“Docket No. 89-1394 SECRETARY OF LABOR,Complainant, v.BLOUNT lNTERNATIONAL, LTD.,Respondent.OSHRC Docket No. 89-1394DECISIONBEFORE: FOULKE, Chairman; WISEMAN and MONTOYA, Commissioners. BY THE COMMISSION:I. IntroductionRespondent, Blount International, Ltd. (\”Blount\”),was the general contractor under a $17 million government contract to build a hangar for aC5A Aircraft at Westover Air Force Base in Massachusetts.\u00a0 A disagreement betweenBlount and its steel erection subcontractor over some of the subcontractor’s actions hadprompted the Army Corps of Engineers (\”ACE\”) to issue a stop-work order on March1, 1989. \u00a0 After the ACE brought the situation to the attention of the OccupationalSafety and Health Administration (\”OSHA\”) Compliance Officer Walter Cienaski,Jr., conducted an 11-day inspection of the construction site. The serious citation issuedto Blount was comprised of seven items, all of which it contested.\u00a0 After a hearingon the merits, Administrative Law Judge David G. Oringer affirmed four of the seven.\u00a0 These were for serious violations of one storage standard, two electrical standardsand one crane standard.\u00a0 Blount petitioned for discretionary review and all four ofthe items were directed for review.\u00a0 For the reasons set forth in this decision, weaffirm the judge’s findings in three [29 C.F.R. ? 1926.250(b)(9); ? 1926.404 (b)(1) and? 1926.405 (b)(1)] of the four citations, and vacate the portion of the judge’s decisionregarding the crane standard violation [29 C.F.R. ? 1926.550(b)(2)] on the grounds thatthe standard does not apply to the circumstances in this case.II. Material Storage StandardAt issue is whether Blount violated 29 C.F.R. ? 1926.250(b)(9) by failing to stack orblock structural steel in order to prevent It from spreading or tilting.[[1]]Compliance officer Cienaski testified in this case that stockpiled steel and pieces ofchannel iron were strewn about the site.\u00a0 Some steel members were 60 feet long,weighed as much as 800-1550 pounds and were resting precariously approximately one footoff the ground on rotten wood and other weatherworn dunnage.\u00a0 The CO also testifiedof concern that the alternately freezing and thawing temperatures could cause the soil andthe dunnage to settle unevenly, increasing the risk of material slippage.\u00a0 Cienaskistated that any workers caught in this area when steel members began to tilt or slidecould suffer broken bones, or worse.Blount’s own project manager, Bobby C. Bailey, admitted that some of the piles probablyshould have been straighter and that the rotted wood supporting the pieces of a doorwaytruss should have been replaced.In light of this testimony, the judge found that the steel had remained in place fromMarch 6 through 17, including the time that the stop-work order was in effect, duringwhich no work was in progress.\u00a0 The judge further found that the steel in this casewas \”stored\” as contemplated by the standard, and that because the steel wasstored in such a manner that would not prevent spreading or tilting, the citation and itsproposed penalty must be affirmed.On review, Blount claims that the material was not in storage,but was in the process of being assembled for truss-related lifts.\u00a0 Blount furtherargues that even if the steel was in the storage, it was of such weight and configurationthat it would not have spread or tilted, and also that the regulation imposes no specificobligations on how to arrange or store material.In a number of cases, the Commission has addressed the argument that material is not instorage and thus, not covered by a storage standard.\u00a0 In Whitcomb Logging Co., 2 BNAOSHC 1419, 1974-75 CCH OSHD ? 19,128 (No. 1323, 1974) the Commission held that ahazardous materials storage regulation covers even material that is in temporary storage.\u00a0 In that case, the standard was violated when blasting caps and powder wereimproperly stored for three to four hours while employee attended to other dutieselsewhere on the site.\u00a0 In Gary Concrete Products, Inc., 15 BNA OSHC 1051, 1991-92CCH OSHD ? 29,344 (No. 86-1087, 1991), the Commission held that a general industrymaterials handling standard was violated when a stack of improperly stored concretepilings collapsed moments after several pilings were removed for transfer off site. \u00a0\”Any material placed on a construction site is presumably for eventual use. \u00a0Under the standard, however, all material is considered ‘stored’ until it is in factused.\”\u00a0 Sierra Constr. Co., 6 BNA OSHC 1278, 1280, 1978 CCH OSHD ? 22,506, p.27,158 (No. 13638, 1978) (citations omitted).The record in the instant case demonstrates that activity did increase once the stop workorder was lifted, with workers reentering the area to engage in fabrication and bolting upwork for the truss members.\u00a0 However, the record indicates that most of the steelavailable on the site remained untouched during the course of the 11-day inspection.\u00a0 We conclude, therefore, that the steel was in storage.\u00a0 Further, the testimonyof the CO and of Blount’s own project manager, along with the photographic evidence,indicate that the steel was being stored in a fashion that endangered workers due to thepotential \”spreading\” or \”tilting\” contemplated by the regulation.\u00a0 Although the standard does not impose specific obligations on how to arrangematerial, Blount’s own project manager conceded that steps could have been taken toimprove storage.Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the judge’s decision regarding this storage issueand find the accompanying $360 penalty to be appropriate.IIl. Electrical Standards (1) Ground-Fault ProtectionAt issue is whether Blount violated 29 C.F.R. ? 1926.404(b)(1)(ii) by not equipping apanel distribution box with ground-fault circuit interrupters (\”GFCl’s\”).[[2]]Compliance officer Cienaski testified that, following an appropriate test, he discoveredthat some of the receptacle outlets were protected by GFCI’s, while others were not.\u00a0 He testified that without some form of ground-fault protection, workers using thetemporary power supply on this worksite were vulnerable to injury from electrical shock.The judge found that the violations were readily detectable, and that Blount, withsupervisory authority and responsibility for overall jobsite safety, could be reasonablyexpected to detect such violations.Blount disagrees, asserting that it did not know and could nothave been expected to know of the violation.\u00a0 Blount argues that since TurnerElectric, Blount’s electrical subcontractor, had installed the system, it was Turner alonethat created and controlled the hazard and Turner alone that should be held accountable.\u00a0 Blount asserts that it was justified in relying on its subcontractor and thatexpecting a general contractor to have detected and abated this hazard is unreasonable.In order to establish a violation of a standard, the Secretary must show that the employerknew or, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have known of the violativecondition.\u00a0 Ormet Corp., 14 BNA OSHC 2134, 2135, 1990 CCH OSHD ? 29,254, p. 39,199(No. 85-531, 1991).\u00a0 In this case, the Secretary charges Blount with failure toexercise reasonable diligence, given its capacity as general contractor with supervisoryauthority.\u00a0 Thus, argues the Secretary, Blount had constructive knowledge of the GFCIhazard.The Commission addressed the question of responsibility for safety on a multi-employerworksite in the Anning-Johnson\/Grossman Steel line of cases:[T]he general contractor normally has responsibility to assurethat the other contractors fulfill their obligations with respect to employee safety whichaffect the entire site.\u00a0 The general contractor is well situated to obtain abatementof hazards, either through its own resources or through its supervisory role with respectto other contractors.\u00a0 It is therefore reasonable to expect the general contractor toassure compliance with the standards insofar as all employees on the site are affected.\u00a0 Thus we will hold the general contractor responsible for violations it couldreasonably have been expected to prevent or abate by reason of its supervisory capacity.Grossman Steel & Aluminum Corp., 4 BNA OSHC 1185, 1188, 1975-76 CCH OSHD ? 20,691, p.24,791 (No. 12775, 1976) (footnote omitted).\u00a0 The Anning-Johnson opinion echoed thatprinciple:[T]ypically a general contractor on a multiple employer project possesses sufficientcontrol over the entire worksite to give rise to a duty under section 5(a)(2) of the Acteither to comply fully with the standards or to take the necessary steps to assurecompliance.Anning-Johnson Co., 4 BNA OSHC 1193, 1199, 1975-76 CCH OSHD ? 20,690, p. 24,784 (No.3694, 1976) (consolidated cases) (footnote omitted).Although neither of those seminal cases involved the rights and duties of generalcontractors, the rules set forth in the Commission’s discussions of the role of suchemployers have been followed in later cases.\u00a0 In Red Lobster Inns of America, Inc., 8BNA OSHC 1762, 1980 CCH OSHD ? 24,635 (No. 76-4754, 1980), the Commission confirmed theAnning-Johnson\/Grossman Steel principle that an employer is responsible for violations ofother employers where it could be reasonably expected to prevent or detect and abate theviolations due to its supervisory authority and control over the worksite. \u00a0Responsibility for compliance under the Red Lobster test does not depend on whether theemployer actually created the hazard or has the manpower or expertise to abate the hazarditself.In Knutson Constr. Co., 4 BNA OSHC 1759, 1976-77 CCH OSHD ? 21,185 (No. 765, 1976),aff’d, 566 F.2d 596 (8th Cir 1977) (\”Knutson\”), the Commission relieved ageneral contractor of liability for failing to detect a one-inch crack on the underside ofa scaffolding platform before it collapsed.The Commission stated:The duty we imposed upon a general contractor in Grossman Steel & Aluminum Corp. andAnning-Johnson Co. is a reasonable one; that is, we will not hold a general contractorliable for violations which it could not reasonably be expected to detect or prevent.Id., 4 BNA OSHC at 1761, 1976-77 CCH OSHD at p. 25,481.\u00a0 In Knutson, the inability ofthe general contractor and of the steel erection subcontractor that rented the defectivescaffold to observe the crack during their inspections, combined with the unforeseencasual relationship between the crack and the collapse of the scaffold, led the Commissionto find a lack of knowledge.\u00a0 In the instant case, the GFCl problem–like manyelectrical hazards–was by nature latent and hidden from view.\u00a0 The CO acknowledgedin his testimony that one could not tell simply by looking at the box which of thereceptacle outlets were energized or, of those, which were protected by GFCI’s.\u00a0 Atester would be required to identify any particular unprotected outlets.\u00a0 The CO alsoagreed that the general contractor is not expected to know every minute detail of theelectrical system at all times.\u00a0 He maintained, however, that a general contractorought to have \”general knowledge of general electrical requirements,\” anddescribed a GFCI system as \”basic knowledge to every job site.\”Unlike the steel erection subcontractor in Knutson, the electrical subcontractor in thiscase likely would have assisted the general contractor in ascertaining how safe theworksite was.\u00a0 To determine whether Blount had some minimal degree of familiaritywith the power supply on its site, the CO turned to the Blount engineer.\u00a0 Theengineer was unable to answer even the most elementary questions about the electricalpanel box.\u00a0 The CO inferred from this that Blount had neither performed its own testsnor consulted with its electrical subcontractor to assure itself that the system was inworking order before requiring employees to use it.\u00a0 The evidence shows that the setof GFCI’s installed by Turner Electric was from the outset inadequate for the number ofoutlets in that box, that the box was never in compliance with the applicable standard,and that Blount remained unaware of the situation.\u00a0 From this, the CO gathered thatBlount had failed to fulfill its fundamental responsibilities as a general contractorcharged with overseeing jobsite safety.Blount, on the other hand, offered no evidence on the GFCI issue at all.\u00a0 The recorddoes not reveal (1) whether Turner Electric presented Blount with any evidence of Turner’sown inspections or with other assurances, (2) other information or statements that theelectrical panel boxes met the required safety and electrical standards, (3) or evenwhether any Blount representative inspected the box at any time.\u00a0 In addition, therecord before the Commission is silent on whether Blount took any precautionary measuresto protect workers on the site and silent on how Turner Electric was selected as acompetent electrical subcontractor; in short, the record is silent on why, as Blountasserts, it was reasonably entitled to rely on Turner’s having performed the work it wasassigned to do.\u00a0 Blount may well have had its reasons, but they are not reflected inthe record.We therefore conclude that the Secretary has demonstrated that Blount’s reliance on Turnerwas unreasonable and that Blount could have known of the GFCI problem with the exercise ofreasonable diligence.[[3]]\u00a0 Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the judge’sdecision regarding the GFCI violation.\u00a0 We find the $150 penalty, as modified by thejudge, appropriate under the circumstances.(2) Weatherproof BoxAt issue is whether Blount violated 29 C.F.R. ? 1926.405(e)(1)by failing to weatherproof an outdoor distribution panel box.[[4]]Compliance officer Cienaski testified that he observed an outdoor distribution panel boxand associated knockout-type receptacle box loosely draped with \”raggedy polyethylenematerial.\”\u00a0 He testified that without a waterproof enclosure, water couldaccumulate, energizing the non-current carrying parts that, in turn, could cause a fullcircuit line shock, resulting in a worker’s electrocution.\u00a0 Cienaski testified thattypical New England weather in March consisted of snow, rain, fog and ice, leading him toclassify the outdoor box as being in a wet location.\u00a0 He testified that the plastictarp partially covering the box was therefore inadequate to protect the energized partsfrom moisture.\u00a0 He also testified that directly below the tarp-covered box wereapproved, properly encased, waterproof-type boxes.On review, Blount argues, as it did before the judge, that the box was weatherproofed witha \”heavy-duty plastic cover,\” and posed no danger to any employee.\u00a0 Findingthis overall assertion to be unsupported by the evidence, the judge ruled that theviolation was readily observable, and that because of its responsibility for overalljobsite safety, Blount reasonably should have known of the violation.\u00a0 Therefore, thejudge affirmed the violation and the $300 penalty proposed by the Secretary.The evidence shows that the box was not weatherproof and that water could enter,jeopardizing worker safety.\u00a0 Blount’s minimal efforts fell far short of the level ofprotection required by the standard.\u00a0 Accordingly, we affirm the weatherproofingcitation and find the proposed $300 penalty to be appropriate.IV. Crane StandardLastly, at issue is whether Blount violated a crane safetystandard incorporated by reference in 29 C.F.R. ? 1926.550(b)(2) by permitting a craneoperator to abandon a crane with a suspended load.[[5]]The evidence in this case reveals that by the time the compliance officer Cienaski arrivedat the construction site in response to the ACE’s notification, the ACE had rescinded itsstop-work order and Blount had resumed the steel erection work that had been leftuncompleted.\u00a0 Contrary to industry practice, a 68-ton J-line roof truss, 278 feetlong and 80 feet high, had been raised before it’s companion H-line truss was ready.\u00a0 However, the J-truss was connected to its vertical \”bents\” or legs, mostof its bolts had been tightened, and guy wires had been attached.\u00a0 For additionalsupport, two 150-ton cranes had been left attached to the truss, a temporary arrangementintended to stabilize the J-truss until the H-truss could be prepared for erection andconnection.That the cranes were unmanned for over a week–between the timethe J-truss was lifted and the time the H-truss was lifted–is undisputed.\u00a0 TheSecretary claims that the cranes kept the truss from falling over, that there was visibletension on the line, and that the truss should be considered a \”suspended load\”requiring the presence of operators during the time in question.\u00a0 Blount concedesthat the lines attached to the truss were taut, not slack, but challenges the Secretary’scharacterization of the load as \”suspended,\” contending that the crane lineswere functioning in the capacity of guy lines to stabilize the truss.The CO testified that an unattended crane, while under load, could slip, whether byinadvertent activation of the controls or faulty brake\/clutch mechanisms. Moreover, hespeculated that without the cranes to support it, the truss could have blown over orfallen to the ground.\u00a0 He suggested that to abate the hazard, Blount could have putthe truss back down on the ground, manned the two cranes while employees were in the areaor kept employees out of the area.[[6]] Blount maintains that the standard does not applybecause the load was not suspended.The judge acknowledged that the subcontractor had created the situation in which thecranes were left to support the truss, but found that Blount was nevertheless obligated toprovide safe working conditions for employees exposed to the hazard.\u00a0 He also foundthat there was no evidence that the bents could have supported the entire weight of thetruss without the aid of the cranes.\u00a0 Because of the dangers attendant to an unmannedcrane while under load, as enumerated by the CO, the judge concluded that the purposes ofthe standard would not be served by adopting Blount’s argument.The Secretary cites Farthing & Weidman, Inc., 11 BNA OSHC 1069, 1983-84 CCH OSHD ?26,389 (No. 78-5366, 1982) (\”F&W\”), in support of her position that the loadwas suspended.\u00a0 In that case, one end of a tank had been lifted when an employeecrawled underneath and was killed when the sling ripped and the tank fell on him. \u00a0The employer argued that the load had not been \”lifted\” within the meaning ofthe standard because only one end of the load had been raised into the air. \u00a0 TheCommission held that the employer was liable for a violation of a standard requiring thata load be well secured and properly balanced in the sling or lifting device before it islifted more than a few inches.\u00a0 The Commission reasoned:To say that the tank involved here was \”lifted\” hardly strains the meaning ofthe word, and indeed, accords well with its plain meaning.\u00a0 In any event, we mustconstrue this standard in light of its purpose:\u00a0 to prevent loads from falling to theground.Id. at 1071, 1983-4 CCH OSHD at p. 33,491 (footnote omitted).The parallels the Secretary urges us to draw between F&W and the case on review areforced.\u00a0 In this case, the truss had long since been lifted and then settled downinto its bents and bolted up.\u00a0 To say that the truss, the load here, was still\”suspended\” would strain the plain meaning of the word.\u00a0 Moreover,construing the provision cited here in light of its purpose–to prevent loads fromdropping to the ground injuring workers below–does not undermine our rationale becausethe load was already on the ground.\u00a0 In this case, both cranes would have had tomalfunction at the same time for the truss to lose what support the cranes provided.\u00a0 Even then, there is little evidence either way on the likelihood of the trussactually collapsing. [[7]]\u00a0 Thus, the facts in the case before us are distinguishablefrom F&W.We note that neither the Secretary nor Blount argues outright that the pertinent cranestandard is ambiguous.\u00a0 Under Martin v. OSHRC (CF&I Steel Corp.), 111 S. Ct. 1171(1991), the Supreme Court held that the Secretary’s reasonable interpretation of anambiguous regulation is entitled to deference.\u00a0 Whether the regulation is ambiguousis a threshold question for analysis under CF&I Steel Corp.\u00a0 Frankly, we view theterm \”suspended\” as it is used here as an unlikely candidate for genuineambiguity.\u00a0 For our purposes, the term is narrowly defined, leaving little room forinterpretation. [[8]]\u00a0 Therefore, CF&I Steel Corp. does not apply to this case.We conclude that the word \”suspended\” in the standard under consideration is notambiguous, that it does not describe the position of the load and that the provision ofANSI B30.5-1968 incorporated by reference in section 1926.550(b)(2) does not apply tothese circumstances.\u00a0 We therefore vacate the portion of the judge’s decisionregarding the crane standard violation.Accordingly, items 1, 3 and 4 are affirmed.\u00a0 Penalties of $360 for item 1, $150 foritem 3 and $300 for item 4 are assessed.\u00a0 Item 5 is vacated.Edwin G. Foulke, Jr.ChairmanVelma MontoyaCommissionerDated: September 18, 1992WISEMAN, Commissioner, dissenting in part:I concur with my colleagues’ decision regarding all citationitems in this case, with the exception of the item alleging a violation of 29 C.F.R. ?1926.404(b)(1)(ii) due to Blount’s alleged failure to equip a panel distribution box withsufficient ground-fault circuit interrupters (\”GFCI’s’).\u00a0 As my colleaguesstated in the majority opinion, the Secretary must show that Blount knew, or with theexercise of reasonable diligence, could have known, of the presence of the violativecondition.\u00a0 Ormet Corp., 14 BNA OSHC 2134, 2135, 1989-90 CCH OSHD ? 29,254, p.39,199 (No. 85-531, 1991).\u00a0 My colleagues find that a preponderance of the evidencedemonstrates that Blount, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have known thatseveral of the receptacle outlets were not protected by GFCI’s and therefore Blount hadconstructive knowledge of the resulting hazard.\u00a0 I disagree.The operative term here is \”reasonable diligence.\”\u00a0\u00a0 While it is truethat Commission precedent establishes that a general contractor is responsible for hazardshe could reasonably be expected to prevent or abate by reason of his supervisory capacityeven though none of his own employees were exposed to the hazards, e.g., Gil Haugan, d\/b\/aHaugan Constr. Co., 7 BNA, OSHC 2004, 1979 CCH OSHD ? 24,105 (No. 76-1512, 1979)(consolidated cases) (\”Gil Haugan\”) (general contractor held liable for failingto notice a missing guardrail and ladder, along with scaffolding planks that were too longor too short to be safe), it is also true that the Commission, in determining whether ageneral contractor has exercised reasonable diligence, has based its decisions on whetherthe hazardous condition was obvious, whether it was visible, and whether it could havebeen observed by the general contractor during his inspections.\u00a0 Knutson Constr. Co.,4 BNA OSHC 1760, 1976-77 CCH OSHD ? 21,185 (No. 765, 1976), aff’d, 566 F.2d. 598 (8thCir. 1977) (\”Knutson\”). Where the answer to these questions has been yes, suchas when a guardrail or a ladder is missing, the Commission has held that it would bereasonable to expect the general contractor to discover the hazardous condition, e.g., GilHaugan, 7 BNA OSHC at 2006, 1979 CCH OSHD at p. 29,290; however, where the answer to thesequestions has been no such as when an invisible crack on the underside of scaffoldingmakes it hazardously weak, the Commission has held that the general contractor could notsee the hazardous condition and therefore was not responsible for the exposure of hissubcontractors’ employees to the hazard.\u00a0 Knutson, 4 BNA OSHC at 1761, 1976-77 CCHOSHD at p.25,481.Such a rule has served to promote the interests of safety onmulti-employer construction sites due to the fact that the general contractor can be inthe best position to discover visible hazards and obtain abatement thereof. \u00a0Unfortunately, the majority is broadening that rule to include invisible hazards. \u00a0The majority indicates that Blount was obligated to apprise itself of which safety effortsits specialty subcontractor had chosen to make by, either (1) buying a tester on its owninitiative and personally testing each receptacle outlet or (2) consulting with itselectrical subcontractor to assure itself that the system was in proper working order.\u00a0 The Commission is now sending a contradictory message to general contractors.\u00a0 On the one hand, general contractors are being told that they cannot rely on theskill and expertise of their subcontractors and that they must duplicate the ongoingcompliance requirements of their subcontractors, i.e., testing each receptacle outlet, nomatter how obscure such subcontractor’s violation may be.\u00a0 On the other hand, generalcontractors are being told that they can rely on a verbal assurance from theirsubcontractors as to that subcontractor’s own skill, expertise, and proper handling ofcertain situations.\u00a0 Of course, to rely on a subcontractor’s verbal assurance, thegeneral contractor now has the burden of acquiring sufficient expertise in order for himto have the ability to ask the appropriate questions.Despite the contradictory aspects of the two options now offered to general contractors,the result is the same: general contractors must now be experts in every facet of the jobin order to identify every potential invisible hazard so that they can run tests, orinquire specifically about the unknown hazard.Why should a general contractor hire an expert if that expert’sreputation and judgment cannot be relied upon?\u00a0 Furthermore, why should a generalcontractor hire a soil expert to conduct studies of a trench location, in order todetermine adequate shoring, if that expert’s judgment cannot be relied upon?When we begin to make general contractors, in their general supervisory capacity, liablefor hazards resulting from invisible defects, detectable only by testing, we aredangerously close to a strict liability test which was never intended by the Act. Blount could not reasonably be expected to detect this particular hidden electrical hazardand consequently did not have constructive notice that the GFCI’s were defective. \u00a0Accordingly, I would vacate the citation.Donald G. Wiseman CommissionerDated: September 18, 1992SECRETARY OF LABOR, United States Department of Labor,Complainant,v. BLOUNT INTERNATIONAL, LTD.,Respondent.OSHRC Docket No. 89-1394Appearances: FOR COMPLAINANT: John Casler, Esq. Office of the SolicitorFOR RESPONDENT:Lynn Lloyd Laughlin, Esq.Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman Decision and OrderORINGER, J: This is a proceeding brought under section 10(c) ofthe Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (84 Stat. 1590, 29 U.S.C. ? 651 et seq.,hereinafter sometimes referred to as (‘the Act’) to review citations issued by theSecretary of Labor pursuant to ? 9(a) and a proposed assessment of penalties thereonissued pursuant to ?10(a) of the Act.Due to a March 6 through 17 inspection of Respondent’s work site located at Westover AirBase in Chicopee, Massachusetts, CompIainant issued a serious citation alleging sixviolations of the construction standards and an other-than-serious citation containing oneitem on March 29, 1989.\u00a0 Respondent timely filed with the Secretary ofLabor a notification of intent to contest the citation and proposed penalties. A hearing on the matter was held in Boston, Massachusetts on November 29 and 30, 1989.BACKGROUNDBlount, International, Ltd. (‘Blount’) was the general contractor for the construction ofa hangar for a C5A Aircraft stationed at Westover Air Force Base, a project for which ithad responsibility for overall job site safety (Tr. 241, 321).\u00a0 Carrie ConstructionCompany (‘Carrie’) was the subcontractor initially responsible for steel erection at thesite (Tr. 13, 49).\u00a0 Due to Carrie’s failure to abide by the contract and engineeringspecifications, Blount assumed the steel erection process on March 7 (Tr. 15).During the first week in March, Blount had approximately seven employees at the site: aproject manager, project engineer, office engineer, field engineer, steel engineer, steelsuperintendent, and an office manager (Tr. 241).\u00a0 In late February, Carrie waspreparing to set up a \”J-line truss,\” a 68 ton roof truss (Tr. 116). \u00a0William Walker, an inspector for the Corps of Engineers, testified that the engineeringplans contemplated by Blount directed that the J-line truss would be lifted by cranes,placed on two vertical bents and bolted into place.\u00a0 All bolts were to be fullytightened at the truss supports prior to the release of the cranes as the bolts were\”slip critical\”, not load-bearing (Tr. 214, 226; R-2).\u00a0 The J-line trusswas not to be lifted until an \”H-line truss\” was ready to be lifted as well.\u00a0 The plans provided that the two trusses were to be connected by steel bridging toprovide Iateral support for the entire structure.Bobby C. Bailey, project manager for Blount, testified that he met with Joe Cavanas,project engineer for Carrie, on February 27 to discuss problems with the project. \u00a0Because the H-line truss was not completed and difficulties with welding and other work onthe J-line truss arose, Carrie was told by Blount and the Corps of Engineers not to liftthe J-line truss.\u00a0 Despite these verbal warnings, Carrie proceeded to lift the J-linetruss (Tr. 245-248).\u00a0 By February 28, the J-line truss had been landed on thevertical bents and half its bolts tightened (Tr. 250).\u00a0 Two 4000W Manitowoc, 150 toncranes and a third crane were attached to the J-truss and left in place to stabilize it(Tr. 251).On March 1, Carrie continued to tighten the bolts so that, as Bailey attested, 90-95% ofthe bolting was complete (Tr. 252).\u00a0 A meeting was held between the Corps ofEngineers and Blount to discuss possible action to be taken in light of Carrie’smalfeasance (Tr. 347-348).\u00a0 On March 2, a stop-work order was issued by the Corps ofEngineers to Blount due to the manner in which Carrie had deviated from contract andsafety requirements (Tr. 259; R- 1). [[1]]\u00a0 Bailey understood this order to mean thatno more work was to be performed on the J-line truss and that they were not to lift theH-Iine truss (Tr. 264). [[2]] Blount submitted a written response to this order on March 2(R-2).Based on a referral from the Corps of Engineers on March 6, 1989, Compliance Safety andHealth Officer Walter Cienaski, Jr. was assigned to inspect the site.\u00a0 By March 6,the two 4000W Manitowoc cranes and the third rig remained attached to the J-line truss,and stayed in that position until March 9.\u00a0 By March 7, Blount had assumed Carrie’ssteel erection function (Tr. 15, 263).On March 8, the stop-work order was rescinded (R-3).\u00a0 Blount lifted the H-Iine trusson March 9, and installed the wind girds, or bridging truss, between the J-line and H-linetrusses (Tr. 271, 272).\u00a0 A crane remained on the J-line truss until the H-line truss,wind girds, and wind trusses were fully installed (Tr. 284).Citation One, Item 1: Alleged serious violation of 29 CFR ?1926.250(b)(9).The standard at 29 CFR ?1926.250(b)(9) provides: (b) Material storage.(9) Structural steel, poles, pipe, bar stock, and other cylindrical materials, unlessracked, shall be stacked and blocked so as to prevent spreading or tilting.Compliance officer Cienaski testified that trusses and steel members in storage were notset up on grillage suitable for the loads that were imposed. Photographic exhibits C-1athrough C-11 depict the conditions he observed: wide flange members were stockpiled andpieces of channel iron, weighing from 800-1550 pounds, rested on cribbing material, orgrillage, such that slippage could occur (Tr. 26, 208-210).\u00a0\u00a0 The photographsdepict support sections for a 157 ton doorway truss resting on rotted wood (Tr. 32).Cienaski also testified that the weather and ground conditions at tile site varied inMarch, causing the ground to repeatedly freeze and thaw facilitating the settling ofdunnage and creating more instability and unevenness in the support of the flange andchannel iron (Tr. 31, 39, 40).\u00a0 He suggested that the proper practice in theconstruction industry is to store this material individually and properly spaced, on theirflanges, on dunnage material, in order that they do not tip and fall (Tr. 35).General construction work took place in this area: fabrication and bolting up work for thetruss members and the inspection of trusses (Tr. 33).\u00a0 Because employees performedwork in this area, Cienaski claimed that if this material fell over, it could result inthe crushing of bones (Tr. 26, 208-210).While project manager Bailey denied that a lateral load couldcause the stockpiled steel to tilt or tip because of its weight, he agreed that some ofthe stockpiled steel should have been straighter and that the rotted wood supporting thepieces of the doorway truss should have been replaced (Tr. 311).Respondent contends that the cited standard applies only to materials in\”storage\” and not to \”work-in-progress\”, citing Majestic WileyContractors, Ltd., 10 BNA OSHC 1951 (No. 81-2545, 1982); Sierra Construction Corp., 6 BNAOSHC 1278 (Rev.Comm. 1978).\u00a0 It maintains that the steel was in the process of beingassembled for the H-line truss lift \”and other truss-related lifts\” and wasthus, not in storage.\u00a0 This argument was specifically rejected in SierraConstruction, supra, when the employer contended that the concrete form material placed ina work area where it was available for \”immediate use\” was not\”stored\” as intended by the standard.\u00a0 The Review Commission held that”[a]ny material placed on a construction site is presumably for eventual use.\u00a0 Underthe standard, however, all material is considered ‘stored’ until it is in fact used.\”\u00a0 Sierra Construction, supra, citing Brennan v. Underhill Construction Corp., 513F.2d 1032 [2 OSHC 1641] (2nd Cir. 1975); Whitcomb Logging Co,. 74 OSAHRC 89\/F7, 2 BNA OSHC1419, 1974- 75 CCH OSHD ?19,128 (No. 1323, 1974).In Majestic Wiley, the employer was engaged in the construction of a 92 mile portion ofthe Alaskan pipeline.\u00a0 While welds and joints of the pipeline were being inspected, apiece of pipeline rolled off of its \”skids\” (wooden cribbing used to elevate thepipeline) resulting in an employee fatality.\u00a0 At the time, the pipe was in theprocess of being welded together.\u00a0 Majestic Wiley held that after work had begun onwelding the pipe, it could no longer be deemed \”in storage\”; the pipe\”could not spread since it is a single pipeline, or tilt, since it is one continuouspipeline 800 feet long.\”\u00a0 Majestic Wiley, supra, at 1953. Further, there was noevidence that the skids were inadequate to support the pipeline.The facts in the instant case are clearly distinguishable from those in Majestic Wiley andin alignment with those in Sierra Construction.\u00a0 The steel had remained in place fromMarch 6 through 17 including the time that a stop-work order had been issued and no workwas, as Respondent contends, \”in progress.\”\u00a0 The steel in this case was\”stored\” as contemplated by the standard; because the steel was stored in such amanner that would not prevent spreading or tilting, I find that this item and its proposedpenalty must be affirmed and assessed.Citation One, Item 2: Alleged serious violation of 29 CFR ? 1926.251 (a) (1) .The standard at 29 CFR ?1926.251(a)(1) provides:(a) General.\u00a0 (1) Rigging equipment for material handlingshall be inspected prior to use on each shift and as necessary during its use to ensurethat it is safe.\u00a0 Defective rigging equipment shall be removed from service.The violation alleged by the Secretary concerns Blount’s failure to detect a missing\”softener\” [[3]] on a rig and its failure to take the lift out of servicebecause of the missing softener.\u00a0 Cienaski testified that on March 9, one of the two4000W Manitowoc cranes was being replaced by a 140-ton Link Belt to support the alreadyraised J-line truss and in doing so, one of the softeners on one leg of the sling was notput back into place (C-2A, C-2B, C-2D, C-2E). Cienaski pointed this out to the erectionforeman who promised to attend to it (Tr. 54).Cienaski testified that the crane used to stabilize the J-line truss had a strain imposedon it, which was evident in the lack of slack of the cable.\u00a0 He did not determine theweight of the load, however estimates of 35,000 pounds and 5,000 pounds were made by thecrane operator and a representative of Carrie, respectively (Tr. 166, 168, 187).\u00a0 Thesoftener, he claimed, would have taken the alleged strain off the wires, and its use isabsolutely necessary in all lifting requirements used by wire rope (Tr. 79).[[4]] \u00a0Cienaski implied that if the equipment had been properly inspected, the absence of asoftener would have been detected (Tr. 95, 96).Bailey testified that Blount’s procedure is to inspectequipment prior to and after each use (Tr. 293).\u00a0 Bailey stated that Blount’s fieldengineer, Pete Johnson and Corps of Engineers representative Rick Walker inspected thecrane attached to the J-line truss when it was ready to be relieved after the H-line trusswas in place (Tr. 294).\u00a0 He testified that no defective rigging equipment was foundbetween March 6 and March 10.\u00a0 Bailey contended that \”his people\” told himthat the softener \”slipped out\” while up in the air and attached to the steel(Tr. 338).Under 29 CFR ?1926.251(a)(1), an employer is under a duty to inspect rigging equipmentprior to use to ensure that it is safe.\u00a0 Dye Construction Company, 9 BNA OSHC 1215(1980), aff’d, 698 F.2d 423 [11 OSHC 1104] (10th Cir. 1983).\u00a0 Inspection\”requires a careful and critical examination and is not satisfied by a mereopportunity to view equipment.\”\u00a0 Austin Commercial v. OSHRC, 610 F.2d 200 (5thCir. 1979) citing Dawson Company Manufacturers v. Cleveland Costume Co., 3 BNA OSHC 1534(1975).In Dye Construction, a violation of this standard was affirmed when an employee in chargeknew that a spreader bar lacked a safety pin but, regardless of this knowledge, decided toproceed with moving a concrete manhole.\u00a0 The court found that the bar was inspected,but used in an unsafe manner causing serious injury to an employee.Respondent’s witness established that Blount regularly inspected equipment.\u00a0 Therewas no testimony to establish that the sling or rigging equipment were defective ordamaged by the accidental absence of the softener which would have required its removalfrom service.\u00a0 A-1 Aggregates & Excavating, Inc., 12 BNA OSHC 1448 (1985). \u00a0The Secretary failed to meet its burden of establishing a violation of the standard,therefore, I find that this item must be vacated.Citation One, Item 3: Alleged serious violation of 29 CFR ?1926.404(b)(1)(ii).The standard at 29 CFR ?1926.404(b)(1)(ii) provides:1926.404 Wiring design and protection.(b) Branch circuits— (1) Ground fault protection (ii) Ground fault circuit interrupters.All 120-volt, single-phase, 15-and 20-ampere receptacle outlets on construction sites,which are not a part of the permanent wiring of the building or structure and which are inuse by employees, shall have approved ground-fault circuit interrupters for personnelprotection.\u00a0 Receptacles on a two-wire, single phase portable or vehicle-mountedgenerator rated not more than 5kW, where the circuit conductors of the generator areinsulated from the generator frame and all other grounded surfaces, need not be protectedwith ground-fault circuit interrupters.The power that ran through the electrical lines at the site was standard: 120-volt, singlephase, 60-hertz power (Tr. 111).\u00a0 Cienaski testified that on March 6, with the aid ofa ground fault circuit interrupter (GFCI) tester, he tested the temporary electricaldistribution panels and outlets used by employees at the site. He concluded that only somereceptacles did not have ground fault protection; in lieu of the GFCI, Cienaski testifiedthat there was no assured ground conductor program (Tr. 98, 99, 103; C-3A, C-3B, C-3C).\u00a0 In absence of either GFCI or an assured ground conductor program, he testified thatelectric shock could occur (Tr. 104).Turner Electric was the subcontractor who installed and maintained these temporary boxes(Tr. 192).\u00a0 Respondent contends that since the electrical work was within the domainof the subcontractor’s field of expertise, that Blount did not know, nor could itreasonably have known of the absence of GFCI protection.\u00a0 Cienaski maintained,however, that Blount, as general contractor with overall job site responsibility forsafety could have discovered these alleged violations by observation, by asking theelectrical contractor or using an inexpensive ground fault tester (Tr. 197). [[5]]Respondent cites Cuthers Corp. d\/b\/a Woodland Construction, 13 BNA OSHC 1986 (1988) forthe proposition that when a cited employer did not create or control the cited hazard, norwas it aware of the violative condition, that it should be justified in relying on theexpertise of the electrical contractor responsible for the hazardous condition.\u00a0 TheReview Commission has held, however, that an employer is responsible for violations of asubcontractor where it could be reasonably expected to prevent or detect and abateviolations by virtue of its supervisory authority and control over the work site. \u00a0Red Lobster Inns of America, Inc., 8 BNA OSHC 1762 (Rev. Comm. 1980).\u00a0 See alsoAnning-Johnson Co., 4 BNA OSHC 1193 (Rev.Comm. 1976).It is indisputable that Blount had supervisory authority and responsibility for overalljob site safety.\u00a0 The evidence established that these violations occurred. Becausethese violations were readily detectable and Blount could be reasonably expected to detectsuch violations, I find that this item must be affirmed and a proposed penalty assessedbut in this instance ameliorated.Citation One, Item 4: Alleged serious violation of 29 CFR ?1926.405(e)(1).The standard at 29 CFR ?1926.405(e)(1) provides: 1926.405\u00a0 Wiring methods, components, and equipment forgeneral use.(e) Enclosures for damp or wet locations (1) Cabinets fittings, and boxes. \u00a0\u00a0Cabinets, cutout boxes, fittings, boxes, and panelboard enclosures in damp or wetlocations shall be installed so as to prevent moisture or water from entering andaccumulating within the enclosures.\u00a0 In wet locations the enclosures shall beweatherproof.Compliance officer Cienaski testified that Temporary Box Number One (the distributionpanel box and associated knockout-type receptacle boxes) which was located outdoors, wasdesigned for indoor use and was not waterproof.\u00a0 This was particularly hazardous, heclaimed, in light of the precipitation occurring in the month of March (Tr. 111; C-3B,C-4).\u00a0 The absence of weatherproofing, he testified, could cause a full circuit lineshock, resulting in electrocution or death, as the accumulation of water could energizethe noncurrent-carrying parts of the panel box (Tr. 113, 114).\u00a0 Below the panelboxes, however, approved waterproof-type outlet boxes were used (Tr. 112, 114).The boxes were semi-covered with what Cienaski described as \”raggedy polyethylenematerial\” that did not provide protection for the energized parts.\u00a0 Thepolyethylene material is shown in exhibits C-3A, C-3B, and C-4 to be wide open, exposingthe panel box.\u00a0 Respondent’s assertion that the electrical boxes were covered with\”heavy-duty plastic covers\” is not supported by the evidence (see C-3A, C-3B,C-4).[[6]]\u00a0 This violation was readily observable; because of its responsibility foroverall job site safety, Respondent reasonably should have known of the violation. \u00a0Therefore I find that this item and its proposed penalty must be affirmed. Citation one, Item 5: Alleged serious violation of 29 CFR ? 1926.550 (b) (2) The standard at 29 C.F.R. ?1926.550 (b) (2) provides inpertinent part:1926.550 Cranes and derricks.(b) Crawler, locomotive, and truck cranes. (2) All crawler, truck, or locomotive cranes in use shall meet the applicable requirementsfor design, inspection, construction, testing, maintenance and operation as prescribed inthe ANSI B30.5-1968 Safety Code for Crawler, Locomotive and Truck Cranes ….The ANSI standard referred to in this section, 5-3.2.1.3, reads:Holding the load.(a) The operator shall not leave his position at the controls while the load is suspended.There is no dispute between the parties concerning the factual circumstances surroundingthis item.\u00a0 As discussed, supra, two 4000W Manitowoc crawler cranes were attached tothe 68 ton J-line roof truss while it was elevated to approximately 80-90 feet aboveground.\u00a0 The engineering plans called for the J-line truss to be lifted by thecranes, set upon two vertical bents, and bolted into place.\u00a0 The bolts, which werenot load-bearing, were to be fully tightened prior to the release of the cranes from theirload.\u00a0 Further, the J-line truss was not to be lifted until the H-line truss wasprepared to be lifted and the two connected by bridging so as to provide greater lateralsupport for the structure.\u00a0 Carrie did not follow these procedures despite warningsfrom Blount and the Corps of Engineers to the contrary.Between March 6 and March 8, the J-line truss was approximately 90-95% bolted to thevertical bents (Tr. 284).\u00a0 During the period of March 6 through March 9, the twocranes, in addition to guy lines, were attached to the J-line truss at all times until, onthe 9th, the J-line and H-line trusses were tied together and both ends of the truss werebolted into the vertical bents.Cienaski testified that Blount personnel were exposed to the potential hazard of fallingmaterial when he observed that cranes were unattended from time to time (Tr. 129, 136;C-5A, C-5B, C-5C, C-5D).\u00a0 Bailey corroborated this observation, by stating thatcranes did not have operators in them at all times between March 6 and March 8 (Tr. 261,276).\u00a0 The crane operator surmised that the cranes carried a Ioad of 35,000 pounds,while a Carrie representative estimated the load to be 5,000 pounds (Tr. 155, 168).The issue to be determined is whether the roof truss was, in fact, \”suspended\”from the cranes during the period in question.\u00a0 The Secretary and Respondent disagreeon the resolution of this issue.Respondent claims that at no time was the J-line truss suspended from the crane, butrather, that \”the crane line was functioning in the capacity of a guy line\” tostabilize the truss (Respondent’s Brief, p.19).\u00a0 The dictionary definition of\”suspended\” presented by Respondent is as follows:Hang; esp. to hang so as to be free on all sides except at thepoint of support (ex., a ball by a thread) …. [[7]]The Secretary counters that while the capacity of the J-line truss to swing at random wassignificantly limited by its having been bolted to the bents, the presence of the craneprevented the truss from falling over.\u00a0 She contends that the roof truss should beconsidered to have been suspended by the cranes until it was \”safely supported.\”Cienaski explained that an unattended crane, while under load, could cause the inadvertentactivation of controls, faulty brake\/clutch mechanisms, or hoist brake slippage (Tr. 122).\u00a0 He testified that accepted practice in the New England construction industry is tohave manned control stations in the cab whenever a Ioad is suspended.[[8]]There is no decisional law to clarify what was meant by the word \”suspend.\”\u00a0 Because of the hazards enumerated by the compliance officer attendant to anunmanned crane while under load, and in light of Respondent’s failure to protect employeesin the area when the cranes were unattended, I find that the purposes of the standardwould not be served by adopting Respondent’s argument.\u00a0 The record established thatthe bolts on the vertical bents were not load bearing; there was no evidence to show thatthe bents could have supported the entire weight of the truss in the event that the cranemalfunctioned as a result of being left unmanned.\u00a0 While I acknowledge that thesubcontractor created the situation in which the cranes were left to support the truss,Respondent was nevertheless obligated to provide safe working conditions for employeesexposed to this hazard.\u00a0 Accordingly, I find that this item and its proposed penaltymust be affirmed and assessed. Citation One, Item 6: Alleged serious violation of 29 CFR?1926.751(c)(2)The standard at 29 CFR ?1926.751(C)(2) provides:?1926.751 Structural steel assembly.(2) Where longspan joists or trusses, 40 feet or longer, are used, a center row ofbolted bridging shall be installed to provide lateral stability during construction priorto slacking of hoisting line.Cienaski testified that the J-line truss was 278 feet long, and was set in place 80 feetabove ground without being tied in with bridging to an adjacent truss (Tr. 139, 164: C-6Athrough C-6F).\u00a0 Lateral bridging was not set up until March 9, although the J-linetruss was hoisted by a hoisting line with tension on it from February 28 through March 8(Tr. 288).\u00a0 Blount personnel worked underneath and in the immediate area to theelevated J-line truss (Tr. 163).Respondent urges this tribunal to consider the predicament inwhich it was forced to ameliorate Carrie’s intransigent actions.\u00a0 After Carrie liftedthe J-line truss, Blount determined that the safest work practice would be to leave thecrane lines guyed to the truss while preparing to lift the H-line truss into place.I agree with the Respondent’s defense.Moreover, the Secretary proposes that both she and Respondent cannot prevail on both items5 and 6 of Citation Number One, as arguments for either affirming or vacating both itemsare mutually exclusive: as the Secretary notes,Respondent’s argument as to Item 5, that the \”J\”truss was no longer suspended from the cranes amounts to an admission that it had indeedslacked the hoisting lines prior to tying in the truss, thus violating 29 CFR1926.751(c)(2).\u00a0 At the same time… Complainant’s position that \”J\” trusswas still suspended would, if accepted by the Court, absolve Respondent of the allegedviolation in Item 6.Respondent makes a similar argument, claiming that the Secretary cannot assert both thatthe line was both taut, suspending a load, as well as slackened.For the preceding reasons, I find that this item and its proposed penalty must be vacated.Citation Two, Item 1: Alleged other-than-serious violationof 29 CFR ?1926.403 (h).The standard at 29 CFR ?1926.403(h) provides: 1926.403\u00a0 General requirements(h) Identification of disconnecting means and circuits.\u00a0 Each disconnecting meansrequired by this subpart for motors and appliances shall be legibly marked to indicate itspurpose, unless located and arranged so the purpose is evident. Each service, feeder, andbranch circuit, at its disconnecting means or overcurrent device, shall be legibly markedto indicate its purpose, unless located and arranged so the purpose is evident. \u00a0These markings shall be of sufficient durability to withstand the environment involved.Cienaski testified that on Temporary Panel Box Number One, each service feeder and branchcircuit was not legibly marked at its disconnecting mains or overcurrent device toindicate its purpose.\u00a0 Cienaski explained that if breakers do not indicate whichcircuit they control, an employee would be exposed to danger in the event that there was apower failure or if power on a particular tool in use were to be disconnected (Tr. 146,147).\u00a0 Respondent did not present evidence to rebut this charge, therefore I findthat this item must be affirmed.FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAWThe findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in this opinion are incorporatedherein in accordance with Rule 52 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.ORDERIn view of the foregoing, good cause appearing therefore, it is ORDERED that:1. The allegation of serious violation by this respondent of the standard set forth at 29CFR 1926.250 (b) (9) and found in Citation Number One, item 1, is affirmed and a penaltyof $360 assessed.2. The allegation of serious violation by this respondent of the standard set forth at 29CFR 1926.251 (a) (1) and found in Citation Number One, item two is vacated.3. The allegation of serious violation by this respondent of the standard set forth at 29CFR 1926.404 (b) (1) (ii) and found in Citation Number One, item 3, is affirmed and apenalty of $150 assessed.4. The allegation of serious violation by this respondent of the standard set forth at 29CFR 1926.405 (e) (1) and found in Citation Number One, item 4 is affirmed and a penalty of$300 assessed.5. The allegation of serious violation by this respondent of the standard set forth at 29CFR 1926.550 (b) (2) and found in Citation Number One, item 5 is affirmed and a penalty of$300 assessed.6. The allegation of serious violation by this respondent of the standard set forth at 29CFR 1926.751(c) (2) and found in Citation Number One, item 6 is vacated.7. The allegation of other than serious violation by this respondent of the standard setforth at 29 CFR 1926.403 (h) and found in Citation Number Two, item 1 is affirmed. IT IS SO ORDEREDDAVID G. ORINGER, Judge, OSHRCDated: November 19,1990Boston, MassachusettsFOOTNOTES: [[1]] The cited standard, 29 C.F.R. ? 1926.250(b)(9), provides:29 C.F.R.? 1926.250\u00a0 General requirements for storage.(b) Material storage.(9) Structural steel…. unless racked, shall be stacked and blocked so as to preventspreading or tilting.[[2]] The cited standard, 29 C.F.R. ? 1926.404 (b)(1), allows for two alternative formsof ground-fault protection on the worksite.\u00a0 Blount’s site was wired with a system ofground-fault circuit interrupters (\”GFCl’s\”), as the standard permits:29 C.F.R. ? 1926.404 Wiring design and protection. (b) Branch circuits — (1) Ground-fault protection….(ii) Ground-fault circuit interrupters.\u00a0 All 120-voltsingle-phase,15- and 20- ampere receptacle outlets on construction sites, which are not apart of the permanent wiring of the building or structure and which are in use byemployees, shall have approved ground-fault circuit interrupters for personnel protection.[[3]] At the same time, we are cognizant of the role of specialty subcontractors inrunning a safe, efficient construction project.\u00a0 A general contractor may reasonablyrely on its subcontractor’s expertise.\u00a0 Sasser Elec., & Mfg Co., 11 BNA OSHC2133, 1984-85 CCH OSHD ? 26,982 (No. 82-178, 1984).\u00a0 Far from requiring thecontracting employer to duplicate the safety efforts of the specialist, the Act demandsonly that general contractors apprise themselves of which safety efforts their specialtysubcontractors have chosen to make in completing their assignments.[[4]] The applicable standard, 29 C.F.R. ? 1926.405(e)(1), calls for certain prophylacticmeasures:29 C.F.R. ? 1926.405\u00a0 Wiring methods, components, andequipment for general use.(e) Enclosures for damp or wet locations [.]\u00a0 (1) Cabinets, fittings, and boxes.\u00a0 Cabinets, cutout boxes, fittings, boxes, and panelboard enclosures in damp or wetlocations shall be installed so as to prevent moisture or water from entering andaccumulating within the enclosures.\u00a0 In wet locations, the enclosures shall beweatherproof.[[5]] The applicable regulation, 29 C.F.R. ? 1926.550(b)(2), provides:29 C.F.R. ? 1926.550\u00a0 Cranes and derricks.(b) Crawler …cranes(2) AlI crawler… cranes in use shall meet the applicable requirements for … operationas prescribed in the ANSI B30.5-1968, Safety Code for Crawler, Locomotive and TruckCranes. The ANSI B30.5-1968 Safety Code incorporated by referenceincludes the following section:5-3.2.4\u00a0 Holding the Load (a) The operator shall not leavehis position at the controls while the load is suspended.(Emphasis added).[[6]] A fourth option, of course, would have been simply to detach the cranes from thetruss.\u00a0 This alternative, however, while technically abating any alleged hazard,would have jeopardized worker safety.[[7]] While the record shows that the crane lines were under some tension, there is noevidence that the cranes were supporting the entire weight of the truss.\u00a0 To thecontrary, the testimony indicates that the load on the cranes was between 5,000 and 35,000pounds at most, only one quarter of the weight of the truss.\u00a0 The standard does notrequire that operators be present whenever the crane is under load, only when the load issuspended.\u00a0 Had the Secretary demonstrated that the cranes were supporting the entireweight of the truss, or close to it, this case might more reasonably be considered underF&W.[[8]] In the absence of much case law, the parties and the judge resorted to thedictionary for guidance, finding nearly identical definitions e.g., \”suspend: Hang;esp to hang so as to be free on all sides except at the point of support (ex.,…. a ballby a thread).\”\u00a0 The word’s denotation was not debated; its potentialconnotations, in light of the purpose of the standard, were.[[1]] The Corps of Engineers’ stop-work order enumeratedfourteen violations which caused the order to be issued. These included:1. The failure to follow safety and quality controlrequirements pertaining to the erection of trusses,2. Connections of truss column \”J\” at Column line 12 were not fully impactedprior to truss erection,3. Failure to fully tension 100% of the bolts at the truss supports prior to the releaseof the cranes….5. Workers were working under truss being erected after having been repeatedly warned notto do so….10. Insufficient operators and standby operators for cranes…(See R-1).[[2]] The Secretary notes that despite the stop-work order, work continued to beperformed by Carrie on the H-line truss on March 6 (Tr. 369).[[3]] A softener, as described by the compliance officer, is a piece of material such aswire, rope, or fabric, placed underneath rigging equipment to preclude damage to theequipment by the sharpness of the member being lifted (Tr. 51).[[4]] C-7, The Handbook for Crane Operators, issued by the International Union ofOperating Engineers, Local No, 98, states that \”wire rope slings should be protectedfrom sharp bends and cutting edges by means of corner saddles, burlap padding, or woodblocking.\”[[5]] Cienaski testified that this violation was readily observable without the use of atester:THE WITNESS: … let’s see, four receptacles that I can pickout real quick had ground fault circuit interrupters provided on it.\u00a0 The rest ofthem didn’t.\u00a0 They’re sitting in side-by-side boxes.Two receptacles on one side of the box had GFCI, two on the other side didn’t.When you looked at the panel, they had two GFCI’s installed and the rest of them werecircuit breakers.Q. [By Mr. Casler] So this was something that could be observedby the naked eye?A That’s how I looked at them.\u00a0 I walked up to the box and looked at it, because thedoor was broken off.\u00a0 (Tr. 107-108).[[6]] Respondent also engages in a battle of semantics: itclaims that the Secretary is attempting to hold Respondent to a higher standard, that of\”waterproof\” rather than the less exacting one of \”weatherproof\” asrequired by the standard.\u00a0 The former, it contends, means \”able to withstandexposure to weather without damage or loss of function\” while the latter is definedas \”impervious to water.\”\u00a0 The standard enunciates that such panel boxes indamp or wet locations \”shall be installed so as to prevent moisture or water fromentering and accumulating within the enclosures.\”\u00a0 The makeshift polyethyleneshown in the photographic exhibits depicts neither \”weatherproof\” nor\”waterproof\” protection.[[7]] The Secretary’s definition is nearly identical: \”To hang by a support fromabove, so as to be free on all sides except at the point of support.\”[[8]] Respondent notes the 1982 version section 5-3.2.1.3(d) of ANSI B 30.5 as reflectingcommon industry practice:(d) As an exception to (a) above, under those circumstanceswhere a load is to be held suspended for a period of time exceeding normal liftingoperations, the operator may leave the controls provided that prior to that time, theappointed individual and operator shall establish the requirements for restraining theboom hoist, telescoping, load, swing, and outrigger functions, and provide notices,barricades, or whatever other precautions may be necessary.\u00a0 [Emphasis added].This section, however, was specifically omitted by the OSHAstandard, which refers only to the 1968 ANSI standard.\u00a0 Further, Respondent presentedno evidence to show that it complied with this alternative exception to the standard, byproviding notices or barricades to protect employees.”