“Docket No. 88-2521 SECRETARY OF LABOR,Complainant,v.KEEFE EARTH BORING COMPANY, INC.,Respondent.OSHRC Docket No. 88-2521DECISION Before: FOULKE, Chairman; MONTOYA and WISEMAN, Commissioners.BY THE COMMISSION:This case presents a motion for relief from seven final ordersof the Commission, entered by operation of law, pursuant to section 10(a) of theOccupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. ? 651-678 (\”theAct\”).[[1\/]] Administrative Law Judge Edwin G. Salyers denied relief from the finalorders. For the following reasons, we affirm his ruling.I A. The Origins of this ProceedingDuring an approximately 15-month period, from late 1986 toearly 1988, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (\”OSHA\”), of theU.S. Department of Labor, issued eight citations to Keefe Earth Boring Company(\”KEBCO\” or \”the company\”). The citations alleged instances ofnoncompliance with OSHA’s standards regulating construction safety, which appear in 29C.F.R. Part 1926. Our table, below, shows the four issuance dates of the eight citations,their classifications, the cited standards, and the proposed penalties:October 29, 1986 1) Serious: 1926.450(a)(1)– ladders $ 240.00 1926.651(c)– sloping, and 1926.651(q) — bracing 280.00 1926.651(i)(1)–spoil piles 240.00 October 14, 1987 2) Repeat: 1926.651(c) –sloping 1,400.00 3) Nonserious: 1926.20(b)(1)–training 0.00 December 10, 1987 4) Willful: 1926.651(c) — sloping 7,000.00 5) Repeat: 1926.20(b)(1) — training 200.00 January 6, 1988 6) Serious: 1926.100(a) — hard hats 600-00 7) Willful: 1926.651(c) –sloping 10,000.00 3) Repeat: 1926.20(b)(1) –training 400.00 Because KEBCO did not file notices of contest to the citations and penalties within thefifteen working – day period immediately following the issuance dates, the uncontestedcitations and penalties became final orders by operation of law. See n-1, supra.KEBCO did not thereafter pay the penalties. Accordingly, in mid-1988, the Secretary ofLabor (\”the Secretary\”) initiated a penalty collection action in the UnitedStates District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, which has jurisdiction overthe area in which KEBCO performed its construction work.[[2\/]] The company, intending todefend against the citations and penalties in the court proceeding, retained an attorney,and it was he who realized that the company should have filed timely notices of contestfor the purpose of initiating the statutorily prescribed administrative reviewproceedings.On the company’s behalf, therefore, the attorney filed thenotice of contest, dated July 25, 1988, that began this proceeding. The notice of contestincluded a motion for relief from the final orders relating to the eight citations issuedto KEBCO. After KEBCO’s case was docketed,[[3\/]] the Secretary filed a motion to dismissKEBCO’s notice of contest[[4\/]]. Both parties filed sworn testimony, in the form ofaffidavits, in support of their respective positions. The parties sharply dispute whetherKEBCO is entitled to relief from the final orders entered against it in 1987 and 1988after it was given written and oral instructions how to file a notice of contest.[[5\/]]B. KEBCO’s Factual PresentationThe factual content of KEBCO’s notice of contest is unsworn,and we do not rely on it except as background to the company’s sworn statements. Thenotice of contest alleged that, in 1986 and thereafter, KEBCO’s management did notunderstand that OSHA citations and penalties are serious legal actions against asubcontractor:[During each of the inspections, the OSHA] inspectors did speakwith defendant’s men. When . . . informed . . . that Keefe did not control or create thepits, the inspectors told [the men] to simply trim some dirt from the end of the pit withshovels and \”they would be alright\”– which they did.Defendant understood, therefore, that the contractors who wereresponsible for the creation of the pits were the targets of the OSHA investigation andthat the actions against Keefe were designed merely to keep pressure on those contractors.This belief was supported and reinforced by the fact that theamounts of the penalties and the condition and sizes of the pits seemed to bear nounderstandable relationship and, at the initial settlement meeting [in 1986], Keefe wasmade to understand that OSHA was prepared to negotiate any… penalty and the figureswere, therefore, arbitrary threatened penalties for the aforesaid purpose. KEBCO took the position, therefore, that the general contractorwas responsible for abatement. The company further alleged that \”it thereafter tookthe only alternative steps available to it.\” That is, the company providedalternative protection, requested the general contractors to abate, and directed its ownemployees not to work under hazardous conditions. [[6\/]]The evidentiary support for KEBCO’s claim that companymanagement misunderstood the legal effect of OSHA citations consists of an affidavit fromthe company’s president, Timothy J. Keefe. The president referred to an apparentlybusiness-related dispute that had led to court suits by his brother, and the presidentsought to make a connection between his experiences in court and certain statementsallegedly made by OSHA officials regarding possible adjudication of the 1986 citation:When I got my first OSHA Notice of Violation in October,1986[,] I assumed it was another thing my brother had started up against me. I . . . wentdown to the OSHA office . . . . There were a couple of men in an office and I told themthat we were working in the same type of trenches since [the] 1960’s and that we didn’tever dig the trenches ourselves. The trenches were dug by the contractors who hired us.They told me that if I didn’t agree to pay at least part of the penalty I would have tohire a lawyer and come back for an OSHA hearing, and that I would just lose that hearinganyway. I agreed to pay $400.00 instead of $760.00 for that reason, even though I felt wehadn’t done anything wrong.After the meeting I decided that I would fight the $400.00rather than pay it. I knew that there was no sense in going back for a hearing in the OSHAdepartment as they had already told me that I would lose. I decided that I should waituntil the matter was brought before a real court like I had been involved in with mybrother and my divorce case.Because of the lawsuits with my brother and my divorce, I knewthat I would be served by a Sheriff and have a chance to tell our story in the real court.I never knew, or understood, that the hearings that the OSHA people spoke about and thatwere mentioned in the papers I was given would be a real trial in front of a judge. Ithought the hearing that they talked about would be before themselves, or people in theirdepartment.The president further averred:I have been in business, and in family law suits long enough toknow that you cannot simply ignore the papers which are served upon you. It’s [w]hat Ialways believed, based upon my meeting with the OSHA officials, that the real trial wouldtake place only when and if the OSHA department decided to file in court and I was servedwith court papers. Even after my meeting with them I received letters which said, on theone hand, that if I would provide certain information it \”will allow us to close thecase . . . \” and, on the other hand, papers that said that there would be\”further action\” if we did not pay the penalties. I understood the \”furtheraction\” to be the real court case.(Reference to exhibits omitted).[[7\/]]C. The Secretary’s factual PresentationIn opposing KEBCO’s motion for relief, the Secretary focused onthe written and oral instructions that were provided to KEBCO with each citation. Downeach citation’s right margin, in boldface, was the following admonition:Penalties Are Due Within 15 Days of Receipt of ThisNotification Unless Contested (See enclosed Booklet)There were further instructions centered on the page, insmaller typeface, which also referred to the enclosed booklet:You must abate the violations … and pay the penaltiesproposed, unless within 15 working days … from your receipt of this Citation and penaltyyou mail a notice of contest to the U.S. Department of Labor Area office … (See theenclosed booklet which outlines your rights and responsibilities and should be read inconjunction with this form). You are further notified that unless you inform the AreaDirector in writing that you intend to contest the Citation or proposed penalties withinfifteen working days after receipt, this Citation and the proposed penalties will become afinal order of the Occupational Safety and Health Review commission and may not bereviewed by any court or agency.The enclosed booklet, entitled \”Employer Rights andResponsibilities Following an OSHA Inspection,\” stated:How to ComplyFor violations you do not contest, you must (1) promptly notifythe OSHA Area Director by letter that you have taken the appropriate corrective actionwithin the time set forth in the citation, and (2) pay any penalties itemized therein.[I]f you contest the citation or penalty in good faith,abatement and payment of penalties for those items contested are suspended until theOccupational Safety and Health Review Commission reviews your case and issues a finalorder. The Review Commission is an independent agency and is not a part of the U.S.Department of Labor….However, penalties for items not contested are still due within 15working days. For further details, see the section on How to Contest.(Emphasis in the original.) That section stated:How to ContestIf you wish to contest any portion of your citation, a writtenNotice of Contest must be submitted within 15 working days after receipt….even if youhave orally stated your disagreement….during a telephone conversation or an informalconference.The next paragraph included a sample notice of contest: \”Iwish to contest the citation and penalty proposed for items 3 and 4 of the citation issuedJuly 27, 1984.\”The administrative hearing was described as a trial before ajudge of the Commission:The Contest ProcessIf the written Notice of Contest has been filed within therequired 15 working days, the OSHA Area Director forwards your case to the OccupationalSafety and Health Review Commission. The Commission assigns the case to an administrativelaw judge who usually will schedule a hearing in a public place close to your workplace.Both employers and employees have the right to participate in this hearing[,] whichcontains all the elements of a trial, including examination and cross-examination ofwitnesses. You may choose to represent yourself or be represented by an attorney. Theadministrative law judge may affirm, modify, or eliminate any contested items of thecitation or penalty.The section on \”Informal Conference and Settlement\” specifically warned:\”Please note, however, that an informal conference will neither extend the 15 workingday Notice of Contest period nor take the place of the filing of a written notice if youdesire to contest.\” It further warned:If you do not contest within 15 working days, your citationwill become a final order. After this occurs, the OSHA Area Director may continue toprovide you with information and assistance on how to abate . . . . However, he or she maynot amend or change any . . . final order.In addition to these written instructions concerning how tocontest, President Keefe received oral instructions. An affidavit by the OSHA complianceofficer who made the 1986 inspection stated: OSHA pamphlet 3000 which outlines the employer’s contest rightswas provided to its job foreman, mailed to the employer along with the citations, and Mr.Keefe was told of his contest rights in a telephone conversation on October 22, 1986.Affidavits by the OSHA compliance officer who made the threeinspections between October 1987 and January 1988 further stated that, immediately afterthe October 1987 inspection, he spoke by telephone to President Keefe, and spoke to himagain the day prior to the citation’s issuance. The compliance officer told PresidentKeefe \”of his contest rights.\” In reply, \”Mr. Keefe advised me he had beento the [OSHA] Office on a previous case.\” During the next two inspections, thecompliance officer made telephone calls to President Keefe, who was unavailable when thecalls were made and yet did not return the calls. According to this compliance officer,\”At no time did the employer indicate any intention to contest the citations.\”IIA. ArgumentsKEBCO argues that the OSHA officials to whom President Keefespoke in 1986 in effect misled him:The fact that OSHA officials in an OSHA office represented to aRespondent that any attempt to resist settlement would merely result in an OSHA hearingthat would just be lost anyway, can only be described as deceptive behavior, and cannot beameliorated by handing the Respondent a booklet which contains, buried therein, a sentenceattempting to describe the independent role of the administrative law judge in OSHAproceedings.KEBCO also argues that President Keefe’s failure to file timelynotices of contest was an \”honest mistake.\” President Keefe is \”a laym[a]nwith a high school degree,\”a small contractor who failed to understand the distinctionbetween the Occupational Safety and Health Administration investigative body, and theOccupational Safety and Health Review Commission as a body separate and apart from theinvestigative agency; a not unreasonable mistake.Thinking that OSHA had already rejected his defense and wouldreject his position in any action initiated by notice of contest, President Keefe\”understood that he had the option to allow OSHA to enter its administrative decisionand that then he would still have the opportunity to present his case to what heunderstood to be an independent forum–the courts.\”The Secretary counters that KEBCO’s inaction was not excusableerror. \”Keefe proceeded on the basis of unwarranted assumptions, false analogies, anda marked lack of care and diligence.\” The company’s receipt of plain instructions tocontest or forgo a hearing \”puts in question respondent’s asserted belief that itcould wait until some later court action to raise its alleged defenses.\” Throughoutthe whole 15-month period, \”KEBCO obviously did nothing to educate itself.\”President Keefe never asked \”for an explanation or clarification even though heclearly had an opportunity to do so.\” President Keefe did not \”even use theopportunity afforded by the telephone call from an OSHA compliance officer in 1987 tovoice his concerns or otherwise seek clarification.\” In sum, the Secretary claimsthat, \”[h]aving jumped to a conclusion in 1986, Keefe never bothered to check itsaccuracy.\”[[8\/]] B. DiscussionThe Commission’s authority to grant relief from final ordersentered pursuant to section 10(a) of the Act comes from Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure and Atlantic Marine, Inc. v. OSHRC, 524 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1975). SeeLouisiana-Pacific Corp., 13 BNA OSHC 2020, 1989 CCH OSHD ? 28,409 (No. 86-1266,1989); Stroudsburg Dyeing & Finishing Co., 13 BNA OSHC 2058, 1989 CCH OSHD ?28,443 (No. 88-1830, 1989).[[9\/]] Rule 60(b) permits relief for \”mistake,inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,\” for \”misrepresentation, or othermisconduct of an adverse party,\” or for \”any other reason justifyingrelief.\” Atlantic Marine permits relief for OSHA misconduct, consisting ofdeceptive practices or noncompliance with required procedures. We will first discusswhether any mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, justifies relief underthe federal rule. Then we will turn to whether any OSHA misrepresentation or misconductjustifies relief under Commission case law or the federal rule.Under either theory, the employer has the burden to show asufficient basis for relief from a final order. Roy Kay, Inc., 13 BNA OSHC 2021,2022, 1989 CCH OSHD ? 28,406, p. 37,534 (No. 88-1748, 1989) ; see also Stroudsburg13 BNA OSHC at 2055 OSHD at p. 37,641. Where the employer’s showing consists oraffidavits, we must \”construe[ ] all ambiguous facts in the light most favorableto\” the employer, and resolve any doubts in the employer’s favor. See Jackson v.Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836-38 (D.C. Cir. 1980), quoted in INVST Financial Group v.Chem-Nuclear Systems, 815 F.2d 391, 398 (6th Cir. 1987); cf. Pav-SaverManufacturing Co., 12 BNA OSHC 2001, 2007, 1986-87 CCH OSHD ? 27,676, p. 36,105 (No.84-733, 1986), appeal filed, No. 87-1418 (7th Cir. March 18, 1987) (conflict inaffidavits unresolved).I. Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise, or Excusable NeglectTo qualify for relief under Rule 60(b) because of mistake or asimilar error, a party must show itself justified in failing to avoid its error. Sears,Sucsy & Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 392 F.Supp. 398 (D.I11. 1975). Merecarelessness or negligence, even by a layman, is not excusable. See WesternTransportation Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co., 682 F.2d 1233, 1236 (7th Cir.1982) (a \”negligent mistake\” by a client’s consultant); National Bank ofJoliet v. W.H. Barber Oil Co., 69 F.R.D. 107, 109 (N.D.I11. 1975) (a client’s lack ofdiligence in informing his attorney regarding matters relevant to the suit).\”Ignorance of court rules does not constitute excusable neglect, even if the litigantappears pro se.\” Swimmer v. I.R.S., 811 F.2d 1343, 1345 (9th Cir. 1987)(a pro se party’s failure to respond in time because of misreading the procedural rules).In short, a layman must exercise reasonable diligence, and whatis reasonable may vary, depending on the information available to the layman. Compare,Kinnear Corp. v. Crawford Door Sales Co.,49 F.R.D. 3, 6 (D.S.C. 1970)(misunderstanding how to make a proper answer is excusable if a layman did try), withKendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 175 (6th Cir. 1984) (pro se party’s failure torespond, due to failure to consult the procedural rules, is not excusable). Relief may bejustified \”if the party offers a credible explanation for the delay that does notexhibit disregard for the judicial proceedings,\” revealing no \”intent tothwart\” or \”reckless disregard for the effect of its conduct.\” ShepardClaims Service, Inc. v. William Darrah & Associates, 796 F.2d 190, 194 & 195(6th Cir. 1986) See Collex, Inc. v. Walsh, 69 F.R.D. 20, 23 (E.D.Pa. 1975)(\”[R]epeated allegations that Mr. Walsh could not file an answer because he could notretrieve his papers from the attorney who advised him in the early stages of this matter,have lost their ring after six months of repetition\”).Relatively recently, the Commission declined to accept a late-filed notice of contest froman employer who, although unsophisticated in OSHA matters, had received the usual writteninstructions concerning the time period for contesting a citation. The employer had neverbefore been cited, did not have a legal department, claimed not to have\”appreciate[d] the essence of the fifteen day period it had to reply,\” andtherefore took too long gathering information that it wished to consider before decidingwhether to contest. Roy Kay, 13 BNA OSHC at 2022, 1989 CCH OSHD at p. 37,534.\”However,\” the commission responded, \”ignorance of procedural rules doesnot constitute ‘excusable neglect’ within Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).\” 13BNA OSHC at 2022, 1989 CCH OSHD at p. 37,534. The employer \”was explicitly told\”of the fifteen working-day contest period by the citation itself and by OSHA’s letter thataccompanied it. 13 BNA OSHC at 2023, 1989 CCH OSHD at p. 37,534.Rule 60(b) cannot be invoked \”to give relief to a partywho has chosen a course of action which in retrospect appears unfortunate or where erroror miscalculation is traceable really to a lack of care.\” Sadowski v. BombardierLtd., 539 F.2d 615, 618 (7th Cir. 1976).13 BNA OSHC at 2022, 1989 CCH OSHD at p. 37,534.In this case, it is clear that KEBCO has failed to show itsentitlement to relief under Rule 60(b). OSHA provided extensive instructions, of a plainand simple nature, to assist Keefe and other employers lacking experience with OSHAcitations and lacking legal advice as to how to contest them. If President Keefe hadcarefully read even portions of the written instructions stated and reiterated on the faceof the 1987 and 1988 citations, he would have known how to proceed. He would also haveknown that his failure to contest the citations in a timely manner would preclude him fromchallenging the citations at a later time. OSHA’s booklet accompanying the citationsprovided additional, straightforward explanations and, if President Keefe still had anyquestions, he could have responded to the compliance officer’s telephone calls. With theexercise of due diligence, President Keefe could have avoided his errors.2. Misrepresentation or MisconductThe affidavit’s claim of misconduct by OSHA officials refersexplicitly to the 1986 citation, and only inferentially explains KEBCO’s inaction on thelater citations, which were received in the succeeding 15 months. The thrust of KEBCO’sclaim is that OSHA officials, by belittling KEBCO’s chances in \”an OSHA hearing\”regarding the 1986 citation, led President Keefe to believe that an administrativedecision had been rendered against the company’s defense to that citation and any onesthat might be issued thereafter. However, the alleged remarks by the OSHA officials, seenote 8 supra, did not explicitly pertain to any future case against KEBCO, and thelater-issued citations were facially separate matters, which KEBCO could have contested intheir own right.Moreover, the context of the OSHA officials’ remarks, assumingthat they were in fact made, is significant. Informal settlement negotiations wereunderway concerning the1986 citation, and OSHA officials were trying to persuade PresidentKeefe to accept the offer of a penalty reduction rather than to exercise his statutoryright to file a notice of contest and defend the alleged violation on the basis thatcompliance with the cited standards was another contractor’s responsibility. The OSHAofficials were not purporting to provide competent advice on how to defend a contestedcase. In addition, they were not purporting to describe the process or persons by which acontested case would be adjudicated. Insofar as President Keefe’s affidavit shows, he didnot explicitly ask how to contest the citation, whether he could contest it and obtain ahearing despite the OSHA officials’ opinions, and who would conduct the hearing. Theofficials did not voice anything that would have confused the company president as to howto proceed. In short, we find no OSHA misconduct warranting relief from the final ordersentered in 1987 and 1988. Compare Merritt Electric Co., 9 BNA OSHC 2088, 2090, 1981CCH OSHD ? 25,556: p. 31,871 (No. 77- 3772, 1981) (erroneous indication that an informalconference served as a notice of contest); Henry C. Beck Co., 8 BNA OSHC 1395,1400, 1980 CCH OSHD ? 24,484, p. 29,906 (No. 11864, 1980) (silent participation in amiscalculation of the date on which a notice of contest was due); B.J. Hughes, Inc.7 BNA OSHC 1471, 1476-77, 1979 CCH OSHD ? 23,675, p. 28,710 (No. 76-2165, 1979)(miscalculation of the date on which a notice of contest was due). [[10\/]]We note that disparaging remarks such as those alleged to have been made by the OSHAofficials in this case can have the effect of discouraging an employer from pursuing itsrights, particularly where the employer lacks legal counsel and is making a first-timeappearance at an OSHA area office to discuss a citation. Therefore, in general, OSHAofficials should make clear that they are only expressing their own opinions aboutproposed defenses and that the ultimate authority to rule on an employer’s defenses lieselsewhere. However, as long as an OSHA official has not misled or improperly confused anemployer as to how to file a notice of contest, we are unwilling to conclude that anemployer’s decision not to file the notice of contest has been unfairly affected merelybecause the employer has been exposed to OSHA’s disparaging remarks. See Keppel’s,Inc., 7 BNA OSHC 1442, 1444, 1979 CCH OSHD ? 23,622, p. 28,636 (No. 77-3020, 1979)(the \”subjective feeling of ‘intimidation’\” that may have contributed to thebelated contest \”apparently existed despite the Secretary’s adherence to properprocedure and lack of deception\”). Therefore, we find no misrepresentation ormisconduct by OSHA that would justify relief from the final orders. [[11\/]]IIIAccordingly, we affirm the judge’s decision denying KEBCO’smotion for relief from the final orders and dismissing KEBCO’s notice of contest.Edwin G. Foulke, Jr.ChairmanVelma Montoya CommissionerDonald G. WisemanCommissionerDated: March 25, 1991SECRETARY OF LABOR,Complainant,v.KEEFE EARTH BORING COMPANY, INC., Respondent.OSHRC Docket No. 88-2521ORDER ON MOTION FOR RELIEFUNDER FEDERAL RULE 60 (b)The respondent in this case was issued citations pursuant tosection 9(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (29 U.S.C. ? 651, et seq.)on three separate occasions in 1986, 1987 and 1988. Respondent did not file a timelynotice of contest to these citations within the time specified in the Act. Thesecitations, therefore, became final orders of the Occupational Safety and Health ReviewCommission pursuant to the operation of law.Acting through its attorney, respondent has filed a motion forrelief under Federal Rule 60(b) claiming that respondent’s failure to act was due tomistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, or other reasons contemplated by Rule 60(b). Theparties have now submitted affidavits and memoranda in support of their respectivepositions. Upon review of the entire record, it is determined that the factual allegationscontained in respondent’s affidavit do not form a basis for relief under Federal Rule60(b). Louisiana Pacific Corporation, 86 OSAHRC ________, ________ BNAOSHC________, 1986-87 CCH OSHD ? 27,818 (No. 86-1266); Roy Kay, Inc., 88 OSAHRC_______,__________ BNA OSHC ________, 1988 CCH OSHD ? _______ (No.88-1748).Accordingly, respondent’s motion is DENIED and this matter isDISMISSED.EDWIN G. SALYERS JudgeDate: February 8, 1989FOOTNOTES: [[1\/]] Section 10(a), 29 U.S.C. ? 659(a), provides, inpertinent part:If, after an inspection or investigation, the Secretary issuesa citation . . . the employer has fifteen working days within which to notify theSecretary that he wishes to contest the citation or proposed assessment of penalty. If . .. the employer fails to notify the Secretary that he intends to contest . . . the citationand the assessment, as proposed, shall be deemed a final order of the Commission and notsubject to review by any court or agency.[[2\/]] Section 17(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. ? 666(1), permitsthe Secretary to institute a penalty collection action in \”the district where theviolation is alleged to have occurred or where the employer has its principaloffice.\” The action may be brought \”within five years from the date when theclaim first accrued.\” 28 U.S.C. ? 2462.[[3\/]] \”By docketing an apparently late notice of contest,the Commission merely provides a forum in which the timeliness of the notice of contestmay be adjudicated.\” Branciforte Builders, 9 BNA OSHC 2113, 2115 n.3, 1981 CCHOSHD ? 25,591, p. 31,921 n.3 (No.80-1920, 1981), citing Norkin Plumbing Co., 5 BNAOSHC 2062, 2062-63, 1977-78 CCH OSHD ? 22,296, p. 26,848 (No.76-4316, 1977).[[4\/]] The direction for review asked whether KEBCO’s motionfor relief complied with the time requirement of Federal Rule 60(b), which limits motionssuch as KEBCO’s to one year following entry of a final order. KEBCO filed its motionwithin the year following entry of the 1987 and 1988 final orders, which are the sevenfinal orders before us for review. See n.5, infra. Accordingly, KEBCO’s motion wastimely filed.[[5\/]] As our discussion of the record will indicate, KEBCOrelies heavily on certain events surrounding the first citation, issued in 1986, as thebasis for relief from the final orders arising out of the 1987 and 1988 citations. Thereremains no issue of relief from the 1986 citation itself, however. In 1989, the districtcourt in the above-mentioned collection action granted summary judgment to the Secretaryregarding the first citation, on the ground that KEBCO \”waived the opportunity toobject to the first citation\” when, within the fifteen working-day period after thecitation issued, KEBCO entered into a settlement agreement with OSHA, agreeing toaffirmance of the citation in exchange for reductions in the Secretary’s proposedpenalties. The court declined to grant summary judgment as to the remaining sevencitations, however, on the ground that their status as final orders is a proper issue forconsideration by this Commission. Secretary v. Keefe Earth Boring Co., 702 F.Supp.705 (N.D.Ill. 1989).[[6\/]] KEBCO also generally alleged improper service of thecitations, but the Secretary has documented each certified mail delivery to KEBCO’s officeaddress. See Stroudsburg Dyeing & Finishing Co., 13 BNA OSHC 2058, 1989 CCHOSHD ? 28,443 (No. 88-1830, 1989) Henry C. Beck Co.,\u00a0 8 BNA OSHC 1395, 1399,1980 CCH OSHD ? 24,484, pp. 29,904-905 (No. 11864, 1980); 29 U.S.C. ? 659(a)(\”notify the employer by certified mail\”).[[7\/]] One of the letters from OSHA that is referred to in thepresident’s affidavit requested information about abatement: \”This information willallow us to close the case and may negate the necessity of a follow up inspection.\”The other letter demanded payment of the penalties: \”If the total amount due … isnot paid … the matter will be referred to the National Office of [OSHA]… for furtheraction.\”[[8\/]] The Secretary also posits that President Keefe onlyinferred that his defense was being adjudged deficient when he was told, correctly, thatanother contractor’s responsibility for a condition does not eliminate the company’s dutyto protect its employees. \”[H]is affidavit does not establish that it is more likelythan not that the statements attributed to OSHA were actually made.\” The Secretaryargues that \”the OSHA official in question would testify that no such statements weremade.\” This statement is not sworn testimony.[[9\/]] \”To preserve the issue for appeal,\” theSecretary asserts that the Commission lacks the authority to grant relief.[[10\/]] KEBCO claims that it reasonably relied on what was, ineffect, erroneous legal advice from the OSHA officials. In support of granting reliefunder Rule 60(b), KEBCO cites Fleming v. Huebsch Laundry, 159 F.2d 581, 584, 585(7th Cir. 1947). That case, however, involved a party who \”was hardly to blame foraccepting the law as given to him by the Government officials\” because the agency’swritten official interpretations exceeded 50,406 pages. Incorrect legal advice mightexcuse a party if, as a practical matter, the party had to rely on it. However, a partywho is \”fully informed of the relevant legal considerations\” and\”sufficiently sophisticated and experienced to protect its interests\” is notjustified in relying on \”erroneous legal advice.\” Meadows v. DominicanRepublic, 628 F.Supp. 599, 609 (N.D.Ca. 1986), aff’d, 817 F.2d 517, 521-22 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied 108 S.Ct. 486 and 106 U.S. 487 (1987). See also, Atchison,Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Matchmaker, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 63, 65 (D.Colo. 1985);Railroad Maintenance Laborers’ v. American Railroad Construction Co., 96 F.R.D.433, 435 (N.D.Ill. 1983).[[11\/]] We also do not find \”any other reason justifyingrelief.\” Rule 60(b)(6). Reason (6) of the federal rule encompasses only reasons otherthan the ones already mentioned in the rule. See Menier v. United States, 405 F.2d245, 248 (5th Cir. 1968), citing Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614-15(1948); See also Rebco Steel, Corp., 8 BNA OSHC 1235, 1237, 1980 CCH OSHD 24,334,p. 29,646 (No. 77-2040, 1980). KEBCO generally requests relief by way of reason (6) butdoes not specify a rationale, and we do not see any.”