“Docket No. 81-2135 SECRETARY OF LABOR,Complainant,v.THERMAL REDUCTION CORPORATION, Respondent.OSHRC Docket No. 81-2135DECISIONBefore:\u00a0 BUCKLEY, Chairman, and CLEARY, Commissioner.CLEARY, Commissioner:This case is before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commissionunder 29 U.S.C. ? 661(i), section 12(j) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of1970, 29 U.S.C. ?? 651-678 (\”the Act\”).\u00a0 The Commission is anadjudicatory agency, independent of the Department of Labor and the Occupational Safetyand Health Administration.\u00a0 It was established to resolve disputes arising out ofenforcement actions brought by the Secretary of Labor under the Act and has no regulatoryfunctions. \u00a0 See section 10(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. ? 659(c).I.At issue in this case is a single alleged willful violation of the Secretary’srecordkeeping regulation at 29 C.F.R. ? 1904.7, which requires in pertinent part that\”[e]ach employer shall provide, upon request, records provided for in ?? 1904.2,1904.4, and 1904.5, for inspection and copying by any representative of the Secretary ofLabor for the purpose of carrying out the provision of the act….\” The allegedviolation resulted from an inspection conducted pursuant to a warrant which was based on acomplaint by a former employee that unsafe and unhealthful conditions existed in afacility of Thermal Reduction Corporation (\”Thermal\”).\u00a0 The warrantauthorized the Secretary to inspect the worksite to determine whether Thermal was incompliance with the Act with regard to the conditions charged in the complaint.\u00a0 Thewarrant also authorized the inspection and copying of \”injury and illnesses [sic]records required to be maintained by 29 C.F.R. ? 1904.\”\u00a0 This case concerns therecords prescribed by 29 C.F.R. ? 1904.2, which requires that an employer maintain a logand summary of recordable occupational injuries and illnesses on form OSHA No. 200 or itsequivalent.The parties stipulated that on two separate occasions, June 1 and June 2,1981, Nicholas Schorsch, Thermal’s vice-president, refused to produce Thermal’s OSHA Form200 at the request of Sullivan, the Secretary’s compliance officer.\u00a0 Schorsch refusedSullivan’s request because Sullivan would not sign a \”Statement of Intent\”prepared by Schorsch which read as follows:\u00a0 \”No information Nicholas Schorsch,of the Thermal Reduction Corporation, divulges will be used against the Thermal ReductionCorporation, or any of its divisions, at this or any time.\”\u00a0 The stipulationstates that Schorsch indicated he had read the warrant and was familiar with itsprovisions.\u00a0 The warrant application and supporting documentation were incorporatedby the stipulation.\u00a0 No evidentiary hearing was held.Based on the stipulation, Administrative Law Judge Paul A. Tenney foundThermal in willful violation as alleged.\u00a0 The judge rejected Thermal’s contentionthat the provision of the warrant allowing the Secretary access to records kept by Thermalwas invalid because it was not supported by a showing of probable cause[[1]] and becausethe Act does not permit the Secretary to examine any employer records during a physicalinspection.\u00a0 The judge also concluded, contrary to Thermal’s arguments, that in orderto prove a violation of 29 C.F.R. ? 1904.7 the Secretary does not have to establisheither that employees are endangered by the employer’s failure to disclose records or thatrecordable injuries or illnesses have occurred in the employer’s facility.\u00a0 For thereasons stated in our separate opinions, Chairman Buckley and I affirm Judge Tenney’sdecision.[[2]]IIThe parties do not dispute that section 8 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. ? 657, imposes specificrecordkeeping responsibilities on employers. Thus, section 8(c)(1) requires that eachemployer prepare and make available to the Secretary those records \”regarding hisactivities relating to this Act\” which the Secretary \”may prescribe byregulation as necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of this Act or for developinginformation regarding the causes and prevention of occupational accidents andillnesses.\”\u00a0 Section 8(c)(2) imposes a mandatory duty on the Secretary toprescribe regulations \”requiring employers to maintain accurate records of, and tomake periodic reports on, work-related deaths, injuries and illnesses other than minorinjuries requiring only first-aid treatments that do not involve medical treatment, lossof consciousness, restriction of work or motion, or transfer to another job.\”\u00a0At section 8(g)(2) of the Act Congress empowered the Secretary to \”prescribesuch rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out [his] responsibilitiesunder this Act, including rules and regulations dealing with the inspection of anemployer’s establishment.\”\u00a0 Pursuant to the authority conferred by section 8 theSecretary promulgated ?? 1904.2 and 1904.5, requiring the maintenance of the log andsummary at issue in this case, as well as ? 1904.4, requiring the employer to makesupplementary records of each occupational injury or illness.\u00a0 In addition to ?1904.7, the disclosure regulation cited here, the Secretary also promulgated a regulationat 29 C.F.R. ? 1903.3, which expressly authorizes inspectors during an inspection\”to review records required by the Act and regulations published in this chapter. . ..\”The Act states that its purpose is to develop safe and healthful workingconditions in part \”by providing for appropriate reporting procedures with respect tooccupational safety and health which procedures will help achieve the objectives of thisAct and accurately describe the nature of the occupational safety and healthproblem.\”\u00a0 Section 2(b)(12).\u00a0 The legislative history of section 8 clearlyindicates Congress’s recognition that a comprehensive system of recording and reportingoccupational injuries and illnesses is essential to achieving the purposes of the Act andinsuring employer compliance with its requirements.\u00a0 The Senate committee stated that\”[f]ull and accurate information is a fundamental precondition for meaningfuladministration of an occupational safety and health program.\”\u00a0 S. Rep. No.91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1970), reprinted in Subcomm. on Labor ofthe Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., Legislative History ofthe Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, at 156 (Comm. Print 1971).\u00a0 Accordingto the conference committee, recordkeeping is required \”to insure compliance\” aswell as for the collection of research information.\u00a0 H.R. Rep. No. 91-1765, 91stCong., 2d Sess. 36 (Comm. Print 1971, at 1189).\u00a0 As the Secretary stated at 29 C.F.R.? 1904.1, entitled \”Purpose and scope\”:These sections provide for recordkeeping and reporting by employers coveredunder the act as necessary or appropriate for enforcement of the act, for developinginformation regarding the causes and prevention of occupational accidents and illnesses,and for maintaining a program of collection, compilation and analysis of occupationalsafety and health statistics . . .[[3]]There is no basis on which to conclude, and Thermal does not contend, thatthe obligations imposed on employers by section 8(c) do not reasonably implement thepurposes of the legislation or that Congress could not reasonably determine that theserequirements would accomplish its goals.\u00a0 Similarly, it is well settled thatregulations issued pursuant to an agency’s authority to promulgate rules necessary for theimplementation of a statute will be upheld so long as they are reasonably related toachieving the purposes of the legislation.\u00a0 Mourning v. Family Publications, Inc.,411 U.S. 356 (1973); Gemsco v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945).\u00a0 The Secretary’spromulgation of Part 1904 requiring that the employer maintain injury and illness recordsand produce such records for examination during a physical inspection reasonablyeffectuates Congress’s requirement that employers maintain and make available to theSecretary records pertaining to the incidence of injuries and illnesses in the workplace.\u00a0Accordingly, the examination of these records during an inspection is consistentwith the Act.[[4]] The warrant allowing the Secretary access to Thermal’s records required underPart 1904 is valid for similar reasons.\u00a0 In Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc.,436 U.S. 307, 321 (1978), the Supreme Court concluded that probable cause for issuance ofan inspection warrant under the Act could be based on \”reasonable legislative oradministrative standards,\” and that any general plan for enforcement of the Actderived from \”neutral sources\” would suffice.\u00a0 The maintenance of employeeinjury and illness records required by regulations pursuant to section 8(c) and thedisclosure of such records to the Secretary constitutes a reasonable legislative andadministrative plan for the enforcement of the Act within the meaning of the Barlow’sdecision.\u00a0 And since all employers must maintain and provide the same information,these requirements are neutral in their application, as further required under Barlow’s.\u00a0 Since the requirements of Barlow’s have been satisfied, there was probablecause for the provision of the warrant allowing the Secretary to examine those recordsrequired to be kept under Part 1904.5\u00a0 See Donovan v. Enterprise Foundry,Inc., No. 84-1329 (1st Cir. Dec. 20, 1984).Thermal contends, nevertheless, that it is not in violation of the disclosure regulationcited in this case.\u00a0 Thermal argues that the Commission cannot affirm a citation forfailure to produce injury and illness records at the request of the Secretary absent proofby the Secretary that its employees are endangered by the failure to disclose, and absentproof that recordable injuries or illnesses had in fact occurred at its workplace.\u00a0Thermal further argues that it cannot be found in violation of 29 C.F.R. ? 1904.7 becausethe warrant on which the inspection was based allows the Secretary only to examine thePart 1904 records and does not require Thermal affirmatively to produce suchrecords.[[6]]\u00a0 Thermal also contends that to require it to assist in the Secretary’sexamination of its records would violate the privilege against self-incrimination.Judge Tenney concluded that exposure to a hazard is not an element of proofof the disclosure regulation but that an employer can defend against an alleged violationof that regulation by affirmatively proving that it has not experienced any recordableinjuries or illnesses.\u00a0 Since the stipulation in this case does not demonstrate anabsence of injuries or illnesses, the judge found a violation.\u00a0 The judge alsoconcluded that the privilege against self-incrimination does not protect against thedisclosure of corporate as opposed to personal records, but did not expressly rule onThermal’s other contention that requiring production would in any event be contrary to theprecise wording of the warrant.The judge correctly held that a requirement that the Secretary demonstrateexposure of employees to a hazard is not appropriate in cases dealing with recordkeepingregulations.\u00a0 Under section 3(8) of the Act, substantive standards must be\”reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe and healthful employment . . ..\” Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute,448 U.S. 607 (1980); Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, Division of United TechnologiesCorp. v. Secretary of Labor, 649 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981).\u00a0 Recordkeepingregulations, however, are not intended to eliminate an existing and identified hazard in aparticular workplace.\u00a0 Rather, as previously indicated, they are promulgated pursuantto a different section of the Act, section 8, which mandates that the Secretary prescriberecordkeeping and reporting requirements for work-related injuries and illnesses andauthorizes the Secretary to make other provisions as the Secretary deems necessary for theimplementation of the Act.\u00a0 See Louisiana Chemical Association v. Bingham,657 F.2d 777, 782 (5th Cir. 1981), in which the court differentiated standards fromregulations according to whether the rule \”reasonably purports to correct aparticular ‘significant risk’ or instead is merely an enforcement or detection procedureto further the goals of the Act generally.\”\u00a0 Cf. General Motors Corp.,Inland Division, 80 OSAHRC 85\/A2, 8 BNA OSHC 2036, 1980 CCH OSHD ? 24,743(No.76-5033, 1980) (recordkeeping requirements of the Act cannot be considered de minimisin nature, that is, trifling or insignificant, in view of the importance of theserequirements in providing information to be used in improving the safety and healthfulnessof workplaces). Judge Tenney’s conclusion that an employer should be permitted to defendagainst an alleged violation of 29 C.F.R. ? 1904.7 by showing an absence of recordableinjuries or illnesses is based on the regulation’s silence as to the employer’s duty insuch circumstances as well as on the Commission’s prior decision in Jack SheltonPainting Co., 74 OSAHRC 72\/A14, 2 BNA OSHC 1264, 1974-75 CCH OSHD ? 18,829 (No. 1111,1974).\u00a0 In that case a judge vacated a citation for violation of 29 C.F.R. ? 1904.4regarding supplementary injury and illness records. The judge ruled, and the Commissionagreed, that there could not have been a violation of this regulation since no employee atthe establishment involved had ever had an occupational injury or illness.Shelton, however, is distinguishable.\u00a0 Subsequent to thatdecision, but prior to the issuance of the citation here, the Secretary amended 29 C.F.R.? 1904.5, which prescribes instructions for completing the annual summary portion of theForm 200.\u00a0 42 Fed. Reg. 65165 (1977).\u00a0 As amended, ? 1904.5 specificallyrequires an employer to make entries on the Form 200 even in the absence of recordableinjuries or illnesses:\u00a0 \”If no injuries or illnesses occurred in the year, zerosmust be entered on the totals line, and the form must be posted.\”\u00a0 Since ?1904.7 requires the disclosure of the Form 200, we conclude that the Secretary does nothave to establish the existence of recordable injuries or illnesses as a precondition toexamining Thermal’s records under ? 1904.7 and that Thermal may not defend against analleged violation of that section by demonstrating that it has not experienced anyinjuries or illnesses.Contrary to Thermal’s contention, it may be found in violation of ? 1904.7despite the fact that the warrant does not expressly require Thermal to produce its injuryand illness records for the Secretary’s examination.\u00a0 The warrant allows theSecretary access to these records consistent with the Fourth Amendment,[[7]] while ?1904.7 is an appropriate exercise of the Secretary’s statutory authority to determine themanner by which he will examine such records.\u00a0 The warrant also does not by its plainwording preclude the Secretary from requiring Thermal to produce the appropriate recordsfor the Secretary’s examination.As Judge Tenney correctly observed, the privilege against self-incriminationdoes not extend to the disclosure of corporate as opposed to individual records, nor may acorporate officer or custodian of corporate records refuse to produce corporate records onthe ground that such records will incriminate either the corporation or the individual.\u00a0 Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957); United States v. White,322 U.S. 694 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Gemsco v.Walling, supra.\u00a0 This rule is particularly applicable with respect to recordsrequired to be kept by law.\u00a0 Wilson, supra, 221 U.S. at 380.\u00a0 SeeShapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).\u00a0 Accordingly, Thermalcannot claim a privilege against self-incrimination in the circumstances presentedhere.[[8]]V.Assuming that the judge did not err in concluding that a privilege againstself-incrimination could not be claimed in the circumstances presented here and did noterr in rejecting Thermal’s other contentions regarding the existence of a violation,Thermal claims nevertheless that it did not commit a willful violation.\u00a0 Thermalargues that its failure to disclose the Form 200 is not willful in nature because therecord does not show that Schorsch was aware that self-incrimination was not a validground for refusal to produce corporate records.\u00a0 Although before the judge Thermalcharacterized Schorsch as requesting an assurance against self-incrimination, Thermal nowcontends before us that the Secretary also made no attempt to determine specifically whatSchorsch was seeking, such as a nondisclosure agreement, a release from civil liability,or Fifth Amendment protection.\u00a0 Lastly, Thermal points out that the stipulation doesnot show that Schorsch was actually aware that production of the Form 200 was requiredunder the Act, but that even if Schorsch had indicated such an awareness, he simply wouldhave been mistaken as to the requirements of the law in view of cases holding that recordsdo not have to be produced during the physical inspection.To establish that a violation is willful, the Secretary must show that it wascommitted with intentional, knowing or voluntary disregard for the requirements of the Actor with plain indifference to employee safety.\u00a0 Asbestos Textile Co., Inc., 84OSAHRC __\/__, 12 BNA OSHC 1062, 1984 CCH OSHD ? 27,101 (No. 79-3831, 1984).\u00a0 In thiscase, Schorsch refused to disclose the Form 200 because the inspector would not sign astatement purporting to protect Thermal from liability.\u00a0 Since the case law is wellsettled that a corporation cannot claim the right against self-incrimination as to theproduction of corporate records required by law, Schorsch could not reasonably havebelieved that he had a right to refuse to produce the OSHA Form 200 on this basis.\u00a0 SeeAnaconda Aluminum Co., 81 OSAHRC 27\/A2, 9 BNA OSHC 1460, 1478-79, 1981 CCH OSHD ?25,300 at p. 31,351 (No. 13102, 1981).\u00a0 In addition, the stipulation states thatSchorsch refused to answer questions asked of him by the inspector, Sullivan. Therefore,there is no merit to Thermal’s further argument that the violation cannot be found willfulbecause the Secretary failed to make an additional inquiry to determine specifically whatsort of protection Schorsch was seeking.The Secretary presented a warrant which expressly allowed the Secretaryaccess to the OSHA Form 200.\u00a0 Furthermore, contrary to Thermal’s argument, the recorddemonstrates that Schorsch was aware that he was required by law to produce the OSHA logat the Secretary’s request, [[9]] and the instructions to the form itself state that itmust be available for inspection and copying.\u00a0 Finally, there is no case lawestablishing that records such as the Form 200 cannot be examined during an inspection.\u00a0Accordingly, the violation is willful in nature as alleged.\u00a0 Thermalconsciously refused to comply with the Act and the disclosure regulation in issue eventhough it was fully aware of its obligation to disclose its Form 200 at the Secretary’srequest and had no reasonable justification for not doing so.\u00a0 See Colemanv. Jiffy June Farms Inc., 458 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,409 U.S. 948 (1972).The judge assessed the proposed penalty of $1000 primarily on the basis ofthe willful character of the violation.\u00a0 In the circumstances, the assessment isappropriate.The judge’s decision is therefore affirmed.FOR THE COMMISSION Ray H. Darling, Jr.Executive Secretary DATED:\u00a0 APR 17 1985 BUCKLEY, Chairman, concurring:When the issues in this case are succinctly stated, the case is much lesscomplex than the parties have made it.[[10\/]]\u00a0 The cited regulation requiresRespondent to provide to the Secretary upon request certain records required to bemaintained by regulation.\u00a0 29 C.F.R. ? 1904.7 (\”Each employer shall provide,upon request, records provided for in ?? 1904.2, 1904.4, and 1904.5, for inspection andcopying by any representative of the Secretary of Labor . . . .\”) Respondent has notchallenged the authority of the Secretary or Congress to require that these records bemaintained and it is uncontroverted that the requested records fall within the category ofrecords required to be maintained.\u00a0 Respondent has admitted that it did not complywith the Secretary’s request for such records.\u00a0 A violation is therefore establishedunless there is some reason why Respondent was not legally required to provide theserecords to the Secretary.\u00a0 I find no legal impediment to the Secretary’s request andno legal excuse for the Respondent’s failure to provide the records for examination.Respondent first asserts that the Secretary cannot obtain these recordswithout a subpoena and that he is not authorized to examine them during a physicalinspection of the worksite.\u00a0 I disagree with both contentions.\u00a0 Thermal’sargument that the Secretary cannot obtain the records without a subpoena is premised onthe assertions that section 8(a) of the Act does not authorize the inspection of recordsduring a physical inspection of the workplace, and that the statutory authority for theSecretary to inspect documentary evidence found in section 8(b) of the Act requires theSecretary to obtain a subpoena.\u00a0 Whether these assertions have merit is irrelevantbecause the request for records made by the Secretary in this case was authorized by adifferent section of the Act not subject to the restrictions Respondent cites sections8(a) and (b).The standards at 29 C.F.R. ?? 1904.2, 1904.4, and 1904.7, which requireemployers to maintain certain records and provide the records to the Secretary forinspection and copying, were promulgated under the statutory mandate in section 8(c) ofthe Act. Section 8(c) requires each employer to maintain and provide to the Secretarycertain records regarding the employer’s activities related to the Act, including injuryand illness records.\u00a0 The statute also authorizes the Secretary to promulgateregulations necessary or appropriate for enforcement of this statutory authority. \u00a0The standard at 29 C.F.R. ? 1904.7 is authorized by, and subject to the limits of,section 8(c) of the Act.\u00a0 I find nothing in either section 8(a) or 8(b) that limitsthe statutory requirement in section 8(c) that the employer keep these records and makethem available to the Secretary upon request.\u00a0 The standard at 29 C.F.R. ? 1904.7was properly promulgated under the authority of section 8(c) and the Secretary is notlimited by the language of sections 8(a) and 8(b). See Donovan v. WollastonAlloys, Inc., 695 F.2d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1982).\u00a0 Nor does section 8(c) require theSecretary to obtain a subpoena to examine records or preclude examination in the course ofa plant inspection.Respondent has not challenged the Secretary’s authority under section 8(c) toissue 29 C.F.R. ? 1904.7.\u00a0 The only challenge to that authority would be thatsection 8(c) is unconstitutional to the extent that it may permit the \”search\”of an employer’s record without a search warrant.\u00a0 Because there was a warrantobtained in this case, that argument clearly does not apply here.\u00a0 The records soughtby the Secretary here are strictly limited to records required by section 8(c) andregulations promulgated pursuant to that section.\u00a0 It is unnecessary to decide herethe questions of whether a warrant is required for the Secretary to obtain records undersection 8(c) or whether Thermal’s arguments would be correct for records not required tobe kept by authority of section 8(c). Respondent also asserts that the evidence should be suppressed because therewas insufficient probable cause for the magistrate to issue a broad-based warrant, andbecause the inspection went beyond the limits permitted by the warrant.\u00a0 There was anindependent determination made by a United States magistrate that there was probable causeto issue the warrant.\u00a0 The Commission and its administrative law judges have noauthority to review such a determination by a judicial officer of a court created underArticle III of the United States Constitution.\u00a0 See Brooks Woolen Co.,Nos. 79-45 and 79-158, slip op. at 3-4 (April 10, 1985) (view of Chairman Buckley); BeautyCraft Tile of the Southwest, Inc., 84 OSAHRC ____, 12 BNA OSHC 1082, 1083, 1984-85 CCHOSHD ? 27,091, pp. 34,929-30 (No. 80-471, 1984) (lead opinion).\u00a0 Accepting andruling on Respondent’s argument that probable cause did not exist to support a broad-basedwarrant would require the Commission to sit as an appellate review body in judgment on thedecision of an Article III court.\u00a0 The Commission cannot do this and must accept theCourt’s decision to issue the warrant.\u00a0 Id.The Commission and it’s judges can, as overseer of the administration of theAct, examine the conduct of OSHA’s officials in obtaining and executing the warrant.\u00a0 A finding that OSHA misled the magistrate in its application for the warrant orexceeded the scope of the warrant might justify the suppression of evidence thusimproperly obtained.\u00a0 Such an inquiry is not a review of the magistrate’sdetermination of probable cause.\u00a0 Suppressing evidence that has been improperlyobtained is appropriate where the effect would be to deter improper conduct by officialscharged with enforcing the law.\u00a0 Here there is no allegation and no evidence tosupport the argument that any OSHA official acted improperly in seeking or obtaining thewarrant.\u00a0 The warrant that issued clearly provided for the inspection of recordsrequired to be maintained under section 8(c) of the Act.\u00a0 In seeking to examine suchrecords, the compliance officer obviously did not exceed the limits of the warrant.[[11\/]] I also agree that the violation was willful.\u00a0 Respondent initiallyrequested a warrant before an inspection would be allowed.\u00a0 The Secretary obtained awarrant authorizing inspection of the documents.\u00a0 Notwithstanding the regulationsrequiring disclosure and the warrant authorizing an examination of the records, Respondentrefused to provide the records unless the Secretary would sign a document absolving thecompany of any liability concerning any matter that would arise as a result of informationdisclosed.\u00a0 The Respondent acted willfully in refusing to comply with the standardunless it could be given such an assurance.\u00a0 See Asbestos Textile Co.,84 OSAHRC ___,12 BNA OSHC 1062, 1063, 1984-85 CCH OSHD ? 27,101, p. 34,948 (No. 70-3831,1984) (a violation is willful if committed with intentional or knowing disregard for therequirements of the Act).\u00a0 I concur in affirming the citation for a willful violationof 29 C.F.R. ? 1904.7.FOOTNOTES: [[1]] Thermal contends that the warrant in its entirety was not supported by probablecause and was overbroad.\u00a0 I find it unnecessary to consider Thermal’s objections tothe validity of any portion of the warrant other than the recordkeeping provision. SinceThermal was not cited for any violation other than that related to recordkeeping, there isno evidence arising from the remaining portion of the warrant to be suppressed even in theevent I were to conclude that other provisions of the warrant were defective.\u00a0 Andsince the records access provision is a separate and distinct clause within the warrant,it is severable from the remainder of the warrant.\u00a0 Therefore, any defects in theremaining portions of the warrant would not justify invalidating the warrant in itsentirety.\u00a0 See Donovan v. Wollaston Alloys, Inc., 695 F.2d 1, 8 (1stCir. 1982); United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 758 (3d Cir. 1982).[[2]] The judge also rejected Thermal’s contentions on several grounds thatthe pleadings were insufficient to afford it fair notice of the charges against it. \u00a0The judge properly disposed of these contentions for the reasons he stated. \u00a0Inaddition, contrary to Thermal’s contention that it lacked notice that the regulation at 29C.F.R. ? 1904.7 was in issue, Thermal’s interrogatories to the Secretary referred toThermal’s \”alleged noncompliance with the requirements of ….. regulations stated inthe citation.\”[[3]] The Secretary also referred to his authority under section 24 of theAct, which deals with statistical programs covering all employments not expressly excludedfrom the Act.[[4]] Thermal points out that section 8(a) of the Act, which confers on theSecretary the authority to make inspections, does not expressly include records within thepermissible scope of an inspection.\u00a0 Accordingly, Thermal contends that the onlymeans by which the Secretary may examine records is through a subpoena issued undersection 8(b), which empowers the Secretary to \”require the attendance and testimonyof witnesses and the production of evidence under oath.\”The cases Thermal cites in support of this proposition are inapposite because they do notinvolve records of the type required to be maintained and made available under Part 1904.\u00a0Thus, in In re Establishment Inspection of Inland Steel Co., 492 F. Supp.1310 (N.D. Ind. 1980), the warrant application included a request to examine employeemedical and personnel records.\u00a0 In Erie Bottling Corp., 539 F. Supp.600 (D.C. Pa. 1982), the court in dictum stated that injury and illness records requiredunder the Secretary’s regulations should be made available during an inspection; it noted,however, that the employer had agreed to allow the Secretary access to those records.\u00a0The court in In re Establishment Inspection of Kulp Foundry, Inc., 691 F.2d1125, 1132 n.18 (3d Cir. 1982), specifically stated that it was not deciding the questionof whether a subpoena is necessary to reach those records that an employer is required tomake available under section 8(c).\u00a0 On the other hand, the one court which hasspecifically considered that issue has held that a subpoena is not the exclusive means ofaccess to an employer’s OSHA Form 200.\u00a0 Donovan v. Wollaston Alloys, Inc., 695F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982).\u00a0 In that case the court noted that an employer would haveless privacy interest in a document it is required by statute or regulation to maintainthan in a document it produces and maintains on its own initiative and for its ownpurposes.\u00a0 See also In re Establishment Inspection of Metal Bank of America, Inc.,516 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (examination during a physical inspection of recordsrequired by regulations under section 8(c) is not inconsistent with section 8(b)).[[5]] Thermal also contends that the warrant’s authorization for inspectionof records did not limit the time period to which it related and contained no\”guidelines\” to circumscribe the inspector’s discretion.\u00a0 Contrary toThermal’s contention, however, a specific time period is provided by 29 C.F.R. ? 1904.6,which requires that the employer maintain injury and illness records, including the Form200, for five years.\u00a0 Since the regulations in Part 1904 specifically identify anddescribe in some detail the injury and illness records required, the reference in thewarrant to records maintained under Part 1904 affords sufficient guidance to theinspector.\u00a0 Thermal points out that the warrant also authorizes inspection of\”employee medical and exposure records required to be maintained by 29 C.F.R. ?1910.20.\”\u00a0 The latter is the Secretary’s regulation governing access to recordsprepared by an employer relating to employee exposure to toxic substances or harmfulphysical agents.\u00a0 Thermal asserts that the records required by the \”cited OSHAregulations\” are more extensive than those required to be made available undersection 8(c) of the Act.\u00a0 Although not clearly stated, Thermal’s argument appears tobe that the records required under section 1910.20 exceed those contemplated by section 8of the Act.\u00a0 The merits of this contention need not be considered because there is noindication that the Secretary ever sought Thermal’s employee exposure or medical recordsor even that Thermal has any such records.\u00a0 Assuming that Thermal is arguing that therecords required under Part 1904 also go beyond the scope of section 8, its argument isfrivolous because the records prescribed by Part 1904 are clearly consistent with section8.As a related matter, Thermal contends that the records access provision ofthe warrant is of no force and effect whatever because it conflicts with another provisionsetting forth the scope of the warrant.\u00a0 The judge properly rejected this argumentfor the reasons he stated.[[6]] Thermal also claims that 29 C.F.R. ? 1904.7 only requires that recordsbe made available and not that the employer physically produce them.\u00a0 The regulation,however, specifically states that the employer must provide the prescribed records onrequest.[[7]] It is unnecessary to rule on the Secretary’s further contention that a warrantitself is not required because an employer can have no reasonable expectation of privacywith respect to records it has to maintain under the Act. [[8]] The custodian of records, however, may not be required to provide personallyincriminating information regarding such records.\u00a0 Curcio v. United States,354 U.S. 118 (1957).\u00a0 With one exception, Thermal does not claim that there is anypossibility of personal incrimination of Schorsch.\u00a0 Before the judge, Thermalreferred to section 17(g) of the Act, which imposes criminal liability on any person whoknowingly makes a false statement, representation, or certification in any record requiredunder the Act.\u00a0 This liability, however, attaches not to the disclosure of recordsbut to their contents.\u00a0 Based on the record before us it would be purely speculativeto conclude that Thermal’s OSHA Form 200 contains information which could be incriminatingunder section 17(g).[[9]] The stipulation incorporates the Secretary’s answers to Thermal’sinterrogatories, in which the Secretary avers that Schorsch had said he was aware of theregulation requiring the Form 200 to be disclosed upon request and was aware that acitation could be issued for nonproduction.[[10\/]] I agree with Commissioner Cleary’s rejection of Thermal’s contentionsthat it did not have fair notice of the allegations against it and that production ofrecords required to be kept under 29 C.F.R. Part 1904 violates its privilege againstself-incrimination.\u00a0 I also agree with Commissioner Cleary’s rejection of Thermal’sassertion that the Secretary must prove that Thermal’s employees have been exposed to ahazard before Thermal can be required to produce its Form 200, and I agree that Thermalmust maintain and disclose the form even if the number of injuries or illnesses isrecorded as zero.\u00a0 Finally, I agree with Commissioner Cleary that it is unnecessaryto reach Thermal’s argument that the records required under 29 C.F.R. ? 1910.20 exceedthe scope of section 8 of the Act, since there is no evidence that the Secretary heresought any records required by that standard.[[11\/]] The only issue before us is a challenge to the citation issued to Respondent forfailing to provide section 8(c) records on request.\u00a0 Whether other aspects of thewarrant were exceeded is not before us.”