“SECRETARY OF LABOR,Complainant,v.KEEFE EARTH BORING COMPANY, INC.,Respondent.OSHRC Docket No. 88-2521_DECISION _Before: FOULKE, Chairman; MONTOYA and WISEMAN, Commissioners.BY THE COMMISSION:This case presents a motion for relief from seven final orders of theCommission, entered by operation of law, pursuant to section 10(a) ofthe Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. ? 651-678(\”the Act\”).[[1\/]] Administrative Law Judge Edwin G. Salyers deniedrelief from the final orders. For the following reasons, we affirm hisruling.IA. _The Origins of this Proceeding_During an approximately 15-month period, from late 1986 to early 1988,the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (\”OSHA\”), of the U.S.Department of Labor, issued eight citations to Keefe Earth BoringCompany (\”KEBCO\” or \”the company\”). The citations alleged instances ofnoncompliance with OSHA’s standards regulating construction safety,which appear in 29 C.F.R. Part 1926. Our table, below, shows the fourissuance dates of the eight citations, their classifications, the citedstandards, and the proposed penalties:_October 29, 1986_1) \tSerious: \t1926.450(a)(1)– ladders \t$ 240.00\t\t1926.651(c)– sloping, and \t\t\t1926.651(q) — bracing \t280.00\t\t1926.651(i)(1)–spoil piles \t240.00_October 14, 1987_2) \tRepeat: \t1926.651(c) –sloping \t1,400.003) \tNonserious: \t1926.20(b)(1)–training \t0.00_December 10, 1987_4) \tWillful: \t1926.651(c) — sloping \t7,000.005) \tRepeat: \t1926.20(b)(1) — training \t200.00_January 6, 1988_6) \tSerious: \t1926.100(a) — hard hats \t600-007) \tWillful: \t1926.651(c) –sloping \t10,000.003) \tRepeat: \t1926.20(b)(1) –training \t400.00Because KEBCO did not file notices of contest to the citations andpenalties within the fifteen working – day period immediately followingthe issuance dates, the uncontested citations and penalties became finalorders by operation of law. See n-1, _supra._KEBCO did not thereafter pay the penalties. Accordingly, in mid-1988,the Secretary of Labor (\”the Secretary\”) initiated a penalty collectionaction in the United States District Court for the Northern District ofIllinois, which has jurisdiction over the area in which KEBCO performedits construction work.[[2\/]] The company, intending to defend againstthe citations and penalties in the court proceeding, retained anattorney, and it was he who realized that the company should have filedtimely notices of contest for the purpose of initiating the statutorilyprescribed administrative review proceedings.On the company’s behalf, therefore, the attorney filed the notice ofcontest, dated July 25, 1988, that began this proceeding. The notice ofcontest included a motion for relief from the final orders relating tothe eight citations issued to KEBCO. After KEBCO’s case wasdocketed,[[3\/]] the Secretary filed a motion to dismiss KEBCO’s noticeof contest[[4\/]]. Both parties filed sworn testimony, in the form ofaffidavits, in support of their respective positions. The partiessharply dispute whether KEBCO is entitled to relief from the finalorders entered against it in 1987 and 1988 after it was given writtenand oral instructions how to file a notice of contest.[[5\/]]B. _KEBCO’s Factual Presentation_The factual content of KEBCO’s notice of contest is unsworn, and we donot rely on it except as background to the company’s sworn statements.The notice of contest alleged that, in 1986 and thereafter, KEBCO’smanagement did not understand that OSHA citations and penalties areserious legal actions against a subcontractor:[During each of the inspections, the OSHA] inspectors did speak withdefendant’s men. When . . . informed . . . that Keefe did not control orcreate the pits, the inspectors told [the men] to simply trim some dirtfrom the end of the pit with shovels and \”they would be alright\”– whichthey did.Defendant understood, therefore, that the contractors who wereresponsible for the creation of the pits were the targets of the OSHAinvestigation and that the actions against Keefe were designed merely tokeep pressure on those contractors.This belief was supported and reinforced by the fact that the amounts ofthe penalties and the condition and sizes of the pits seemed to bear nounderstandable relationship and, at the initial settlement meeting [in1986], Keefe was made to understand that OSHA was prepared to negotiateany… penalty and the figures were, therefore, arbitrary threatenedpenalties for the aforesaid purpose.KEBCO took the position, therefore, that the general contractor wasresponsible for abatement. The company further alleged that \”itthereafter took the only alternative steps available to it.\” That is,the company provided alternative protection, requested the generalcontractors to abate, and directed its own employees not to work underhazardous conditions. [[6\/]]The evidentiary support for KEBCO’s claim that company managementmisunderstood the legal effect of OSHA citations consists of anaffidavit from the company’s president, Timothy J. Keefe. The presidentreferred to an apparently business-related dispute that had led to courtsuits by his brother, and the president sought to make a connectionbetween his experiences in court and certain statements allegedly madeby OSHA officials regarding possible adjudication of the 1986 citation:When I got my first OSHA Notice of Violation in October, 1986[,] Iassumed it was another thing my brother had started up against me. I . .. went down to the OSHA office . . . . There were a couple of men in anoffice and I told them that we were working in the same type of trenchessince [the] 1960’s and that we didn’t ever dig the trenches ourselves.The trenches were dug by the contractors who hired us. They told me thatif I didn’t agree to pay at least part of the penalty I would have tohire a lawyer and come back for an OSHA hearing, and that I would justlose that hearing anyway. I agreed to pay $400.00 instead of $760.00 forthat reason, even though I felt we hadn’t done anything wrong.After the meeting I decided that I would fight the $400.00 rather thanpay it. I knew that there was no sense in going back for a hearing inthe OSHA department as they had already told me that I would lose. Idecided that I should wait until the matter was brought before a realcourt like I had been involved in with my brother and my divorce case.Because of the lawsuits with my brother and my divorce, I knew that Iwould be served by a Sheriff and have a chance to tell our story in thereal court. I never knew, or understood, that the hearings that the OSHApeople spoke about and that were mentioned in the papers I was givenwould be a real trial in front of a judge. I thought the hearing thatthey talked about would be before themselves, or people in their department.The president further averred:I have been in business, and in family law suits long enough to knowthat you cannot simply ignore the papers which are served upon you. It’s[w]hat I always believed, based upon my meeting with the OSHA officials,that the real trial would take place only when and if the OSHAdepartment decided to file in court and I was served with court papers.Even after my meeting with them I received letters which said, on theone hand, that if I would provide certain information it \”will allow usto close the case . . . \” and, on the other hand, papers that said thatthere would be \”further action\” if we did not pay the penalties. Iunderstood the \”further action\” to be the real court case.(Reference to exhibits omitted).[[7\/]]C. _The Secretary’s factual Presentation_In opposing KEBCO’s motion for relief, the Secretary focused on thewritten and oral instructions that were provided to KEBCO with eachcitation. Down each citation’s right margin, in boldface, was thefollowing admonition:Penalties Are Due Within 15 Days of Receipt of This Notification UnlessContested (See enclosed Booklet)There were further instructions centered on the page, in smallertypeface, which also referred to the enclosed booklet:You must abate the violations … and pay the penalties proposed, unlesswithin 15 working days … from your receipt of this Citation andpenalty you mail a notice of contest to the U.S. Department of LaborArea office … (See the enclosed booklet which outlines your rights andresponsibilities and should be read in conjunction with this form). Youare further notified that unless you inform the Area Director in writingthat you intend to contest the Citation or proposed penalties withinfifteen working days after receipt, this Citation and the proposedpenalties will become a final order of the Occupational Safety andHealth Review commission and may not be reviewed by any court or agency.The enclosed booklet, entitled \”Employer Rights and ResponsibilitiesFollowing an OSHA Inspection,\” stated:_How to Comply_For violations you do not contest, you must (1) promptly notify the OSHAArea Director by letter that you have taken the appropriate correctiveaction within the time set forth in the citation, and (2) pay anypenalties itemized therein.[I]f you contest the citation or penalty in good faith, abatement andpayment of penalties for those items contested are suspended until theOccupational Safety and Health Review Commission reviews your case andissues a final order. The Review Commission is an independent agency andis not a part of the U.S. Department of Labor….However, penalties foritems not contested are still due within 15 working days. For furtherdetails, see the section on How to Contest.(Emphasis in the original.) That section stated:_How to Contest_If you wish to contest any portion of your citation, a written Notice ofContest must be submitted within 15 working days after receipt….evenif you have orally stated your disagreement….during a telephoneconversation or an informal conference.The next paragraph included a sample notice of contest: \”I wish tocontest the citation and penalty proposed for items 3 and 4 of thecitation issued July 27, 1984.\”The administrative hearing was described as a trial before a judge ofthe Commission:_The Contest Process_If the written Notice of Contest has been filed within the required 15working days, the OSHA Area Director forwards your case to theOccupational Safety and Health Review Commission. The Commission assignsthe case to an administrative law judge who usually will schedule ahearing in a public place close to your workplace. Both employers andemployees have the right to participate in this hearing[,] whichcontains all the elements of a trial, including examination andcross-examination of witnesses. You may choose to represent yourself orbe represented by an attorney. The administrative law judge may affirm,modify, or eliminate any contested items of the citation or penalty.The section on \”Informal Conference and Settlement\” specifically warned:\”Please note, however, that an informal conference will neither extendthe 15 working day Notice of Contest period nor take the place of thefiling of a written notice if you desire to contest.\” It further warned:If you do not contest within 15 working days, your citation will becomea final order. After this occurs, the OSHA Area Director may continue toprovide you with information and assistance on how to abate . . . .However, he or she may not amend or change any . . . final order.In addition to these written instructions concerning how to contest,President Keefe received oral instructions. An affidavit by the OSHAcompliance officer who made the 1986 inspection stated:OSHA pamphlet 3000 which outlines the employer’s contest rights wasprovided to its job foreman, mailed to the employer along with thecitations, and Mr. Keefe was told of his contest rights in a telephoneconversation on October 22, 1986.Affidavits by the OSHA compliance officer who made the three inspectionsbetween October 1987 and January 1988 further stated that, immediatelyafter the October 1987 inspection, he spoke by telephone to PresidentKeefe, and spoke to him again the day prior to the citation’s issuance.The compliance officer told President Keefe \”of his contest rights.\” Inreply, \”Mr. Keefe advised me he had been to the [OSHA] Office on aprevious case.\” During the next two inspections, the compliance officermade telephone calls to President Keefe, who was unavailable when thecalls were made and yet did not return the calls. According to thiscompliance officer, \”At no time did the employer indicate any intentionto contest the citations.\”IIA. _Arguments_KEBCO argues that the OSHA officials to whom President Keefe spoke in1986 in effect misled him:The fact that OSHA officials in an OSHA office represented to aRespondent that any attempt to resist settlement would merely result inan OSHA hearing that would just be lost anyway, can only be described asdeceptive behavior, and cannot be ameliorated by handing the Respondenta booklet which contains, buried therein, a sentence attempting todescribe the independent role of the administrative law judge in OSHAproceedings.KEBCO also argues that President Keefe’s failure to file timely noticesof contest was an \”honest mistake.\” President Keefe is \”a laym[a]n witha high school degree,\”a small contractor who failed to understand the distinction between theOccupational Safety and Health Administration investigative body, andthe Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission as a body separateand apart from the investigative agency; a not unreasonable mistake.Thinking that OSHA had already rejected his defense and would reject hisposition in any action initiated by notice of contest, President Keefe\”understood that he had the option to allow OSHA to enter itsadministrative decision and that then he would still have theopportunity to present his case to what he understood to be anindependent forum–the courts.\”The Secretary counters that KEBCO’s inaction was not excusable error.\”Keefe proceeded on the basis of unwarranted assumptions, falseanalogies, and a marked lack of care and diligence.\” The company’sreceipt of plain instructions to contest or forgo a hearing \”puts inquestion respondent’s asserted belief that it could wait until somelater court action to raise its alleged defenses.\” Throughout the whole15-month period, \”KEBCO obviously did nothing to educate itself.\”President Keefe never asked \”for an explanation or clarification eventhough he clearly had an opportunity to do so.\” President Keefe did not\”even use the opportunity afforded by the telephone call from an OSHAcompliance officer in 1987 to voice his concerns or otherwise seekclarification.\” In sum, the Secretary claims that, \”[h]aving jumped to aconclusion in 1986, Keefe never bothered to check its accuracy.\”[[8\/]]B. _Discussion_The Commission’s authority to grant relief from final orders enteredpursuant to section 10(a) of the Act comes from Rule 60(b) of theFederal Rules of Civil Procedure and _Atlantic Marine, Inc. v. OSHRC,_524 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1975). _See Louisiana-Pacific Corp.,_ 13 BNA OSHC2020, 1989 CCH OSHD ? 28,409 (No. 86-1266, 1989); _Stroudsburg Dyeing &Finishing Co.,_ 13 BNA OSHC 2058, 1989 CCH OSHD ? 28,443 (No. 88-1830,1989).[[9\/]] Rule 60(b) permits relief for \”mistake, inadvertence,surprise, or excusable neglect,\” for \”misrepresentation, or othermisconduct of an adverse party,\” or for \”any other reason justifyingrelief.\” _Atlantic Marine _permits relief for OSHA misconduct,consisting of deceptive practices or noncompliance with requiredprocedures. We will first discuss whether any mistake, inadvertence,surprise or excusable neglect, justifies relief under the federal rule.Then we will turn to whether any OSHA misrepresentation or misconductjustifies relief under Commission case law or the federal rule.Under either theory, the employer has the burden to show a sufficientbasis for relief from a final order. _Roy Kay, Inc., _13 BNA OSHC 2021,2022, 1989 CCH OSHD ? 28,406, p. 37,534 (No. 88-1748, 1989) ; _see alsoStroudsburg_ 13 BNA OSHC at 2055 OSHD at p. 37,641. Where the employer’sshowing consists or affidavits, we must \”construe[ ] all ambiguous factsin the light most favorable to\” the employer, and resolve any doubts inthe employer’s favor. _See Jackson v. Beech,_ 636 F.2d 831, 836-38 (D.C.Cir. 1980), quoted in _INVST Financial Group v. Chem-Nuclear Systems,_815 F.2d 391, 398 (6th Cir. 1987); _cf. Pav-Saver Manufacturing Co.,_12 BNA OSHC 2001, 2007, 1986-87 CCH OSHD ? 27,676, p. 36,105 (No.84-733, 1986), _appeal filed,_ No. 87-1418 (7th Cir. March 18, 1987)(conflict in affidavits unresolved).I. _Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise, or Excusable Neglect_To qualify for relief under Rule 60(b) because of mistake or a similarerror, a party must show itself justified in failing to avoid its error._Sears, Sucsy & Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America,_ 392 F.Supp. 398(D.I11. 1975). Mere carelessness or negligence, even by a layman, is notexcusable. _See Western Transportation Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemoursand Co.,_ 682 F.2d 1233, 1236 (7th Cir. 1982) (a \”negligent mistake\” bya client’s consultant); _National Bank of Joliet v. W.H. Barber OilCo.,_ 69 F.R.D. 107, 109 (N.D.I11. 1975) (a client’s lack of diligencein informing his attorney regarding matters relevant to the suit).\”Ignorance of court rules does not constitute excusable neglect, even ifthe litigant appears _pro se_.\” _Swimmer v. I.R.S.,_ 811 F.2d 1343, 1345(9th Cir. 1987) (a pro se party’s failure to respond in time because ofmisreading the procedural rules).In short, a layman must exercise reasonable diligence, and what isreasonable may vary, depending on the information available to thelayman. _Compare, Kinnear Corp. v. Crawford Door Sales Co._,49 F.R.D. 3,6 (D.S.C. 1970) (misunderstanding how to make a proper answer isexcusable if a layman did try),_with_ _Kendall v. Hoover Co., _751 F.2d171, 175 (6th Cir. 1984) (pro se party’s failure to respond, due tofailure to consult the procedural rules, is not excusable). Relief maybe justified \”if the party offers a credible explanation for the delaythat does not exhibit disregard for the judicial proceedings,\” revealingno \”intent to thwart\” or \”reckless disregard for the effect of itsconduct.\” _Shepard Claims Service, Inc. v. William Darrah & Associates,_796 F.2d 190, 194 & 195 (6th Cir. 1986) _See Collex, Inc. v. Walsh,_ 69F.R.D. 20, 23 (E.D.Pa. 1975) (\”[R]epeated allegations that Mr. Walshcould not file an answer because he could not retrieve his papers fromthe attorney who advised him in the early stages of this matter, havelost their ring after six months of repetition\”).Relatively recently, the Commission declined to accept a late-filednotice of contest from an employer who, although unsophisticated in OSHAmatters, had received the usual written instructions concerning the timeperiod for contesting a citation. The employer had never before beencited, did not have a legal department, claimed not to have\”appreciate[d] the essence of the fifteen day period it had to reply,\”and therefore took too long gathering information that it wished toconsider before deciding whether to contest. _Roy Kay, _13 BNA OSHC at2022, 1989 CCH OSHD at p. 37,534. \”However,\” the commission responded,\”ignorance of procedural rules does not constitute ‘excusable neglect’within Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).\” 13 BNA OSHC at 2022, 1989CCH OSHD at p. 37,534. The employer \”was explicitly told\” of the fifteenworking-day contest period by the citation itself and by OSHA’s letterthat accompanied it. 13 BNA OSHC at 2023, 1989 CCH OSHD at p. 37,534.Rule 60(b) cannot be invoked \”to give relief to a party who has chosen acourse of action which in retrospect appears unfortunate or where erroror miscalculation is traceable really to a lack of care.\” _Sadowski v.Bombardier Ltd., _539 F.2d 615, 618 (7th Cir. 1976).13 BNA OSHC at 2022, 1989 CCH OSHD at p. 37,534.In this case, it is clear that KEBCO has failed to show its entitlementto relief under Rule 60(b). OSHA provided extensive instructions, of aplain and simple nature, to assist Keefe and other employers lackingexperience with OSHA citations and lacking legal advice as to how tocontest them. If President Keefe had carefully read even portions of thewritten instructions stated and reiterated on the face of the 1987 and1988 citations, he would have known how to proceed. He would also haveknown that his failure to contest the citations in a timely manner wouldpreclude him from challenging the citations at a later time. OSHA’sbooklet accompanying the citations provided additional, straightforwardexplanations and, if President Keefe still had any questions, he couldhave responded to the compliance officer’s telephone calls. With theexercise of due diligence, President Keefe could have avoided his errors.2. _Misrepresentation or Misconduct_The affidavit’s claim of misconduct by OSHA officials refers explicitlyto the 1986 citation, and only inferentially explains KEBCO’s inactionon the later citations, which were received in the succeeding 15 months.The thrust of KEBCO’s claim is that OSHA officials, by belittlingKEBCO’s chances in \”an OSHA hearing\” regarding the 1986 citation, ledPresident Keefe to believe that an administrative decision had beenrendered against the company’s defense to that citation and any onesthat might be issued thereafter. However, the alleged remarks by theOSHA officials, see note 8 _supra,_ did not explicitly pertain to anyfuture case against KEBCO, and the later-issued citations were faciallyseparate matters, which KEBCO could have contested in their own right.Moreover, the context of the OSHA officials’ remarks, assuming that theywere in fact made, is significant. Informal settlement negotiations wereunderway concerning the1986 citation, and OSHA officials were trying topersuade President Keefe to accept the offer of a penalty reductionrather than to exercise his statutory right to file a notice of contestand defend the alleged violation on the basis that compliance with thecited standards was another contractor’s responsibility. The OSHAofficials were not purporting to provide competent advice on how todefend a contested case. In addition, they were not purporting todescribe the process or persons by which a contested case would beadjudicated. Insofar as President Keefe’s affidavit shows, he did notexplicitly ask how to contest the citation, whether he could contest itand obtain a hearing despite the OSHA officials’ opinions, and who wouldconduct the hearing. The officials did not voice anything that wouldhave confused the company president as to how to proceed. In short, wefind no OSHA misconduct warranting relief from the final orders enteredin 1987 and 1988. _Compare Merritt Electric Co.,_ 9 BNA OSHC 2088, 2090,1981 CCH OSHD ? 25,556: p. 31,871 (No. 77- 3772, 1981) (erroneousindication that an informal conference served as a notice of contest);_Henry C. Beck Co.,_ 8 BNA OSHC 1395, 1400, 1980 CCH OSHD ? 24,484, p.29,906 (No. 11864, 1980) (silent participation in a miscalculation ofthe date on which a notice of contest was due); _B.J. Hughes, Inc._ 7BNA OSHC 1471, 1476-77, 1979 CCH OSHD ? 23,675, p. 28,710 (No. 76-2165,1979) (miscalculation of the date on which a notice of contest was due).[[10\/]]We note that disparaging remarks such as those alleged to have been madeby the OSHA officials in this case can have the effect of discouragingan employer from pursuing its rights, particularly where the employerlacks legal counsel and is making a first-time appearance at an OSHAarea office to discuss a citation. Therefore, in general, OSHA officialsshould make clear that they are only expressing their own opinions aboutproposed defenses and that the ultimate authority to rule on anemployer’s defenses lies elsewhere. However, as long as an OSHA officialhas not misled or improperly confused an employer as to how to file anotice of contest, we are unwilling to conclude that an employer’sdecision not to file the notice of contest has been unfairly affectedmerely because the employer has been exposed to OSHA’s disparagingremarks. _See Keppel’s, Inc., _7 BNA OSHC 1442, 1444, 1979 CCH OSHD ?23,622, p. 28,636 (No. 77-3020, 1979) (the \”subjective feeling of’intimidation’\” that may have contributed to the belated contest\”apparently existed despite the Secretary’s adherence to properprocedure and lack of deception\”). Therefore, we find nomisrepresentation or misconduct by OSHA that would justify relief fromthe final orders. [[11\/]]IIIAccordingly, we affirm the judge’s decision denying KEBCO’s motion forrelief from the final orders and dismissing KEBCO’s notice of contest.Edwin G. Foulke, Jr.ChairmanVelma MontoyaCommissionerDonald G. WisemanCommissionerDated: March 25, 1991————————————————————————SECRETARY OF LABOR,Complainant,v.KEEFE EARTH BORINGCOMPANY, INC.,Respondent.OSHRC Docket No. 88-2521_ORDER ON MOTION FOR RELIEF__UNDER FEDERAL RULE 60 (b)_The respondent in this case was issued citations pursuant to section9(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (29 U.S.C. ? 651, _et__seq_.) on three separate occasions in 1986, 1987 and 1988. Respondentdid not file a timely notice of contest to these citations within thetime specified in the Act. These citations, therefore, became finalorders of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission pursuantto the operation of law.Acting through its attorney, respondent has filed a motion for reliefunder Federal Rule 60(b) claiming that respondent’s failure to act wasdue to mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, or other reasonscontemplated by Rule 60(b). The parties have now submitted affidavitsand memoranda in support of their respective positions. Upon review ofthe entire record, it is determined that the factual allegationscontained in respondent’s affidavit do not form a basis for relief underFederal Rule 60(b). _Louisiana Pacific Corporation,_ 86 OSAHRC ________,________ BNA OSHC________, 1986-87 CCH OSHD ? 27,818 (No. 86-1266); RoyKay, Inc., 88 OSAHRC_______, __________ BNA OSHC ________, 1988 CCH OSHD? _______ (No.88-1748).Accordingly, respondent’s motion is DENIED and this matter is DISMISSED.EDWIN G. SALYERSJudgeDate: February 8, 1989————————————————————————FOOTNOTES:[[1\/]] Section 10(a), 29 U.S.C. ? 659(a), provides, in pertinent part:If, after an inspection or investigation, the Secretary issues acitation . . . the employer has fifteen working days within which tonotify the Secretary that he wishes to contest the citation or proposedassessment of penalty. If . . . the employer fails to notify theSecretary that he intends to contest . . . the citation and theassessment, as proposed, shall be deemed a final order of the Commissionand not subject to review by any court or agency.[[2\/]] Section 17(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. ? 666(1), permits theSecretary to institute a penalty collection action in \”the districtwhere the violation is alleged to have occurred or where the employerhas its principal office.\” The action may be brought \”within five yearsfrom the date when the claim first accrued.\” 28 U.S.C. ? 2462.[[3\/]] \”By docketing an apparently late notice of contest, theCommission merely provides a forum in which the timeliness of the noticeof contest may be adjudicated.\” _Branciforte Builders,_ 9 BNA OSHC 2113,2115 n.3, 1981 CCH OSHD ? 25,591, p. 31,921 n.3 (No.80-1920, 1981),citing _Norkin Plumbing Co.,_ 5 BNA OSHC 2062, 2062-63, 1977-78 CCH OSHD? 22,296, p. 26,848 (No.76-4316, 1977).[[4\/]] The direction for review asked whether KEBCO’s motion for reliefcomplied with the time requirement of Federal Rule 60(b), which limitsmotions such as KEBCO’s to one year following entry of a final order.KEBCO filed its motion within the year following entry of the 1987 and1988 final orders, which are the seven final orders before us forreview. See n.5, _infra._ Accordingly, KEBCO’s motion was timely filed.[[5\/]] As our discussion of the record will indicate, KEBCO reliesheavily on certain events surrounding the first citation, issued in1986, as the basis for relief from the final orders arising out of the1987 and 1988 citations. There remains no issue of relief from the 1986citation itself, however. In 1989, the district court in theabove-mentioned collection action granted summary judgment to theSecretary regarding the first citation, on the ground that KEBCO \”waivedthe opportunity to object to the first citation\” when, within thefifteen working-day period after the citation issued, KEBCO entered intoa settlement agreement with OSHA, agreeing to affirmance of the citationin exchange for reductions in the Secretary’s proposed penalties. Thecourt declined to grant summary judgment as to the remaining sevencitations, however, on the ground that their status as final orders is aproper issue for consideration by this Commission. _Secretary v. KeefeEarth Boring Co.,_ 702 F.Supp. 705 (N.D.Ill. 1989).[[6\/]] KEBCO also generally alleged improper service of the citations,but the Secretary has documented each certified mail delivery to KEBCO’soffice address._See Stroudsburg Dyeing & Finishing Co., _13 BNA OSHC2058, 1989 CCH OSHD ? 28,443 (No. 88-1830, 1989) _Henry C. Beck Co.,_ 8BNA OSHC 1395, 1399, 1980 CCH OSHD ? 24,484, pp. 29,904-905 (No. 11864,1980); 29 U.S.C. ? 659(a) (\”notify the employer by certified mail\”).[[7\/]] One of the letters from OSHA that is referred to in thepresident’s affidavit requested information about abatement: \”Thisinformation will allow us to close the case and may negate the necessityof a follow up inspection.\” The other letter demanded payment of thepenalties: \”If the total amount due … is not paid … the matter willbe referred to the National Office of [OSHA]… for further action.\”[[8\/]] The Secretary also posits that President Keefe only inferred thathis defense was being adjudged deficient when he was told, correctly,that another contractor’s responsibility for a condition does noteliminate the company’s duty to protect its employees. \”[H]is affidavitdoes not establish that it is more likely than not that the statementsattributed to OSHA were actually made.\” The Secretary argues that \”theOSHA official in question would testify that no such statements weremade.\” This statement is not sworn testimony.[[9\/]] \”To preserve the issue for appeal,\” the Secretary asserts thatthe Commission lacks the authority to grant relief.[[10\/]] KEBCO claims that it reasonably relied on what was, in effect,erroneous legal advice from the OSHA officials. In support of grantingrelief under Rule 60(b), KEBCO cites _Fleming v. Huebsch Laundry, _159F.2d 581, 584, 585 (7th Cir. 1947). That case, however, involved a partywho \”was hardly to blame for accepting the law as given to him by theGovernment officials\” because the agency’s written officialinterpretations exceeded 50,406 pages. Incorrect legal advice mightexcuse a party if, as a practical matter, the party had to rely on it.However, a party who is \”fully informed of the relevant legalconsiderations\” and \”sufficiently sophisticated and experienced toprotect its interests\” is not justified in relying on \”erroneous legaladvice.\” _Meadows v. Dominican Republic,_ 628 F.Supp. 599, 609 (N.D.Ca.1986), aff’d, 817 F.2d 517, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1987), _cert. denied _108S.Ct. 486 and 106 U.S. 487 (1987). _See_ _also_, _Atchison, Topeka andSanta Fe Railway Co. v. Matchmaker, Inc.,_ 107 F.R.D. 63, 65 (D.Colo.1985); _Railroad Maintenance Laborers’ v. American Railroad ConstructionCo.,_ 96 F.R.D. 433, 435 (N.D.Ill. 1983).[[11\/]] We also do not find \”any other reason justifying relief.\” Rule60(b)(6). Reason (6) of the federal rule encompasses only reasons otherthan the ones already mentioned in the rule. _See Menier v. UnitedStates,_ 405 F.2d 245, 248 (5th Cir. 1968), citing _Klapprott v. UnitedStates_, 335 U.S. 601, 614-15 (1948); _See also Rebco Steel, Corp.,_ 8BNA OSHC 1235, 1237, 1980 CCH OSHD 24,334, p. 29,646 (No. 77-2040,1980). KEBCO generally requests relief by way of reason (6) but does notspecify a rationale, and we do not see any.”