hiddenParagraph { visibility:hidden } p { margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0; font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt; color:WindowText; } p { font-family:Calibri; font-size:11pt; } p.style_Normal { } span.style_DefaultParagraphFont { } table.style_TableNormal { } table.style_TableGrid { } p.style_FootnoteText { line-height:1; font-size:10pt; } .style_FootnoteText span { } span.style_FootnoteTextChar { font-size:10pt; } .style_FootnoteTextChar span { } span.style_FootnoteReference { position:relative;font-size:0.58em; bottom: 1ex;} .style_FootnoteReference span { position:relative;font-size:0.58em; bottom: 1ex;} p.style_BalloonText { line-height:1; font-size:9pt; font-family:Segoe UI; } .style_BalloonText span { font-family:Segoe UI; } span.style_BalloonTextChar { font-size:9pt; font-family:Segoe UI; } .style_BalloonTextChar span { font-family:Segoe UI; } p.style_Header { line-height:1; } span.style_HeaderChar { } p.style_Footer { line-height:1; } span.style_FooterChar { } span.X3AS7TOCHyperlink { color:#000000; text-decoration:none; } p.X3AS7TABSTYLE { } span.BulletSymbol { font-family:’Symbol’; } body { margin-left:96px;margin-top:96px;margin-bottom:96px;margin-right:96px;} div.basic { width:16.51cm;height:22.86cm;} p.hiddenParagraph { font-size:2pt; visibility:hidden; } \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tvar useragent = navigator.userAgent;\t\t\t\t\t\t\tvar navigatorname;\t\t\t\t\t\t\tif (useragent.indexOf(‘MSIE’)!= -1)\t\t\t\t\t\t\t{\t\t\t\t\t\t\tnavigatorname=\”MSIE\”;\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\t\t\t\t\t\t\telse if (useragent.indexOf(‘Gecko’)!= -1)\t\t\t\t\t\t\t{\t\t\t\t\t\t\tif (useragent.indexOf(‘Chrome’)!= -1)\t\t\t\t\t\t\tnavigatorname=\”Google Chrome\”;\t\t\t\t\t\t\telse\t\t\t\t\t\t\tnavigatorname=\”Mozilla\”;\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\t\t\t\t\t\t\telse if (useragent.indexOf(‘Mozilla’)!= -1)\t\t\t\t\t\t\t{\t\t\t\t\t\t\tnavigatorname=\”old Netscape or Mozilla\”;\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\t\t\t\t\t\t\telse if (useragent.indexOf(‘Opera’)!= -1)\t\t\t\t\t\t\t{\t\t\t\t\t\t\tnavigatorname=\”Opera\”;\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfunction symbol(code1,code2)\t\t\t\t\t\t\t{\t\t\t\t\t\t\tif (navigatorname == ‘MSIE’)\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tdocument.write(code1);\t\t\t\t\t\t\telse\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tdocument.write(code2);\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tUNITED STATES\t\t\t\t\t\tOF\t\t\t\t\t\tAMERICA\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tOCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tSECRETARY OF LABOR,\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t Complainant,\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t v.\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tDocket No. 12699\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tIMPERIAL LUMBER COMPANY,\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t Respondent.\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tDECISION\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tBefore: BARNAKO, Chairman; MORAN\t\t\t\t\t\tand CLEARY, Commissioners.\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tMORAN, Commissioner: A decision of Review Commission\t\t\t\t\t\tJudge Joseph\t\t\t\t\t\tL.\t\t\t\t\t\tChalk, dated April 14, 1975, is before the Commission for review pursuant to 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 661(i).\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\u00a0Respondent was cited under the provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 19701\t\t\t\t\t\tfollowing the inspection of the Imperial Lumber Company\u2019s facility at Bartow Air Base Industrial Park in Bartow, Florida. The citation and notice of prosed penalties addressed to \u201cImperial\t\t\t\t\t\tLumber Company, P.O. Box 350, Bartow, Florida\u201d was received on February 19, 1975, at which time Mr. Delph, the president of the company was abroad. Upon his return on March 14, 1975, he wrote a letter\t\t\t\t\t\tcontesting the citation which was forwarded to complainant\u2019s Tampa Area Office by\t\t\t\t\t\tthe Company\u2019s Safety Director. On March 26, complainant filed a motion to dismiss this notice of contest on the grounds that it was not timely filed. The Judge\t\t\t\t\t\tgranted this motion. We reverse. \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\u00a0The crucial issue in this case is whether the citation addressed to the Imperial Lumber\t\t\t\t\t\tCompany constituted effective service thereof on February 19, 1975, when the mail arrived;\t\t\t\t\t\ton Mach 14,1975, wen Mr. Delph received it; or on some intermediate date.\t\t\t\t\t\t2 In\t\t\t\t\t\tBuckley & Company\t\t\t\t\t\tv. Secretary of Labor, 507 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1975), the court held that \u201cthe relevant intent of Congress in enacting section 10(a) was to provide notice to those corporate officials who have the precise authority to spend\t\t\t\t\t\tcorporate funds to either (a) pay the\t\t\t\t\t\tproposed penalty, or (b) to abate the alleged violation or (c) to contest the enforcement proceedings.\u201d3 Before the validity of the notice of contest can be determined in this instance, evidence must be received and a decision reached as to whether proper service could be made in Mr. Delph\u2019s absence.\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\u00a0Whether or not a corporate official with the above-mentioned power\t\t\t\t\t\twas present in respondent\u2019s facility before the return of Mr. Delph is exclusively within the knowledge of the respondent. Accordingly, in order to establish that its notice of contest was timely filed with it was filed on\t\t\t\t\t\tMarch\t\t\t\t\t\t14, 1975, respondent has the burden of proving that no such official was present before February 21, 1975. See\t\t\t\t\t\tAllstate Finance Corporation v. Zimmerman, 330 F.2d 740, 744 (5th\t\t\t\t\t\tCir. 1964); 9 Wigmore, Evidence \u00a7 2486 (3d ed. 1940).\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\u00a0This case is therefore remanded for appropriate determination.\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0FOR THE COMMISSION\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\/s\/ William S. McLaughlin\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Executive Secretary\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tDated: Dec. 13 1976\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tCLEARY, Commissioner, DISSENTING:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\u00a0I would hold that notice was effected under section 10(a) of the Act and 29 CFR \u00a7\u00a01903.15(a)\t\t\t\t\t\ton receipt by the corporation of the notice of proposed penalties on February 19, 1975, and therefore is remand is not necessary. The decision of the administrative law judge granting the Secretary\u2019s motion to dismiss respondent\u2019s notice of contest on the grounds that it was not timely filed should be affirmed.\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\u00a0The majority has misinterpreted\t\t\t\t\t\tBuckley and Co., Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 507 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1975) and has arrived at a conclusion totally at odds with the purposes and policy of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 651\t\t\t\t\t\tet\t\t\t\t\t\tseq. [hereinafter \u201cthe Act\u201d]. In\t\t\t\t\t\tBuckley, the Court dealt with the interpretation of the notice requirements of section 10(a) of the Act, which provides in part:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tIf, after an inspection or investigation, the Secretary issues a citation under section 9(a), he shall, within a reasonable time after the termination of such inspection or investigation,\t\t\t\t\t\tnotify the employer by certified mail\t\t\t\t\t\tof the penalty\u2026(emphasis added).\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tThe source of the majority\u2019s confusion is the following paragraph in the Third Circuit\u2019s decision in\t\t\t\t\t\tBuckley:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[Commissioner]\t\t\t\t\t\tMoran emphasized that \u2018[i]t is clear that no official of the corporate respondent with authority to spend corporate funds either (a) to pay the proposed penalty, or (b) to abate the alleged violation, or (c) to contest the enforcement proceedings, received notice of either citation until long after both of them had become default judgments.\u2019 We believe that the relevant intent of Congress in enacting \u00a7 10(a) was to provide notice to those corporate officials who have the precise authority delineated by\t\t\t\t\t\t[Commissioner]\t\t\t\t\t\tMoran. If we were to interpret \u00a7 10(a) otherwise, then we would frustrate one of the principal purposes of the Act\u2014abatement of hazardous conditions.\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t507 F.2d at 80.\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\u00a0In\t\t\t\t\t\tBuckley, citations and notifications of proposed penalty were sent by certified mail directly to the superintendent of a maintenance shop concerning violations which an OSHA inspection had discovered. The superintendent neglected to forward the citations and notices of proposed penalty to corporate officials whose offices were located at a separate location. The employer, therefore, did not receive notice of the citations and proposed penalties until several\t\t\t\t\t\tmonths later when the Secretary sent a letter demanding payment for the assessed penalties. The employer attempted to contest the imposition of the penalties, alleging that its notice of contest\t\t\t\t\t\twas timely since the earlier notification to the shop superintendent was not sufficient notice to the corporation. The Secretary moved to dismiss the late notice of contest on the ground that the citations and proposed penalties had become final and unreviewable pursuant to sections 19(a) and (b) of the Act. The Commission majority held that the mailing notice to the shop superintendent complied with the requirements of section 10(a) of the Act.4 In my concurring opinion, I stated that any mailing to an employer that is reasonably calculated to give the employer notice of\t\t\t\t\t\tthe citation and proposed penalty comports with the requirements of section 10(a) of the Act.5 On the facts of that case, I determined that the mailing to the shop superintendent was reasonably calculated to give such notice to this employer. \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\u00a0On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,\t\t\t\t\t\tholding that the mailing to the shop superintendent was improper under section 10(a) of the Act. The Court maintained that it was as reasonable to conclude that the superintendent would attempt to cover up any derelictions as it would be to conclude that he would forward the citations to his supervisors. The Court stated what it thought section 10(a) of the Act required:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tAs to this corporate\t\t\t\t\t\tthis means at the very least, a notice to the officials at the corporate headquarters, not the employee in charge of a particular worksite.\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t507 F.2d at 81.\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\u00a0The Court eschewed my view that the mailing of the citations and notices of proposed penalty to a shop superintendent at a maintenance shop was reasonably calculated to afford corporate officials proper notice. By implication, however, it affirmed my basic premise that section 10(a) of the Act only requires a mailing that is reasonable calculated to afford the employer notice. This follows from the Court\u2019s conclusion that notice to \u201cofficials\u201d at corporate headquarters would probably have been sufficient notice to the employer. The Court\u2019s reference to the three indicia of corporate authority mentioned by Commissioner Moran seems merely to illustrate the\t\t\t\t\t\tCourt\u2019s reasoning why service upon corporate headquarters as opposed to a\t\t\t\t\t\tmaintenance shop was required by section 10(a) of the Act. The majority had misread\t\t\t\t\t\tBuckley\t\t\t\t\t\tso as to mandate service\t\t\t\t\t\t6\t\t\t\t\t\tupon specific individuals within the corporate structure who possess specific authority in the following areas: (a) contest of the citation; (b) payment of penalties; and (c) disbursement of corporate funds to abate violations. This interpretation by the majority is predicated on the extraction of the above-quoted language in\t\t\t\t\t\tBuckley, which the Court\t\t\t\t\t\texplained was to achieve the prompt abatement of the hazards. In complete disregard of this principle, the majority orders a remand to inquire into specific functions and duties of corporate officials in an attempt to determine if anyone in addition to the president is amenable to service. This result clearly defeats the very result the Court of Appeals desired. It also leads to the disturbing possibility that a corporation may manipulate its line of authority so as to require notice on its terms. \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\u00a0The respondent alleges that Mr. Bill R. Delph had exclusive authority over disbursement of funds and decisions on all legal matters. Thus, it argues that notice my mail was not effective until Mr. Delph, not the corporation, actually received the notice on his return from a business trip to the Middle East. This contention is unpersuasive.7 Mr. Delph is not the corporation. The corporation continued to function despite his absence. I would hold that notice by mail to this corporate address was adequate under\t\t\t\t\t\tBuckley.\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\u00a0The misinterpretation of\t\t\t\t\t\tBuckley\t\t\t\t\t\tand the concomitant action ordered by the majority seems destined to protract enforcement actions under the Act. After a violation has been found, the Secretary\t\t\t\t\t\twill be arguably delayed in issuing the citation by the need to determine the existence and whereabouts the particular individuals within the corporate structure who have the applicable corporate authority. This is particularly ironic because one member of the majority still adheres to the view that in order for a citation to be issued with \u201creasonable promptness\u201d under section 9(a) of the Act, it must\t\t\t\t\t\tissue within 72 hours of the inspection if it is to be valid. See\t\t\t\t\t\tConcrete Constr. Corp., No. 2490, BNA 4 OSHC 1133, CCH 1975-76 OSHD para. 20,610 (1976) (Moran, Commissioner, dissenting).\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, inadequate consideration is given to the fact that neither compliance officers nor Area Directors who have the statutory authority to issue\t\t\t\t\t\tcitations with \u201creasonable promptness\u201d are equipped to disentangle possible issues of corporate responsibility. These employees have expertise in safety. They lack legal skills. Cf.\t\t\t\t\t\tNational Realty Constr. Co., v. O.S.H.R.C., 489 F.2d 1257, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1973). They should not be burdened in their efforts to achieve compliance with the Act by the requirement that the expend their efforts in determining matters that are clearly outside their area of competence. It is not a complete answer to this problem to place the burden o proof upon the corporate employer to show inadequate notice under the circumstances of this case. The trial preparation of the Secretary will still likely require some examination of this issue at the investigatory stage. \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tOCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tSECRETARY OF LABOR,\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t Complainant,\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t v.\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t Docket No. 12699\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tIMPERIAL LUMBER COMPANY,\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t Respondent.\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tDECISION AND ORDER\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tChalk, Judge\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\u00a0Complainant has filed a motion for summary dismissal of Respondent\u2019s Notice of Contest because it was not timely filed. As the record supports Complainant\u2019s assertion of untimeliness, the motion will be granted\t\t\t\t\t\t(Secretary v. Acme Plastering Co. Inc., Docket No. 9215, October 17, 1974;\t\t\t\t\t\tSecretary v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., Docket No. 8859, October 22, 1974, ordered for review by the Commission on November 21, 1974).\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\u00a0Complainant\u2019s motion is granted, Respondent\u2019s Notice of Contest is dismissed, and the proceedings are terminated.\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\u00a0So ORDERED.\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Joseph L. Chalk\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Judge, OSAHRC\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tDated: April 14, 1975\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\u00a0Washington, D.C.\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\” \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t1 \t\t\t\t\t\t84 Stat. 1590, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 651,\t\t\t\t\t\tet seq., hereinafter the Act.\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t2 \t\t\t\t\t\tA notice of contest is untimely unless an employer notifies the Secretary of Labor within 15 working days from the receipt of the proposed penalty\t\t\t\t\t\t29 U.S.C. \u00a7 659(a).\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t3 \t\t\t\t\t\tSection 10(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 659 (a), in pertinent parts reads:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u201cIf, after an inspection or investigation, the Secretary issues a citation under section 9(a), he shall, within a reasonable time after the termination of such inspection or investigation notify the\t\t\t\t\t\temployer\t\t\t\t\t\tby certified mail of the penalty.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t4 \t\t\t\t\t\t[Noted as FN 3 in error in original].\t\t\t\t\t\tBuckley and Co., Inc., No. 1342, BNA 1 OSHC 1535, CCH 1973-74 OSHD para. 17,338 (1974).\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t5 \t\t\t\t\t\t[Noted as FN 4 in error in original]. For a complete discussion of my views concerning the notice requirements under section 10(a) of the Act\t\t\t\t\t\tsee\t\t\t\t\t\tDonald K. Nelson Constr., Inc., No. 4309, BNA 3 OSHC 1914, 1975-76 CCH OSHD para. 20,299 (1976) (Cleary, Commissioner, dissenting)\t\t\t\t\t\tappeal dismissed, 76-1112 (10th Cir., August 5, 1976).\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t6 \t\t\t\t\t\t[Noted as FN 5 in error in original]. Section 10(a) of the Act states in part: \u201c[T]he Secretary \u2026shall \u2026notify the employer by certified mail of the penalty\u2026.\u201d The Act specifically refrains from requiring \u201cservice\u201d upon the employer which connotes greater formality and precision than that mandated by the carefully chosen usage of the word \u201cnotify.\u201d The Court of Appeals\u2019 decision in\t\t\t\t\t\tBuckley\t\t\t\t\t\tscrupulously observed this distinction by not once resorting to the use of the word \u201cservice\u201d in lieu of \u201cnotify\u201d or \u201cnotice.\u201d\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t7 \t\t\t\t\t\t[Noted as FN 6 in error in original]. The citations and notice of proposed penalties were addressed and mailed as follows:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tImperial Lumber Company\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tP.O. Box 350\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tBartona, Florida 33830\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tIn its answer to the motion to dismiss, respondent alleged that service should have been addressed:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tBill R. Delph, President\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tImperial Lumber Company\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tP.O. Box 350\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tBartona, Florida 33830\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\u00a0\t\t\t “